USA v. $822,694.81 in United States Currency Seized From Account No. XXXXXXXX7424 et al

Filing 169

ORDER denying 119 the motion for summary judgment filed by the Ezeemos. See attached. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 9/12/2019. (Constantine, A.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
$822,694.81 IN UNITED STATES :
CURRENCY, SEIZED FROM ACCOUNT :
NO. XXXXXXXX7424, HELD IN THE :
NAMES OF GODWIN EZEEMO AND
:
WINIFRED C.N. EZEEMO, AT BANK :
OF AMERICA,
:
:
Defendant.
:

CASE NO. 3:13CV545(DFM)

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The United States of America commenced this civil forfeiture
action seeking forfeiture of $822,694.81 in a Bank of America
account

in

"Ezeemos").1

1Section

the

names

of

Godwin

and

Winifred

Ezeemo

(the

The government alleges that the $822,694.81 (the

981 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code authorizes civil
forfeiture of property "involved in," "derived from," or
"traceable to" a variety of specified federal crimes. 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1). "In a civil forfeiture case, the government is the
plaintiff, the property is the defendant and the claimant is an
intervenor seeking to challenge the forfeiture." Stefan D.
Casella, Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States at 374 (2d ed.
2013). See United States v. One-Sixth Share, 326 F.3d 36, 40 (1st
Cir. 2003)("Because civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding, the
property subject to forfeiture is the defendant. Thus, defenses
against the forfeiture can be brought only by third parties, who
must intervene."); United States v. All Funds in Account Nos.
747.034/278 in Banco Espanol de Credito, Spain 295 F.3d 23, 25
(D.C. Cir. 2002) ("Civil forfeiture actions are brought against

"defendant currency") is subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18
U.S.C.

§

981(a)(1)(A),

laundering

in

violation

because
of

18

it

is

U.S.C.

the
§

product

of

money

1956(a)(1)(A)(i),

or

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), because it is the product of
wire fraud or conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1343. (ECF #1, Verified Compl. ¶6.)
the government's forfeiture action.

The Ezeemos contest

They do not dispute that

certain deposits to the BOA account were obtained by fraud but
maintain that they were not aware of the fraud.

Pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56, the Ezeemos move for summary judgment as to the
government's forfeiture action.

(ECF #119.)

For the reasons that

follow, the motion is denied.
I.

Legal Standard
"A moving party is entitled to summary judgment where the

record reveals 'no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a)."

Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 344 (2d

Cir. 2019).

A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law," and a dispute is "genuine"
if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party" based on it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

property, not people. The owner of the property may intervene to
protect his interest.")
2

248 (1986).

"The evidentiary standard that must be met by the

moving party is a high one, since a court is obliged 'to draw all
inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is
sought,' Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d
Cir. 1989), and to 'construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party,' United States v. All Funds
Distributed to Weiss, 345 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2003)."

United States

v. Collado, 348 F.3d 323, 327 (2d Cir. 2003).
The government did not file a memorandum in opposition in
response to the Ezeemos' summary judgment motion.

The Second

Circuit has made clear, however, that a district court may not
grant a motion for summary judgment "without first examining the
moving party's submission to determine if it has met its burden of
demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains for trial."
Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244
(2d Cir. 2004).

"If the evidence submitted in support of the

summary judgment motion does not meet the movant's burden of
production, then summary judgment must be denied even if

no

opposing evidentiary matter is presented." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).

See Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139,

141 (2d Cir. 2003)(noting that the "non-movant is not required to
rebut

an

insufficient

showing").

"Moreover,

in

determining

whether the moving party has met this burden of showing the absence
3

of a genuine issue for trial, the district court may not rely
solely on the statement of undisputed facts contained in the moving
party's Rule 56.1 statement.
citation

to

evidence

in

It must be satisfied that the

the

record

supports

the

assertion."

Vermont Teddy Bear Co., 373 F.3d at 244; Giannullo, 322 F.3d at
143 n. 5 (stating that not verifying in the record the assertions
in the motion for summary judgment "would derogate the truthfinding

functions

of

the

judicial

process

by

substituting

convenience for facts").
II.

