Lagueux v. Leonardi

Filing 28

RULING granting 13 Motion to Dismiss as to all claims except the state law claims, over which the court declines to extend its jurisdiction.; denying 26 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 5/31/13. (Torrenti, R.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
MICHAEL J. LAGUEUX,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS B. LEONARDI,
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:13-CV-339 (JCH)

MAY 31, 2013

RULING RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 13) and PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Doc. No. 26)
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Michael J. Lagueux, pro se, brings this action against Thomas B.

Leonardi, the Insurance Commissioner for the State of Connecticut, in both his official
and individual capacities, for a litany of claims related to the denial of Lagueux’s
application for an insurance producer’s license. So far as this court is able to discern,
Lagueux asserts violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e et seq. for gender discrimination and retaliation, violation of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §
2000d, violation of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and
enforced through section 1983 and 1981 of title 42 of the United States Code, violations
of Connecticut state law against libel, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Leonardi to issue an
Insurance Producer’s license to Lagueux despite the prior denial of that license.
Leonardi filed this Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 13) as to all claims against him, for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.
For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is granted as to all claims
except the state law claims, over which the court declines to extend its jurisdiction. The
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court also denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 26) of the court’s
Order (Doc. No. 25) denying his Motion to Supplement the Complaint.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate it. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d
167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008). In assessing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, “the court must take all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff.” Natural Res. Def. Council v. Johnson, 461
F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2006). The court, however, refrains from “drawing from the
pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting [jurisdiction].” APWU v. Potter,
343 F.3d 619, 623 (2d Cir. 2003).
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the
complaint. See Morrison, 547 F.3d at 170; see also Makarova v. United States, 201
F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); Malik v. Meissner, 82 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1996). That
showing may not be made solely by implication. See Morrison, 547 F.3d at 170. A
court evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion “may resolve the disputed jurisdictional fact
issues by reference to evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits.” Zappia
Middle E. Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2000).

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B. Rule 12(b)(6)
When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must
determine whether plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim by making allegations
that, if true, would show that plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (interpreting Rule 12(b)(6), in accordance with Rule 8(a)(2), to
require allegations with “enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief’”
(alteration in original)). As with Rule 12(b)(1), the court takes the factual allegations of
the complaint to be true, Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 130 S.Ct. 983, 986–87
(2010), and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, Fulton v. Goord, 591
F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2009). However, the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s
allegations as true is inapplicable to “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Additionally, the court considers only “facts stated in
the complaint or documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by
reference.” Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing
Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1996)).
To survive a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more

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than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Lagueux is a citizen of Connecticut who was actively seeking work as an

Insurance Producer. Compl. at 1. Leonardi is the Commissioner of the Connecticut
Insurance Department (“Department”). Id. In May 2011, Lagueux was offered a
position as an Insurance Producer by AFLAC insurance company. Id. at 3. In June
2011, Lagueux enrolled in and passed a pre-licensing course for potential Insurance
Producers at an AFLAC training center. Id. at 3-4. He was subsequently enrolled in the
company’s sales training classes to sell insurance. Id. at 4. He successfully passed the
Insurance Producer’s licensing examination, and subsequently applied for an Insurance
Producer’s license through the website of the Department. Id.
On December 19, 2011, the Department’s Licensing Unit issued Lagueux a letter
of denial. Id. The letter of denial stated, “Because the Department is charged with
protecting the public interest, under sections 38a-702k, 38a-774 and 38a-769 of the
Connecticut General Statutes, we are denying your request for a Producer’s license.”
Id. The denial letter also stated, “Included in the information you submitted to us was
documentation reflecting multiple convictions for harassment in the second degree, as
well as convictions for criminal trespass and violation of probation.” Id.
Lagueux challenged the denial of his application, and the Department held an
administrative hearing on Lagueux’s application. Id. at 4-6. At some point during the

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The court accepts as true the following facts for the purposes of a Motion to Dismiss.

