Edwards et al v. Hartford et al
Filing
55
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 37 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 38 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Warren W. Eginton on 11/23/15. (Gould, K.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
FABIAN EDWARDS, KENVILLE
EDWARDS, KEITHMICHAEL MITTO
and ELIZABETH EDWARDS,
Plaintiffs,
:
:
:
:
:
v.
:
:
CITY OF HARTFORD, JAMES
:
ROVELLA, OFFICER MATTHEW
:
CORNELL, OFFICER CHRISTOPHER :
MAY, and OFFICER ERIC
:
BAUMGARTEN,
:
Defendants.
:
No. 3:13-cv-878 (WWE)
RULING ON DEFENSE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In their thirty-nine-count complaint, plaintiffs Fabian Edwards, Kenville Edwards,
KeithMichael Mitto, and Elizabeth Edwards allege several civil rights violations pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Hartford, Chief James Rovella, and Officers
Matthew Cornell, Christopher May and Eric Baumgarten.1
The complaint alleges that defendants violated plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights
based on Miranda violations; Fourteenth Amendment rights; and Fourth Amendment
rights. Plaintiffs also allege state law claims of violations of the Connecticut
Constitution, assault and battery, recklessness and maliciousness, negligence,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
municipal liability pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-557n and for
indemnification.
The defendant officers filed a motion for partial summary judgment on certain of
the claims against them; defendant City of Hartford moved for summary judgment on
1
Pursuant to a stipulation of dismissal, all counts and claims have been dismissed against Chief Rovella.
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the plaintiffs’ claims for municipal liability pursuant to state law. For the following
reasons, the defendant officers’ motion for summary judgment will be granted in part
and denied in part; and the City of Hartford’s motion for summary judgment will granted
in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The parties have submitted statements of facts with evidentiary exhibits and
affidavits that reveal the following factual background.
On June 14, 2012, Hartford Police officers executed a search warrant at 18 Bond
Street in Hartford, Connecticut. Officers Cornell and May secured the intersection of
Bond Street and Franklin Avenue. Their marked police cruiser was parked at the
intersection of these streets. Four to five police cruisers blocked off Bond Street.
At the same time, plaintiffs were located at the apartments of a building at 234
Franklin Avenue. The building has two entrances to access the apartments. The left
hand door provides the entry to the second and third floor apartment, and the right hand
door provides entry to the first floor apartment, where Elizabeth Edwards resided.
A bicycle rider who was popping wheelies down Bond Street. A police officer
approached the bicycle rider, asked him what he was doing and then placed him in the
rear of the police cruiser parked at the intersection of Bond Street and Franklin Avenue.
Family members of the individual in the rear of the police car walked over to the police
cruiser and questioned Officers May and Cornell.
Fabian Edwards, who wanted to get a beer, walked towards Paulino’s Grocery
store, which is adjacent to where the police cruiser was parked. As he walked by the
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cruiser, he asked the individual who was in the rear of cruiser if he was okay. Officers
Cornell and May told the crowd of people to disperse or they would be arrested.
Fabian Edwards stopped about two feet before entering the store. An officer
approached him and told him to go into the store. Fabian Edwards answered that he
was going into the store.
Fabian Edwards claims that an officer pushed him into store
after he opened the door. He asserts that he jumped forward as a result of the push,
but he did not fall down or strike anything in the store as a result of the push. Later,
Fabian Edwards exited the store and walked across Bond Street, jumped the chain link
fence surrounding 234 Franklin Avenue and shouted to Officers Cornell and May, “Why
the fuck did you push me?”
The officers looked at him and then away. Fabian Edwards shouted, “Why did
you put your hands on me?” Officers Cornell and May walked over to him. After an
exchange of words, Fabian Edwards stated, “You don’t intimidate me.” Officers Cornell
and May then walked through the front gate of the 234 Franklin property and onto the
front stoop. Officer Cornell asked for Fabian Edwards’s identification.
