Gray v. Erfe et al

Filing 21

ORDER: Defendant Yother's motion to dismiss 17 is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants and close this case. Signed by Judge Janet Bond Arterton on 6/5/15. (Harris, J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

BENNIE GRAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT ERFE, et al.,
Defendants.

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:
:
: CASE NO. 3:13-cv-39 (JBA)
:
:
:

RULING ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. #17]
The plaintiff, incarcerated and pro se, has filed this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Warden Scott
Erfe, Commissioner Leo Arnone and Correctional Officer Yother,
to challenge disciplinary actions taken against him as a result
of finding cocaine in his inmate property.

By Initial Review

Order filed March 21, 2013, the Court dismissed all claims
against defendants Erfe and Arnone and the claim for issuance of
a prison disciplinary report.

Defendant Yother, the only

remaining defendant, now moves to dismiss the remaining claims
for malicious prosecution and violation of Eighth Amendment
rights.

For the reasons that follow, defendant Yother’s motion

to dismiss is granted.
I.

Standard of Review
When considering a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., the court accepts as true all factual

allegations in the complaint and draws inferences from these
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Flores v. Southern
Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2003).

The court

considers not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but
whether he has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted
so that he should be entitled to offer evidence to support his
claim.

See York v. Association of Bar of City of New York, 286

F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1089 (2002).
In reviewing the complaint in response to a motion to
dismiss, the court applies “a ‘plausibility standard,’ which is
guided by two working principles.”
662, 678 (2009).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

First, the requirement that the court accept

as true the allegations in the complaint “‘is inapplicable to
legal conclusions,’ and ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.’”

Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.

2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Second, to survive a

motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a plausible claim
for relief.

Determining whether the complaint states a

plausible claim for relief is “‘a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.’”

Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
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Even

under this standard, however, the court liberally construes a
pro se complaint.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (per curiam); Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213-14,
216 (2d Cir. 2008).
II.

Facts
The incident underlying the complaint took place at

the Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Institution.

On May 9,

2012, defendant Yother stated that he found cocaine hidden
in a sock in the plaintiff’s property.

The plaintiff

received prison disciplinary charges as well as outside
state charges for possession of narcotics.

The state

charges were dismissed on December 12, 2012.

Defendant

Yother was discharged from state employment about this
time.
III.

Discussion
Defendant Yother moves to dismiss the remaining claims in

the amended complaint on the ground that the plaintiff fails to
state a cognizable claim under section 1983.

Defendant Yother

also urges the Court to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claim for malicious
prosecution.
A.

Malicious Prosecution Claim

The plaintiff contends that he was maliciously prosecuted
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in state court on charges of possession of narcotics.

To assert

a constitutional claim for malicious prosecution under section
1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate conduct that is tortious
under state law and injuries that resulted from the deprivation
of liberty guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.

See Singer v.

Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995).

Within

this circuit, the law is clear that “[a] plaintiff does not have
a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution under section
1983 if, at the time of his arrest and prosecution, he already
is in custody on other charges, because there is no deprivation
of liberty interests.”

Arnold v. Geary, No. 09 Civ. 7299(GWG),

2013 WL 4269388, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing cases); see also
Leniart v. Bundy, 2011 WL 4452186, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 26,
2011).
At the time of his arrest and prosecution, the plaintiff
was incarcerated on other charges.

He had been imprisoned since

November 1997 and was serving a twenty-three year sentence for
sale of hallucinogenic or narcotic substances.1

See

http://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailssupv.asp?id_inmt_num=

1

The court may take judicial notice of prison records. See
Martinez v. New York State Dep’t of Corrections, No. 12 Civ.
1499(RWS), 2013 WL 5194054, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013).

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259596 (last visited Apr. 8, 2015).

Thus, the plaintiff cannot

establish the required deprivation of liberty.

The motion to

dismiss is granted as to the section 1983 claim for malicious
prosecution.
B.

Eighth Amendment Claim

The Eighth Amendment proscribes “the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.”

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319

(1986)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The

proscription encompasses both “the treatment a prisoner receives
in prison and the conditions of his confinement.”
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993).

Helling v.

To rise to the level of a

constitutional injury, however, the alleged Eighth Amendment
violation must be sufficiently serious.

The prisoner must not

be denied the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”
and his conditions must be more than “restrictive [or] even
harsh.”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994).

In

addition, the prison official must have acted with a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind”; negligence is not
sufficient.

Id. at 834.

The only claim against defendant Yother other than
malicious prosecution or false arrest is a false accusation
claim based on defendant Yother’s statement that he found
cocaine in the plaintiff’s property.
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False accusations,

however, are not cognizable under the Eighth Amendment.

See

Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A]
prison inmate has no general constitutional right to be free
from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report.”).

An

inmate’s protection against false accusations lies in the
procedural due process requirements afforded in disciplinary
hearings or court proceedings.

See Grillo v. Coughlin, 31 F.3d

53, 56 (2d Cir. 1994) (fair hearing conforming to due process
standards will cure constitutional violation otherwise resulting
from false accusation).

The plaintiff was afforded a trial in

state court and was found not guilty of the charges.

Thus, he

was afforded due process.
The plaintiff includes no other allegations suggesting that
he was denied any of life’s necessities, such as food, clothing,
shelter or safety, as a result of defendant Yother’s actions.
The motion to dismiss is granted as to any Eighth Amendment
claim.
C.

State Law Claims

Defendant Yother asks the court to decline to take
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claim
for malicious prosecution.
Supplemental jurisdiction is a matter of discretion.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 715-16 (1966).
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See
If

the federal court has dismissed all federal claims, it should
decline to exercise jurisdiction over the supplemental state law
claims.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Giordano v. City of New York,

274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases).
As all federal claims have been dismissed, defendant
Yother’s request that the court decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any state law claims is granted.
IV.

Conclusion
Defendant Yother’s motion to dismiss [Doc. # 17] is

GRANTED.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of

the defendants and close this case.
It is so ordered.
/s/
___
Janet Bond Arterton
United States District Judge
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 5th day of June 2015.

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