Background
The following facts, taken from the Ezeemos' Local Rule 56(a)1

statement (ECF #119-2) and supporting exhibits (ECF #119-4 – #11943), are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
The Ezeemos are Nigerian citizens who operate businesses in
Nigeria. (ECF #119-22, Local Rule 56(a)1 ¶6; ECF #119-42 at 5.)
As

part

of

their

business,

they

purchase

goods

from

Blount

International, a U.S. company in Oregon, for resale in Western
Africa.

(ECF #119-2, Local Rule 56(a)1 ¶16.)

accounts in Nigeria.

They maintain bank

(ECF #119-4, Ezeemo Dep. at 40.)

They also

have a joint checking account at Bank of America ("BOA"). (ECF
#119-2, Local Rule 56(a)1 ¶37.)

2Citations

The BOA account initially was a

are to ECF-generated page numbers found at the top
of the documents.
4

personal checking account.

(ECF #119-5, Ezeemo Dep. at 17.)

The

Ezeemos subsequently used the account to purchase U.S. currency.
(ECF #119-5, Ezeemo Dep. at 19.)
their U.S suppliers.

They wanted U.S. dollars to pay

(ECF #119-4, Ezeemo Dep. at 14-15, #119-5,

Ezeemo Dep. at 19.)
To

procure

U.S.

currency,

Godwin

Ezeemo

contacted

individual named Abubaker Lade ("Lade") in Lagos, Nigeria.
#119-4, Ezeemo Dep. at 15.)

an
(ECF

Lade worked in Lagos as a "marketer"

for a local Nigerian Bureau de Change that handles private foreign
currency transactions.

(ECF. #119-7, Lade Dep. at 66.)

Lade

testified that he was unlicensed, although Ezeemo testified to the
contrary. (ECF #119-7, Lade Dep. at 65-66.)
obtain customers for the Bureau de Change.
at 66.)

Lade's job was to

(ECF #119-7, Lade Dep.

To do so, he went "outside" to the local "market" and

"warehouse."

(ECF #119-7, Lade Dep. at 68.)

Godwin Ezeemo used

a Bureau de Change to obtain U.S. dollars because he was able to
move more money more quickly than he would if he used a bank.

(ECF

#119-4, Ezeemo Dep. at 16; ECF #119-5, Ezeemo Dep. at 14.)
Ezeemo ordered "bulk" purchases of U.S. dollars – such as
$500,000 - from Lade.

(Doc. #119-5, Ezeemo Dep. at 54.)

negotiated the exchange rate.

They

(ECF #119-7, Lade Dep. at 110-11.)

Ezeemo gave Lade the BOA account information so Lade could make
deposits/wire the U.S. dollars into the account.
5

(ECF #119-2,

Local

Rule

56(a)1

¶48.)

information to others.

Lade

gave

the

Ezeemos'

BOA

(ECF #119-7, Lade Dep. at 13.)

account

Over time

Lade caused deposits in varying amounts to be made into the
Ezeemos' BOA account.

(ECF #119-5, Ezeemo Dep. at 21-22.)

Lade

gave Godwin Ezeemo the wire confirmation receipt and/or deposit
slip for every wire transfer or deposit into the BOA account.

(ECF

#119-2, Local Rule 56(a)1 ¶51.) After Godwin Ezeemo saw the online
confirmation of payment into his BOA account, he paid Lade in naira
(Nigerian currency) for each transaction.

(ECF #119-2, Local Rule

56(a)1 ¶53.) The Ezeemos used the U.S. currency that was deposited
in the BOA account to pay for their purchases from Blount.

(ECF

#119-41, Ezeemo Aff. ¶18.)
Godwin Ezeemo did not know how Lade obtained the funds that
were deposited into the BOA account. (ECF #119-5, Ezeemo Dep. at
22.)

When Ezeemo reviewed his account, it showed wire transfers

from various individuals, none of whom Ezeemo knew.
Ezeemo Dep. at 26.)

