Heinonen v. Cramer & Anderson

Filing 43

ORDER granting Defendants' 15 Motion to Dismiss; denying Plaintiff's 22 Motion to Supplement/Amend his complaint; denying as moot 28 Motion to Strike. See the attached Memorandum of Decision. The Clerk is directed to close this case and to mail a copy of this Order to the pro se Plaintiff. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/20/13. (Ives, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

MARK HEINONEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CRAMER & ANDERSON LLP,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:13-CV-00459 (VLB)

DECEMBER 20, 2013

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
COMPLAINT [Dkt. #15]; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
COMPLAINT [Dkt. #22]

I.

Introduction
The pro se Plaintiff, Mark Heinonen (“Heinonen”), brings this action against

Defendant law firm Cramer & Anderson, along with John Tower and Scott
McCarthy, two of the firm’s attorneys, alleging various claims related to Mr.
Heinonen’s eviction from and sale of the property in which he lived.1 Cramer &
Anderson has moved to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims on four grounds: first, this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1);
second, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); third, this action is barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine; and fourth, the action is barred by res judicata as Plaintiff has
previously litigated his claims in state court. For the reasons that follow,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

1

While the case caption reflects that the Defendant in this action is the law firm
Cramer & Anderson, the Plaintiff also makes allegations against two partners of
the firm. The Court will consider this motion with reference to all three
Defendants against whom Plaintiff makes allegations.
1

II.

Factual Background
The following facts and allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s pro se

complaint. Plaintiff, a long-time resident of Connecticut, was a specific devisee
of real property located at 138 Route 37, South Sherman, Connecticut (the
“Property”), bequeathed to him by his mother, Barbara Heinonen Scott, upon her
death on December 1, 2006. [Dkt. #1, Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 3]. Plaintiff alleges in his
first count that the Defendants, hired by his sister-in-law, a non-party to Barbara
Heinonen Scott’s estate (the “Estate”), on February 14, 2008 “sent a State of
Connecticut Marshal to Plaintiffs [sic] home and served a fraudulent, harassing
and threatening, ‘NOTICE TO QUIT OCUPANCY’ [sic] document,” which declared
that the Plaintiff had violated a landlord tenant agreement that Plaintiff alleges did
not exist. [Id. at ¶ 4]. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants argued for sale of the
Property to satisfy debts of the Estate, but such debt was manufactured by the
Defendants. [Id. at ¶ 12]. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ claim that he no
longer had the right to occupy the Property is contradictory to Connecticut
statutes, that Defendants owe Barbara Heinonen Scott’s beneficiaries “a duty to
protect and preserve the property,” that they have “wasted the estate” and
“harassed, robbed and assaulted Plaintiff,” that the Defendants were never
retained by the Estate’s executor, Arthur Scott, and that “Defendant deceived The
Judges of the Appellate Court with slanderous, unfounded allegations” that the
decedent’s Estate was insolvent and that Heinonen had failed to pay property
taxes or maintain home owners insurance. [Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6, 11]. He also “suggests

2

that The Probate Court lacks jurisdiction to bring an eviction upon anyone.” [Id.
at ¶ 10].
Count two alleges that on January 3, 2011 the Defendants “had a Superior
Court Clerk sign an illegal ‘Execution of Eviction’ notice,” and Plaintiff and his
three minor children had only three days to evacuate the Property. [Id. at ¶ 13].
Plaintiff also contends that the Defendants “ignored the ‘Rules of Summary
Process’” when they provided only three days for him to vacate the property
instead of the requisite five, and that they ignored Plaintiff’s basic human rights
and defied Connecticut statutes. [Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14].
In count three, Plaintiff asserts that he was illegally evicted on January 6,
2011, after which the Defendants wasted the Estate and the Property deteriorated
while unoccupied and unmaintained. [Id. at ¶ 15]. On November 15, 2011 “the
Defendants encouraged the executor [of the Estate], Arthur Scott to sign a
‘Contract of Sale’ of Plaintiff’s property,” before a probate judge had authorized a
sale. [Id. at ¶ 16]. He claims that his Property was “illegally sold and [is] being
illegally occupied, due to the Defendants [sic] disregard to Law, pursuant to the
sale of property and rules of the court.” [Id. at ¶ 18]. Plaintiff notes that he “is
appealing the Probate Courts [sic] December 2011 erroneous authorization to
‘Sell or Mortgage Real Property.’” [Id. at ¶ 17].
Plaintiff’s fourth count alleges false arrest. On January 11, 2013, “Plaintiff
called several media outlets to verify his invitations to witness a summary
judgment hearing scheduled for January 14th, 2013” at which the Plaintiff

