Molina v. Eagle Leasing Co

Filing 83

Memorandum and Decision granting in part and denying in part 50 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Warren W. Eginton on 9/22/2015. (Falcone, K.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
FELIX MOLINA,
Plaintiff,

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v.
EAGLE LEASING COMPANY,
Defendant.

3:13cv413 (WWE)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
In this action, plaintiff Felix Molina claims that Eagle Leasing Company is liable
for discriminatory disparate treatment, hostile work environment and retaliation in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act
(“CFEPA”); and for negligent supervision.1
Defendant has moved for summary judgment. For the following reasons,
defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The parties have submitted statements of fact with supporting exhibits that reveal
the following factual background. The parties dispute most of the facts relevant to the
claims in this case.
Plaintiff is a male of Hispanic heritage and speaks Spanish as his first language.
In October 2010, plaintiff commenced work with defendant Eagle Leasing.
Eagle Leasing is a provider of truck trailers and ground level containers for short

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The Court has previously dismissed a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

and long-term lease. It also maintains a repair and maintenance shop at its
headquarters. Generally, Eagle Leasing employs a labor force which is more than 92%
of Hispanic origin.
During plaintiff’s employment with Eagle Leasing, two of the laborers were not of
Hispanic origin. The parties dispute the facts relevant to the treatment of Hispanic
laborers and whether plaintiff and other laborers of Hispanic origin were directed to
speak English only. The parties also disagree on facts specific to plaintiff’s last day of
employment; his complaints about working conditions, harassment and retaliation; and
requests for light duty.
DISCUSSION
A motion for summary judgment will be granted where there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The burden is on the
moving party to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in
dispute. American International Group, Inc. v. London American International Corp.,
664 F. 2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981). In determining whether a genuine factual issue
exists, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against
the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). "Only
when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary
judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F. 2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 849 (1991). If a nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof, then
summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the nonmoving
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party submits evidence which is "merely colorable," legally sufficient opposition to the
motion for summary judgment is not met. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Time Bar on Title VII Claims
Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s Title VII claims are untimely.
To preserve a claim under Title VII, an aggrieved employee must submit a
charge of discrimination to the EEOC within 180 days of the allegedly unlawful incident,
or within 300 days of the incident if the employee first presented the charge to a state or
local equal opportunity agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Here, plaintiff filed his
claims with the state agency, the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities on March 29, 2012.
Defendant asserts that plaintiff stopped working at Eagle Leasing on June 2,
2011, due to the occurrence of his work place injury that day. Thus, defendant
maintains that plaintiff had until March 28, 2012 to file his administrative claim with the
EEOC.
Plaintiff disputes that June 2, 2011 was his last day of work. First, he contends
that he returned to work on June 3, 2011, although he later brought himself to the
hospital. He also claims to have returned to work on June 7 or 8, 2011, when he
provided defendant with medical documentation of his injury. He maintains that he was
instructed to return to work when he was medically cleared for work. Plaintiff asserts
that he attempted to return to work when he had obtained medical clearance on August
31, 2011, but that defendant informed him that it did not consider him to be an
employee.
Disputed issues of fact preclude this Court from determining the date of the
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plaintiff’s termination. Accordingly, for purposes of ruling on this motion for summary
judgment, the Court will assume that plaintiff’s Title VII claims are timely filed.
Disparate Treatment
Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to disparate treatment based on his
Hispanic heritage in violation of Title VII and CFEPA.2
In a disparate treatment case based on circumstantial evidence, the Court
analyzes plaintiff’s claims of discrimination according to the burden shifting process
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) and Texas
Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, religion, national origin or
ancestry. To establish his prima facie claim of gender or national origin discrimination
in violation of Title VII, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is a member of a protected
class; (2) he was intentionally discriminated against on the basis of that protected class;
(3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. DowrichWeeks v. Cooper Square Realty, Inc., 2013 WL 4437071, *1 (2d Cir. 2013); Joseph v.
North Shore Univ. Hosp., 473 Fed. Appx. 34, 37 (2d Cir. 2012). Although the plaintiff’s
initial burden is not onerous, he must show that the alleged adverse employment action
was not made for legitimate reasons. Thomas v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 990 F.
Supp. 81, 86 (D. Conn. 1998).