(ECF #119-5,

Ezeemo did not know where the money came, nor

did he know the identity of those depositing it.

Indeed, he stated

that he could not "be bothered with who pays this money into my
account" and "d[id] not query Lade on how he does his business."
(ECF #119-5, Ezeemo Dep. at 26, 28, 31.)

He knew that Lade caused

the transfers because the "confirmation slip that comes from him
tells the proof." (ECF #119-5, Ezeemo Dep. 27.)
6

Some of the money deposited into the BOA account was obtained
fraudulently.3

The victims were subject to different types of

scams but all were tricked into putting money into the BOA account.4
(ECF. #119-1 at 16.)

U.S. Secret Service Agent Michael Shove

investigated the deposits made into the BOA account.

(ECF #119-

2, Local Rule 56(a)1 at ¶58.)5
One victim was a law firm.

On February 9, 2012, the law firm

of Weycer, Kaplan, Pilaski and Zuber (the "Weycer law firm") wired
$194,340 into the BOA account.

(ECF #119-5, Ezeemo Dep. at 41.)

After the transfer, Ezeemo could not access his account.
#119-5, Ezeemo Dep. at 41.)

(ECF

He called BOA and was told his account

was frozen because the $194,340 transfer was fraudulent. (ECF #1195, Ezeemo Dep. at 42, 65, 75, 78.)

Ezeemo stopped using Lade to

obtain foreign currency and authorized his attorney to make a

3Some

of the alleged fraud victims intervened in this action
to contest the government's forfeiture. Doc. ##47, 55, 64, 65.
4For example, several transfers to the BOA account were from
"Leon Wu," whom Ezeemo testified he did not know. (ECF #119-5,
Ezeemo Dep. 27.) Wu claims he was duped into transferring money
into the Ezeemos' BOA account. According to Wu, he had an online
relationship in 2011 with a woman named "Salerno Joan," who
purported to live in London.
Salerno told Wu that she had
inherited $60 million and wanted to move to the United States,
marry him, and share her inheritance. But first Salerno needed Wu
to pay "fees" to help Salerno obtain the inheritance. In response,
Wu wired – in various increments – more than $500,000 into the
Ezeemos' BOA account. Salerno never came to the United States,
shared any inheritance or returned the money to Wu. (ECF #1 at
13.)
5The government alleges eight victim losses in its complaint.
7

complaint against Lade with the Nigerian Police.
Ezeemo Dep. at 47.)

(ECF #119-5,

The March 1, 2012 police report stated that

the basis for the complaint was "fraudulent deceitful transfer of
$194,340 to the account of Mr. Ezeemo."
at 92; ECF #119-17 at 3.)
a crime and released.
Notwithstanding
$194,340

wire

continued

to

Lade was arrested but not charged with

(ECF #119-7, Lade Dep. at 101.)
that

transfer
use

(ECF #119-5, Ezeemo Dep.

the

the

by

account

the

Weycer

account.

was
law

Transfers

"frozen"

after

the

firm,

the

Ezeemos

into

the

account

continued, including one for $154,210.86 and another for $40,000,
both by persons and entities the Ezeemos did not know.6 (ECF #1195, Ezeemo Dep. at 59-60, ECF #119-6, W. Ezeemo Dep. at 29.)
On

March

23,

2012,

the

government

seized

the

defendant

currency and thereafter filed this civil forfeiture action.

The

Ezeemos concede that "several people were defrauded by a scam" but
maintain that they had no knowledge of any fraud and that they
legally purchased the U.S. currency.

(ECF #119-1 at 16.)

III. Discussion
A.

Criminal Liability
The Ezeemos first argue that they are entitled to summary

6These

transfers were made on March 15, 2012 by Bank of New
Canaan and Deborah Stuckey, respectively.
(ECF #119-5, Ezeemo
Dep. at 59.) Both claim that they were tricked into making the
transfers. (ECF #1, ¶¶17-18.)
8

judgment on the government's forfeiture action because they did
not violate the underlying criminal statutes prohibiting wire
fraud or money laundering.

