Moody v. Aircastle Advisor, LLC

Filing 61

ORDER granting 30 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 03/30/2016. (LaPre, E.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
SANDRA MOODY,
Plaintiff,
v.
AIRCASTLE ADVISOR, LLC,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.:
3:13-cv-00575 (VAB)

MARCH 30, 2016

RULING ON DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
Sandra Moody filed this action against her former employer, Aircastle Advisor, LLC

(“Aircastle”), claiming (1) race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”), the Connecticut Unfair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), and 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a); (2) sex (including pregnancy)1 discrimination in violation of Title VII and
CFEPA; (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII and CFEPA; (4) hostile work environment in
violation of Title VII and CFEPA; and (5) a violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”). Aircastle moves for summary judgment as to all claims. For the reasons stated
herein, the motion is GRANTED.
II.

FACTS2

1

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII’s definition of “because of sex” to include discrimination
because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 343 (2d
Cir. 2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). Accordingly, the Court interprets Moody’s pregnancy discrimination
claims as sex discrimination claims under Title VII and CFEPA. See Jamilik v. Yale Univ., 362 F. App’x 148, 150,
150 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (“ . . . CFEPA claims are governed by the same standards applicable to Title VII claims.”).

2

The facts set forth herein are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. The Court deemed admitted all
properly-supported allegations in Aircastle’s Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement that were not denied in Moody’s Local
Rule 56(a)2 Statement with specific citations to record evidence that actually contradicted the allegations. See D.
Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)3. Moody’s Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement does not comply with Local Rule 56(a)2, because it

1 

Moody is an African-American female. Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 Statement [hereinafter “Pl.’s
Stmt.”] ¶ 10, ECF No. 45. Aircastle is a company that acquires, leases, and sells commercial jet
aircraft to customers throughout the world. Id. ¶ 1.
In 2005, Aircastle’s chief executive officer, Ron Wainshal, interviewed Moody for an
administrative assistant position. See id. ¶¶ 11-12. On June 30, 2005, Wainshal offered Moody
the job. Id. ¶ 12. He knew that Moody was African-American. Id. Moody accepted, and started
on July 8, 2005. Id. ¶ 13.
Throughout her tenure at Aircastle, Moody’s supervisor was Marie Gannon, who was the
office manager at the Stamford, Connecticut office where Moody worked. Id. ¶ 14. Moody and
Gannon were close friends who socialized outside of the office. See id. ¶¶ 24, 68.3 Gannon
talked to Moody about her family life, and sometimes spoke with Moody’s children on the
telephone and sent them letters. See id. ¶ 25.4
Moody was pregnant five times during her tenure at Aircastle. See id. ¶¶ 112, 114. Two
pregnancies resulted in miscarriages in the fall of 2006 and December 2010. Id. ¶ 112. Gannon
was sympathetic for Moody’s losses with respect to her 2006 miscarriage, and a miscarriage that
pre-dated her tenure at Aircastle. See Moody Dep. at 28. Moody’s other three pregnancies
resulted in births in April 2006, January 2008, and July 2012. Id. ¶ 114. Aircastle threw a baby

does not contain “in a separate section titled ‘Disputed Issues of Material Fact’ a list of each issue of material fact as
to which it is contended there is a genuine issue to be tried.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)2.
3

Denying this allegation in her Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement, Moody cited paragraph 22 of her declaration, which
reads in part, “We were not close personal friends merely co-workers [sic].” Moody Decl. ¶ 22. Moody testified at
her deposition, however, that she and Gannon were close and that she considered Gannon a friend. Moody Dep. at
28:1-6, 70:21-24. “It is beyond cavil that ‘a party may not create an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit in
opposition to a summary judgment motion that . . . contradicts the affiant’s previous deposition testimony.’”
Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 455 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Hayes v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., 84
F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996)). Moreover, Moody admitted the allegation that “[p]rior to late fall 2010, Plaintiff and
Gannon enjoyed a friendly relationship both at the office and outside of work. They socialized with each other
outside the office . . . .” Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 68.
4

Moody denies these allegations in her Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement, but does not cite to record evidence that in fact
contradicts them. See Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 25; Moody Decl. ¶ 23.

2 

shower to celebrate the birth of Moody’s first child, id. ¶ 115, and gave her gifts at the births of
each of her children, id.; Moody Decl. ¶ 23. Moody took twelve weeks of leave, without
incident, following her April 2006 childbirth, and again following her January 2008 childbirth.
Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 116.
Aircastle’s executive management team set Moody’s compensation.5 Id. ¶ 26. Each
year, Moody received a compensation statement setting forth her base salary for the upcoming
year and her cash bonus for the previous year. Id. From 2005 to 2007, Moody was an
administrative assistant compensated as follows:
Year
2005
2006
2007

Base Salary
$55,000
$55,000
$57,750

Bonus
$5,000 (prorated)
$13,750
$14,400

Id. ¶ 27.
In late 2007, Aircastle hired a new chief financial officer, Michael Inglese, who brought
along his executive assistant, Adriana Tournas, who is Caucasian. Id. ¶ 30; Moody Decl. ¶ 11.
Inglese supervised Tournas. Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 30. Tournas started with a base salary of $65,000,
which was more than Moody’s base salary at the time. See id. ¶¶ 27, 30. Moody brought this to
Gannon’s attention, and Aircastle promoted Moody to executive assistant and increased her
salary to match Tournas’s. Id. ¶ 31. From 2008 to 2012, Moody and Tournas were compensated
as follows:
Year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Moody’s Base Salary; Bonus
$65,000; $14,500
$66,650; $14,500
$66,650; $12,500
$66,650; $10,500
$66,650; $0

Tournas’s Base Salary; Bonus
$65,000; $14,500
$66,650; $14,500
$66,650; $14,500
$66,650; $14,400
$68,000; $14,500

5

The parties dispute whether Gannon offered input as to Moody’s compensation. See Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 26.

3 

Id. ¶ 33. 
During her tenure at Aircastle, Moody enrolled in an online undergraduate degree
program. Id. ¶ 20. Moody sometimes did schoolwork at work. Id. ¶ 21; Moody Dep. at 22-23.
Moody received her undergraduate degree in November 2010. Id. ¶ 22. In December 2010,
Moody began an online master’s degree program. Id. ¶ 23. She obtained her master’s degree in
2012. Id. 
At the end of each year, Moody completed a self-appraisal of her performance for the
year. Gannon reviewed Moody’s self-appraisals and drafted manager’s appraisals. Id. ¶¶ 38-39.
Gannon and Moody then met to discuss the appraisals. Id. ¶ 40. Moody admits that Gannon’s
appraisals of her work for the years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 were fair and not tainted with
discriminatory or retaliatory animus. Id. ¶ 42. Moody’s appraisals for these years were
generally positive. See Def.’s Exs. 18-21.
At the end of 2010, Moody submitted her self-appraisal for the year. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 48. It
was essentially half-finished; Moody failed to set goals, provide feedback or suggestions about
how to improve Aircastle, and request training or development opportunities. This self-appraisal
stood in contrast to Moody’s prior self-appraisals, where Moody had included personal goals and
feedback for Aircastle. Id. ¶ 49.
On January 16, 2011, Moody sent a letter to Wainshal and Lori Kleiman, Aircastle’s
human resources consultant. Pl.’s Ex. A; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 3. In the letter, Moody noted that the
friendly relationship she had with Gannon began to change when she got her undergraduate
degree. Pl.’s Ex. A at 1. The letter went on to complain about (1) Gannon telling Moody to
inform someone when she takes her lunch break and is unable to answer the telephone; (2) a
December 2010 incident where Gannon asked Moody why she would miss an office holiday

