Mpala v. Funaro et al

Filing 33

ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the attached Ruling, the Court denies Defendants' 30 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge William I. Garfinkel on 12/4/2013. (Smith, M.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
ZEWEE MPALA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH FURANO, et al.,

:
:
:

No. 3:13cv252(WIG)

:

Defendants.
:
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RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [Doc. # 30]
Defendants seek reconsideration of the Court’s denial of their motion for judgment on the
pleadings based upon the Court’s having improperly relied on matters outside the pleadings,
namely Plaintiff’s “idle speculation” that there may be circumstances under which he would not
be bound by the Public Defender’s stipulation of probable cause. Contrary to Defendants’
supposition, the Court relied only upon the transcript of the state court proceeding, which
demonstrated that Plaintiff was not present at the time of this stipulation. In fact, the Public
Defender even questioned whether he could enter a stipulation for Plaintiff.
The second ground asserted by Defendants for reconsideration simply rehashes the
argument previously raised in their motion for judgment on the pleadings and is an improper
basis for reconsideration. Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that a motion for reconsideration should not be used to relitigate an issue already decided).
The third ground raised by Defendants - that the Court’s decision sets a dangerous
precedent for criminal defendants seeking to initiate civil proceedings based upon criminal
charges levied against them - overlooks the fact that the Court was not ruling on the merits of
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Plaintiff’s case. It was ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. A motion for judgment
on the pleadings will be granted only if, after accepting as true all allegations of the plaintiff’s
complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to
relief. See Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1998). Given this strict standard, the
Court concluded that Defendants were not entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
In sum, defense counsel chose simply to repeat his arguments, albeit with added
petulance, rather than provide some actual law for the proposition that a lawyer’s stipulation of
probable cause in the absence of his client, under any circumstances, definitively establishes that
probable cause existed at the time of the arrest. If, for example, the client’s lack of consent and
even knowledge of the stipulation are irrelevant, defense counsel has not shown that. Given that
failure, the Court cannot grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and will not grant the
motion for reconsideration.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. # 30].
SO ORDERED, this

4th

day of December, 2013, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

/s/ William I. Garfinkel
WILLIAM I. GARFINKEL
United States Magistrate Judge

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