Bryant v. Meriden Police Department et al

Filing 106

Minute Entry and Conference Memorandum and Order. Pretrial Conference and Motion Hearing held before Judge Stefan R. Underhill: granting in part and denying in part 98 Motion in Limine; granting in part and denying in part 99 Motion in Limine; granting 100 Motion in Limine. Jury selection is continued to 4/8/2016, jury trial will begin on 4/20/2016. Total Time: 1 hours and 52 minutes. (Court Reporter Sharon Masse.) (Landman, M)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
DERRICK BRYANT,
Plaintiff,
No. 3:13-cv-449 (SRU)
v.
MERIDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
ET AL.,
Defendants.

CONFERENCE MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On February 2, 2016, I held a pretrial conference on the record with counsel for the
plaintiff, Derrick Bryant, and counsel for the defendants, the Meriden Police Department and
several Meriden police officers. The purpose of the conference was to discuss my pretrial
procedures and resolve the pending motions in limine (docs. # 98-100). During the conference,
it became apparent that there was a risk that the case would not be able to be tried within the time
period that I had set aside for trial. Accordingly, I set a new trial schedule: jury selection is set
for April 8, 2016, at 9:00 a.m.; trial will begin on April 20, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. Trial will be held
on April 20th and 21st, and will resume on April 25th.
In addition to resetting the trial schedule, I heard argument and ruled on the pending
motions in limine. I ruled as follows:
(1)

Defendants’ motion to preclude the testimony of Desiree Jiminez and her video

recording of the alleged incident (doc. # 98) is granted in part, denied in part. Defendants’
motion, insofar as it moves to preclude Jiminez’s testimony, is denied without prejudice. At this
point, the parties have been unable to locate Jiminez, which has resulted in defendants’ inability
to take her deposition prior to trial. Because Jiminez is not a party witness, Bryant has no
obligation to make her available for a deposition. However, should Bryant become aware of her

location prior to trial, he is obligated to inform the defendants of her whereabouts so that they
can have an opportunity to depose her.
I denied defendants’ motion to preclude the admission of a cellphone video taken by
Jiminez, subject to someone being able to testify to its authenticity. The video may be properly
authenticated by anyone who can testify to the fact that it depicted the events as they occurred on
the date that is the subject of the instant dispute. Klevelend v. United States, 345 F.2d 134, 137
(2d Cir. 1965).
I granted defendants’ motion to the extent it seeks to exclude statements made on the
video by non-defendant witnesses. Accordingly, the video must be redacted in order to remove
any audio recording that includes statements from people other than the defendants.
(2)

Defendants’ motion to exclude portions of Bryant’s medical records (doc. # 99) is

granted in part, denied in part. Statements such as “beaten” and “assaulted” are inadmissible
hearsay statements, not subject to the Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) hearsay exception
because such statements attribute fault and are not made for the purposes of medical treatment or
diagnosis. To the extent that they could be seen as admissible under Rule 803(4), they are still
inadmissible because the risk of unfair prejudice caused by their admission outweighs their
probative value. Fed. R. Evid. 403. That said, statements made by Bryant indicating that he was
struck with the butt of a gun, tased, and struck with “fists, knees, and feet,” are admissible as
statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. Finally, I held that statements in
the medical records made by persons other than Bryant are inadmissible hearsay, not subject to
an exception.
(3)

Defendants’ motion to exclude evidence of other police misconduct or the fact

that Officer Palmer resigned after the events at issue (doc. # 100) is granted. I held that such

evidence falls within the scope of impermissible character evidence under Rule 404(b) and
accordingly is inadmissible.
In addition to ruling on above motions, I heard argument regarding the parties’ objections
to the proposed exhibits. With regard to defendants’ objection regarding the use of the
confidential informant’s name in Exhibit 17, I ordered the parties to redact the informant’s name
and replace it with the informant’s identification number, CI-295. The parties agreed that, in
order to preserve the anonymity of the informant, the informant would be referred to as CI-295
throughout the case. With respect to the other objections raised, I took the matters under
advisement. I instructed the parties to renew their objections on the morning before the opposing
party intends to offer an exhibit subject to an objection.
It is so ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 4th day of February 2016.

/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge