Cavuoti et al v. Lakota
Filing
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RULING (see attached) granting 2 Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. This Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in full force and effect to and including June 28, 2013, following which date the Order expires, unless extended by further Court Order or by consent of the parties. Signed by Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. on June 14, 2013. (Dorais, L.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
ALFRED CAVUOTI and KIMBERLY
ARDITO, individually and on behalf of
NICHOLAS ARDITO,
No. 3:13 - CV - 829 (CSH)
Plaintiffs,
JUNE 14, 2013
v.
MARY LAKOTA,
Defendant.
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
HAIGHT, Senior District Judge:
This is an action alleging violation of the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. ("FHA"), and, by supplemental jurisdiction, violation of Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 46a-64c.
Plaintiffs Alfred Cavuoti, Kimberly Ardito and Nicholas Ardito are currently rent-paying
tenants residing in a second-floor apartment in a building located at 100 Church Street, Wallingford,
Connecticut. The building is owned by Defendant Mary Lakota. Cavuoti, Kimberly Ardito and
Nicholas Ardito are identified as the Tenants in a one-year lease covering the apartment. Lakota is
the Landlord. By its terms, the lease expires on June 15, 2013. Lakota sent Plaintiffs a letter dated
March 22, 2013, stating that she would not be renewing their lease.
Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that Defendant is terminating the lease because Nicholas
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Ardito, son of Kimberly Ardito, is a disabled individual. If that theory is proven, Defendant would
be in violation of the FHA, entitling Plaintiffs to injunctive relief. Defendant's theory of the case is
that she is terminating the lease because Plaintiffs created unreasonable levels of noise in the
apartment, causing the first-floor tenant to complain.
Plaintiffs did not commence this action until June 11, 2013, when they filed a complaint
seeking a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a preliminary injunction. Given the exigencies
of time, the Court scheduled a hearing for 11:00 a.m. on June 14. Defendant Lakota could not
arrange for the attendance of counsel on that short notice, and accordingly appeared pro se. Plaintiffs
were represented by counsel. Plaintiff Cavuoti says in an affidavit that Lakota identified Nicholas
Ardito's disabilities as the reason for the lease termination during telephone conversations "in April
and May." Doc. #2-2 (Cavuoti Affidavit), ¶ 5. Plaintiffs did not act with due diligence in waiting
until June 11, four days before the lease terminated, before commencing this action. However, this
is not laches rising to the level of foreclosing injunctive relief if Plaintiffs' FHA claim is well
founded. It appears from the record that during part of this period Plaintiffs were searching for
another apartment, apparently without success to date, but if that search had succeeded no lawsuit
would have been necessary.
Plaintiffs seek a TRO which, if granted, would for the duration of the Order keep them in the
apartment, paying the prior monthly sums. The propriety of issuing a TRO is determined by the
same standards governing a preliminary injunction, and are applicable to actions alleging a violation
of the FHA. See, e.g., LaFlamme v. New Horizons, Inc., 514 F.Supp.2d 250, 254 (D.Conn. 2007).
In the circumstances of this case, the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek is prohibitory, rather than
mandatory, and to obtain that relief Plaintiffs must demonstrate "(1) that [they] will be irreparably
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harmed in the absence of an injunction, and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b)
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of the case to make them a fair ground for litigation,
and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in [their] favor." Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v.
Town of No. Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1999) (action alleging violation of FHA).
Plaintiffs at bar satisfy the irreparable injury element because "[w]here a plaintiff
demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits of a FHA claim, irreparable harm may be
presumed." Parris v. Pappas, No. 3:10-cv-1128, 2010 WL 5157326 (D.Conn. Dec. 14, 2010), at
*1 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs establish a likelihood of success on the merits because their
submissions contain direct evidence of Defendant's refusing to renew the lease because Nicholas
Ardito is disabled. Cavuoti states in ¶ 6 of his affidavit that Lakota told him "the reason she is not
renewing our lease and plans to file an eviction is that Nicholas should not be living on the second
floor or using stairs because of his disabilities." Doc. #2-2 (Cavuoti Affidavit), at ¶ 6. Plaintiffs also
submit an affidavit from a non-party, Suzanne M. Ciaburri, who inspected the apartment in May after
Lakota advertised it for rent, asked Lakota why the current tenants were moving out, and received
this response:
Mary told me that she was not renewing their lease because they have
a disabled son. She said that a disabled child should not be living in
a second floor apartment and instead belongs on the first floor. She
also said that the disabled child should not be using stairs.
Doc. #2-4 (Ciaburri Affidavit), at ¶ 7. Accepting arguendo that Lakota's decision not to renew the
lease was prompted solely by praiseworthy solicitude for Nicholas's disabilities, that would not
preserve the decision from violating the FHA, which "prohibits a landlord from discriminating
against a handicapped tenant on account of his or her disability." LaFlamme, 514 F.Supp.2d at 255.
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The statute's prohibition is absolute: a landlord's good intentions cannot constitute a defense. See
LaFlamme v. New Horizons, Inc., 605 F.Supp.2d 378, 394 (D.Conn. 2009) (Arterton, J.) ("A
discriminatory housing practice is still unlawful even if made with good intentions if it denies
housing to individuals with disabilities based on their disabilities.").
As for Lakota's statement at the hearing that Plaintiffs' lease is not being renewed because
of the excessive noise they made, that reason would not violate the FHA, but Lakota's
contemporaneous remarks would seem to establish that Nicholas's disability was at least a partial
motivating factor in the termination, and that is sufficient to show prohibited discriminatory
treatment under the FHA. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1979).
If one looks to the alternative basis for granting a TRO, it is clear that at the very least
Plaintiffs show serious questions deserving of further litigation, and the balance of hardships tips
decidedly in their favor. The eviction of the Plaintiff family with a disabled son from their home
causes irreparable injury almost by definition; and there is no discernible hardship to the Defendant
resulting from a TRO, since Plaintiffs say they are willing, able and intend to keep on paying the
monthly amounts specified in the lease.
For these reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion for a TRO (Doc. #2), and enters an
Order as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Mary Lakota, her agents, servants, employees
and attorneys, and other persons who are in active concert or participation with her, are hereby
TEMPORARILY RESTRAINED:
1. From terminating the lease covering the premises at 100 Church Street, Apartment 2,
Wallingford, Connecticut, wherein Defendant Lakota is the Landlord and Plaintiffs Alfred Cavuoti,
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Kimberly Ardito and Nicholas Ardito are the Tenants; and
2. From evicting, or taking any steps to commence the eviction, of the Plaintiffs from the
leased premises referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Order.
This Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in full force and effect to and including June
28, 2013, following which date the Order expires, unless extended by further Court Order or by
consent of the parties.
Dated: New Haven, Connecticut
June 14, 2013
/s/Charles S. Haight, Jr.
CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR.
Senior United States District Judge
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