Kaye et al v. Amicus Mediation & Arbitration Group, Inc. et al

Filing 113

RULING denying re 90 MOTION for Reconsideration filed by Amicus Mediation & Arbitration Group, Inc., Hillary Earle, denying 92 MOTION to Stay filed by Amicus Mediation & Arbitration Group, Inc., Hillary Earle. Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 10/10/2014. (Malone, P.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ROGER H. KAYE et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AMICUS MEDIATION &
ARBITRATION GROUP, INC. et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:13-cv-347 (JCH)

OCTOBER 10, 2014

RULING RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Doc. No. 90),
MOTION FOR STAY (Doc. No. 92)
Defendants Amicus Mediation & Arbitration Group, Inc. (“Amicus”) and Hillary
Earle move the court to reconsider its Rulings of May 27 and 28, 2014 certifying classes
and denying the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 58) and Motion for Stay (Doc.
No. 86). See Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 90). They also move for a stay
pending appeal. See Motion for Stay (Doc. No. 92). The facts of this case are
otherwise laid out in the court’s rulings of May 27 and 28, 2014 (Docs. No. 87, 89). The
court denies the defendants’ two Motions.
I.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The defendants move the court to reconsider its Ruling (Doc. No. 89) denying the

defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and its Ruling (Doc. No. 87) denying their Motion for
Stay.
The Second Circuit has held that “[t]he standard for granting [a motion for
reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving
party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in

other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.” Schrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 395 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000). Reconsideration may also
be justified by “the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Virgin Atl.
Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
A.

As to the Motion to Dismiss

One part of the defendants’ Motion turns on the argument that the court
committed “clear error” in its Ruling of May 28 (Doc. No. 89) because it did not
determine as a matter of law whether the defendants’ offer of judgment exceeded the
limit of damages recoverable given the allegations in the Complaint (Doc. No. 1).
In its Ruling (Doc. No. 89), the court decided that the plaintiffs stated a claim for
damages exceeding the amount offered by the defendants and, consequently, that the
defendants’ offer would not render their claims moot. While the court did briefly note the
possibility that the Court of Appeals might reverse this decision as to the total amount
actually recoverable, the defendants misunderstand the Ruling if they take it not to
render a decision on this jurisdictional issue. If the court was not clear enough for the
defendants in the Ruling, let it be clear now: it is this court’s conclusion at this time that
the plaintiffs may recover multiple damages and that, consequently, the offer of
judgment could not render their claims moot.
Amicus and Earle point to no controlling law that contravenes the court’s decision
in this unsettled area of law. Instead, they merely present anew arguments that have
already been considered and rejected by the court. This rehashing of old arguments
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falls short of the defendants’ burden on this Motion.
B.

As to the Motion for Stay pending a petition to the FCC

The defendants also argue that the court should not have denied them the stay
that they sought pending resolution of a petition to the FCC. However, they only do so
by attempting to chip away at two of the rationales that the court gave when it denied
the stay in the first instance. In support of their two arguments, they cite to no
“controlling decisions or data” that they claim the court overlooked, Schrader, 70 F.3d at
257, but merely reargue issues already thoroughly treated. A motion for reconsideration
is not simply an opportunity to reargue questions already decided by the court.
The Motion for Reconsideration is denied in all respects.
III.

MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
The defendants move for a stay pending resolution by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit of the defendants’ petition for interlocutory appeal under
Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, if that petition is granted,
pending the appeal.
In deciding whether to grant a stay, a court is to consider:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to
succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent
a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties
interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A stay is an “intrusion into the ordinary processes of
administration and judicial review, and accordingly is not a matter of right.” Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see

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also Maldonado-Padilla v. Holder, 651 F.3d 325, 327 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Nken, 556
U.S. at 427).
The defendants have not made any showing—let alone a “strong” one—that their
petition to the Court of Appeals is likely to be granted or, if granted, that they are likely
to obtain the relief that they seek. Indeed, the defendants’ memoranda do not directly
argue, let alone cite to cases or facts in support of any argument, that they are likely to
succeed in these respects.
Despite many references to the phrase “death knell” in their filings in support of
their new Motion for Stay, see, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of
Their Motion for a Stay (Doc. No. 93) at 4, the defendants have not made a sufficient
showing that they will be irreparably harmed. The most substantial facts to which the
defendants point are a few lines of deposition testimony to the effect that the company
has few employees and was founded recently. See id. (referring to filings not before
this court but before the Court of Appeals). They point to no hard financial information
about their own finances at all. Of course, no matter the company, most every
certification of a class of plaintiffs seeking damages renders it more and not less likely
that a defendant will find itself subject to substantial financial liability. The mere fact (or
threat) of such liability does not per se constitute irreparable harm.
The defendants make no argument that a stay will serve the public interest.
Even assuming that a stay would not cause substantial harm to the plaintiffs (which the
court doubts), in light of the defendants’ paltry offerings on the first two prongs the court
finds no good cause to stay the proceedings. The Motion is denied.

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III.

CONCLUSION
The defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 90) and Motion for Stay

(Doc. No. 92) are both DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 10th day of October 2014 at New Haven, Connecticut.

/s/ Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge

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