4 

party following a miscarriage; (3) an incident where Gannon held Moody responsible for
booking an unneeded car service reservation; and (4) an incident where Gannon got upset with
Moody for not ensuring that a microwave was discarded promptly. Id. at 1-2. Moody did not
include any complaints about disparate treatment on the basis of her race because, at the time,
she did not believe that race was a factor in her treatment. Moody Dep. 71:5-16. Moody did not
have any complaints about her treatment that she did not include in the January 16, 2011 letter.
Id. at 76:19-25. It was the first time that Moody had ever complained to anyone at Aircastle.
Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 70. Wainshal asked Kleiman to address Moody’s concerns, and she did. Id. ¶ 78.
Moody believed, and asserts in this action, that Gannon’s attitude toward her and
treatment of her changed because she got a degree. See id. ¶¶ 74-76. The change in their
relationship began before Moody’s miscarriage in December 2010. Id. ¶ 75. Moody’s 2006 and
2008 childbirths had not affected Moody’s relationship with Gannon; they had continued to be
friendly. Id. ¶ 117. 
In February 2011, Gannon and Moody signed Moody’s 2010 manager appraisal.6 Def.’s
Ex. 31 at AYR000161. It noted that Moody’s work was “generally satisfactory,” but that she
should take more initiative, improve communication with her manager, follow through with
assignments until their completion in a timely manner, not do schoolwork in the office, and keep
personal telephone calls to a minimum. Id. The appraisal mentioned the microwave incident,
and made a goal for Moody to identify and resolve issues that arose on her projects. Id. Moody
prepared a rebuttal contesting some of the negative marks. Id. at AYR000164-66. Gannon,
Moody, and Kleiman met in February 2011 to discuss Moody’s appraisal. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 57;

6

The parties dispute when Gannon finished drafting Moody’s 2010 appraisal. See Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 50-51, 77. Moody
claims that Gannon revised it after learning about Moody’s letter to Wainshal. See Moody Decl. ¶ 15. Aircastle
claims that Gannon did not see that letter before completing Moody’s appraisal. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 58, 77.

5 

Moody Decl. ¶ 12. At that meeting, Moody learned that her bonus for the year would be $2,000
less than her previous bonus. Moody Decl. ¶ 12.
On April 14, 2011, Moody filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”) alleging that Aircastle gave her a poor appraisal,
reduced her bonus, and retaliated against her because of her race and because of her letter to
Wainshal. Pls.’ Stmt. ¶ 79, 81-82; Def.’s Ex. 35.
On October 19, 2011, Moody sent Wainshal another letter complaining that her work
environment was “hostile,” that she was reprimanded for making an unneeded travel reservation,
and noting that the purpose of the letter was to “bring [Wainshal] up to speed about one of the
many nitpicky things that have been going on behind the scenes.” Def.’s Ex. 36. The letter does
not assert that the alleged hostility was because of Moody’s race, sex, or pregnancy. Id. Moody
admits that, with respect to the travel reservation incident, Gannon did not say anything to her
other than to explain the reasoning behind Aircastle’s policy to not book travel over the
weekend. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 89. Gannon did not see Moody’s second letter to Wainshal until after the
filing of this lawsuit. Id. ¶ 90.7
In November 2011, upon the CHRO’s recommendation, Aircastle engaged a relationship
coach to help Moody and Gannon with their relationship. Id. ¶¶ 92-97. Moody and Gannon met
with the coach individually, but never jointly. Id.
Aircastle’s receptionist was charged with answering the main telephone line within the
first two rings. If the receptionist was away from her desk and the phone rang more than twice,
Moody or Tournas were supposed to answer – Moody in the morning, Tournas in the afternoon.
Moody often left her desk without notifying anyone, which resulted in Tournas having to answer

7

In denying this assertion, Moody cites two paragraphs of her declaration concerning unrelated events that predate
the October 19, 2011 letter. See Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 90.

6 

the telephone when Moody should have been available to answer. Moody also failed to answer
Wainshal’s phone. The receptionist reported this issue to Gannon, and it became the subject of
meetings of the administrative staff. Id. ¶¶ 45, 46; Eyler Dep. at 13. Moody proposed having the
receptionist advise Moody and Tournas if she needed to leave her desk. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 47.
Gannon did not approve this proposal. See id.; Eyler Dep. at 14.
In November or December 2011, Gannon drafted Moody’s 2011 appraisal. Pl.’s Stmt.
¶ 59. It was worse than her 2010 appraisal. It noted that Moody’s “performance has declined
since her most recent job review” and reiterated that she must follow through with assignments
and be more proactive around the office. It concluded that Moody had accomplished only two of
her seven goals from her previous appraisal, id. ¶ 60, and that Moody “does not normally
complete projects in a timely manner and rarely follows up to make sure manager [sic] is
informed” and “continues to have communication issues with her Manager, including showing a
lack of respect[,]” Def.’s Ex. 32 at AYR000151. Finally, it noted that Moody’s “lack of respect
towards her supervisor is disruptive to Aircastle” and that she “is not providing value to the
administrative team and must immediately change her work habit as described herein for
continued employment.” Id. at AYR000152. Moody prepared a rebuttal contesting some of the
negative comments. Id. at AYR000154-56. 
Throughout 2012, several employees complained to Gannon about Moody. Gannon Dep.
at 41-42. In 2012, “people just stayed away from [Moody]. She didn’t look up. She rarely said
hello. People just stayed away from her. She was not very friendly.” Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 62. During
the last two years of her tenure at Aircastle, Moody was defensive, unapproachable, and
insubordinate in her dealings with Gannon. Nevertheless, Gannon attempted to speak with
Moody to understand her negative attitude. Moody countered with more unpleasantness and

7 

disrespect. Moody refused to look at Gannon when Gannon spoke, and Moody spoke
disrespectfully to Gannon. Id. ¶ 67.
Prior to January 2012, Aircastle had separate vacation leave and sick leave policies. Id.
¶ 98. Effective January 1, 2012, Aircastle combined its vacation leave and sick leave policies
into a single Paid Time Off (“PTO”) policy under which employees would accrue PTO
throughout the year to be used for absences due to illness or vacation. Id. ¶ 100.
Under the policy, Moody was entitled to 23 PTO days in 2012, which would accrue at a
rate of 1.92 days per month.8 Id. ¶ 101. The policy provided that “PTO may be used in
minimum increments of one-half day (4 hours) except for exceptional circumstances and with
prior approval of your direct supervisor.” Def.’s Ex. 37 at AYR003024. The policy did not
explicitly permit employees to “go negative” (i.e., to take PTO that they had not yet accrued).
See id. at ARY003022-24. Nonetheless, to allow Moody to receive prenatal care, Aircastle
permitted her to “go negative” shortly after the policy went into effect. Moody constantly
exceeded her allotment of PTO. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 104.
In April 2012, Aircastle formally amended the PTO policy to allow employees in good
standing to “go negative” up to five days at the discretion of their supervisors. Id. ¶ 108. The
policy provided that once an employee had “gone negative” five days, the employee could not
take any additional PTO until the employee had accrued enough to return to a zero balance.
Def.’s Ex. 37 at AYR003029.