3

“intended to prove that the Defendants have been misrepresenting Arthur Scott
and was seeking public support to encourage the presiding Judge to respond
appropriately.” [Id. at ¶ 20]. Then, “[a] telephone receptionist from WFSB
Channel 3 News responded by calling the Court and mentioned that the Plaintiff
had made a reference to the Sandy Hook massacre.” [Id. at ¶ 21]. Plaintiff’s
complaint further explains that “Plaintiff’s reference to the Sandy Hook massacre
was a statement that suggested that the courts should show consideration and
concern to litigate [sic] who suffer with mental illness.” [Id.]. He further notes
“[f]or seven years Plaintiff has complained to the courts, that condoning
defendant’s blatant dishonesty, false representation, unauthorized practice of law
and fraud has caused Plaintiff to suffer undue seizures.” [Id.].
He alleges that Defendants “heard about Plaintiffs [sic] invitation to the
News media and retaliated by concocting bazaar [sic] allegations that Plaintiff
was somehow threatening the court” and so sent Connecticut State Police to his
residence. [Id. at ¶ 22]. The Troopers, he asserts, then “questioned Plaintiff
about his conversation with the phone receptionist for Channel 3 News,” took his
statement, and “departed assured that the Plaintiff was not threatening and
allegations that the Defendant made that ‘Plaintiff threatened the Court’ were
without merit.” [Id. at ¶ 23].
“Defendants were disappointed with the State Troopers conclusion” and so
they “had a judge conspire to arrest Plaintiff, based on Defendants [sic]
fabricated, nonsense allegation, and held without bond on erroneous 1st Degree
Threatening charges.” Seven weeks later he was released on a promise to
4

appear. [Id. at ¶24]. In so doing, the Defendants “succeeded in disabling
[Plaintiff] from submitting two ‘Briefs’ due in the Appellate Court in February
2013.” [Id. at ¶ 25].
Plaintiff’s prayer for relief contains further allegations and requests varied
relief from this Court. Plaintiff first requests that this Court “reprimand” the
Defendants for their “dishonesty and attack on a disabled citizen, his deceased
mother and her beloved grandchildren,” as “they had no right to pursue an
eviction, fraudulently declaring to represent the executor of the estate.” [Dkt. # 1,
Compl. at p. 7, ¶ 1]. He also alleges, among other things, that the “Defendants
forced homelessness on a disabled citizen and three minor children without
reason” by evicting him, which defies the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. [Id. at ¶ 2]. As the Defendants’ “illegal and immoral proceeding”
caused irreparable injury, Plaintiff requests disbarment of the Defendants. [Id.].
Plaintiff next asserts that “Defendants conspired with The Judge of the probate
court, a confused realtor [ ], and an inscrutable Banking Institution, and illegally
sold plaintiffs [sic] property behind his back,” and contends that the “Defendants
harmful error, selling someone else’s property without their permission, and
when an appeal from The Probate Courts [sic] illogical authorization ‘To Sell or
Mortgage Real Property’, is pending in Superior Court, is a mistake that needs
correction.” [Dkt. # 1, Compl. at p. 8, ¶ 3]. As to Plaintiff’s fourth count for false
arrest, he “moves the court to acknowledge Defendants [sic] irrational and illegal
actions” as, “[w]hile Plaintiff was unjustly incarcerated, 16 million dollars,

5

requested restitution for Professional Malpractice, was dismissed by the
Appellate Court” and other of Plaintiff’s lawsuits were “derailed.” [Id. at ¶ 4].
III.

Standard of Review
“‘To survive a motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Sarmiento v. U.S., 678 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, “[a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotations omitted). “Where a complaint
pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id.
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court
should follow a “two-pronged approach” to evaluate the sufficiency of the
complaint. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). “A court ‘can
choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
6

U.S. at 679). “At the second step, a court should determine whether the ‘wellpleaded factual allegations,’ assumed to be true, ‘plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal
quotations omitted).
In general, the Court’s review on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) “is limited to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the
complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any
documents incorporated in the complaint by reference.” McCarthy v. Dun &
Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court may also consider
“matters of which judicial notice may be taken” and “documents either in
plaintiffs’ possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in
bringing suit.” Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993);
Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 131 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2011); Patrowicz v. Transamerica
HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144 (D. Conn. 2005)(MRK).
Unlike the Connecticut Superior Court, which is a court of general
jurisdiction, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not hear
claims over which they have no subject matter jurisdiction. Mims v. Arrow Fin.
Servs, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 747 (2012); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (federal courts
“possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute”). Lack of
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by a party or by the court
7