At approximately this time, Kenville Edwards came around the left corner of the
house towards the front porch. Defendants assert that a struggle ensued between
Kenville Edwards and Officer May, and between Fabian Edwards and Officer Cornell.
Fabian Edwards was subsequently tased and subjected to OC spray. Fabian Edwards
was then taken into custody.
Elizabeth Edwards, who had been in close proximity to Fabian Edwards, felt the
immediate shock from the taser and burning from the OC spray. By the next day, the
effects of the OC spray had resolved.
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Mitto arrived on the scene to see what was going on. Officer May directed OC
spray in the direction of both Kenville Edwards and Mitto. Kenville Edwards then closed
the left-side door, and he and Mitto went upstairs to the third floor apartment. Officers
May and Eric Baumgarten proceeded to the third floor apartment where they placed
Mitto and Kenville Edwards in custody.
Mitto and Fabian and Kenville Edwards were arrested for interfering with an
officer in violation of Connecticut General Statutes, Section 53a-167a and assault on a
police officer in violation Section 53-167c. They each performed community service in
exchange for having their criminal charges nolled.
Elizabeth Edwards was not arrested.
II. DISCUSSION
A motion for summary judgment will be granted where there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The burden is on the
moving party to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in
dispute. American International Group, Inc. v. London American International Corp.,
664 F. 2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981). In determining whether a genuine factual issue
exists, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against
the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). "Only
when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary
judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F. 2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 849 (1991). If a nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof, then
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summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the nonmoving
party submits evidence which is "merely colorable," legally sufficient opposition to the
motion for summary judgment is not met. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
A.
Fifth Amendment Claims
Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’
claims pursuant to the Fifth Amendment because there is no civil cause of action for
Miranda violations. Plaintiffs concede that summary judgment should be granted on this
claim.
B.
Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Defendants argue that summary judgment should enter on the Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process claims because the Fourth Amendment provides
an explicit textual source of protection.
State action violates substantive due process rights where it is “so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Londardi
v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2007). “Where a particular Amendment provides
an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of
government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive
due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266 (1994).
Plaintiffs agree that the Fourth Amendment governs the claims asserted by
Fabian Edwards, Kenville Edwards and Mitto, who were all arrested by the defendant
officers. However, Elizabeth Edwards was not arrested or otherwise seized. In such
instances, her claim for excessive force falls outside the Fourth Amendment and is
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governed by substantive due process. Argro v. Osborne, 2015 WL 1446427, *5
(N.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing cases).
C.
Fourth Amendment Claims for False Arrest and Malicious
Prosecution
Defendants maintain that the Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and
malicious prosecution fail because plaintiffs did not receive favorable termination of their
criminal charges. Plaintiffs agree that summary judgment should be granted on these
claims.
D. Official Capacity Claims
Defendants assert that the official capacity claims are redundant of the claims
against the City of Hartford. The Court agrees that federal claims against the officers in
their official capacities are the same as a claim against a municipality pursuant to
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). The proof required and
resulting damages of official capacity and municipal liability claims are indistinguishable,
and district courts have dismissed such duplicative claims because they provide a
plaintiff with no additional relief than that provided by the claim asserted against a
municipality. See Demski v. Town of Enfield, 2015 WL 4478401, *2 (D. Conn. 2015).
Plaintiffs have stipulated to dismissal of all claims against Chief Rovella, and they
maintain that their counts against the City of Hartford are limited to claims for damages
and indemnification pursuant to state law. In light of plaintiffs’ failure to allege that City
of Hartford is liable for the federal claims, the Court will not dismiss the official capacity
claims as duplicative. However, the Court recommends that plaintiffs consider whether
they intend to assume the burden of proof for such official capacity claims.
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E.
Excessive Force Claims of Mitto and Elizabeth Edwards
Defendants argue that the excessive force claims asserted by Mitto and
Elizabeth Edwards fail as matter of law because they involve de minimis injuries.