8

Moody claims she was “shorted” three PTO days in 2012. Moody Decl. ¶ 71.D. In support, however, she cites an
August 2012 e-mail exchange where she asked human resources to “apply 3 of my PTO days so that my pay cycle
will go through the 14th of September[.]” The response indicated that Moody’s September 14 paycheck would
include “3 PTO days [at] 100% of her daily rate” for “9/12 – 9/13 – 9/14[.]” The remainder of the exchange
concerns Moody’s belief, based on her memory of her experiences before Aircastle instituted its PTO policy, that
she was entitled to full compensation for all 12 weeks of her FMLA leave. Pl.’s Ex. DD.

8 

On January 5, 2012, Moody requested a half-day of PTO to leave work at 11:30 A.M. so
that she could attend a 2:00 P.M. doctor’s appointment. Because her shift began at 8:00 A.M.,
she would only have worked three-and-one-half hours if she left at 11:30 A.M. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 120.
As noted above, the PTO policy provided that “PTO may be used in minimum increments of
one-half day (4 hours) except for exceptional circumstances and with prior approval of your
direct supervisor.” Def.’s Ex. 37 at AYR003024. Gannon explained to Moody that she had to
work until 12:00 P.M. in order to use a half day of PTO; alternatively, she could use a full day of
PTO. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 120. Moody offered to start work early to make up the time, but Gannon
declined on the ground that Aircastle did not need an executive assistant in the early morning.
Id. ¶ 122. In March 2012, Tournas was allowed to work only two-and-one-half hours, take only
a half PTO day, and make up the hours on a later date. See Moody Decl. ¶ 40; Pl.’s Ex. N.
On January 17, 2012, Moody e-mailed Gannon stating that she was going to take a full
PTO day because her car would not start. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 124. On January 23, 2012, Moody
e-mailed Gannon stating that she was not coming to work because she was not feeling well. Id. ¶
25. The next day, Moody again e-mailed Gannon stating that she was not coming to work
because she was not feeling well. Id. ¶ 126.
By February 15, 2012, Moody had exhausted all of her accrued PTO, and had “gone
negative” nearly five days of unearned PTO, which Gannon had allowed her to take. Lori
Kleiman, Aircastle’s human resources consultant, informed Moody that Aircastle could not
approve unlimited days off, even if they were unpaid, and that Aircastle “need[ed] [Moody] to be
in the office to perform a function on a regular basis.” Id. ¶ 127; Def.’s Ex. 43. Kleiman also
advised Moody of her right to take intermittent leave for her doctor’s appointments, and that she
would receive the necessary FMLA paperwork to seek approval for such leave. FMLA-

9 

approved absences would not count against her, but any future absences that did not qualify for
FMLA leave would be unapproved. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 128.
On February 22, 2012, Moody’s physician certified that Plaintiff required routine
antepartum and postpartum care. Id. ¶ 130. Kleiman e-mailed Moody on March 1, 2012 to
advise her that she was approved for intermittent FMLA leave for one prenatal doctor’s visit per
month, as requested by her physician. The e-mail stated that, if Moody took any intermittent
leave before the birth of her child, it would be deducted from her twelve weeks of FMLA leave.
But Aircastle ultimately elected not to deduct Moody’s intermittent leave from her twelve weeks
of FMLA leave, and instead granted Moody a full twelve weeks of FMLA leave beginning after
her last day of work before giving birth, allowing her to exceed the twelve weeks of unpaid leave
required under the FMLA. Id. ¶ 131. However, Kleiman advised Moody that Aircastle would
not approve future non-FMLA-qualifying absences, which would be unpaid until Moody became
eligible for PTO under the policy. Id. ¶ 132.
Kleiman attached to her e-mail a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”), dated February
29, 2012. Moody signed the PIP on March 1, 2012. Id. ¶ 134. It noted that Kleiman and Moody
had discussed the fact that Moody’s absences were excessive and a concern to Aircastle, and that
Moody had been told to submit an FMLA application if she believed her absences related to a
serious health condition. Otherwise, her time off would be considered unauthorized. Id. ¶ 135.
As a result of this PIP, Moody was no longer in good standing under the PTO policy. Id. ¶ 136.
Moody missed work on April 11, 12, and 13. On April 16, Moody submitted a note from
her general physician indicating that she had been under the physician’s care since April 11 and
could return to work on April 16. Because the physician’s note did not appear to relate to
Plaintiff’s approved intermittent FMLA leave for prenatal appointments, Aircastle determined

10 

that the absences would be unapproved unless they pertained to a separate serious medical
condition covered by the FMLA. Id. ¶ 137.
By letter dated April 16, Kleiman advised Moody that her absences for April 11, 12, and
13 were unapproved and would be unpaid because Moody had already exhausted her accrued
PTO. In fact, she had “gone negative” five days. The letter also stated that the doctor’s note that
Moody had submitted did not provide sufficient information for Aircastle to determine why she
was absent and unable to work, another reason why her absences were unapproved and unpaid.
Kleiman advised Moody, however, that if the absences were related to a serious medical
condition, she could apply for concurrent FMLA leave – in which case the absences would no
longer be unapproved – by submitting the appropriate paperwork by no later than April 30, 2012.
Moody never did so. Id. ¶ 138. Kleiman also warned Moody that her continued absences were
creating a hardship for Aircastle’s administrative team, and that future absences, except for
FMLA or other approved leave, would be unauthorized and unpaid until Plaintiff accrued
sufficient PTO to return to a zero balance. Thereafter, any PTO that would cause Moody to “go
negative” would be approved or not at Gannon’s discretion. Id. ¶ 139.
On April 20, 2012, Moody frequently left her desk to use the restroom and was
unavailable to answer the phone. Id. ¶ 140. Gannon e-mailed her to inquire if she was alright.
Gannon then notified Kleiman that Moody had left her work area at least four times that day for
approximately 30 minutes or more each time. Id.
On May 8, 2012, Moody filed another complaint with the CHRO alleging discrimination,
harassment, retaliation, and delegation of difficult assignments because of her sex, pregnancy,
and previously opposing discrimination. See id. ¶ 42; Def.’s Ex. 37. She also alleged that she
was assigned to move large, heavy binders. Id.

11 

Aircastle had several hundred binders that were not needed on-site. Aircastle decided
that the paper in the binders would be sent to storage, but the binders themselves would be kept
on-site to reuse. Id. ¶ 144. In 2011, before Moody was pregnant, Gannon assigned her to move
the binders. Id. ¶ 143; Moody Decl. ¶ 43. In January 2012, when Moody was pregnant, Gannon
assigned Moody to remove the paper from the binders, which were standing upright on a table.
Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 147. She did not ask Moody to lift the heavy binders, only to empty their contents.
Id. At Moody’s request, a receptionist helped her set up the binders so that she could remove
their contents. Id. ¶ 150. Throughout the process, Moody put binders on the floor, which
bothered some of her colleagues. See id. ¶ 152-53. Emptying the binders was an uncomfortable
task for Moody because it required her to bend, which caused pressure on her bladder because
her baby was resting low in her abdomen. Moody Decl. ¶ 44.
Kristin O’Neill, a Caucasian female, was Aircastle’s Director of Contract Management.
Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 105. She reported to Aircastle’s chief operating officer and general counsel, and
was responsible for managing the contracts group and all of Aircastle’s leasing activities. Id.
Aircastle did not require O’Neill to complete FMLA paperwork in order to attend prenatal
doctor’s appointments, but did require Moody to do so. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 107. O’Neill’s last day of
work before maternity leave was January 4, 2012. Id. ¶ 174. She initially asked to take fifteen
weeks of leave, but ultimately took less because she could not afford to go the extra time without
compensation. Id. O’Neill was allowed to “go negative” in March 2012. Id. ¶ 107.
In June 2012, Aircastle began preparing for Moody’s imminent maternity leave. By
letter dated June 19, 2012, Aircastle’s payroll specialist notified Moody that she was entitled to
twelve weeks of FMLA leave and was expected to return to work on September 24, 2012. Id. ¶
155. Except for a seven-day waiting period imposed by Aircastle’s short term disability policy,

12 

Moody would be paid her base salary during the first eight weeks of her leave. Id. ¶ 157.
On or about June 19, 2012, Moody met with the payroll specialist and Blaire Milanese,
Aircastle’s Senior Vice President of Human Resources. Id. ¶ 159. Moody was presented with a
disability leave calendar, which she reviewed and signed. It indicated that Moody’s maternity
leave would begin on June 28, 2012 and that she would return to work on September 24, 2012.
The portion of her leave beyond eight weeks – from September 5 to September 21 – would be
unpaid unless Moody chose to apply accrued PTO. Id. ¶¶ 160-62.
On June 27, Moody wrote a letter to Milanese requesting that her short term disability
benefits begin on July 2. Id. ¶ 163. Milanese responded by letter dated July 5, 2012, explaining
that, based on Moody’s physician’s certificate, Moody’s period of incapacity ran from June 29
through September 21, and that Aircastle had granted her FLMA leave for that twelve-week
period. Id. ¶ 164. Milanese also explained that Aircastle could not commence Plaintiff’s short
term disability benefits on July 2, because the policy mandated a seven-day waiting period.
Accordingly, the only way for Moody to be paid during the waiting period would be for her to
use accrued PTO, but Plaintiff did not have any accrued PTO at that time. As a result, Plaintiff
would not be paid for June 29, July 2, 3 and 5. She would be paid for the July 4th holiday,
however. Id. ¶ 165. Milanese further explained that Aircastle’s policy was to cover six to eight
weeks recovery post-birth at 100% of an employee’s base salary. Notwithstanding, Aircastle
allowed Moody to begin her eight-week period at 100% of her salary pre-birth, immediately after
the expiration of the waiting period on July 5. Milanese noted that Moody’s eight-week period
at 100% of her salary would end on August 31st. Id. ¶ 167.
Moody gave birth in July 2012. Id. ¶ 168. Aircastle sent Moody a gift basket to
congratulate her. Id. ¶ 169.

13 

On August 21, 2012, Moody e-mailed the payroll specialist to say that her short term
disability would end on September 11 and to request three PTO days so that she would be paid
through September 14. Moody also complained that she would not receive 100% of her base
salary after August 31. Id. ¶ 170. Milanese responded on August 23rd and confirmed that
Aircastle would apply three of Moody’s PTO days on September 12th, 13th and 14th. Milanese
also reminded Moody that Aircastle’s policy had always been to pay an employee at 100% of
base salary for the first six to eight weeks of short term disability leave. After six to eight weeks,
continued short term disability leave, if approved by Aircastle’s insurance carrier, was paid at
only 70% of base salary. Id. ¶ 171. Moody responded that she had been paid at 100% for longer
than eight weeks during her maternity leave in 2008. Id. ¶ 172. Milanese responded that
Aircastle’s PTO policy had changed since Moody’s maternity leave in 2008 to eliminate
unlimited sick time, and further noted that she reviewed Moody’s 2008 short term disability
calendar and confirmed that Moody was paid at 100% for only eight weeks, not more, as she
claimed. Id. ¶ 173; Def.’s Ex. 65.
When Moody returned to work on September 24, 2012, she had exhausted her twelve
weeks of FMLA leave. Moody took full PTO days on October 3 and 8,9 and a half day on
October 31.10 Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 190-91, 193.
Once a year, Aircastle hosts a few days of off-site meetings, typically in New York City.
Employee attendance is mandatory. Id. ¶ 180. The purpose of the off-site meetings is partly to
discuss business and partly for employees to meet in person – not through video conference –

9

Moody notes that this was Columbus Day, but she states that she took a PTO day, and does not cite any evidence
showing that Aircastle employees were not expected to work that day. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 191. Aircastle submitted an
e-mail sent by Moody on this date stating, “I am not feeling well this morning I will not be in the office.” Def.’s Ex.
42 at 000254.
10

Aircastle claims that Moody also missed work on October 18, but cites to an e-mail dated October 8, 2012. See
Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 192.

14 

and spend time together and do team-building. Id. ¶ 181. On September 26, 2012, Gannon
announced that the 2012 off-site would be held in New York City, beginning with a dinner on
the evening of November 7th and ending in the early afternoon on November 9th. Gannon noted
that attendance was mandatory. Id. ¶ 182.
On October 23, 2012, Moody, who was breastfeeding, e-mailed Milanese and Aircastle’s
chief operating officer and general counsel stating, “I have a new infant at home which I am
currently nursing and as such I will not be able to attend the offsite since it is too long of a
separation period from the baby with such commute. However, I can still be in the office to
conduct my daily duties.” Id. ¶ 184. Milanese responded and asked Moody to come to her
office to discuss. Milanese told Moody that she could skip the dinner on November 7th and that
she did not have to stay overnight in New York City.11 Moody was only expected to attend the
meetings on November 8th and 9th. The off-site meetings were scheduled to end no later than
noon on November 9th. Milanese advised Moody that she would not be permitted to work from
the office on November 8th and 9th because the office would be empty and Aircastle did not
need her to be there. Id. ¶ 185. Aircastle hired a temporary worker to cover office duties during
the off-site meetings. Moody Decl. ¶ 66.
On the morning of November 9th, Moody e-mailed Milanese and Gannon stating, “Not
making it to the city at the doctor’s [sic].” Milanese responded that attendance at the off-site was
mandatory and requested that Moody provide a doctor’s note for her absence. Moody provided
two doctor’s notes, but Aircastle did not excuse Moody’s November 9th absence on the ground
that she had exhausted all of her PTO and FMLA leave. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 187-88.

11

Moody denies this allegation, but does not cite record evidence that actually supports her denial. See Pl.’s Stmt. ¶
185.