(Doc. #119-1 at 7-12.)

Their argument

fails.
Civil forfeiture proceedings are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 983.
Section 983(c) provides that "[i]n a suit or action brought under
any civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any
property . . . the burden of proof is on the Government to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property
is subject to forfeiture." "In civil forfeiture, the United States
brings a civil action against the property itself as an in rem
proceeding — '[i]t is the property which is proceeded against, and
. . . held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead
of inanimate and insentient.' . . ."
692

F.3d

136,

146

(2d

Cir.

United States v. Contorinis,

2012)(citations

omitted).

The

"claimant's culpability in the underlying criminal conduct is
irrelevant."

United States v. $6,207, 757 F. Supp.2d 1155, 1163

(M.D. Ala. 2010).

See United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 666

n.16 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The most notable distinction between civil
and criminal forfeiture is that civil forfeiture proceedings are
brought against property, not against the property owner; the
owner's culpability is irrelevant in deciding whether property
should be forfeited."); Vereda, Ltda. v. United States, 271 F.3d
9

1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001)("in an in rem forfeiture . . . the
guilt or innocence of the property owner is irrelevant in view of
the fact that the action resulting in forfeiture is 'directed
against [the] guilty property, rather than against the offender
himself'"); United States v. $90,000.00 in U.S. Funds, No. 5:12CV-169(CAR), 2012 WL 5287888, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2012)("A
civil forfeiture action is a proceeding in rem and operates under
the legal fiction that objects and property can be guilty of
wrongdoing,

making

any

actual

guilt

related

to

the

owner

irrelevant."); United States v. A Parcel of Land Located at 5185
S. Westwood Drive Republic, Mo., No. 09-03357-CV-S-DGK, 2012 WL
1113197, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 2, 2012) ("Civil forfeiture is an in
rem action against the property itself, not the person. Therefore,
civil forfeiture is 'not conditioned upon the culpability of the
owner of the defendant property.' Essentially, 'the innocence of
the owner is irrelevant.'")(citation omitted); Stefan D. Cassella,
Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States 503 (2d ed. 2013)("The
claimant's lack of personal involvement in the crime giving rise
to the forfeiture is irrelevant . . . .").
B.

Innocent Owner Defense
The Ezeemos next argue that they are entitled to summary

judgment

on

their

affirmative

defense

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
10

of

innocent

ownership

Section 983(d)(1) provides:

"An innocent owner's property

shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute."7

"An

innocent-owner defense is an affirmative defense to be proven by
the claimant by a preponderance of the evidence."

United States

v. All Assets of G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 487–88 (2d Cir.
1995).
"Section 983 provides for two categories of innocent owners."
In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Properties, No. 08 CIV. 10934(KBF),
2014 WL 1998233, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2014).
category, §

983(d)(2)(A),

governs

claimants with

The first
pre-existing

ownership interests and "comprises owners whose property interests
were in existence 'at the time the illegal conduct giving rise to
forfeiture
Properties,
§

took
2014

983(d)(2)(A)).

place.'"
WL

In

re

1998233,

at

650
*4–5

Fifth

Ave.

(quoting

&
18

Related
U.S.C.

The second category, § 983(d)(3)(A), "comprises

owners who acquired their property interests 'after the conduct
giving rise to the forfeiture took place.'" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 983(d)(3)(A)).

See United States v. Real Prop. Located at 6124

Mary Lane Drive, San Diego, California, No. 3:03CV580, 2008 WL
3925074, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 2008)("The conditions one must

7The

statute defines an "owner" as "a person with an ownership
interest in the specific property sought to be forfeited, including
a leasehold, lien, mortgage, recorded security interest, or valid
assignment of an ownership interest." 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(6)(A).
11

meet to be an innocent owner depend on whether the claimant's
property interest was acquired before or after the illegal conduct
giving rise to the forfeiture took place.")
1.

18 U.S.C.
Interest

§

983(d)(2)(A)

–

Pre-Existing

Property

The Ezeemos first argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment

pursuant

to

§

983(d)(2)(A).

