Chapman v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp

Filing 146

ORDER granting in part 93 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is directed to DISMISS Counts One and Three, i.e., the federal ADEA claim, WITH PREJUDICE and without costs. As for Counts Two, Four, Five, and Six, these are state law claims and the Court declines to accept jurisdiction over them. The Clerk is directed to DISMISS those Counts WITHOUT PREJUDICE and without costs. The Clerk is directed to close the case. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 12/3/2015. (Shin, D.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

MARK CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff,
No. 13-cv-00518 (VAB)

v.
SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,
Defendant.

RULING ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Mark Chapman, filed an amended complaint [Doc. No. 19] against his former
employer, Defendant Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (“Sikorsky”), alleging violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Connecticut Fair
Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60 et seq., invasion of privacy,
and libel per se. Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 93]. For the
reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims arising under
federal law. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
law claims and dismisses them without prejudice.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mark Chapman began working at Sikorsky in February 2007, at the age of 47, as a
manager of Technical Training Systems. 56(a) Stmts. ¶ 1. In or about July 2010, he began
reporting to Terry Eichman, who had until that time been reporting to him. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. During
his tenure at Sikorsky, Chapman received exceptional performance or fully competent personnel
reviews, most recently in April 2011, and was awarded tens of thousands of dollars in bonuses,

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including a performance-based bonus for work he did in 2010. Chapman Dep. 37, 52; Eichman
Dep. 74-75.
Beginning in the summer of 2011, however, when Chapman was 52 years-old,
Chapman’s supervisor, Eichman, allegedly began making derogatory comments about Chapman
and other older employees based on their age. See, e.g., Chapman Dep. 52 (“[Eichman] would
look at me . . . and say, well, you’re having a senior moment”); Chapman Dep. 49 (“[Eichman]
said you got a bunch of old prunellas down there and you need to get rid of some of that, and
start to look at some folks that . . . are going to be with us a longer period of time); Chapman
Dep. 263 (“Eichman told me, specifically, that I was getting too old, and that I wasn’t able to
keep up with the work”); Chapman Dep. 342 (“[Eichman] said, ‘you look like an old bag of
bones.’”). Eichman also allegedly asked Chapman his age at least three times during the weeks
leading up to Chapman’s termination, including two days before the termination, and when
Chapman responded with his age, Eichman would respond with a derogatory comment, such as,
“you’re just getting too old to continue to do this.” Chapman Dep. 340-42. In addition, in late
August 2011, when Chapman was getting ready to take time off from work for surgery, Eichman
told him that he was “a bug under a magnifying lens with senior management,” and that senior
management was “looking to get rid of [him] in the next 30 to 60 days.” Chapman Dep. 50.
On the morning of Thursday, September 1, 2011, Eichman wrote “an urgent email” to
Chapman regarding an assignment related to a Malaysia project that he said was due by 3:00
p.m. the next day. Chapman Dep. 288-89; Pl. Ex. N. Chapman was able to complete the
assignment by early the next afternoon, and Eichman responded to him after the weekend by
saying, “I didn’t think you would be able to get that done.” Id.

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The project most relevant to this litigation is Sikorsky’s proposal to sell Black Hawk
helicopters to the Royal Brunei Air Force, together with after-market support, ground support
equipment, logistical support, and training (the “Brunei project”). Id. ¶ 5. Chapman was
responsible for the training component of the proposal. Id. ¶ 6. There was some dissatisfaction
expressed by Linda Scott, the business acquisition manager for the Brunei project, with
Chapman’s work; Scott expected items outside the scope of the tender would be included in the
work on the project and Chapman believed it would have been unlawful to include these items.
56(a) Stmts. ¶¶ 8, 11-14.
Scott sent the team, including Chapman, an email at 12:28 p.m. on September 22, 2011,
detailing deficiencies with the training plan and changes that needed to be made. Chapman
responded, “if the customer is so disappointed, please send us the written documentation of this.”
Def. Ex. B. Scott responded that the customer had not provided written documentation, but “was
most disappointed in the training.” Id. Chapman responded that he found it “very disconcerting
and unusual” that the team had been in Brunei all week and that no disappointment had been
expressed to him or any other member of the team that he was aware of, and that there was also
nothing in writing raising the issues Scott was now bringing up. Pl. Ex. X. Chapman then
emailed Eichman at 12:54 p. m. to explain that changes Scott was requesting were “out of scope
and beyond the contents of the tender.” Pl. Ex. Y; see also Lightsey Dep. 45-46 (noting that
some of Scott’s requested changes would violate Sikorsky’s export license agreement).
Eichman took Chapman off the project that afternoon and re-assigned it to Paul
Robinson, an employee who had less experience at the company and was seven years younger
than Chapman. Chapman Dep. 97; Robinson Dep. 36-37; Pl. Ex. M., at 3. After having been
taken off the project, Chapman took approved days off from work on Friday, September 23 and

