Younger v. Hanks et al

Filing 67

ORDER: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 45 ) is hereby GRANTED, and judgment shall enter in favor of defendant Shante Hanks with respect to the claims against her. In addition, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 52 ) is hereby DENIED. The Clerk shall close this case. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 2/10/2015. (Wang, M.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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ROBIN YOUNGER,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
SHANTE HANKS,
:
ELIZABETH GOTTLIEB, and
:
DWOUN BYRD,
:
:
Defendants.
:
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Civil No. 12cv1814 (AWT)

RULING ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The pro se plaintiff brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
against the sole remaining defendant, Shante Hanks (“Hanks”),
claiming that Hanks improperly allowed Iris Santiago (“Santiago”)
to terminate the plaintiff from the Section 8 Housing Choice
Voucher Program (“Section 8 Program”) administered by the
Bridgeport Housing Authority (“BHA”) because of the plaintiff’s
race and status as a grandparent.1

Hanks is being sued in her

individual capacity.
The defendant has moved for summary judgment, and in the
plaintiff’s amended opposition to the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff moves for summary judgment on
her claims against Hanks.
Opp.”), Doc. No. 52, at 4.)

(See Plaintiff’s Opposition (“Pl.’s
For the reasons set forth below,

1

On June 5, 2013, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to withdraw her
claims against defendants Elizabeth Gottlieb and Dwoun Byrd. (See Doc. No.
31.)

1

the defendant’s motion is being granted and the pro se
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is being denied.
I.

Factual Background
Hanks is a Commissioner on the BHA Board of Commissioners,

and was the Chairperson of the Board in 2012.

In 2012, Santiago

was the Director of the Section 8 Program at BHA.

Eligibility

for participation in the program is based on income and family
composition, and continued eligibility is reviewed on an annual
basis.

Participants are required to comply with certain

obligations as set forth by HUD regulations, including providing
information that is necessary for a public housing authority to
verify family composition.

If a participant meets the

guidelines of the Section 8 Program, she will receive a voucher
that indicates the number of bedrooms for which her family is
eligible.
From 2008 to December 2012, the plaintiff was a participant
in the Section 8 Program.

During that time, she resided in a

three-bedroom apartment at 86 Magnolia Street in Bridgeport.
The plaintiff received vouchers for a three-bedroom apartment
based on information she supplied, i.e., that her family
composition included two grandchildren.

During an annual

recertification, in a November 9, 2011 Second & Final Notice,
the BHA reminded the plaintiff that she needed to submit
documents to confirm her income and family composition.

2

Subsequently, the plaintiff listed her two grandchildren as
members of her family on an Application for Admission and
Continued Occupancy, and the BHA sought additional documents to
verify the plaintiff’s family composition.

On January 31, 2012,

the BHA sent the plaintiff a notice of its intent to terminate
her participation in the Section 8 Program as a result of her
failure to provide, inter alia, documents that substantiated her
claim that her family composition included two grandchildren.
The notice informed the plaintiff that she had 10 days to
request an informal hearing.
On March 6, 2012, the BHA held an informal hearing.

At

that hearing, the plaintiff informed the BHA that in 2010 a
third grandchild had come to live with her.
represented by counsel at the hearing.

The plaintiff was

During the hearing it

was decided that the BHA would reach out to the grandchildren’s
schools to obtain documents verifying whether the plaintiff had
custody of her grandchildren.
verification from the schools.

On March 7, 2012, the BHA sought
However, for two of the

grandchildren, their school informed the BHA that the plaintiff
was not listed as a current guardian; for the third grandchild,
the school informed the BHA that the minor did not reside at 86
Magnolia Street and that the plaintiff was not listed in the
school’s records.

The BHA determined, inter alia, that because

the plaintiff had not been able to provide proof that her

3

grandchildren had resided with her since 2008, the plaintiff had
been overpaid on the “dependency allowance” and “rental subsidy”;
that instead of a voucher for a three-bedroom unit, the
plaintiff was entitled to a voucher for a one-bedroom unit; and
that the plaintiff had to repay the BHA the overpaid amount.
The BHA notified the plaintiff of its conclusions and a proposed
repayment agreement in a March 22, 2012 letter, entitled Housing
Authority of the City of Bridgeport Summary of Informal Hearing
Conference.

The letter also informed the plaintiff that she had

a right to a formal hearing.2
On June 19, 2012, a formal hearing was held, and Nicholas
Calace (“Calace”), the then-Executive Director of the BHA, was
the hearing officer.