sua sponte. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (“When a requirement
goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte
issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not presented. Subject-matter
jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited.”) (internal citations omitted);
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011) (“Courts do
not usually raise claims or arguments on their own. But federal courts have an
independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their
jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions
that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.”).
In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(1) the Court “may resolve disputed factual issues by reference to
evidence outside the pleadings, including affidavits.” State Emps. Bargaining
Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 77 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2007). See also Morrison v.
Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In resolving a motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) a district
court may consider evidence outside the pleadings”); Makarova v. U.S., 201 F.3d
110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding same). Further, “[i]f the court determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Finally, the Court notes that the Paintiff brings this action pro se. It is well
established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally
and interpreted “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Jabbar v.
Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks, alterations, and citation
8

omitted); see also Toliver v. City of New York, 530 F. App'x 90, 91 (2d Cir. 2013);
Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2008); Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d
241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006); Sharpe v. Conole, 386 F.3d 482, 484 (2d Cir. 2004);
Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003); Bennett v. Goord,
343 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2003). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks
and quotation omitted). “This policy of liberally construing pro se submissions is
driven by the understanding that implicit in the right of self-representation is an
obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro
se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of
legal training.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV.

Discussion
a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint

pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Plaintiff is asking the Court to
review and/or reverse final judgments rendered by various state courts prior to
the filing of this action.
“United States District Courts lack subject matter jurisdiction under the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine over claims that effectively challenge state court
judgments.” Russo v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 13-1475, --- F. App’x ---, 2013 WL

9

6332551, at * (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2013). See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) (holding that “a United States District Court has
no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings”);
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (noting that “no court of the
United States other than [the Supreme Court] could entertain a proceeding to
reverse or modify [a state court's] judgment for errors”). A federal court must
abstain from considering claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where
“(1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by
the state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites district court review of that
judgment, and (4) the state court judgment was entered before the plaintiff's
federal suit commenced.” McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010).
District courts lack jurisdiction “over challenges to state court decisions in
particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges
allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at
486; Russo, 2013 WL 6332551, at *1 (same); Jordan v. Levine, 12-3339, --- F. App’x
---, 2013 WL 5788643, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 2013) (same). The United States
Supreme Court is the only federal court that has jurisdiction to review state court
decisions. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486 (“Review of [state court] decisions may
be had only in this Court.”); Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 185 (2d
Cir. 1999) (pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “among federal courts, only
the Supreme Court has subject matter jurisdiction to review state court
judgments”).

10

Here, the Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
to hear Plaintiff’s first, second, and third counts, each dealing with decisions
rendered in state court. First, as the Plaintiff has explicitly recognized in his
complaint, he has lost in state court on several occasions and, indeed, the facts
underlying the present action have a long and torturous history in state court
dating back to 2008. Arthur Scott, the executor of the Estate of Barbara Heinonen
Scott (and Mrs. Scott’s husband), brought a summary process action against
Mark Heinonen in 2008, seeking to evict Heinonen from the home that the
decedent had owned before her death and which had been devised to Mr.
Heinonen (and which is the Property at issue in the present federal action). The
probate court authorized the executor to market the home for sale to satisfy the
financial obligations of the Estate. The Superior Court, Judicial District of
Danbury, Geographical Area No. 3, entered judgment of possession in favor of
Heinonen. See Scott v. Heinonen, 118 Conn. App. 577 (2009). On December 29,
2009, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed and remanded the lower court’s
decision, holding that Heinonen did not hold title to the property specifically
devised to him by his deceased mother at the time the executor of the Estate
served upon him a Notice to Quit the property by February 20, 2008. Rather, the
court held that the Estate itself held proper legal title to the property, entitling
Scott to serve the Notice to Quit on the Plaintiff and to evict him. Scott v.
Heinonen, 118 Conn. App. 577, 581-82 (2009). In so holding, the Appellate Court
recognized that “[o]ur legislature has granted the Probate Court the power to
authorize the sale of specifically devised property to satisfy the debts of an

11

estate. Common sense dictates that inherent in such an order is a right to
immediate possession and control of such property by the administrator of the
estate to make the property marketable.” Id. at 584. The court concluded that
Arthur Scott, as executor of the Estate, was entitled to summary process as a
matter of law. Id. at 589. On February 25, 2010 the Connecticut Supreme Court
denied Heinonen’s petition for certiorari. Scott v. Heinonen, 295 Conn. 909 (Feb.
25, 2010).
Heinonen subsequently lost in a second superior court summary process
action mirroring the first. On October 12, 2010, the Connecticut Appellate Court
dismissed his appeal, declining to write a direct opinion on this appeal and
instead citing directly to its prior decision in the first summary process action,
Scott v. Heinonen, 118 Conn. App. 577, 581-82 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 909
(2010). The Connecticut Supreme Court denied Heinonen’s appeal of the
Appellate Court’s October 12, 2010 summary dismissal. Scott v. Heinonen, 299
Conn. 913 (Nov. 16, 2010). The U.S. Supreme Court then denied Heinonen’s
petition for writ of certiorari and subsequently denied his petition for a rehearing.
Heinonen v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 2905 (May 23, 2011), rehearing denied 132 S. Ct. 59
(Aug. 15, 2011).
The Plaintiff has filed and lost various other actions in state court related to
the facts alleged in this action. On January 24, 2011, Plaintiff commenced a pro
se action on behalf of himself and his minor children in Danbury Superior Court
against Attorney John Tower of Cramer & Anderson in which he alleged various
counts including fraud, assault of a disabled citizen, “disrespect to Superior
12