15 

On November 15, 2012, Milanese issued Moody a second PIP. Milanese and Moody met
to discuss the PIP and Moody’s performance issues. Milanese warned that, unless Moody
improved her performance, Aircastle would take more serious disciplinary measures. Id. ¶ 198.
The PIP noted that Moody’s performance fell short of expectations in four areas (attention to
detail, performance goals, attendance, and communication), and provided examples of failures in
each area. Def.’s Ex. 75 at AYR002263- 64. It set forth corrective actions, including that “[a]ll
PTO is cleared in advance; if your PTO banks is negative, your PTO will not be approved and if
taken will be unpaid[,]” and that “communication with your supervisor and others will improve
dramatically both in emails and in-person conversations. Your current overall attitude is
unsatisfactory.” Id. at AYR002265.
The next day, Moody missed work, claiming “I am not feeling well this morning I will
not be in the office.” Def.’s Ex. 42 at AYR004858. Thereafter, her communication, attendance,
and attention to detail did not improve, and she failed to set any goals for herself in her 2012
appraisal.12 Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 200. During her 2012 appraisal meeting, Milanese asked Moody
several times if she had any questions or if she had anything to say about her performance issues.
Moody’s only response was “nope, nope.” Id. ¶ 201.
Moody missed half day of work on November 20, 2012. Id. ¶ 202. She missed a half
day on December 5. Def.’s Ex. 76 at AYR 005661.15. She missed a full day on December 18.
Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 204.
On January 14, 2013, after consulting with Gannon and Aircastle’s executive
management team, Milanese met with Moody and Gannon and told Moody that her employment
was being terminated. Wainshal approved the decision to terminate Moody’s employment.

12

Moody denies this allegation, but does not cite to record evidence that actually controverts it. See Pl.’s Stmt. ¶
200.

16 

Wainshal Decl. ¶ 12. Gannon advised Moody that her performance had not improved since the
second PIP was issued and that, as a result, that day would be her last at Aircastle. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶
227. Plaintiff’s final payment of wages was dated January 14, 2013. She received her regular
wages, plus payment for accrued and unused PTO. Id. ¶ 228.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court shall grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has carried that
initial burden, “the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the
existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d
Cir. 2011). If no reasonable jury could find in favor of the opposing party because “the evidence
to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary
judgment is proper.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d
Cir. 1994).
A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under substantive law, and a
dispute is “genuine” if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the
non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Dalberth v. Xerox
Corp., 766 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2014).
Summary judgment may be appropriate “even in the fact-intensive context of
discrimination cases.” Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001).

17 

However, “summary judgment is ordinarily inappropriate where an individual’s intent and state
of mind are implicated.” Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985). Thus, “[a] trial
court must be cautious about granting summary judgment to an employer when . . . its intent is at
issue,” and “affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof
which, if believed, would show discrimination.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224 (citations omitted). But
“the mere incantation of intent and state of mind” does not “operate as a talisman to defeat an
otherwise valid motion.” Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998. Thus, “an employer would be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to
whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted
independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Disparate Treatment on the Basis of Race, Sex, and Pregnancy

Moody asserts race and sex (including pregnancy) discrimination under Title VII and
CFEPA, and asserts race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The same analysis applies to
all claims: the three-step burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Sanchez v. Conn. Nat. Gas Co., 421 F. App’x 33, 34 n.2 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“Although McDonnell Douglas concerned the burden and allocation of proof under Title VII, its
framework is also applied to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . . . and the CFEPA”).
To overcome a motion for summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
“a plaintiff must first satisfy an initial burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a
prima facie case of discrimination.” Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 45

18 

(2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Establishment of the prima facie case creates
a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee, thus placing
upon the defendant “the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the prima facie case—i.e.,
the burden of producing evidence that the adverse employment actions were taken for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07
(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“If the defendant makes such a showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove
discrimination, for example, by showing that the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual.”
Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2006). “[A]lthough the presumption of
discrimination drops out of the picture once the defendant meets its burden of production, the
trier of fact may still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff’s prima facie case and
inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is
pretextual.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143. Although the evidentiary burden shifts back and forth,
“[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 518.
1.

Prima Facie Case

To satisfy her prima facie burden, Moody must show that: (1) she was a member of a
protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination. Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003). “[T]he
showing the plaintiff must make as to the elements of the prima facie case in order to defeat a
motion for summary judgment is ‘de minimus.’” Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196,
203-04 (2d Cir. 1995).

19 

a.

Protected Class

Moody belongs to protected classes because of her African-American race, female sex,
and pregnancy. E.g., Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2014)
(African-American is protected class); Sweeney v. Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y., 711
F.2d 1179, 1185 (2d Cir. 1983) (female is protected class); Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d
58, 64 (2d Cir. 1995) (pregnant is protected class).
b.

Qualified for the Position

The Court assumes without deciding that Moody satisfied her de minimus burden to show
that she was qualified for her position.
c.

Adverse Employment Action

Moody’s filings do not identify her claimed adverse employment actions with any
specificity. Liberally construed, they suggest that she claims as adverse employment actions her
reduced bonuses, negative appraisals, and termination.13 Moody’s termination is an adverse
employment action, and the Court assumes without deciding that Moody’s negative appraisals
and reduced bonuses are as well. See Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“[N]egative evaluations are adverse employment actions only if they affect ultimate
employment decisions such as promotions, wages or termination.”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 804 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2015) (district court

13

Moody’s filings do not claim excessive scrutiny as an adverse employment action. Even if they had, the Court
would not conclude that the scrutiny Moody claims to have been under amounted to an adverse employment action
in this case. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 615 F. App’x 702, 704 (2d Cir. 2015) (district court properly
held that claimed excessive scrutiny did not qualify as an adverse employment action); Nicastro v. Runyon, 60 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (excessive scrutiny from supervisors and requiring documentation for sick leave
did not support Title VII retaliation claim) (citing Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1994) and
Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 327 (2d Cir. 1996)); Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 216 (D. Conn.
2004) (“[C]ourts within the Second Circuit have found that reprimands, threats of disciplinary action and excessive
scrutiny do not constitute adverse employment actions.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

20 

erred in ruling that denial or reduction of bonus could not constitute adverse employment action
solely because employer had discretion whether to pay a bonus).
d.

Inference of Discrimination

The Court also assumes without deciding that Moody satisfied her burden to raise an
inference of discrimination.
2.

Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason

At the second step of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry, the burden shifts to the defendant
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Hicks,
509 U.S. 507. Aircastle has met its burden by “clearly set[ting] forth, through the introduction of
admissible evidence,” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981), its
reason for taking adverse action against Moody: her performance and attendance issues.
3.

Pretext

Moody has not carried her burden at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry,
which requires her to show that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were pretext for
discrimination.
First, Moody has not raised a genuine dispute as to whether Aircastle’s stated reasons for
taking adverse employment actions are “unworthy of credence[.]” See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
That is, she has not shown that she did not have performance and attendance issues. Moody
admits that she constantly exceeded her allotment of PTO, Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 104, was placed on two
PIPs because of her attendance and performance issues, id. ¶¶ 134-36, 198; Def.’s Ex. 75, failed
to complete self-appraisals, Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 49, 200, and, during the last two years of her tenure,
was not friendly or approachable, id. ¶ 62, and was defensive, insubordinate, and disrespectful in
her dealings with Gannon, id. ¶ 67. See McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.