Section

983(d)(2)(A)

provides:
With respect to a property interest in existence at
the time the illegal conduct giving rise to forfeiture
took place, the term "innocent owner" means an owner
who-(i) did not know of the conduct giving rise to
forfeiture; or
(ii) upon learning of the conduct giving rise to
the forfeiture, did all that reasonably could be
expected under the circumstances to terminate such use
of the property.
The Ezeemos' § 983(d)(2) argument fails.
§

As indicated,

983(d)(2) concerns "pre-existing" ownership interests, that is,

ownership interests in existence at the time of the underlying
criminal offense. 8

8See,

"[E]very claimant asserting an affirmative

e.g., United States v. An Interest in the Real Prop.
Located at 2101 Lincoln Blvd., Los Angeles, Cal., 729 F. Supp. 2d
1150, 1154–55 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (§ 983(d)(2) governs "a case where
the claimant already owns a piece of property"); United States v.
A 2000 Jeep Grand Cherokee, VIN. No. 1J4GW48N7YC303169, License
No. 70-J870, No. 07-CV-4114-DEO, 2009 WL 1586016 (N.D. Iowa June
4, 2009)(where mother owned the vehicle prior to her son's use of
it in criminal activity, her ownership interest was "in existence"
at the time the property was used to commit underlying offense);
United States v. Real Prop. Known & Numbered as 2621 Bradford
12

defense under section 983(d)(2) must begin by establishing that he
was an owner of the property at the time the offense giving rise
to

the

forfeiture

took

place."

Stefan

D.

Cassella,

Forfeiture Law in the United States 499 (2d ed. 2013).

Asset
Claims

under § 983(d)(2) fail "if the claimant did not acquire his
interest in the forfeited property until after the crime giving
rise to the forfeiture took place."

Id. at 497.

The Ezeemos

failed to brief, much less establish, how their ownership interest
in the defendant currency was "in existence at the time the illegal
conduct giving rise to forfeiture took place."

§ 983(d)(2)(A).

"A person who cannot satisfy this temporal requirement has no claim
under

Section

983(d)(2)

.

.

.

."

Stefan

D.

Cassella,

Asset

Forfeiture Law in the United States 496 (2d ed. 2013).
Even assuming that the Ezeemos could make this showing, their
claim under § 983(d)(2) still fails.
Section 983(d)(2)(A)(i) requires an owner prove that he "did
not know of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture."

The Ezeemos

Drive, Middletown, Butler Cty., Ohio, No. 1:07-CV-875, 2008 WL
11402027, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2008)(where claimant owned the
defendant property since 1995, his "property interest arose prior
to the illegal activity"); United States v. 392 Lexington Parkway
S., St. Paul, Minn., Ramsey Cty., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1070 (D.
Minn. 2005) (claimant asserted that it was an innocent owner
pursuant to § 983(d)(2)(A) where it closed on its mortgage on
November 13, 2002, prior to the illegal conduct giving rise to the
forfeiture).
13

argue they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to
this provision because there is no "evidence that [they] had any
knowledge of the unlawful activity."

(Doc. #119-1 at 14.)

In

support, the Ezeemos point to their deposition testimony and
affidavits disavowing any knowledge that the U.S. currency was
obtained by fraud.

(ECF #119-1 at 14, citing to ECF ##119-2, Local

Rule 56(a)1 ¶¶54-57.)
Knowledge under § 983(d)(2)(A)(i) "includes the concept of
'willful blindness'." Stefan D. Cassella, The Uniform Innocent
Owner Defense to Civil Asset Forfeiture, 89 Ky. L.J. 653, 684
(2001).

An owner of property is not entitled to an innocent owner

defense to forfeiture by being willfully blind to the facts that
gave rise to the forfeiture.

United States v. Collado, 348 F.3d

323, 327 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the court has "construed the
'knowledge' prong broadly such that "where an owner has engaged in
'willful blindness' as to the activities occurring on her property,
her ignorance will not entitle her to avoid forfeiture.")

