Weeks v. Colvin

Filing 47

RULING re 41 Objection re 40 Order on Motion for Attorney Fees filed by Roger A. Weeks. Objection is Overruled Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 5/28/2015.(Malone, P.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ROGER WEEKS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:13-CV-00232 (JCH)

MAY 28, 2015

RULING RE: OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS (Doc. No. 41)
The plaintiff, Roger Weeks (“Weeks”), objects to Magistrate Judge Holly B.
Fitzsimmons’ Ruling denying in part his motion for attorney’s fees and costs under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) (Doc. No. 37) (“Magistrate Judge Ruling”). Weeks
argues that Judge Fitzsimmons’ Ruling was clearly erroneous in reducing the total
number of hours requested. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. No.
45) (“Mem.”). For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff’s objection is overruled.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where a timely objection is filed, the court reviews a magistrate judge’s ruling

pursuant to a “clearly erroneous” standard. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(a). “A district court is justified in finding a magistrate judge’s ruling clearly
erroneous where, although there is evidence to support it, the revieiwing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Burgos v. Astrue, 2011 WL 1085623 at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2011)
(quoting Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Schneider, 551 F.Supp.2d 173, 177–78

1

(S.D.N.Y.2008)). This standard of review is “highly deferential,” and thus “magistrate
judges are afforded broad discretion and reversal is appropriate only if that discretion is
abused.” Id.
III.

DISCUSSION
The court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of

the case. Under the EAJA,
a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . including
proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United
States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that
the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412. The government bears the burden of showing that its position was
“substantially justified.” Healey v. Leavitt, 485 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2007). In her Ruling,
the magistrate judge determined that the Commissioner had not made this showing,
Magistrate Judge Ruling at 8, and thus awarded fees to Weeks. However, she
determined that the total number of hours requested, 69.1 hours, was excessive, and
reduced the total award to 40.3 hours, Magistrate Judge Ruling at 12. 1
“A court has ‘broad discretion’ when determining the reasonableness of hours
expended in pursuing a claim.” Beck v. Astrue, 2013 WL 3853444 at *1 (citing Aston
v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 808 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986). After reviewing

1

The magistrate judge also determined that Weeks was precluded from recovering costs
because he proceeded in forma pauperis. While plaintiff’s objection concludes by asking for costs of
$210, he offers no argument or explanation as to why the magistrate judge’s finding to that effect is
erroneous. Further, the court agrees that plaintiff is precluded from recovering costs against the United
States by the in forma pauperis statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(1); Maida v. Callahan, 148 F.3d 190,
193 (2d Cir. 1998). Thus, to the extent plaintiff objects to the denial of costs, such objection is overruled.

2

the record, the court concludes that Magistrate Judge Fitzsimmon’s decision to award a
reduced amount to plaintiff’s counsel was not clearly erroneous.
First, courts in this Circuit have consistently found that “routine Social Security
cases” require, “on average,” between twenty and fourty hours of attorney work. See
Poulin v. Astrue, 2012 WL 264579, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 27, 2012); Cobb v. Astrue,
2009 WL 2940205, at *3 (D.Conn. Sept. 2, 2009); Parsons v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
2008 WL 5191725, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2008) (“[In] . . . districts within the Second
Circuit, the average time approved by courts for routine social security disability cases
ranges from twenty to forty hours.”) (collecting cases). The award for 40.3 hours falls
directly at the higher end of this range.
Second, in reducing the time spent drafting a Motion to Reverse and/or
Remand by ten hours, Judge Fitzsimmons noted that plaintiff’s counsel had
represented him at the administrative level and was familiary with the record and
administrative proceedings, that the medical records were not “extraordinarily
voluminous,” that the issues were not overly complex, and that plaintiff did not raise
novel questions of law. Magistrate Judge Ruling at 11. The court cannot say that the
decision to reduce the award for this reason was clearly erroneous. See Rodriguez v.
Astrue, No. CIV308CV00154 (JCH) (HBF), 2009 WL 6319262, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 3,
2009) (in determining whether fees in excess of the average are reasonable, “[r]elevant
factors to weigh include the size of the administrative record, the complexity of the
factual and legal issues involved, counsel's experience, and whether counsel
represented the claimant during the administrative proceedings”), modified on other
grounds, 2010 WL 1286895 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2010). It was the plaintiff’s burden to