21 

1997) (where record established that plaintiff arriving at work late, failed to submit paperwork
on time, and had inadequate written and oral communication, plaintiff’s rationalizations for
performance deficiencies did not establish pretext); Taylor v. Polygram Records, No. 94 Civ.
7689 (CSH), 1999 WL 124456, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[F]aulting others for, or otherwise
rationalizing, problems legitimately perceived by [plaintiff’s] employer does not establish
pretext.”) (citing McLee, 109 F.3d at 135).
Of course, “[p]roof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply
one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination . . . .” Reeves,
530 U.S. at 147. Moody may meet her burden at this stage by demonstrating that a
discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated Aircastle’s adverse employment actions
against her. See Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 155-57 (2d Cir. 2010) (plaintiff not
required to prove that employer’s stated justification was false, but must establish that defendant
was motivated at least in part by discrimination). However, because Aircastle’s “stated reasons
for the challenged action are strongly supported by the evidence, the burden on plaintiff to prove
that they are a pretext for discrimination is substantial.” Lucibello v. Yale-New Haven Hosp.,
No. 03-cv-814, 2005 WL 578324, at *7 (D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2005).
As to sex (including pregnancy) discrimination, Moody’s own allegations undermine her
claim. She alleges that Aircastle treated O’Neill more favorably by allowing her to attend
prenatal doctor’s appointments without completing FMLA paperwork, and by authorizing her to
take fifteen weeks of leave. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 107; Moody Decl. ¶ 71.D. Moody’s allegation that a
pregnant employee received more favorable treatment undermines any inference that Aircastle
was motivated by anti-pregnancy animus. See Turner v. Eastconn Reg’l Educ. Serv. Ctr., 588 F.
App’x 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Title VII

22 

pregnancy discrimination claim where plaintiff alleged more favorable treatment of another
pregnant employee).
Further, Moody admits that her 2006 and 2008 childbirths did not affect her friendly
relationship with Gannon, Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 117, and that Gannon was sympathetic for her losses with
respect to her 2006 miscarriage and another miscarriage that pre-dated her tenure at Aircastle,
see Moody Dep. at 28. Moody initially claimed that Gannon’s hostility began because she got a
degree, and seems to stand by that claim in this litigation, see Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 74 (admitting
allegation that relationship change “was the result” of academic degree), but simultaneously
claims that Gannon’s alleged hostility, beginning after years of friendship and support, was
because of her sex and/or pregnancy. Similarly, Moody admits that her appraisals for 2006,
2007, 2008, and 2009, during which time she had multiple pregnancies, were not tainted with
discriminatory animus, id. ¶ 42, and does not claim that her pay was discriminatory before her
bonus reduction in early 2011, but claims that the same persons responsible for those appraisals
and pay determinations (Gannon and Wainshal) began discriminating against her on the basis of
sex with respect to appraisals and compensation in early 2011. Moody does not offer evidence
lending any credibility to this turnaround, and has not otherwise raised a genuine dispute as to
whether Aircastle’s actions were motivated by sex discrimination.14 
As to race discrimination, Moody offers no evidence of derogatory racial remarks, and
instead compares her treatment to that of two Caucasian colleagues: O’Neill and Tournas. A
plaintiff may raise an inference of discrimination when the employer treats the plaintiff less
favorably than an employee who is “similarly situated” “in all material respects” and “outside
[her] protected group.” Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003).

14

The Court concludes, for the reasons stated herein, that Moody has not raised a genuine dispute as to whether
Aircastle violated the CFEPA provision providing particular protections for pregnant employees. See Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7).

23 

Moody notes that Aircastle allowed O’Neill to attend prenatal doctor’s appointments
without completing FMLA paperwork, and authorized her to take fifteen weeks of FMLA leave.
Neither alleged event relates to any of Moody’s claimed adverse employment actions. Also,
Moody does not allege that she asked for, and was denied, more than twelve weeks of FMLA
leave, and therefore the second point does not show disparate treatment.
Furthermore, Moody has not shown that O’Neill was similarly situated in all material
respects. In Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second
Circuit determined that the plaintiff’s co-workers were not similarly situated in all material
respects because, inter alia, they had different supervisors and the plaintiff did not show that
they had engaged in comparable misconduct. Accord Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34,
40 (2d Cir. 2000) (plaintiff must show that comparator engaged in comparable conduct).
Plaintiff has not shown that she and O’Neill were similarly situated with respect to job position
and responsibilities, nor with respect to conduct. O’Neill was Aircastle’s Director of Contract
Management responsible for Aircastle’s leasing activities, she sometimes worked from home,
and she reported to Aircastle’s chief operating officer and general counsel, Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 105,
213-14, whereas Moody was an executive assistant and reported to Gannon. Moreover, Moody
had attendance issues leading up to her placement on a PIP shortly after O’Neill took maternity
leave, and Moody offers no evidence that O’Neill had similar issues at or about the time that she
attended prenatal doctor’s appointments.
As to Tournas, Moody notes that Tournas was allowed to take a half PTO day when she
worked fewer than four hours and make up the time later, and that Tournas’s bonuses were not
reduced. But Tournas was not similarly situated in all material respects, either. While it is clear
that Moody’s bonuses declined and Tournas’s held steady, Moody’s declining bonuses coincided

24 

with her performance and attendance issues resulting in negative appraisals and PIPs. Moody
offered no evidence that Tournas had similar disciplinary issues. See, e.g., Stefanidis v. Jos. A.
Bank Clothiers, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-00971 (VAB), 2016 WL 845297, at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 2,
2016) (co-worker with dissimilar disciplinary record was not similarly situated in all material
respects); Padilla v. Harris, 285 F. Supp. 2d 263, 270-71 (D. Conn. 2003) (granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant because possible comparator had “fundamentally different”
disciplinary record, and noting that “[p]rior disciplinary problems may be sufficient to justify
differential treatment of otherwise similarly situated employees”); Moore v. Capital Region
Workforce Dev. Bd., 359 F. Supp. 2d 133, 138 (D. Conn. 2005) (granting summary judgment in
favor of employer that discharged African-American administrative assistant for poor work
performance where plaintiff failed to show that proposed comparators had similar job
responsibilities and disciplinary records). Moreover, Aircastle promptly increased Moody’s
compensation to meet Tournas’s when she joined Aircastle. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 31. With regard to
Aircastle’s allowing Tournas to take a half PTO day and make up the hours later, Moody offers
no evidence suggesting that this was race-based favoritism, and, again, Tournas was not similarly
situated because she reported to a different supervisor, and there is no evidence that Tournas had
absenteeism issues.
Finally, as noted above, Moody’s own admissions undercut her claims of discrimination.
Moody admitted that her experience at Aircastle was untainted by discrimination until late 2010,
and even testified at her deposition that she had no basis for believing that her race was a factor
in her first bonus reduction. See Moody Dep. at 69-70. Moody claims that Gannon became
hostile toward her because she got a degree, but at the same time speculates that Gannon, after
years of close friendship and positive appraisals, became hostile toward her because she is black.