The main issue addressed at the formal

hearing was whether the plaintiff could substantiate her claim
that her grandchildren lived with her from 2008 to 2012.

During

the hearing, Santiago informed Calace that while the plaintiff
had claimed that she had custody of her grandchildren, the
grandchildren’s schools informed the BHA that the plaintiff was
not listed as a legal guardian in school records so the schools
could not release any information to the BHA.

Santiago also

provided a form from the grandchildren’s doctor, which did not
2

The March 22, 2012 summary of the informal hearing also states that during
the hearing, Santiago asked the plaintiff why she had accused Santiago of
being a racist when the plaintiff had never met or spoken to Santiago. The
summary states that the plaintiff explained “that was what she heard from
other people.” (Defendant’s Memorandum of Law (“Def.’s Mem.”), Doc. No. 45-2,
Ex. G, at 3.)

4

list the plaintiff’s name and address.

However, in the version

of the form submitted by the plaintiff, her name and address
were listed.

Santiago stated that the information provided by

the plaintiff was inaccurate, that she was not entitled to a
three-bedroom apartment, and that the plaintiff had been oversubsidized by over $21,720 as of March 2012.
The plaintiff’s counsel represented that the plaintiff had
filed for legal custody of her grandchildren but their parents
were never around to go to court.

While the plaintiff claimed

that the grandchildren used her address for school, Calace noted
that school documents only recognized the grandchildren’s mother
and listed the mother as the emergency contact.
Calace concluded that it was a peculiar situation, that he
would consult with his coordinator at HUD about the definition
of the term “custody,” that the grandchildren’s mother needed to
correct the records for the grandchildren’s benefit, that the
plaintiff’s file needed to be corrected, that the issue of the
plaintiff’s family composition warranted further research, and
that no determination would be made that day.

Calace also noted

that he would have accepted information from the grandchildren’s
schools if it substantiated the plaintiff’s claim of family
composition.

5

The plaintiff was provided with a letter dated July 5, 2012
and entitled Formal Hearing Determination.

The letter informed

the plaintiff that she had 10 business days to provide:


A release form from the schools, doctor and dentist
of [the plaintiff’s] grandchildren, so that [the BHA]
can
verify
who
they
recognized
as
the
grandchildren’s
guardian
and
their
place
of
residence for the years 2008 until [2012].



Copies of the signed and dated tax returns . . . for
the parents of the children from 2008 to 2011 to
establish who claimed the children as dependents.

(Def.’s Mem., Doc. No. 45-2, Exhibit H, at 6.)

The letter also

informed the plaintiff that she would be terminated from the
Section 8 Program unless she entered into a repayment agreement
for the overpaid amount of $21,720.
In a letter dated July 24, 2012, Calace informed the
plaintiff that while she had provided some documents to the BHA,
she had not submitted documents showing that she had had custody
of her grandchildren going back to 2008.

If the plaintiff did

not enter into the repayment agreement by August 1, 2012, her
participation in the Section 8 Program would be terminated
effective August 31, 2012.

Subsequently, the plaintiff’s

participation was terminated because she never provided the
requested documents nor entered into the repayment agreement.
II.

Legal Standard
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the

court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact
6

to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such
issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322-23 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22
F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994).

When ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, the court may not try issues of fact, but must
leave those issues to the jury.

See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Donahue v. Windsor Locks
Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 834 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1987).

Thus, the

trial court’s task is “carefully limited to discerning whether
there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not
to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined . . . to
issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.”

Gallo,

22 F.3d at 1224.
Summary judgment is inappropriate only if the issue to be
resolved is both genuine and related to a material fact.
Therefore, the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment.

An issue is

“genuine . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A material fact

is one that would “affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

7

Only those facts

that must be decided in order to resolve a claim or defense will
prevent summary judgment from being granted.

Immaterial or

minor facts will not prevent summary judgment.

See Howard v.

Gleason Corp., 901 F.2d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1990).
When reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary
judgment, the court must “assess the record in the light most
favorable to the non-movant and . . . draw all reasonable
inferences in its favor.”

Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d

33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000)(quoting Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1990)).
However, the inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant must be
supported by evidence.

“[M]ere speculation and conjecture” is

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Stern v.

Trustees of Columbia University, 131 F.3d 305, 315 (2d Cir. 1997)
(quoting Western World Ins. Co. v. Stack Oil, Inc., 922 F.2d 118,
121 (2d Cir. 1990)).