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Monday, September 26, 2011. Chapman Dep. 103, 187, 256. Even so, Chapman sent an email
on Friday afternoon offering to assist even though he was no longer on the project. Pl. Ex. AA.
However, he received no communications or information regarding the project until he returned
to work on the morning of Tuesday, September 27, when an email was circulated to the team at
8:50 a.m. indicating that certain updates needed to be made to the training document. Def. Ex.
C. At this point, Chapman no longer had access to the underlying data. Chapman Dep. 99.
Eichman then required Chapman to attend meetings from 9:00 a.m. to approximately 10:45 a.m.
Chapman Dep. 98.
After these meetings concluded, Eichman wrote an email to Chapman at 10:47 a.m.,
instructing Chapman to “[c]onfirm you are working on a response” to the 8:50 a.m. email.
Chapman immediately wrote an email response to Eichman stating: “No, I am not working on
this.” Three minutes later, Eichman replied by email that “I need you to work this.” Chapman,
again immediately, responded, “Sorry. You benched me. Not touching this anymore[.]”
Eighty-eight minutes later, Eichman emailed Chapman the following response: “No one was or
has been benched, never the case. No relief of assignment.” Chapman promptly replied, “Too
bad. Not working it[.]” Def. Ex. C.
Eichman re-assigned the task to Robinson and another employee, who working together
and with full access to the underlying data, still had to work for dozens of man-hours to complete
the assignment. See Eichman Dep. 323; Chapman Dep. 107-08. Chapman left the office around
2:30 p.m. that day for a prescheduled medical appointment for follow-up to his surgery, an
appointment which Eichman had known about. Chapman Dep. 100-01, 195.
Two days later, on September 29, 2011, Eichman and a Human Resources representative
called Chapman to inform him that he was terminated. Chapman Dep. 130-31. They informed

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him that he would receive a termination letter the next day via Federal Express. Id. Chapman
did not receive the letter until approximately two weeks later, via U.S. Mail, in an envelope that
was already torn open and had a mailing address located across the street from his home.
Chapman Dep. 132; Def. Ex. F; Pl. Ex. HH.
At the time of Chapman’s termination, Sikorsky’s Employee Manual contained a
provision stating that “INSUBORDINATION, refusal to do assigned work, failure to carry out a
reasonable order, use of obscene or vulgar language, or disrespectful behavior toward a
management representative” was a “strictly forbidden” practice and “proper cause for
disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal.” Def. Ex. E. At least two of Chapman’s coworkers have at some point told Eichman that they could not do things he asked of them.
Lightsey Dep. 174-77. E. Jan. Lightsey, Training Manager and Integrated Product Team Lead,
testified in her deposition that, subsequent to Eichman replacing Chapman as the senior person in
the department, Eichman had asked her to do things which she said to him she could not do. Id.
at 174. She testified that she was never directly disciplined for doing so. Id. at 175. She further
testified that when she told Eichman she was not going to do a project that he had asked her to
do, she “did not get a writeup” and “was not put on an EIP [Employee Improvement Plan].” Id.
at 175-76. Lightsey also testified that, if Eichman assigned her a project that she is unable to do
within the time limit or the strictures Eichman has lain down, it is permissible to tell him that she
cannot do the project. Id. at 177. According to Lightsey, a second employee, Kari Deyo, also
told Eichman that she could not do a project he asked her to perform. Id. at 176.
After Chapman’s termination, he was replaced by David Scheu, then 42 years of age, and
Michael Canady, then 30, who were both younger employees. See, e.g., Eichman Dep. 43-67;
Pl. Ex. F ¶ 19.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the court determines that
there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such
issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir.
2005). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court may not try issues of fact, but
must leave those issues to the jury. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). Thus, the trial court’s task is “carefully limited to discerning whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined . . .
to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs.,
Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).
“[T]he moving party bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to summary
judgment.” United Transp. Union v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 588 F.3d 805, 809 (2d Cir.
2009). Once the moving party has satisfied that burden, in order to defeat the motion, “the party
opposing summary judgment . . . must set forth ‘specific facts’ demonstrating that there is ‘a
genuine issue for trial.’” Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e)). Summary judgment is inappropriate only if the issue to be resolved is both
genuine and related to a material fact. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment. An issue is “genuine . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks
omitted). A material fact is one that would “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Id. Only those facts that must be decided in order to resolve a claim or defense will