Court order,” grand larceny, and “loss of enjoyment of life.” Heinonen’s
allegations stemmed from Tower’s representation of executor Arthur Scott in
prior actions in which Heinonen was a defendant, including the two summary
process actions noted previously which resulted in Connecticut Appellate Court
decisions in the Estate’s favor. The superior court granted Tower’s motion for
summary judgment on June 24, 2011, concluding that Tower was not liable to
Heinonen relating to his representation of executor Arthur Scott, as Tower “owed
no duty to either Heinonen or his children.” Heinonen v. Tower, No.
DBDCV115008889S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jun. 24, 2011) (docket entry number 115.00),
available at http://civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov/GetDocket.aspx.
Heinonen filed a second action in Danbury Superior Court on December 7,
2011 against John Tower and Scott McCarthy, both defendants in the present
action. Heinonen alleged five counts: (1) the defendants committed “legal
malpractice” in the initiation of legal proceedings against Heinonen which
resulted in his eviction from his home, which previously belonged to his mother;
(2) the defendants “wasted the money” which he was ordered in a prior
proceeding to pay on a monthly basis for the benefit of his mother’s Estate; (3)
the defendants committed defamation relating to two allegedly “illegal eviction
actions” as well as to the Appellate Court’s decision, Scott v. Heinonen, 118
Conn. App. 577 (2009); (4) the defendants violated Heinonen’s due process rights
in relation to various proceedings and hearings in which they caused “many
erroneous court decisions,” have “tricked the courts,” “made up harmful and
hurtful misinformation,” and caused him “anxiety and physical harm;” and (5) the
13

defendants’ caused Heinonen “loss of enjoyment of life.” Heinonen v. McCarthy,
No. CV 115009005S, 2012 WL 4040336, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2012). The
Connecticut Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and against Heinonen on all five counts, noting of his due process
claim that “Plaintiff has failed to identify any legal authority which establishes a
right of action for due process violations in other pending or prior litigation.” Id.
at *3. The court also granted summary judgment on the basis of res judicata,
concluding that “the underlying factual claims and allegations in the
[DBDCV115008889S superior court action] appear to be exactly the same claims”
asserted in the later action, which shared an identical nucleus of common fact
with the earlier action. Id. at *4-5. Finally, the court made a special finding
pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-226a that Heinonen’s action was without merit
and not in good faith. Id. at *6.
Each of the foregoing state court judgments was entered before the
commencement of this federal action on April 8, 2013.
Plaintiff’s first, second, and third causes of action are plainly barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In this action, Plaintiff alleges in his first count that the
Defendant’s February 14, 2008 Notice to Quit Occupancy was “fraudulent,
harassing and threatening,” that Plaintiff was entitled to occupy the property at
that time, that Plaintiff was illegally evicted, that the “Probate Court lacks
jurisdiction to bring an eviction upon anyone,” that the probate court’s order to
market the property should have been dismissed, and that Cramer & Anderson
had no right to represent the Estate. [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 7, 10, 12]. Count
14

two alleges that on January 3, 2011 the Defendants “had a Superior Court Clerk
sign an illegal ‘Execution of Eviction’ notice,” and that the Defendants “ignored
the ‘Rules of Summary Process’” when they provided only three days for him to
vacate the property instead of the requisite five. [Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14]. Finally, count
three alleges that the property was illegally sold after Plaintiff’s eviction and that
the Defendants have since “wasted the estate.” [Id. at ¶¶ 15-19]. In his prayer for
relief, Heinonen further alleges that Cramer & Anderson had no right to pursue an
eviction as it did not represent the executor of his mother’s Estate. [Id. at p. 7 ¶
1]. He also contends that “Defendants conspired with The Judge of the probate
court, a confused realtor [ ], and an inscrutable Banking Institution, and illegally
sold plaintiffs [sic] property behind his back,” and proclaims that the “Defendants
harmful error, selling someone else’s property without their permission, and
when an appeal from The Probate Courts [sic] illogical authorization ‘To Sell or
Mortgage Real Property’, is pending in Superior Court, is a mistake that needs
correction.” [Dkt. # 1, Compl. at p. 8, ¶ 3]. As a result of these violations, Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendants have forced homelessness on him and his children
without reason as a result of illegal eviction and sale of the Property.
It is clear on the face of the Plaintiff’s complaint that he seeks review of
prior Connecticut state court decisions which allowed his mother’s Estate to evict
him, take possession of the Property belonging to the Estate, and sell the
Property to pay the debts of the Estate. Each of Plaintiff’s first three causes of
action specifically rely on actions taken pursuant to state court decisions.
Indeed, Plaintiff explicitly seeks review of the various state court decisions by
15