3

demonstrate that the requested fee was reasonable, and the magistrate judge’s
determination that he had not done so was not clearly erroneous. See Cobb v. Astrue,
2009 WL 2940205 at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 2, 2009).
The magistrate judge also reduced the time spent to review and prepare a reply
brief from twenty to ten hours, since the reply raised the same argument set forth in the
motion to reverse and/or remand. Similarly, she reduced from fourteen to seven hours
the time spent to review the Recommended Ruling and file an objection by seven
hours, based on her determination that the objection “raise[d] the same arguments set
forth in [plaintiff’s] motion to reverse and/or remand, and reply.” Magistrate Judge
Ruling at 12. These reductions were not clearly erroneous.

2

See Cobb, 2009 WL

2940205 at *2 (in calculating a reasonable fee under the EAJA, “the district court should
exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours”).
Third, the magistrate judge’s determination that “the overall reduction of the fee
award also reflects the limited degree of success,” Magistrate Judge Ruling at 12, was
not clearly erroneous. In Cobb, the court found that the requested fee was not
“reasonable” under the EAJA in light of, among others, “counsel’s limited degree of
success.” Cobb, 2009 WL 2940205 at *2-3. Plaintiff argues that this case is
distinguishable from Cobb because “[i]n Cobb, the Court, unlike here, found that . . . the
defendant Commissioner was ‘substantially justified’ in defending the case,” and thus
that “the Court had the authority to deny a fee under the EAJA entirely” when it awarded

2

The Ruling also declined to award fees for 1.8 hours spent reviewing the court’s Order to Show
Cause for failure to prosecute, filing a motion for extension of time in response, and reviewing related
Court Orders regarding requests for extension of time. Plaintiff’s objection does not appear to challenge
this reduction; however, it is also not clearly erroneous.

4

an amount less than requested. Mem. at 2. As noted in the defendant’s Reponse,
this position is incorrect. The court in Cobb expressly found that the government’s
position below – i.e., the position of the ALJ – “was not substantially justified,” and thus
that the plantiff was entitled to fees, albeit reduced. 3 Cobb, 2009 WL 2940205 at *2.
Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the cases cited in his objection do not preclude
consideration of the plaintiff’s degree of success in assessing the reasonableness of his
fee.

4

Finally, plaintiff’s argument that the magistrate judge’s ruling is clearly erroneous
in that it failed to distinguish another social security case, Stanchfield v. Astrue, 2012
WL 1069174 (D.Conn. Mar. 29, 2012), where a higher fee award was found to be
“reasonable,” is unavailing. See Mem. at 3-4. As previously discussed, the
magistrate judge’s determination that a reduction in hours was warranted was not
clearly erroneous, and the court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether a fee is
reasonable. The magistrate judge was not required to distinguish every case where
the court concluded that, on the facts of that case, a higher award was reasonable.

3

In determining whether the government has met its burden of showing that its position was
substantially justified, the court must review both the government’s position in the civil action as well as
“the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based.” 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(D).
4

The majority of the cases cited on pages 5-7 of plaintiff’s objection primarily address whether
fees may be awarded although the government’s position was “substantially justified” on some issues, not
whether the degree of success may be taken into account in determining whether the total fee is
“reasonable.” Indeed, one of the cases cited by plaintiff explicitly states that “the most critical factor in
determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained.” Mastrio v. Sebelius,
2013 WL 1336838, at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2013) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992)).

5

IV.

CONCLUSION

After reviewing the record, the court cannot conclude that Judge Fitzsimmons’
findings were clearly erroneous. Thus, the plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate
Judge’s Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs under the EAJA
(Doc. No. 41) is OVERRULED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 28th day of May, 2015, at New Haven, Connecticut.

/s/ Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge

6