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prevent summary judgment from being granted. Immaterial or minor facts will not prevent
summary judgment. See Howard v. Gleason Corp., 901 F. 2d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1990).
When reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court must “assess
the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and . . . draw all reasonable inferences
in its favor.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the
Second Circuit has “repeatedly expressed the need for caution about granting summary judgment
to an employer in a discrimination case where . . . the merits turn on a dispute as to the
employer’s intent.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008). However, the
inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant must be supported by evidence. “[M]ere speculation
and conjecture” is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, Stern v. Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 315 (2d Cir. 1997), as is the “mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position,” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
DISCUSSION
I.

ADEA Claim
The ADEA prohibits workplace discrimination on the basis of age. See 29 U.S.C.

§§ 621(b), 623(a). The Second Circuit has indicated that ADEA claims are analyzed under the
same framework as claims brought pursuant to Title VII, i.e., a burden shifting standard under
which a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, after which the
employer is required to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business rationale for its actions,
and if the employer articulates such a reason, the plaintiff then has the burden of proving that his
age was the real reason for his discharge. See Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir.
2000).

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For purposes of its Motion, Defendant assumes a prima facie case of age discrimination,
but by proffering evidence that it terminated Plaintiff for taking vacation days off from work in
the face of time-sensitive customer concerns in September 2011 and explicitly refusing to work
on the Brunei project upon his return, in spite of his supervisor’s instructions, Defendant has
shifted the burden to Plaintiff to prove this legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination
to be pretext. See Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 469 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Once the employer has articulated non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged employment
actions, the presumption of discrimination vanishes and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
come forward with evidence that the employer’s proffered explanations were merely pretextual
and that the actual motivations more likely than not were discriminatory.”). In order to satisfy
his burden at this final stage, Plaintiff must “present[] facts, which taken in his favor, suffice to
show that a triable issue exists as to whether his age was a ‘but for’ cause of his termination,”
i.e., that “the adverse employment action would not have occurred without it.” Delaney v. Bank
of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 168, 169 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Plaintiff proffers several pieces of evidence to attempt to establish pretext. First, he
points out that his supervisor, Eichman, gave him permission to take off Friday, September 23
and Monday, September 26, 2011, that he had already been taken off the Brunei project as of
September 22, 2011, and that he had turned over all his work related to the project to a younger,
less experienced employee (Paul Robinson) at the direction of Eichman. When he returned to
work on Tuesday, September 27, 2011, he was suddenly and unexpectedly tasked by Eichman
with fully rewriting the iteration of the report that had been produced by the other employee
within six hours, in spite of having not been privy to the developments on the project for the past

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five days nor having the data the other employee had relied upon in creating the report that he
was now tasked with fully rewriting. When Plaintiff did not perform the task, the assignment
was given to Paul Robinson and another employee, who spent substantially more time
completing the rewrite than Plaintiff had been given. See Chapman Dep. 107; Eichman Dep.
323. Plaintiff argues that this indicates that he was being set up to fail with an impossible task
that was mere pretext for terminating him because of his age.
Second, Plaintiff was employed at Sikorsky for about five years, during which time he
received either exceptional performance or fully competent personnel reviews, including a fully
competent review as recently as April 2011. Chapman Dep. 37, 52. He had also received tens of
thousands of dollars in bonuses, including a performance-based bonus as recently as 2010.
Chapman Dep. 37; Eichman Dep. 74-75. There was no indication that his employment was in
jeopardy until the summer of 2011. In or about late August 2011, Mr. Eichman told Mr.
Chapman that he was “a bug under a magnifying lens right now with senior management,” and
that “they’re looking to get rid of you in the next 30 to 60 days.” Chapman Dep. 50.
Third, Plaintiff notes that his supervisor, Eichman, occasionally made derogatory
comments about individuals based on their age. For example, Plaintiff claims that Eichman on at
least five occasions said that Plaintiff was having a “senior moment.” Plaintiff also claims that
Eichman referred to him and some other older Sikorsky employees as “old prunellas.” Plaintiff
alleges that Eichman said that there was a need to get rid of some of the prunellas “and start to
look at some folks that, you know, are going to be with us for a longer period of time.”
Chapman Dep. 49:3-4. Eichman allegedly said that their team had some older members, and that
he wanted to replace them with younger people. Plaintiff claims that Eichman also asked him
his age on as many as three occasions, that Eichman said that he was “getting too old” and