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administrative hearing, a department employee named Amy Stegall2 testified as to the
rationale behind the issuance of the denial letter and at some point referenced the
license application as “inflammatory,” “hostile,” and “aggressive.” Id. at 5.
Leonardi, acting as Insurance Commissioner, adopted the recommendation of
the hearing officer affirming the denial of the insurance producer license. Id. at 6.3
Lagueux appealed this affirmation to the Connecticut Superior Court, which held that
the hearing officer’s decision (adopted by Leonardi), improperly applied sections 38a769(c) and (d) to insurance producer licenses and remanded the case to Leonardi. See
Lagueux v. Leonardi, No. CV125015628S, 2012 WL 6582533, *5-6 (Conn. Super. Nov.
20, 2012). This decision was subsequently appealed by Leonardi to the Connecticut
Appellate Court, where it is pending. See Michael J. Lagueux v. Thomas B. Leonardi,
Insurance Commissioner, No. A.C. 35257 (Filed Nov. 28, 2012).
Lagueux filed this action in federal court on March 13, 2013.
IV.

DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss
Leonardi moves to dismiss all of the counts against him based on a number of

theories, including various federal abstention doctrines, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
res judicata, collateral estoppel, quasi-judicial absolute immunity, the Eleventh

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The court notes that Ms. Stegall’s name is spelled as both “Stegal” and “Stegall” in the
Complaint. For the sake of consistency with the state court decisions related to this case, the court will
use the spelling “Stegall.”
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Lagueux references and discusses, but does not attach to his Complaint, Leonardi’s final
decision affirming the denial of the license application and the subsequent appeal of that decision in
Connecticut Superior Court. Because those decisions are integral to the Complaint, and because the
court may take judicial notice of them, the court considers them here. See Global Network Commc’ns,
Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006); Kavowras v. New York Times Co., 328 F.3d
50, 57 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Judicial notice may be taken of public filings”).

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Amendment, sovereign immunity, and failure to state a claim. The court notes that
Lagueux’s Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Memo. Opp. Mot.
Dismiss”) (Doc. No. 20) is not directly responsive to most of Leonardi’s arguments.
While the court is aware of its obligations to be solicitous of pro se litigants, pro se
status does not exempt parties from the rules of procedural or substantive law. See
Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006).4
1. Younger Abstention
Leonardi first argues that to the extent Lagueux seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief in the form of an order directing Leonardi to issue Lagueux an insurance
producer’s license, these claims are barred by the abstention doctrine outlined in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “Under Younger, abstention is mandatory
where: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest is
implicated; and (3) the plaintiff has an avenue open for review of the constitutional
claims in the state court.” Parent v. New York, 485 Fed.Appx. 500, 503 (2d Cir. 2012)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). “Although the Younger doctrine was
originally formulated in the context of criminal proceedings, it now applies with equal
force to civil proceedings, including state administrative proceedings that are judicial in
nature.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here, there is clearly an ongoing, state proceeding relating to the denial of the
insurance producer’s license. That an important state interest exists in the regulation of
licensure for who can be an insurance producer also cannot seriously be doubted,

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The court notes that Lagueux’s filings, while replete with rather creative imagery, are also rife
with unacceptable and inappropriate ad hominem attacks.

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particularly where the decisions below implicate the applicability of several state
statutes.
It is clear, too, that Lagueux had an avenue open for review of constitutional
claims in the state court, even if he did not pursue them there. The underlying Superior
Court action was an administrative appeal, subject to Connecticut’s Uniform
Administrative Procedure Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-183. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-183;
Toomey v. Reider, No. CV 96134029, 1997 WL 120071, *2 (Conn. Super. Feb. 21,
1997) (applying analysis under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-183 to appeal from decision of
Commissioner of Connecticut Insurance Department to suspend a bail license). That
statute states, “The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds
that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . [i]n violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-183(j). Lagueux’s federal
constitutional claims, along with her other claims, could have been raised in the
Superior Court. See, e.g., Ross v. New Canaan Environmental Commission, No.
3:09CV01966 (PCD), 2010 WL 2351475, *5 (D. Conn. June 8, 2010) (“It is unclear why
Plaintiff believes that her constitutional claims could not have been raised during the
Superior Court proceedings, as an administrative appeal is considered an ordinary civil
action in almost all respects.”). “So long as a plaintiff is not barred on procedural or
technical grounds from raising alleged constitutional infirmities, it cannot be said that
state court review of constitutional claims is inadequate for Younger purposes.” Hansel
v. Town Court for the Town of Springfield, New York, 56 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 1995);
Sastrom v. Berger, No. 303CV671DJSTPS, 2004 WL 253495, *3-4 (D. Conn. Feb. 9,