Moreover, the “mere existence of a

scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position”
will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury
could “reasonably find” for the nonmovant.

Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 252.
III. Discussion
A.

Section 1983

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code states,
in pertinent part, that “[e]very person who, under color of any

8

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State

. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law . . . .”

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against a supervisory
official in h[er] individual capacity must allege that the
supervisor was personally involved in the alleged constitutional
deprivation.”

Barnes v. Henderson, 490 F. Supp. 2d 313, 318

(W.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist.,
239 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Personal involvement may be shown by evidence that: (1)
the defendant participated directly in the alleged
constitutional violation; (2) the defendant, after
being informed of the violation through a report or
appeal, failed to remedy the wrong; (3) the defendant
created
a
policy
or
custom
under
which
unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the
continuance of such a policy or custom; (4) the
defendant
was
grossly
negligent
in
supervising
subordinates who committed the wrongful acts; or (5)
the defendant exhibited deliberate[] indifference to
others’ rights by failing to act on information
indicat[ing] that constitutional acts were occurring.
Id. at 318-19 (citing Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d
Cir. 1995); Williams v. Smith, 781 F2d 319, 323-24 (2d Cir.
1986)).
Here, there is not sufficient evidence in the record that
could show that Hanks had personal involvement in the

9

termination of the plaintiff’s participation in the Section 8
Program.

First, the plaintiff testified that Hanks “had no

individual role in the determination process as to [her]
voucher.”

(Def.’s Mem., Doc. No. 45-2, Ex. C, 133:15-18.)

In

addition, the defendant was not present at the informal hearing
or at the formal hearing.

The hearing officer at the formal

hearing was Calace, and he also sent the July 24, 2012 letter to
the plaintiff informing her that she would be terminated from
the program unless she entered into the repayment agreement.
Nothing in the record suggests that Calace informed Hanks of his
decision or that he consulted with Hanks.
As evidence that Hanks had personal involvement, the
plaintiff proffers a webpage from HUD stating that a board of
commissioners is responsible for securing the management of a
public housing authority.

However, being responsible for

managing a public housing authority is not evidence of personal
involvement in terminating the plaintiff from the Section 8
Program.

The plaintiff also has proffered a document from the

Linn-Benton Housing Authority concerning responsibilities of a
housing authority commissioner.

The document lists one of the

functions performed by the board of commissioners for the LinnBenton Housing Authority as “[m]ay respond to difficult and
sensitive employee, client or citizen complaints.

May be

requested to review Authority staff decisions on such matters.”

10

(Pl.’s Opp., Doc. No. 52, Ex. D, at 2.)

This document does not

create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hanks had
personal involvement because the BHA is governed by its own bylaws, and reviewing staff decisions on legal matters is not a
function performed by the chair of the commission.

Rather,

under the by-laws, the chair has “general supervision over the
business and affairs of the [BHA] . . . .”

(Def.’s Mem., Doc.

No. 45-2, Ex. N, at 6.)
Second, the plaintiff has not proffered any evidence, only
mere allegations, that could show that she informed Hanks that
she had been wrongfully terminated from the Section 8 Voucher
Program on the basis of race and status as a grandparent.
Correspondence between the plaintiff and Hanks shows that the
plaintiff claimed that Santiago was attempting to terminate her
from the Section 8 Program and that Santiago cancelled the
plaintiff’s formal hearing, but Hanks’s response shows that she
had looked into the matter and was informed that a hearing had
been scheduled through the plaintiff’s counsel.

In addition,

the correspondence shows that the plaintiff was aware that Hanks
“d[id] not get in the middle of a matter with the BHA . . . .”
(Pl.’s Opp., Doc. No. 52, Ex. E, Email on May 19, 2012 at 1:24
PM.)
Third, the plaintiff has not proffered any evidence that
could suggest that Hanks, as opposed to the BHA, created any

11

policy or custom that violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom.
The record shows that under the Housing Choice Voucher Program
Administrative Plan, the plaintiff was required to supply
information requested by the BHA for use in a reexamination of
family income and composition.

In addition, the July 5, 2012

Formal Hearing Determination letter states that “[t]he legality
of the family composition for children is either custody or
pursuit of custody. . . . .

Every housing authority is required

to take [HUD] regulations and create an administrative plan for
the Board for approval.

The individual housing authorities

determine the language on how detailed its Board wants it be
identified.”

(Def.’s Mem., Doc. No. 45-2, Ex. H, at 4.)