25 

In sum, Moody has not shown that Aircastle’s proffered reasons for taking adverse action against
her are unworthy of credence, and has not otherwise raised a genuine dispute that Aircastle was
motivated by discrimination.
B.

Retaliation

The Court analyzes Title VII retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 315 (2d Cir. 2015). To make out a prima facie case
of retaliation, a plaintiff must show “(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that the
defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Id. at 315-16.
“Even if a plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case, however, this establishes only a rebuttable
presumption of retaliation, and where the defendant identifies a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason
for the adverse employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
defendant’s articulated reason is a pretext for retaliation.” Dixon v. Int’l Fed’n of Accountants,
416 F. App’x 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2011).
With respect to Title VII claims, the plaintiff must “demonstrate that the proffered reason
is pretext for retaliation and that, more generally, the plaintiff’s protected activity was a but-for
cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Sanderson v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas
Corp., 560 F. App’x 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
accord Univ. of Tex. SW Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) (Title VII retaliation
claims “must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation”). Connecticut
courts have not yet adopted Nassar’s but-for causation standard for retaliation claims under
CFEPA, and therefore CFEPA retaliation claims may remain subject to a less-demanding
“motivating factor” analysis. See Tremalio v. Demand Shoes, LLC, No. 3:12-cv-00357, 2013

26 

WL 5445258, at *21 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2013). The distinction does not matter in this case,
however, because Moody has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact under either standard.
1.

Prima Facie Case
a.

Protected Activity

An employee’s complaint may constitute protected activity so long as the employee had a
good faith, reasonable belief that she was opposing an employment practice prohibited by Title
VII. Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Eng’rs, P.C., 716 F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir.
2013). Neither of Moody’s letters to Wainshal constituted protected activity. Both letters were
generalized complaints that did not claim disparate treatment on the basis of any trait protected
under Title VII. See Def.’s Exs. 34, 36. No reasonable jury could conclude that, with either
letter, Moody had a good faith, reasonable belief that she was opposing unlawful discrimination.
Moody’s CHRO complaints filed on April 14, 2011 and May 8, 2012 did constitute
protected activity. Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990) (formal
charges of discrimination constitute protected activity).
b.

Defendant’s Knowledge of Protected Activity

Aircastle knew of Moody’s CHRO complaints against it. See Kessler v. Westchester Cty.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 210 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that only general corporate
knowledge of protected activity is required, and holding that defendant knew of complaint filed
against it with the New York State Division of Human Rights).
c.

Adverse Employment Action

Moody’s termination constituted an adverse employment action. As above, the Court
assumes without deciding that her bonus reductions and negative appraisals did as well. But
adverse employment actions predating protected activity do not support retaliation claims.

27 

McAllister v. Queens Borough Pub. Library, 309 F. App’x 457, 459 (2d Cir. 2009) (plaintiff
failed to state a claim for retaliation because adverse employment action occurred before his
protected activity). Therefore, Moody’s bonus reductions and negative appraisals predating
April 14, 2011 do not support her claim.
d.

Causal Connection

Moody has failed to establish a causal connection between her protected activity and the
subsequent adverse employment actions that she suffered.
Aircastle terminated Moody nearly twenty-one months after her first CCHRO complaint,
and over eight months after her second. Given this lapse of time, and Moody’s performance and
attendance issues, no reasonable jury could infer that her protected activity caused her
termination. See, e.g., Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 274 (2001) (twenty
months between protected activity and adverse action suggests “no causality at all.”); Figueroa
v. Weisenfreund, 255 F. App’x. 595, 597 (2d Cir. 2007) (no prima facie causal connection where
fifteen months separated complaints and termination); Farina v. Branford Bd. of Educ., No.
3:09-cv-00049 (JCH), 2010 WL 3829160, at *8 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2010) (no causal connection
where seven months separated filing of CHRO complaint and plaintiff’s termination), aff’d, 458
F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2011).
Moody also fails to provide sufficient evidence of a causal connection between her
protected activity and her negative appraisals and bonus reductions. Moody’s memorandum
focuses principally on her argument, which the Court rejects, that her first letter to Wainshal was
protected activity. See Pl.’s Mem. at 27-28. She also argues that she was “constantly harassed”
throughout her final two years at Aircastle, but in support of that proposition cites paragraphs of
her declaration merely showing that Wainshal did not respond to her unprotected letter, that

28 

Aircastle arranged for her and Gannon to meet with a relationship coach, and that she filed a
second CHRO complaint. See id. at 28. In any event, she claims that the alleged harassment
began before her protected activity, and as a result of her degree and her unprotected letter to
Wainshal. See Moody Decl. ¶¶ 8, 18, 19; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 74. She again points to O’Neill’s not
having to complete FMLA paperwork to attend prenatal doctor’s appointments, but, as discussed
supra, Moody has not shown that O’Neill was similarly situated, and, in any event, Moody fails
to offer any evidence connecting this dissimilar treatment to her first CHRO complaint, which
she filed approximately six months before.
The only remaining basis for finding a causal connection is temporal proximity, which
cannot establish a causal connection in this case because the adverse employment actions,
beginning in February 2011, were part of an extended period of progressive discipline which
commenced before Moody’s protected activity in April 2011. See, e.g., Slattery v. Swiss
Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (no inference of retaliation where
“adverse employment actions were both part, and the ultimate product, of ‘an extensive period of
progressive discipline’ which began” five months before filing discrimination charge; “Where
timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well
before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity, an inference of retaliation does
not arise”); Bernard v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 408 F. App’x 465, 469 (2d Cir. 2011) (where
plaintiff relied only on temporal proximity, district court properly granted defendant’s motion for
summary judgment as to retaliation claim where plaintiff’s supervisors gave her verbal and
written warnings before protected activity; “[s]ince [defendant]’s adverse employment actions
against [plaintiff] began several months before [plaintiff] engaged in any potentially protected
activity, [plaintiff] cannot demonstrate a causal connection between them.”) (citing Slattery, 248

29 

F.3d at 95); Nicastro v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Design & Const., 125 F. App’x 357, 358 (2d Cir. 2005)
(no prima facie inference of retaliation where “[plaintiff] was subject to adverse employment
actions well before he engaged in protected activity, and his demotion and salary reduction
occurred almost ten months after this activity.”).
Finally, even if Moody had established a prima facie case, the Court concludes, for the
reasons discussed supra at Part IV.A.3, and because temporal proximity alone cannot establish
pretext, El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2010), that Moody has failed
to offer sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute as to whether Aircastle’s legitimate,
non-retaliatory reasons were pretext.
C.

Hostile Work Environment

Moody’s hostile work environment claim fails because no reasonable jury could conclude
that Aircastle subjected Moody to conduct that was severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile work environment because of a protected trait.
Title VII15 makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” strikes at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment in the workplace, including
requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile environment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Accordingly, Title VII is violated when “the workplace is permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to

15

The same standards govern Moody’s hostile work environment claims under CFEPA and Title VII. Martinez v.
Conn., State Library, 817 F. Supp. 2d 28, 55 (D. Conn. 2011) (“The standards governing . . . hostile work
environment under CFEPA are the same as those governing Title VII.”); see also Craine v. Trinity Coll., 791 A.2d
518, 531 n.6 (Conn. 2002) (“We look to federal law for guidance on interpreting state employment discrimination
law, and the analysis is the same under both.”).

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alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment – an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive – is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Id. In evaluating severity or pervasiveness, the Court
must look at all of the circumstances, and may consider “the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. at
23. As to frequency, “[t]here is no fixed number of incidents that a plaintiff must endure in order
to establish a hostile work environment.” Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 379 (2d Cir. 2002).
“[I]ncidents must be more than episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in
order to be pervasive.” Id. at 374. “Isolated acts, unless very serious, do not meet the threshold
of severity or pervasiveness.” Id. However, “even a single act can meet the threshold if, by
itself, it can and does work a transformation of the plaintiff’s workplace.” Id.
Moody’s memorandum makes vague references to “derogatory” and “[d]iscriminatory”
comments without explaining what they were or who made them. See Pl.’s Mem. at 6, 15, 20,
21, 27, 28. She references Gannon’s querying why Moody could not attend an office holiday
party following a miscarriage, and references an e-mail, not addressed to Moody, where female
co-workers accused Moody of faking contraction pains so that she could skip work. Id. Moody
also points to having her bonus reduced, getting poor appraisals, receiving scrutiny for taking
time off to go to doctor’s appointments, being assigned to remove papers from binders while
pregnant, being asked to go to an off-site meeting in New York City, and not being excused for
her absence from the off-site meeting. See id. at 29-31.

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Title VII is not a “general civility code for the American workplace,” Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998), and this Court is not a “super personnel
department[.]” Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2001). The
Court must apply the standards for judging hostility to “filter out complaints attacking the
ordinary tribulations of the workplace . . . .” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788
(1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Moody’s vague allegations of “derogatory” remarks amount to nothing more than
“[s]imple teasing, offhand comments, or isolated incidents of offensive conduct” which are not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. See Petrosino v. Bell Atl.,
385 F.3d 210, 223 (2d Cir. 2004). The remainder of Moody’s allegations – that she was
disciplined and scrutinized for her performance and attendance, and that she was required to
empty binders and attend a meeting in New York – amount to ordinary workplace tribulations
that, while perhaps inconvenient and offensive to Ms. Moody, do not provide a basis for a
reasonable jury to find an objectively hostile work environment. See, e.g., Graciani v. Patients
Med., P.C., No. 13-CV-2751 (NGG) (RLM), 2015 WL 5139199, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2015)
(conduct not sufficiently severe or pervasive where pregnant plaintiff was required to run errands
and lift heavy boxes on three occasions, received “evil looks” and “nasty” responses from
colleague, was told to cover her stomach and wear bigger clothes, and was followed to
restroom); Gratton v. Jetblue Airways, No. 04 Civ. 7561 (DLC), 2005 WL 1251786, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2005) (dismissing hostile work environment claim based on allegations that
pregnant plaintiff’s supervisors required her to provide doctor’s notes explaining her limitations
while pregnant, and reprimanded her for complaining about supervisor’s treatment of her);
Anderson v. State of N.Y., Office of Court Admin. of Unified Court Sys., 614 F. Supp. 2d 404, 424

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(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting summary judgment as to hostile work environment claim based on
plaintiff’s being accused of not following instructions, receiving negative performance
evaluation, and being subjected to an unwarranted counseling session; such conduct was not
severe or pervasive), aff’d sub nom., Anderson v. Cahill, 417 F. App’x 92 (2d Cir. 2011).
Furthermore, for the reasons discussed supra, the Court concludes that Moody has not
raised a genuine dispute that her alleged hostile treatment was because of her race, sex, or
pregnancy. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (Title VII is directed only at discrimination based upon
the categories protected by Title VII); Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 318
(2d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff must demonstrate that “she was subjected to hostility because of her
membership in a protected class”). Moody’s own filings maintain that the alleged hostile
conduct began as a result of Gannon learning that Moody was pursuing a degree and had written
an unprotected letter to Wainshal. See, e.g., Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 74-76; Moody Decl. ¶¶ 8, 18. This
alleged conduct followed years of close friendship between Moody and Gannon, during which
Gannon supported Moody through pregnancies and miscarriages, and during which Moody
received years of appraisals that, she admits, were untainted by discrimination. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 24,
42, 68; Moody Dep. at 28. Even drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, no reasonable
jury could conclude that Moody was subjected to allegedly hostile conduct because of her race,
sex, or pregnancy.
D.

FMLA Claim

The Second Circuit has recognized two types of FMLA claims: interference and
retaliation. Smith v. Westchester Cty., 769 F. Supp. 2d 448, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Potenza
v. City of N.Y., 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2004)). Moody’s claim is neither.

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Moody complains that Aircastle did not give her proper notice before instituting its PTO
policy, that she was required to complete FMLA paperwork in order to attend prenatal doctor’s
appointments whereas a Caucasian colleague was not, and that Aircastle’s PTO policy violates
public policy because it discriminates against pregnant women. Moody has not alleged or
briefed interference or retaliation under the FMLA. To the extent that her filings can be
construed to assert an interference claim,16 the Court concludes that no genuine dispute exists as
to whether Aircastle interfered with Moody’s rights under the FMLA.
To prevail on a claim of interference under the FMLA, a plaintiff must establish that (1)
she is an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the defendant is an employer as defined by the
FMLA; (3) she was entitled to take leave under the FMLA; (4) she gave notice to the defendant
of her intention to take leave; and (5) she was denied benefits to which she was entitled under the
FMLA. Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., --- F.3d ---, No. 15-888-CV, 2016 WL 1055742, at
*6 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2016).
Moody has not raised a genuine dispute as to whether Aircastle denied her FMLA
benefits. Moody received her full twelve weeks of leave. In fact, Aircastle elected not to deduct
Moody’s intermittent prenatal leave from her twelve weeks of FMLA leave, and instead granted
Moody a full twelve weeks beginning after her last day of work before giving birth, allowing her
to exceed the twelve weeks of unpaid leave required under the FMLA. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 131. E.g.,
Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming
district court’s dismissal of interference claim because plaintiff received the twelve weeks of
leave to which he was entitled); Stuart v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 14-CV-4252 (JMF), 2015 WL

16

Moody’s filings plainly do not assert a retaliation claim under the FMLA. See Pl.’s Mem. at 27-28, 32-33;
Compl. ¶ 21. Even if they could be construed to assert such a claim, the Court concludes, for the reasons discussed
herein, that Moody has not raised a genuine dispute as to whether “the adverse employment action[s] occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of retaliatory intent,” Potenza, 365 F.3d at 168, nor has she raised a
genuine dispute as to pretext.

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4760184, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2015) (granting employer’s motion for summary judgment as
to interference claim where “there [was] no evidence that [plaintiff] was denied a benefit to
which she was entitled under the FMLA . . . . In fact, [defendant] went above and beyond its
obligations under the Act and provided [plaintiff] with additional leave beyond the twelve
workweeks to which she was entitled.”).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Aircastle’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30) is

GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in Aircastle’s favor and close this case.

SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut this thirtieth day of March, 2016.

/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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