this Court: in his prayer for relief, Heinonen asserts that “The Defendants [sic]
harmful error, selling someone else’s property without their permission, and
when an appeal from the The Probate Courts [sic] illogical authorization, ‘To Sell
or Mortgage Real Property’, is pending in Superior Court, is a mistake that needs
correction.” [Id. at p.8 ¶ 3]. He also claims that the Defendant’s contention that
he no longer had a right to occupy the property – a conclusion reached by the
Connecticut Appellate Court on two separate occasions – “is contradictory to the
CT STAT of law.” [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶ 5]. Elsewhere, Plaintiff claims that “The
Probate Court lacks jurisdiction to bring an eviction upon anyone,” an assertion
refuted by the Connecticut Appellate Court, and that the probate court’s
December 2011 authorization for sale of the property was “erroneous.” [Id. at
¶10]. In sum, the Plaintiff is essentially attempting to appeal prior state court
judgments in federal district court, which may not hear such appeals. It would be
impossible for this Court to pass judgment on Plaintiff’s first three claims without
engaging in direct review of judgments rendered by the Connecticut state courts,
and the Court could not rule in Plaintiff’s favor without effectively reversing or
contradicting those final state court judgments. Such a review is not permissible
under Rooker-Feldman. This Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
counts one, two, or three, and those counts must be DISMISSED.
b. Count 4: Failure to State a Claim and Lack of Jurisdiction
The Defendant argues that dismissal of the Plaintiff’s complaint is
necessary pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) because the Plaintiff has failed
to allege that the Defendant acted under color of state law such that Cramer &
16

Anderson may be held liable for alleged Constitutional violations. As this Court
lacks jurisdiction over counts one, two, and three of Plaintiff’s complaint, the
Court will analyze the merits of this argument as applied to count four only.
Any person who, under color of state law, deprives another person of his
or her Constitutional rights is liable for injuries caused by the deprivation. 42
U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must show
that a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a federal
constitutional or statutory right.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 405-06 (2d
Cir. 2013). “A private actor may be liable under § 1983 only if there is a
sufficiently ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that
seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’ ”
Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brentwood Acad.
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)).
Plaintiff’s fourth count alleges that the Defendants conspired with a
superior court judge to have him falsely arrested for threatening. [Id. at ¶¶20-26].
To the extent that Heinonen alleges that Attorneys Tower or McCarthy acted
under color of state law because they engaged in a conspiracy with a Connecticut
superior court judge to falsely arrest him, Heinonen has failed to plead facts
plausibly suggesting that the judge committed any unconstitutional act and has
failed to offer facts sufficient to state a claim for conspiracy such that Tower,
McCarthy, or Cramer & Anderson could be liable.
To state a claim against a private entity on a section 1983
conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts
17

demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the
state actor to commit an unconstitutional act. Put differently,
a private actor acts under color of state law when the private
actor is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its
agents. A merely conclusory allegation that a private entity
acted in concert with a state actor does not suffice to state a §
1983 claim against the private entity.
Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
The Plaintiff has clearly alleged in his complaint that he “called several
media outlets to verify his invitations to witness a summary judgment hearing
scheduled for January 14th, 2013” in state superior court and that, during these
phone calls, he made reference to the Sandy Hook massacre that took the lives of
twenty-six children and educators in Newtown, Connecticut in December 2012,
less than a month prior to his calls. [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21]. Subsequently,
“[a] telephone receptionist from WFSB Channel 3 News responded by calling the
Court and mentioned that the Plaintiff had made a reference to the Sandy Hook
massacre.” [Id. at ¶ 21]. Plaintiff’s complaint further explains that his reference
to this event “was a statement that suggested that the courts should show
consideration and concern to litigate [sic] who suffer with mental illness.” [Id.].
He alleges that Cramer & Anderson “heard about Plaintiffs [sic] invitation to the
News media and retaliated by concocting bazaar [sic] allegations that Plaintiff
was somehow threatening the court” and so sent State Troopers to his residence.
[Id. at ¶ 22]. The Troopers, he asserts, then “questioned Plaintiff about his
conversation with the phone receptionist for Channel 3 News,” took his
statement, and “departed assured that the Plaintiff was not threatening and
18