See

United States v. $ 38,148.00 United States Currency, No. 13-CV1162A(F), 2018 WL 2091415, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2018) ("A
claimant's

willful

blindness,

however,

will

not

avoid

forfeiture"); United States v. $175,121.75 in Wells Fargo Bank
Funds, No. CV 15-7149-R, 2016 WL 7655746, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June
21,

2016)

("Innocent

owner

defenses
14

have

consistently

been

rejected in forfeiture cases where the claimant was found to be
willfully blind"); United States v. Funds Seized From Account No.
20548408 at Baybank, N.A., No. 93 CIV. 12224(MEL), 1995 WL 381659,
at *6 (D. Mass. June 16, 1995)("In the context of an 'innocent
owner'

defense,

willful

blindness

.

.

.

is

tantamount

to

knowledge"); United States v. All Funds Presently on Deposit, 832
F. Supp. 542, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (To be an innocent owner, "[a]
claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
it did not . . . have knowledge of the illegal activities and was
not willfully blind to those activities.")

Regarding whether a

claimant knew of the conduct giving rise to forfeiture, ordinarily
"[m]atters of knowledge and willful avoidance of knowledge are
questions of fact."

United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 844

(2d Cir. 1995).
To prevail on their affirmative innocent owner defense, the
Ezeemos bear the burden of showing they did not know of the illegal
activity.
party,

the

Construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
Ezeemos'

submissions

fall

short.

Godwin

Ezeemo

purchased significant amounts of U.S. currency from a local man
who testified that he was not licensed and gathered customers by
going "outside" to the "market" and "warehouse" in Lagos.
#119-7, Lade Dep. at 68.)

(ECF

Although Ezeemo was aware of the many

deposits into his BOA account by individuals and entities whom he
15

did not know, he never questioned the source of the money.

Despite

the presence of these red flags, the Ezeemos did nothing to
investigate the legitimacy of the funds deposited in the account.9
Viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether

the

activity.

Ezeemos

were

willfully

blind

to

the

fraudulent

See United States v. 16328 S. 43rd E. Ave., Bixby, Tulsa

Cty., Okla., 275 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 2002)(explaining that
the court need not accept "bare denials" where the claimant's
"alleged ignorance amounts to willful blindness").
The Ezeemos next argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment pursuant to § 983(d)(2)(A)(ii).

Section 983(d)(2)(A)(ii)

provides that an innocent owner is an owner who "upon learning of
the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, did all that reasonably
could be expected under the circumstances to terminate such use of
the property."

Section 983(d)(2)(B)(i) further states that:

[W]ays in which a person may show that such person did
all that reasonably could be expected may include
demonstrating that such person, to the extent permitted
by law—
(I) gave timely notice to an appropriate law
enforcement agency of information that led the
person to know the conduct giving rise to a
forfeiture would occur or has occurred; and

9In

the words of Secret Service agent Shove, Ezeemo "turned a
blind eye to the source of the funds." (Doc. #119-8, Shove Dep.
at 64.)
16

(II) in a timely fashion revoked or made a
good faith attempt to revoke permission for
those engaging in such conduct to use the
property or took reasonable actions in
consultation with a law enforcement agency to
discourage or prevent the illegal use of the
property.
18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(2)(B)(i).
The
§

Ezeemos

make

a

passing

argument

that

they

satisfy

983(d)(2)(A)(ii) because after they were told that the $194,340

transfer was fraudulent, they "stopped using Lade" to obtain U.S.
currency and "wrote a complaint to the Nigerian police against
Lade which resulted in Lade's arrest."

(Doc. #119-1 at 14.)

The Ezeemos fail to sustain their burden of demonstrating
that they are innocent owners pursuant to § 983(d)(2)(A)(ii).

The

record reveals that the Ezeemos' complaint to the Nigerian police
referred only to the $194,340 deposit.