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2004) (abstaining under Younger in a case involving an administrative appeal under
Conn. Gen. Stat. §4-183 and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-597).
Lagueux is clearly trying to enjoin or direct the outcome of an ongoing state
proceeding, an action that implicates important issues of comity. As such, the court
must abstain from the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.
However, Younger abstention is inapplicable to Lagueux’s claims for money
damages. See Kirschner v. Kelmons, 225 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[R]egardless
of the inapplicability or applicability of any exception, we hold that Younger abstention is
not appropriate with respect to Kirschner’s claim for money damages under § 1983
against Klemons because it is a claim for money damages and not for declaratory or
injunctive relief.”); but see American Consumer Pub. Ass’n, Inc. v. Margosian, 349 F.3d
1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Younger abstention is appropriate in actions for money
damages in those rare cases in which an adjudication of damages would interfere
directly with a pending state proceeding. That is, courts must abstain when (but only
when) a necessary predicate of the claim for damages undermines a necessary
element in the pending state proceeding.”). Generally, courts encountering such a
scenario will stay the money damages claims pending resolution of the declaratory and
injunctive relief issues in the state court. Id. Here, however, rationales other than those
involved in the abstention discussion merit dismissal. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996) (“We have thus held that in cases where the relief being
sought is equitable in nature or otherwise discretionary, federal courts not only have the
power to stay the action based on abstention principles, but can also, in otherwise
appropriate circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether by either

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dismissing the suit or remanding it to state court. By contrast, while we have held that
federal courts may stay actions for damages based on abstention principles, we have
not held that those principles support the outright dismissal or remand of damages
actions.”) (discussing Burford abstention); Kirschner, 225 F.3d at 238 (“[A]bstention and
dismissal are inappropriate when damages are sought, even when a pending state
proceeding raises identical issues and we would dismiss otherwise identical claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief, but . . . a stay of the action pending resolution of the
state proceeding may be appropriate.”) (emphasis added). Here, while the court has
the power to stay Lagueux’s monetary claims pending resolution of the administrative
appeal regarding the denial of his insurance producer’s license, other grounds for
dismissal of these claims exist that do not depend on, or potentially infringe, the pending
state court proceedings. Accordingly, the court will proceed to consider those claims.
See, e.g., Russo v. City of Hartford, 158 F. Supp. 2d 214, 230 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding
in a case involving Younger abstention of section 1983 claims, “[T]he court does not find
it necessary to stay the present case pending the outcome of the appeal in the state
criminal case. The decision as to whether to stay a federal action on the ground that
there is a related action pending in a state court is committed to the sound discretion of
the district court.” (citing United States v. Pikna, 880 F.2d 1578, 1582 (2d Cir. 1989)).
2. Official Capacity Claims
To the extent that Lagueux’s section 19835 claims under federal law are directed
against Leonardi in his official capacity, those claims are barred by the Eleventh

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Lagueux also appears to have brought claims pursuant to section 1981. However, “the
exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by [s]ection 1981 when the
claim is pressed against a state actor” is a section 1983 action. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.

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Amendment. See Kostok v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1997) (“As a general
matter, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits of any sort against a state in federal court
unless the state has consented to be sued of Congress has expressly abrogated the
state’s immunity.”); Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he
immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states
themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of the
state.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159
(1985). The Insurance Commissioner for the State of Connecticut qualifies as such an
official. Accordingly, the section 1983 claims for monetary damages directed against
Leonardi in his official capacity are dismissed.
Lagueux’s Title VII and Title VI monetary claims directed against Leonardi in his
official capacity are dismissed under the sovereign immunity doctrine of the Eleventh
Amendment. See Nadimi v. Brown, 8 Fed.Appx. 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]o the
extent that the defendants were being sued in their official capacities [for a Title VII
violation], the claims for damages and retroactive injunctive relief were barred under the
sovereign immunity doctrine of the Eleventh Amendment.”).
3. Individual Capacity Claims
Such claims against Leonardi in his individual capacity are also barred under the
doctrine of quasi-judicial absolute immunity, as all of Lagueux’s claims stem from
Leonardi’s adoption of the hearing officer’s denial of Lagueux’s insurance producer’s
license. See Kuck v. Danaher, 822 F.Supp.2d 109, 147 (D. Conn. 2011) (“Quasijudicial immunity should only extend to claims against defendants sued in their
701, 702 (1989); see also McKnight v. Connecticut, No. 3:10-cv-1471 (JCH), 2013 WL 321677, *3 (D.
Conn. Jan. 28, 2013). Accordingly, his section 1981 claims against Leonardi in both his official and
individual capacities are dismissed.

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individual and not official capacities”). While quasi-judicial immunity exists with regard
to federal claims and Connecticut state law claims, the two doctrines, while similar, are
distinct. See Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2009). “We clarify now that the
federal law on quasi-judicial immunity applies to state officials sued in federal court on
federal claims.” Id. at 81. “In this context, the U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a
‘functional’ test that is binding on this court in matters of federal law.” Id. (quoting
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1985). The factors include:
(a) The need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without
harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the
need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional
conduct; (c) insulation from political influence; (d) the importance of
precedent; (e) the adversary nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of
error on appeal.
Id. The court notes that, “The Supreme Court has found that an executive branch
administrative law judge or hearing officer who conducts hearings in accordance with
the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act is entitled to absolute immunity.” Morneau v.
Connecticut, No. 3:07cv819 (JBA), 2008 WL 2704817, *5 (D. Conn. July 7, 2008)
(finding that members of the Connecticut Marshals Commission, which resolves
disciplinary complaints against state marshals, were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity).
The only action Lagueux claims Leonardi undertook personally was adopting the
hearing officer’s recommendation, following a hearing, of affirming the initial denial of
Lagueux’s insurance producer license application. It is apparent from the Complaint
that such a hearing -- to which Lagueux was entitled under Connecticut law -- took
place. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 38a-19. At such hearings, oaths may be taken, witnesses
subpoenaed, and evidence produced. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-177b. Parties may be
represented by an attorney, inspect and copy records, cross-examine witnesses, and
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maker arguments. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-177c; Conn. Regs. § 38a-8-33; Conn. Regs. §
38a-8-39. While Leonardi did not directly preside over the hearing here, it is clear that
his role was adjudicatory. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-774(a) (“Whenever a person
other than the commissioner acts as the hearing officer, such person shall submit to the
commissioner a memorandum of the findings and recommendations upon which the
commissioner may bas a decision.”). As the Cleavinger factors are satisfied, Leonardi
is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the federal claims brought against him in his
individual capacity. Accordingly, those claims are dismissed.
4. State Law Claims
Because the court has abstained from the claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief, and has dismissed all federal claims against Leonardi in his official and individual
capacities, only state law claims remain. The court declines to exercise jurisdiction over
those claims as a result.
B. Motion for Reconsideration
Lagueux has also moved this court to reconsider its Order denying his Motion to
Supplement the Complaint. The Order instructed Lagueux that if he wished to amend
his Complaint, he should do so by means of an Amended Complaint. See Doc. No. 25.
The Second Circuit has held that “[t]he standard for granting [a motion for
reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving
party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked -- matters, in
other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.” Schrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted). There are three grounds that justify granting a motion for reconsideration: (1)

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an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of newly discovered
evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Virgin
Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992). That the
court overlooked controlling law or material facts may also entitle a party to succeed on
a motion to reconsider. Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 395 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (“To be entitled to reargument, a party must demonstrate that the Court
overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the
underlying motion”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Lagueux has not met this
standard.
However, while the court denies the motion for reconsideration, the court has, in
connection with the Motion to Dismiss, reviewed the Motion to Supplement the
Complaint and the attached documents to see if they would impact in any way on the
court’s Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. They do not. The supplemental materials are
all documents related to other proceedings involving the Insurance Commissioner and
third parties. Nothing in these documents affects the court’s Ruling on the Motion to
Dismiss.
Further, to the extent that Lagueux’s Motion for Reconsideration is also a Motion
to Remove Lagueux’s Security Costs, that motion is also denied. Lagueux has supplied
no basis for the granting of that Motion. Also, to the extent that Lagueux’s Motion for
Reconsideration is also a Motion to Recuse the Judge, that motion is denied. Simply
denying Lagueux’s Motion to Supplement the Complaint is no basis for the recusal of a
judge.

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V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Leonardi’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

No. 13) as to all claims except the state law claims, over which the court declines to
extend its jurisdiction. The court also denies Lagueux’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Doc. No. 26). The Clerk is directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 31st day of May, 2013.

/s/ Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge

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