allegations that the Defendant made that ‘Plaintiff threatened the Court’ were
without merit.” [Id. at ¶ 23].
Although the Plaintiff contends that “Defendants were disappointed with
the State Troopers conclusion” and so “had a judge conspire to arrest Plaintiff,
based on Defendants [sic] fabricated, nonsense allegation, and held without bond
on erroneous 1st Degree Threatening charges,” nothing in Plaintiff’s allegations
ties Cramer & Anderson or its attorneys to his arrest, and the plain facts as
relayed by Plaintiff himself demonstrate that the superior court judge who
apparently issued a warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest on threatening charges
committed no Constitutional violations by so doing. By his own admission, the
Plaintiff called local media outlets and explicitly referenced a mass murder that
took the lives of twenty-six people barely one month before Plaintiff’s call,
apparently in a bid to draw public attention to his legal plight and to draw the
media to an upcoming public hearing which he would be attending. While this
Court does not doubt that Heinonen’s explanation that his reference to Sandy
Hook was innocent and only “suggested that the courts should show
consideration and concern to litigate [sic] who suffer with mental illness” is true,
this reference could nonetheless reasonably have been – and apparently was –
understood to be an implicit threat that great physical harm would come to those
who failed to show consideration to litigants with mental illness such as the
Plaintiff. Based on allegations of the Plaintiff’s complaint, the superior court
judge did not abuse his or her discretion in finding probable to sign an arrest
warrant.
19

Furthermore, Heinonen’s complaint plainly admits that he called various
news outlets and referenced the Sandy Hook massacre, at which point a phone
receptionist for a media outlet contacted the court. He also admits that State
Troopers questioned him about his conversation with the phone receptionist
when they arrived at his residence. Despite acknowledging that the receptionist
called the court after receiving Heinonen’s call, and despite that the Troopers
specifically questioned Plaintiff about this call to a news outlet, the Plaintiff
conclusorily alleges that the reason he was arrested was because Tower and
McCarthy heard about Plaintiff’s calls to the media, concocted allegations of
threatening against him, “sent Connecticut State Police to Plaintiff’s residence,”
and subsequently “had a judge conspire to arrest Plaintiff.” The Plaintiff has
offered no evidence connecting the unnamed superior court judge and Attorneys
Tower or Anderson. Rather, his complaint specifically alleges that a
representative of the news media contacted the court to report Plaintiff’s
reference to the Sandy Hook massacre. Plaintiff’s allegations are thus
conclusory and are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the private
Defendants.
Finally, the Court notes that the criminal charges against Heinonen
stemming from this incident remain pending in state court. See Docket No. D03DCR13-0145765-S, available at
http://www.jud2.ct.gov/crdockets/CaseDetail.aspx?source=Pending&Key=7db116
ac-5f27-43e4-a5ec-2fe62594346b. “The Connecticut common law tort of false
arrest ‘is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another.’ ”
20

Miles v. City of Hartford, 445 F. App'x 379, 383 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Green v.
Donroe, 186 Conn. 265 (1982)). The Second Circuit has expressly held that
favorable termination is an element of a § 1983 claim sounding in false
imprisonment or false arrest. Miles v. City of Hartford, 445 F. App'x 379, 383 (2d
Cir. 2011); Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 853 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A person who
thinks there is not even probable cause to believe he committed the crime with
which he is charged must pursue the criminal case to an acquittal or an
unqualified dismissal, or else waive his section 1983 claim.”). Even if the Plaintiff
has plausibly alleged that Cramer & Anderson or its representatives were acting
under color of state law for purposes of his false arrest claim, the Plaintiff has not
and cannot allege that these criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor
such that a false arrest claim pursuant to § 1983 would be ripe for review. This
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this claim.
Absent a plausible claim of constitutional injury by the superior court judge
or the State Troopers who apparently executed an arrest warrant, Heinonen
cannot claim that any role the private defendant law firm took in his arrest (and
Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that the Defendant firm or attorneys had any
role) was collusive action under color of state law. Moreover, Plaintiff’s false
arrest claim is not ripe for review at this time. Count four must be DISMISSED.
c. Lack of Diversity Jurisdiction
Cramer & Anderson alternatively moves to dismiss on the ground that this
Court lacks jurisdiction over this action because the parties are not diverse and