Notwithstanding that Lade

had caused numerous other deposits into the BOA account, the
Ezeemos took no action to investigate the source or legality of
those deposits.
continued

to

use

Even after they reported Lade, the
the

BOA

account

and

received

Ezeemos

additional

questionable deposits into the account from sources they did not
know.

(ECF #119-5, Ezeemo Dep. at 59-60.)

Viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, genuine issues of
material fact exist regarding whether the Ezeemos "did all that
reasonably could [have] be[en] expected under the circumstances to
17

terminate such use of the property." 18 U.S.C. § 983(2)(A)(ii).
See United States v. Property Identified as 1813 15th Street N.W.,
Washington D.C., 956 F. Supp. 1029, 1037 (D.D.C. 1997)(under
§

983(2)(A)(ii), "the claimant must supply evidence to allow a

reasonable juror to conclude that, under the circumstances, all
reasonable steps were taken to curtail the illegal activity . . .
.

[E]vidence

to

prove

some

reasonable

steps

were

taken

is

insufficient . . . .")(emphasis in original).
2.

18 U.S.C.
Interest

§

983(d)(3)(A)

–

After-Acquired

Property

The Ezeemos next argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment
§

on

their

innocent

owner

defense

pursuant

to

983(d)(3)(A), which governs after-acquired property interests.

Section 983(d)(3)(A) provides:
With respect to a property interest acquired after
the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture has taken
place, the term "innocent owner" means a person who, at
the time that person acquired the interest in the
property-(i) was a bona fide purchaser or seller for value
(including a purchaser or seller of goods or services
for value); and
(ii) did not know and was reasonably without cause
to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.
18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(A).
The Ezeemos argue that they "paid the equivalent in Nigerian
currency for each and every dollar deposited in the BOA account"

18

and "did not know that the BOA Account was [sic] been used in a
criminal activity." (Doc. #119-1 at 18.)
The court need not address the first element of the defense
because the Ezeemos fail to satisfy the required second element of
the defense that they "did not know and [were] reasonably without
cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture."
§

983(d)(3)(A)(ii).

This section "requires that the innocent

owner be ignorant of the fact that the property was involved in or
traceable to a criminal violation."

United States v. An Interest

in the Real Prop. Located at 2101 Lincoln Blvd., Los Angeles, Cal.,
729 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
"objective" one.

The test is an

United States v. Real Prop. Located at 6124 Mary

Lane Drive, San Diego, California, No. 3:03CV580, 2008 WL 3925074,
at *4 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 2008), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Munson, 477 F. App'x 57 (4th Cir. 2012).

"The reason-to-believe

standard is an objective one: even a genuinely-held belief that
the property was not subject to forfeiture will be insufficient if
a reasonable person would have been on notice that the property
could be forfeited to the government."

Stefan D. Cassella, Asset

Forfeiture Law in the United States 512 (2d ed. 2013).

And as

with § 983(d)(2)(A)(i), a claimant asserting a defense under
§

983(d)(3)(A) "cannot rely on 'willful blindness' to support his

lack of knowledge."

United States v. 2003 Lamborghini Murcielago,
19

No. 6:07CV726ORL-19KRS, 2007 WL 4287674, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6,
2007). See United States v. $175,121.75 in Wells Fargo Bank Funds,
No. CV 15-7149-R, 2016 WL 7655746, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 21,
2016)(claimant's innocent owner claim under § 983(d)(3)(A) failed
where claimant was "willfully blind" and "had a definitive reason
to believe that the money was subject to forfeiture").
For the reasons set forth in the court's discussion of
§

983(d)(2)(A)(i) regarding the Ezeemos' knowledge, supra at 15-

16, the Ezeemos fail to establish that no issue of material fact
exists as to whether they "did not know, and [were] reasonably
without

cause

to

believe,

that

the

property

was

subject

to

forfeiture."
IV.

Conclusion
Accordingly, the Ezeemos' motion for summary judgment (ECF

#119) is DENIED.
SO

ORDERED

at

Hartford,

Connecticut,

this

11th

day

of

September, 2019.

_____________/s/__________________
Donna F. Martinez
United States Magistrate Judge

20