Klorczyk et al v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. et al

Filing 172

RULING re 145 Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Discovery Requests or, in the Alternative, Motion for Leave for an Extension of Time regarding Plaintiffs' Responses. The Court GRANTS in part plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time regarding their responses. See attached ruling for details. Signed by Judge Holly B. Fitzsimmons on 4/9/2015.(Katz, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
FREDERICK KLORCZYK, JR., as
Co-Administrator of the
Estate of Christian R.
Klorczyk, et al
v.
SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO, ET AL

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CIV. NO. 3:13CV257 (JAM)

RULING RE: PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS’
DISCOVERY REQUESTS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR LEAVE FOR
AN EXTENSION OF TIME REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSES [DOC. #
145]
Pending before the Court are the objections and responses
of plaintiffs Frederick and Lynne Klorczyk, as co-administrators
of the estate of Christian R. Klorczyk, (“plaintiffs”) to
defendants’ discovery requests or, in the alternative, motion
for an extension of time regarding plaintiffs’ responses. [Doc.
#145].

Defendants MVP (H.K.) Industries, Ltd. (“MVP”) and Wei

Fu (Taishan) Machinery & Electric Co., Ltd. (“Wei Fu”) filed a
“Reply” in opposition to plaintiffs’ objections [Doc. #150], to
which plaintiffs filed a “Response.” [Doc. #152].

On January

14, 2015, the Court held a telephone conference addressing
plaintiffs’ objections. Thereafter, the Court held an in person
discovery conference on March 4, 2015, where the parties further
addressed this issue. For the reasons articulated below, the
Court GRANTS in part plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time
regarding their responses.

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1. Background
The Court presumes familiarity with the factual background
of this matter and will recite applicable facts only as relevant
to the Court’s rulings below. Nevertheless, the Court will
briefly review the procedural history leading to the present
dispute. Unless otherwise noted, the Court derives the following
background from the parties’ written submissions. [Doc. ##145,
150, 152].
On December 4, 2013, MVP served plaintiffs with
interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for
admissions. Plaintiffs contend that these requests are
“identical” to those served on October 25, 2013, by defendants
Shinn Fu Corporation (“SFC”) and Shinn Fu Co. of America, Inc.
(“SFA”), to which plaintiffs had served responses and
objections. Rather than formally responding to MVP’s discovery
requests, plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter dated December 16,
2014, stating in pertinent part that,
Plaintiffs will not, however, serve separate responses to
MVP’s discovery request. It is clear that MVP’s discovery
requests are unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of
those served by SFC and SFA, and serve no purpose other
than to harass and unduly burden Plaintiffs. Moreover,
MVP’s interrogatories and requests for production are
untimely pursuant to the Court’s Scheduling Order Regarding
Case Management Plan (Dkt. No. 75). Accordingly, in
response to MVP’s discovery requests, Plaintiffs hereby
incorporate their objections and responses to the discovery
requests served by SFC and SFA.

[Doc. #145-1].
Similarly, on February 18, 2014, Wei Fu served plaintiffs
with interrogatories, requests for production and requests for
admission, which plaintiffs contend are also “largely identical

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and duplicative” of those served on October 25, 2013, by
defendants SFC and SFA. Again, rather than formally responding,
on March 18, 2014, plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to Wei Fu’s
counsel substantively similar to that addressing MVP’s discovery
requests. [Doc. #145-2]. As to Wei Fu’s discovery requests,
plaintiffs again “incorporate[d] their objections and responses
to the requests served by Shinn Fu Corp. and SFA.” [Id.].
It was not until a November 12, 2014 telephone conference
before Judge Meyer that the present dispute arose. During that
telephone conference, Judge Meyer directed plaintiffs to file
the objection at issue, thereby formally raising for decision
plaintiffs’ objections set forth in their December 16, 2013 and
March 18, 2014 letters. Judge Meyer referred this dispute to the
undersigned on December 29, 2014. [Doc. #153]. Notably, although
plaintiffs raise objections to all discovery served by MVP and
Wei Fu, the parties focus their arguments on plaintiffs’
responses to the requests for admissions, or perceived lack
thereof. Accordingly, and in light of discussions during the
Court’s January 13 and March 4, 2015 conferences, this Ruling
only addresses MVP and Wei Fu’s requests for admissions.
2. Discussion
Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
requests for admissions. Under Rule 36(a)(3), requests for
admissions are deemed admitted unless the party to whom they are
propounded serves “a written answer or objection” within thirty
days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Rule 36 also sets forth the
proper form of answers and objections to requests for
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admissions. For example, answers “must specifically deny it or
state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit
or deny it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). Similarly, “The grounds
for objecting to a request must be stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
36(a)(5). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b),
“[a] matter deemed admitted under this rule is conclusively
established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission
to be withdrawn or amended.”
As an initial matter, plaintiffs’ December 16, 2013 and
March 18, 2014 letters do not comply with Rule 36(a). To the
extent that plaintiffs believed certain requests to be
impermissibly duplicative, cumulative, or harassing, plaintiffs
should have sought a protective order, rather than summarily
respond by letter. However, the Court notes that plaintiffs did
not entirely shirk their responsibility to respond to MVP and
Wei Fu’s discovery requests as they incorporated by reference
their responses to prior requests for admission. Nevertheless,
plaintiffs’ letters do not comply with the spirit or letter of
Rule 36 and technically plaintiffs have failed to respond to MVP
and Wei Fu’s requests.
However, rather than deem the requests admitted, the Court
will GRANT in part plaintiffs’ request for additional time to
respond to the requests for admissions. Although plaintiffs have
not filed a motion to withdraw them, the Court construes
plaintiff’s motion for extension of time as a motion to withdraw
their admissions if their letters were deemed insufficient
responses under Rule 36. See, e.g., 7 JAMES WM. MOORE,
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ET AL.,

MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §36.13 (3d ed. 2014)(“A motion is required
to withdraw or amend an admission. However, some courts have
concluded that a formal written motion to withdraw is not
necessary. A request to withdraw usually may be made orally or
may be imputed from a party’s action. Courts have even found
that a late response to requests for admission is equivalent to
a withdrawal of a deemed admission.”).
Rule 36(b) permits the withdrawal of an admission when (1)
“the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby” and (2) “the party who obtained the admission fails to
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice
that party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). “The prejudice contemplated by Rule 36(b)
is not merely that the party obtaining the admission must, as a
consequence of the withdrawal, prove the matter admitted but
rather relates to difficulties the party may face in proving its
case, such as the availability of key witnesses.” Vandever v.
Murphy, No. 3:09CV1752 AWT, 2012 WL 5507257, at *2 (D. Conn.
Nov. 14, 2012) (quoting Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v.
Trustmark Ins. Co., 217 F.R.D. 296, 298 (D. Conn. 2002)).
“Courts have usually found that the prejudice contemplated by
Rule 36(b) relates to special difficulties a party may face
caused by a sudden need to obtain evidence upon withdrawal or
amendment of an admission.” Vandever, 2012 WL 55057257, at *2
(quoting Am. Auto. Ass'n (Inc.) v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson
Crooke, P.C., 930 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th Cir.1991)). The “decision
to excuse the defendant from its admissions is in the court's
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discretion.” Vandever, 2012 WL 55057257, at *2 (citation
omitted).
The Court does not condone plaintiffs’ playing fast and
loose with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the
Court must apply the legal principles underlying Rule 36(b). As
to the first prong of Rule 36(b), permitting the withdrawal of
the deemed admissions undoubtedly would “promote the
presentation of the merits of the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
36(b). With regard to the second prong, although MVP and Wei Fu
did not make a showing of prejudice, at the March 4 conference,
counsel argued that withdrawing the admissions would essentially
hit the “reset” button in terms of the discovery conducted to
date. Plaintiffs responded that there would be no prejudice to
defendants, but rather plaintiffs would be “colossally”
prejudiced if the requests were deemed admitted. Considering the
arguments of counsel, the Court finds that defendants have
failed to show that withdrawal of the admissions would result in
the prejudice Rule 36(b) requires, particularly in light of the
amended case management order previously issued.
Accordingly, the court GRANTS in part plaintiff's motion
for extension of time to serve responses to MVP and Wei Fu’s
requests for admissions. Plaintiffs will serve their responses
to the requests for admissions within ten (10) days from this
ruling. Westmoreland v. Triumph Motorcycle Corp., 71 F.R.D. 192,
192-93 (D. Conn. 1976)(determination by court whether to allow
amendment or withdrawal is matter of discretion and appellate
review based on abuse of discretion).
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Thereafter, the parties

will confer concerning the pending objections to the requests
for admissions, along with any other pending discovery
objections. To the extent the parties are unable to resolve
plaintiffs’ objections, they may raise this via motion filed on
CMECF. To the extent that defendants will seek to compel
responses to its requests for admissions, they may have thirty
days from the date of plaintiffs’ responses to do so.
This is not a Recommended Ruling. This is a discovery
ruling or order which is reviewable pursuant to the “clearly
erroneous” statutory standard of review. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); and D. Conn. L. Civ. R.
72.2. As such, it is an order of the Court unless reversed or
modified by the district judge upon motion timely made.

ENTERED at Bridgeport, this 9th day of April 2015.
___/s/_____________________
HOLLY B. FITZSIMMONS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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