The

letter also shows that Calace was tasked with interpreting the
definition of the term “custody” and that he would have accepted
documents from the grandchildren’s schools showing that the
schools recognized the plaintiff as being a guardian of her
grandchildren to “substantiate . . . the residency of the
children.”

(Id. at 5.)

Fourth, the plaintiff has not proffered any evidence, only
mere allegations, that could show that Hanks was grossly
negligent.

Correspondence between the plaintiff and Hanks shows

that while Hanks had no involvement in the process of
determining the plaintiff’s family composition, Hanks, in her

12

capacity as a Constituent Services Representative for
Congressman Jim Himes, had assisted the plaintiff in scheduling
a hearing with the BHA.
Finally, nothing in the record could show that Hanks
exhibited deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s claim of
constitutional violations or that the plaintiff had informed
Hanks that she was being discriminated against because of her
race or her status as a grandparent.

At most, the record shows

that the plaintiff contacted Hanks for assistance in scheduling
a hearing regarding the plaintiff’s continuing eligibility for
the Section 8 Program, that Hanks looked into the situation and
was informed that a hearing had been scheduled through the
plaintiff’s counsel, and that Hanks informed the plaintiff that
her understanding was that the hearing had taken place and the
plaintiff was “unable to produce school documentation verifying
[the plaintiff’s] residence as the primary residence for [her]
grandchildren . . . [and the] BHA [had given the plaintiff] 10
additional business days to submit these missing documents.”
(Pl.’s Opp., Doc. No. 52, Ex. E, Email on March 12, 2012 at 2:28
PM.)
B.

Racial Discrimination

The plaintiff has not proffered any evidence that could
show that her termination from the Section 8 Program was
racially motivated.

Hanks, like the plaintiff, is African-

13

American.

The court notes that “a well-recognized inference

against discrimination exists where the person who participated
in the allegedly adverse decision is also a member of the same
protected class.”

Drummond v. IPC Intern., Inc., 400 F. Supp.

2d 521, 532 (E.D.N.Y 2005).

In addition, the March 22, 2012

letter summary of the informal hearing and the July 5, 2012
Formal Hearing Determination letter contain nothing that could
show that the plaintiff’s termination was motivated by race.

To

the contrary, the record shows that the plaintiff said during
the informal hearing that she had accused Santiago of being a
racist based on what the plaintiff heard from other people.
C.

Familial Status

With respect to the plaintiff’s claim that she was
wrongfully terminated from the Section 8 Program because the BHA
required proof of legal custody, the record shows that in e-mail
correspondence between the plaintiff and HUD, the plaintiff was
informed that while the Section 8 Program “does not have a
policy that requires a family to have legal custody or show
documentation that the family has legal custody,” there may be
situations where a public housing authority “may request such
documentation in order to resolve a dispute about the
composition of the family/household.”

(Def.’s Mem., Doc. No.

45-2, Ex. I, Sept. 17, 2012 at 11:58 AM.)

The July 5, 2012

Formal Hearing Determination letter shows that discrepancies

14

existed with respect to the documents the plaintiff submitted to
substantiate her claim that her grandchildren lived with her
from 2008 to 2012.

Calace informed the plaintiff that “the

paperwork is sloppy and misleading” and that “[w]hen records are
suspect, it causes further investigation.

This is an obligation

that [the BHA] has.”

Moreover, the

(Id., Ex. H, at 6.)

plaintiff’s counsel represented to Calace during the formal
hearing that the plaintiff had filed for legal custody of her
grandchildren but their parents had failed to go to court to
complete the process.

The plaintiff has proffered no evidence

that could show that the BHA or Hanks discriminated against her
because she was a grandparent by requiring documents to
substantiate her family composition from 2008 to 2012.
D.

Substantive and Procedural Due Process

The plaintiff has proffered no evidence that could show
that Hanks violated her substantive or procedural due process
rights.

Instead, the record shows that the BHA sent her at

least five letters informing her that she could be terminated
from the Section 8 Program either because she had failed to
provide documents substantiating her family composition or
because she had failed to enter into the repayment agreement.
In addition, it is undisputed that the plaintiff requested an
informal hearing and a formal hearing, both hearings were held,
and she was represented by counsel at both hearings.

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IV.

Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. 45) is hereby GRANTED, and judgment shall enter in favor of
defendant Shante Hanks with respect to the claims against her.
In addition, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.
No. 52) is hereby DENIED.
The Clerk shall close this case.
It is so ordered.
Signed this 10th day of February 2015, at Hartford,
Connecticut.

/s/
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge

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