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therefore “wasn’t able to keep up with the work,” Chapman Dep. 263:8-10, and that Eichman
said that he looked “like an old bag of bones,” Chapman Dep. 342:12-13.
Fourth, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant hired two younger employees, aged 30 and 42, to
replace him.
As Plaintiff acknowledges in his Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 117], “[t]o prove pretext, an age discrimination
plaintiff must do more than simply refute or cast doubt, on the employer’s rationale.” Libront v.
Columbus McKinnon Corp., 832 F. Supp. 597, 628 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). “The rule that proof of
pretext also requires proof that discrimination was the real reason for an adverse job action has
long been settled in the Second Circuit.” Fetcho v. Hearst Connecticut Post, LLC, No. 3:12-cv904, 2015 WL 1800111, at *11, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50049, at *27 (D. Conn. Apr. 16, 2015).
While “invidious comments about people in the protected age class” and “criticism of an
employee’s work performance in age-related degrading terms” can support an inference of age
discrimination, Miller v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 230, 245 (E.D.N.Y.
2010), such comments only “constitute evidence of discriminatory motivation when a plaintiff
demonstrates that a nexus exists between the allegedly discriminatory statements and a
defendant’s decision to discharge the plaintiff,” Pronin v. Raffi Custom Photo Lab., Inc., 383 F.
Supp. 2d 628, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In determining whether a remark is probative, district
courts in this Circuit generally consider four factors: (1) who made the remark (i.e., a decision
maker, a supervisor, or a low-level co-worker); (2) when the remark was made in relation to the
employment decision at issue; (3) the content of the remark (i.e., whether a reasonable juror
could view the remark as discriminatory); and (4) the context in which the remark was made

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(i.e., whether it was related to the decision-making process).” Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 616
F.3d 134, 150 (2d Cir. 2010).
In this case, the alleged remarks were made by Plaintiff’s supervisor near in time to
Plaintiff’s termination and reasonably could be viewed as discriminatory. Significantly, many of
the alleged remarks were made in the context of replacing older workers, including Plaintiff,
with younger workers, and therefore they could be viewed as related to the decision-making
process.
In addition, although the fact that Plaintiff’s replacements are substantially younger than
him can be seen as a “reliable indicator of age discrimination,” O’Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996), “such evidence alone is not enough on which a
reasonable jury could find that [an employer’s] nondiscriminatory reason for terminating [a
plaintiff’s] employment was pretextual,” Farina v. Branford Bd. of Educ., 2010 WL 3829160, at
*6, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99730, at *23 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2010) (citing Brennan v. Metro.
Opera Ass’n, 192 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 1999)). However, in combination with the alleged
ageist comments of Plaintiff’s supervisor, particularly the comments that Defendant needed to
replace older employees with younger ones, this fact can help support a finding of pretext.
Even so, the record does not support a reasonable inference that he would not have been
fired but for his age. It is undisputed that Plaintiff explicitly defied a direct order from his
supervisor in response to two successive emails. See Def. Ex. C (Eichman wrote, “I need you to
work this”; Chapman responded, “Not touching this anymore”; Eichman then wrote, “No relief
of assignment”; and Chapman responded, “Not working it”.). It is also undisputed that Sikorsky
had in place at the time a clearly-articulated policy that insubordination, refusal to do assigned
work, or failure to carry out a reasonable order is “proper cause for disciplinary action, up to and