21

the Plaintiff has asserted no federal question over which this Court may preside.
The Court agrees.
Federal district courts have original diversity jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 and is
between citizens of different States. 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1). For a case to be
diverse, there must be complete diversity of parties; “[d]iversity is not complete if
any plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders Supply, 409 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 2005). Here,
the Plaintiff avers in his complaint that he is a “longtime (forty-five years) resident
of the State of Connecticut.” [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶ 1]. He alleges that “Defendants
(John Tower & Scott McCarthy) are partners of the law firm, Cramer & Anderson,
located at 51 Main Street New Milford, CT.” [Id. at ¶2]. Thus, as all parties to this
action are citizens of the state of Connecticut, no diversity exists and this Court
may not exercise jurisdiction based on diversity of the parties.
Federal district courts also have original jurisdiction “of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
1331. A case arises under federal law if “a well-pleaded complaint establishes
either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”
Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006) (quoting
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern
Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983)).

22

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable,
clear federal question arising under the U.S. Constitution or laws that would
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Court and, even where Plaintiff invokes
the U.S. Constitution, has failed to allege any facts that could make his claims
cognizable against a non-state actor. The Court agrees.
Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that the Defendant sent to him a
“fraudulent, harassing and threatening” Notice to Quit Occupancy, that the
defendants have wasted the estate and violated a duty to protect and preserve
the property, have violated Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-139b2, and have “deceived The
Judges of the Appellate Court with slanderous, unfound allegations.” [Dkt. 1,
Compl. ¶¶4-6, 11]. Plaintiff’s third count appears to allege that the Defendants
wasted the Estate and that the property was illegally sold. No clear federal cause
of action is alleged in counts one or three over which this Court has jurisdiction
absent diversity of the parties.3
Counts two and four contain allegations that the Defendants “ignored the
‘Rules of Summary Process’” in the eviction proceeding, and that they conspired
to have the Plaintiff falsely arrested and, as a result, “succeeded in disabling him
from submitting two ‘Briefs’ due in the Appellate Court in February 2013.” [Dkt.
#1, Compl. ¶¶ 13-14, 20-25]. In his prayer for relief, the Plaintiff alleges that
“Defendants [sic] cruel and evil ‘execution of eviction’ defies the 14th Amendment

2

The Court notes that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-139b does not exist. Section 45a139 deals with probate bonds and waivers.
3
As previously discussed, these claims are also barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
23

of The Constitution.” [Compl., page 7 ¶ 2]. To the extent that the Plaintiff is
alleging a due process claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, or a false
arrest claim pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the Plaintiff has not included any
allegation against Cramer & Anderson or its attorneys that would allow the Court
to conclude that the Defendant(s) is (or are) state actors such that this Court
could hear such constitutional tort claims against them. As discussed
previously, Heinonen has failed to plausibly allege a conspiracy between the
judge and the private attorneys pursuant to § 1983 in count four, and has failed to
allege action by which the Court can reasonably infer that the Defendant was
acting under color of state law in his remaining three counts. Further, any
Constitutional due process violation alleged in count two is barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine, as count two requires this Court to analyze prior state court
decisions. Thus, the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that this case involves
a question of federal law over which this Court has jurisdiction.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that “[i]f the court determines
at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). See also Lovejoy v. Watson, 475 F. App'x 792 (2d
Cir. 2012) (“Where jurisdiction is lacking, ... dismissal is mandatory.”) (citation
omitted). Because the Plaintiff has not pled diversity of citizenship and his
complaint lacks any articulable claims based on the Constitution or federal laws,

24

this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case and it must be
dismissed.4
d. Plaintiff’s Request to Supplement the Complaint
The last page of Plaintiff’s opposition to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss
contains a “Request for Judicial Notice,” which requests that the Court “review
the attached, ‘related case’ complaint” which relates to the Plaintiff’s allegations
of conspiracy. It also notes that the Plaintiff “intends to amend his complaint to
include several other Defendants,” including those named in the superior court
action of which Plaintiff would like the Court to take notice, “the Real Estate
Agency, the Bank, the Insurance Agency, the Executor of the Estate and his
attorney, the non-blood relative, non-party to the Estate responsible for financing
the Defendants [sic] actions.” [Dkt. #23, p. 3]. The Plaintiff did not attach
anything to this opposition. However, Heinonen had previously filed a Motion to
Supplement his Complaint. The case caption on Plaintiff’s motion to supplement
lists the case as one filed in Danbury Superior Court, No. DBDcv125009110,
against “Jepson, George (CT State Police)” on July 29, 2013. [Dkt. #22, p. 1]. The
Court assumes that the request for judicial notice articulated in Plaintiff’s
opposition to the motion to dismiss pertains to the superior court case filed as a
motion to supplement his complaint, and that the Plaintiff would like to