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The Court will analyze the Title VII and CFEPA claims together since they are
generally subject to the same standards. Adams v. Festival Fun Parks, 2013 WL
951710, *7 (D. Conn. 2013).
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If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory business reason for the alleged discriminatory action.
The plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the supposed
legitimate reason is actually a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
In accordance with plaintiff’s representations in his opposition papers, the Court
assumes that plaintiff was terminated on August 31, 2011. Plaintiff maintains that he
has set forth sufficient evidence to support his claim of constructive discharge.
However, it is unclear whether plaintiff suffered an actual or constructive discharge.
“Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an employer, rather than
directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere
that forces an employee to quit involuntarily.” Brittell v. Dep’t of Corr., 247 Conn. 148,
178 (1998). Plaintiff has proffered testimony relevant to his supervisor subjecting him
to insults based on his heritage, instructing him to only speak English, and mistreatment
of employees based on race or ethnicity. At the same time, it appears that plaintiff
intended to return to work in August 2011, but that he was prevented from doing so
when he learned that he was no longer considered an employee. Nevertheless, it is
undisputed that plaintiff’s employment with defendant has ceased. Construed most
liberally in favor of plaintiff, the evidence indicates that plaintiff did not voluntarily quit
working for defendant. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has met the third prong
of the prima facie case that he suffered an adverse employment action.
The asserted discriminatory mistreatment that plaintiff and other Hispanics
experienced during the work day, if proved true, may constitute a hostile work
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environment. However, the evidence adduced fails to suggest that his termination in
August 2011 had any connection with a discriminatory animus. Thus, the fourth prong,
that he suffered his adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination, is not satisfied. Summary judgment will enter on this claim.
Hostile Work Environment
Plaintiff asserts that defendant subjected him to a hostile work environment in
violation of Title VII and CFEPA. Defendant maintains that plaintiff has failed to
establish a hostile work environment claim.
To make out a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must present evidence
(1) that the conduct in question was objectively severe or pervasive, that is, that it
created an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive; (2) that
the plaintiff subjectively perceived the environment as hostile or abusive; and (3) that
the plaintiff was subject to the hostile work environment ‘because of’ his race or
ethnicity. Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007). A court must assess the
evidence supporting a hostile work environment claim collectively and evaluate factors
such as (1) frequency of the discriminatory conduct, (2) the severity of the conduct, (3)
whether it is physically threatening or merely an offensive utterance, and (4) whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Harris v. Fork Lift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
Here, plaintiff has submitted testimony that he and other Hispanic workers were
continually cursed at and subjected to degrading comments and mistreatment on the
basis of being Hispanic. Plaintiff also described how his supervisor threw out the
lunches of Hispanic workers and how the supervisor would refer to the Hispanic
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workers’ lunches as “shit food.” Construing the facts most favorably to plaintiff, the
Court finds that plaintiff has raised an inference of a discriminatory hostile work
environment. Summary judgment will not enter on this claim.
Retaliation
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered retaliation for making complaints. Defendant
maintains that plaintiff did not make any complaints about discrimination that would be
protected under the statute.
To state a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must allege
that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of this activity;
(3) the employer took adverse action against the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection
exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Kessler v.
Westchester Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2006).
Complaints concerning safety or general employment conditions are not protected
activity under Title VII. Gonzales v. Eagle Leasing Co., 2015 WL 4886489, at * 6 (D.
Conn. 2015). An adverse employment action is any action that “could well dissuade a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). Proof of the causation element
“can be shown either: (1) indirectly, by showing that the protected activity was followed
closely by discriminatory treatment, or through other circumstantial evidence such as
disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct; or (2) directly,
through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against the plaintiff by the defendant.”
Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000). Retaliation
claims are also subject to the burden shifting paradigm applicable to disparate
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treatment claims. Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002).
Here, plaintiff asserts that he complained to his supervisor about discriminatory
treatment and that he thereafter became the subject of insults and punitive work
assignments such as picking up garbage in the freezing weather. Plaintiff has also
testified that Louis Eagle, defendant’s owner, repeatedly refused to meet with him to
discuss the discriminatory treatment.
Plaintiff has not established a causal connection between plaintiff’s complaints of
discrimination and his termination in August 2011. Without information regarding the
dates of plaintiff’s asserted protected activity or more specific information about his
termination, the Court cannot find that a causal connection exists. However, plaintiff
has indicated by his testimony that the insulting mistreatment and his demotion from
paint shop to garbage detail followed closely after his complaints of discrimination.
Summary judgment will be granted on the basis that plaintiff suffered retaliatory
termination, but will be denied as to other adverse employment actions, including
mistreatment and demotion.
Negligent Supervision
Plaintiff alleges that defendant is liable for the negligent supervision that resulted
in a discriminatory, hostile and unsafe workplace. Defendant argues that plaintiff
cannot establish that plaintiff sustained a sufficient injury to recover on a negligent
supervision claim.
To state a negligent supervision claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered an
injury due to the defendant’s failure to supervise an employee whom the defendant had
a duty to supervise. Abate v. Circuit-Wise, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 341, 344 (D. Conn.
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2001). Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for negligent supervision when the only alleged
harm is an injury based on violation of Title VII or emotional injury. See Deguzman v.
Kramer, 2005 WL 2030447, at *2 (D. Conn.) (unlawful discrimination alone is
insufficient to satisfy injury for negligent supervision); Antonopoulos v. Zitnay, 360 F.
Supp. 2d 420, 430-31 (D. Conn. 2005) (employee cannot bring negligence-based claim
against employer for emotional distress occurring during ongoing employment
relationship).
In support of his negligent supervision claim, plaintiff argues that he has suffered
“discrimination, harassment and retaliation by the defendant” and that defendant “owes
the plaintiff the duty not to discriminate against him.” Thus, even construed most
liberally, plaintiff asserts either an injury arising out the asserted Title VII violations or an
emotional injury. The Court will enter summary judgment on the claim of negligent
supervision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. #
50] is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Summary judgment is GRANTED on the
claims of discriminatory disparate treatment, retaliatory termination, and negligent
supervision. Summary judgment is DENIED on the claims for discriminatory hostile
work environment and retaliation based on adverse employment action of mistreatment
and demotion.
Dated this _22d___ day of September, 2015, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

/s/Warren W. Eginton
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WARREN W. EGINTON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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