11

including dismissal.” Def. Ex. E. The plain meaning of the email exchange of September 27,
2011, demonstrates Plaintiff engaged in “strictly forbidden” practices; Plaintiff was terminated
two days later. Based on this set of facts, no reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff would
not have been fired but for his age.
Plaintiff points to evidence of two younger employees who were not subjected to
discipline when they informed Eichman that they could not perform assignments that he had
given them. See Lightsey Dep. 174-77. The record falls short, however, of providing a factual
basis for inferring that these two employees were similarly situated to Mr. Chapman’s repeated
refusals to perform work requested of him. In this Circuit,
An employee is similarly situated to co-employees if they were (1) subject to the
same performance evaluation and discipline standards and (2) engaged in
comparable conduct. The standard for comparing conduct requires a reasonably
close resemblance of the facts and circumstances of plaintiff’s and comparator’s
cases, rather than a showing that both cases are identical. In other words, the
comparator must be similarly situated to the plaintiff in all material respects.
Ordinarily, the question whether two employees are similarly situated is a
question of fact for the jury. To satisfy the all material respects standard for being
similarly situated, a plaintiff must show that his co-employees were subject to the
same performance evaluation and discipline standards.
Bryant v. Greater New Haven Transit Dist., 8 F. Supp. 3d 115, 130 (D. Conn. 2014) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff relies on the testimony of a co-worker, E.
Jan Lightsey, who states that she had told Mr. Eichman that she was “not going to do a project
that he asked [her] to do,” Lightsey Dep. at 175-76, and that she suffered no disciplinary
consequences. Id. Ms. Lightsey further testified that she was aware of at least one other team
member who was unable to perform a project in the time provided, told Mr. Eichman that she
could not perform it, and also allegedly suffered no disciplinary consequences.
This testimony, however, was vague about the particular circumstances of these
comparators’ cases, such as what specific words were exchanged and the degree of their

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resistance to Eichman’s orders; for example, there is no mention at all about whether either
employee’s situation involved repeated refusals to do work after persistent requests by Eichman.
As a result, there are not enough facts from which a jury could infer that these situations were
similar in all material respects to Plaintiff’s, much less draw the conclusion that the disciplinary
action against Plaintiff was a pretext for discrimination on the basis of his age or, even more
pointedly, that but for his age Plaintiff would not have been terminated. See Tomasino v. Mount
Sinai Med. Ctr. & Hosp., No. 97-cv-5252, 2003 WL 1193726, at *14, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3766, at *38 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2003) (“factual record reveals that [proffered] comparators are
not similarly-situated to [plaintiff] in all material respects” because while they “had committed
violations similar” to plaintiff’s, no evidence that they had “committed the most serious of the
infractions for which [plaintiff] was discharged”); cf. Slatky v. Healthfirst, Inc., No. 02-cv-5182,
2003 WL 22705123, at *5-6, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20608, at *16-19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003)
(holding minor discrepancies in deposition testimony regarding plaintiff’s allegedly
insubordinate conduct insufficient to overcome defendant’s substantial evidence plaintiff was
terminated for that articulated reason). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot escape the implication of
his unambiguous expression of insubordination that provided his employer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and non-pretextual basis for terminating him.
Therefore, because Plaintiff cannot establish that he would not have been terminated but
for his age, the Court must grant summary judgment with respect to Count One.
II.

State Law Claims
In addition to his federal law ADEA claims, Plaintiff also brings state law claims for age

discrimination under CFEPA, common law invasion of privacy, and common law libel per se.
As one judge in this District recently explained,

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this Court is reluctant to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in non-diversity cases,
given that under 28 U.S.C § 1367(c) and (c)(3), United States district courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if they have dismissed
all claims over which they had original jurisdiction. Indeed, in recently citing and
interpreting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c) and (c)(3), the Second Circuit noted that
although federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over related state-law claims
where an independent basis of subject-matter jurisdiction exists, such a court may,
for various reasons, nonetheless decline to do so. The Second Circuit further
explained that such discretion is subject to boundaries, and that if a plaintiff’s
federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state law claims should be dismissed
as well.
Kelly v. Signet Star Re, LLC, 971 F. Supp. 2d 237, 254 (D. Conn. 2013) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly, this Court will not evaluate any of Plaintiff’s state law claims. See, e.g.,
Bellamy v. General Dynamics Corp., No. 3:10-cv-1219 (MRK), 2012 WL 1987171, at *7, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76890, at *20-21 (D. Conn. June 4, 2012) (questioning whether plaintiff
“could effectively state a CFEPA claim on this record,” but “leav[ing] this determination to the
state courts”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 93] is
GRANTED with respect to Counts One and Three, i.e., the federal ADEA claim.1 The Clerk is
directed to dismiss these Counts with prejudice and without costs.
As for Counts Two, Four, Five, and Six, the Court declines to accept jurisdiction over
these state law claims. The Clerk is directed to DISMISS those Counts without prejudice and
without costs.
The Clerk is then directed to close the case.

1

The Court need not independently address Count Three of the amended complaint because Plaintiff is no longer
asserting claims for hostile work environment independent of his termination from Sikorsky. See November 4, 2014
Conference Memorandum and Order [Doc. No. 72], at 1.

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SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 3rd day of December, 2015.

/s/ Victor A. Bolden
Victor A. Bolden
United States District Judge

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