4

The Defendant also argues that the Plaintiff’s complaint is vague and
conclusory and thus fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, and that Plaintiff’s first,
second, and third causes of action must be dismissed on the basis of res judicata
because Heinonen has already litigated these claims in prior state court
proceedings. Given the various other reasons for dismissal of this complaint, the
Court declines to address these arguments.
25

supplement his complaint to include the allegations and the defendants in the
state court action. The Defendants object both to Plaintiff’s motion to
supplement and his request for judicial notice.
In his motion to supplement, which appears to be the text of a filing on the
superior court docket noted above, Heinonen “brings mention to the Court that a
complaint for false arrest was filed October 22, 2012. Defendant never answered
Plaintiffs [sic] Complain [sic] and entered an erroneous, out of order ‘Motion to
Strike’, five months later on March 1st, 2013.” [Id.]. He claims that “all of the
States allegations and arrest are plainly retaliatory response to Plaintiffs [sic]
Civil Actions brought upon them.” [Id.]. The motion then proceeds to reiterate
the circumstances surrounding the Plaintiff’s arrest on January 11, 2013 for
threatening and alleges that the arrest was the result of a conspiracy involving
the State Police, John Tower, State Prosecutor Stephan Sedenski, and Superior
Court Judge Blowie. [Id.].
A review of the Connecticut Judicial Branch’s website reveals that the case
of which Heinonen requests that this Court take notice was filed on October 22,
2012, before the filing of this federal action, against Attorney General George
Jepson and Connecticut State Police Trooper Robert Burke. See
http://civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov/CaseDetail/PublicCaseDetail.aspx?DocketNo=DBDCV
125009110S. On August 13, 2013, after the present action was filed, the superior
court granted the defendants’ motion to strike Heinonen’s complaint, which
contained a false arrest claim, in its entirety. [DBD-CV12-5009110-S, Dkt. no.
103.25, 8/15/13].
26

To the extent that Plaintiff is requesting leave to amend his complaint as to
his allegations of false arrest, the motion is DENIED. To the extent that Plaintiff
requests leave to add defendants to this federal action, the motion is DENIED.
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend a pleading
at this juncture “only with the opposing party’s written consent or with the
court’s leave,” which should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, “it is within the sound discretion of the district court to
grant or deny leave to amend.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d
184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007). A court should deny leave to amend only upon a showing
of “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice
to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of
amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Dougherty v. Town of N.
Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2002) (same).
“Granting leave to amend is futile if it appears that plaintiff cannot address the
deficiencies identified by the court and allege facts sufficient to support the
claim.” Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc'ns, Inc., 347 F. App'x 617, 622 (2d
Cir. 2009). A proposed amendment is also futile if it could not withstand a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Dougherty, 282 F.3d at 88. See also Basile
v. Connolly, 13-339-CV, --- F. App’x ---, 2013 WL 4711473, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 3,
2013) (“while a district court generally should not dismiss a pro se complaint
without granting the plaintiff leave to amend, such leave is not necessary when it
would be futile.”).

27

As discussed previously, the criminal charges brought against Plaintiff in
connection with his January 11, 2013 arrest are still pending and the Plaintiff has
not received a favorable determination of the charges such that his false arrest
claim is ripe for adjudication. The addition of defendants related to this claim is
improper for the same reason. Furthermore, the addition of probate and/or
superior court judges and other private parties involved in the eviction of the
Plaintiff and his children as defendants in this action is barred by this Court’s
lack of jurisdiction to hear probate matters and barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, as the Connecticut Appellate Court has twice held that the Plaintiff’s
eviction from and sale of property owned by the Estate of his deceased mother
was legal and proper.5 Moreover, superior and probate court judges are immune
from suit for judicial acts in proceedings within the judge’s jurisdiction. Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–62 (1978); Owens v. State of N.Y. Attorney Gen., 10
F. App’x 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2001) (amendment is futile if proposed defendants would
be immune from suit for their conduct). As the Plaintiff is unable to cure the
jurisdictional deficiencies of his original complaint by amendment, amendment is
futile. Plaintiff’s motion to amend and/or supplement his complaint is DENIED.
V.

Conclusion

5

The Court notes that, in his reply to the Defendant’s objection to his request to
amend, Plaintiff again clearly asks this Court to review the judgments of the state
courts that have previously heard his eviction and sale of property claims.
“Plaintiff asks this Court to recognize what time has clearly proven: Plaintiff and
His Children were illegally evicted from their Homestead see section 120a 139b
without cause. . . . Defendants – without cause – illegally sold Plaintiffs [sic]
property and have continued to misappropriate the proceeds from their dirty
deal.” [Dkt. #27, P’s Response, p. 2].
28

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ [Dkt. #15] Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiff’s complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement his complaint
is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

________/s/______________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: December 20, 2013

29