Defendants characterize the following as de minimis: Relevant to Elizabeth Edwards, an
immediate shock from the taser and burning from the OC spray lasting until the next day
when it completely resolved; and relevant to Mitto, a burning sensation from the OC
spray lasting approximately a week and a half, and a pain in the head that resolved the
next day. The Court must consider the Fourth Amendment and substantive due
process standards applicable to Mitto’s and Elizabeth Edwards’s claims of excessive
force claims, respectively.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a claim by a citizen that law enforcement officials
used excessive force is reviewed under “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). To determine whether excessive force occurred,
the Court considers the “objective reasonableness” of a particular use of force by a
police officer, the Court balances “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing interests at stake.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. This analysis requires careful attention to the individual
circumstances present, “including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.
To determine whether the use of force violated the plaintiff Elizabeth Edwards’s
substantive due process rights, the Court must determine whether the force used
“shocks the conscience” by considering the following factors: “[1] the need for the
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application of force, [2] the relationship between the need and the amount of force that
was used, [3] the extent of injury inflicted, and [4] whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.” Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 1998). “If the
force used was unreasonable and excessive, the plaintiff may recover even if the
injuries inflicted were not permanent or severe.” Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 924 (2d
Cir.1987).
Courts have held that an injury is de minimis when it is temporary or minor in
severity such as short-term swelling, brief numbness from tight handcuffing or
superficial scratches. Regels v. Giardono, 2015 WL 3901764, *20 (N.D.N.Y. 2015).
However, the fact that a plaintiff sustained no serious long lasting harm is not dispositive
of an excessive force claim. McGrew v. Holt, 2015 WL 736614, *6 (N.D.N.Y. 2015).
But if the force used was excessive, courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover despite a
lack of permanent or severe injury. See, e.g., Argro, 2015 WL 1446427, at *6 (push into
washing machine causing bruising could constitute excessive force under substantive
due process standards). Here, plaintiffs may demonstrate that the defendants’ use of
the taser and OC spray represented an unreasonable use force in light of the
circumstances. The question of whether the amount of force used was excessive force
remains a question for the jury. Accordingly, the Court will deny summary judgment on
these claims.
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F.
Negligence and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims sounding in negligence fail because the
allegations and evidence support only intentional conduct. Defendants assert further
that governmental immunity bars such claims.
This Court and other district courts have held that a plaintiff may not prevail on a
negligence claim when he or she has brought claims of intentional use of excessive
force and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Frappier v. City of Waterbury, 2008
WL 4980362, *3 (D. Conn. 2008). The Court will grant the motion for summary
judgment on claims sounding in negligence asserted by Fabian Edwards and Kenville
Edwards. However, the officers’ conduct with regard to Elizabeth Edwards and Mitto
may implicate a breach of the duty of care. Thus, the Court will consider whether the
negligence claims asserted by Elizabeth Edwards and Mitto are barred by governmental
immunity.
A municipal employee enjoys qualified immunity from tort liability based on
unintentional conduct related to the performance of governmental or discretionary acts.
See Elliot v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 411 (1998). “The hallmark of a
discretionary act is that it requires the exercise of judgment.” Lombard v. Edward J.
Peters, Jr. P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 628 (2000). The manner in which a police officer
makes an arrest, including when to use force, is a discretionary act. See Gordon v.
Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 180-181 (1988) (policing community and
investigating those who break the law is discretionary function).
However, exceptions exist to discretionary act immunity where a public official’s
duty to act is clear and unequivocal. Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 153 (1982).
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Liability may be imposed for a discretionary act where the circumstances make it
apparent that a public officer’s failure to act would likely subject an identifiable person to
imminent harm. Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607, 615 (2006). Here, plaintiffs invoke
this identifiable person exception to discretionary immunity. In Doe, the Connecticut
Supreme Court set forth that this exception requires “(1) an imminent harm; (2) an
identifiable victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct
is likely to subject that victim to that harm.” Id. at 616. “[T]he proper standard for
determining whether a harm was imminent is whether it was apparent to the municipal
defendant that the dangerous condition was so likely to cause harm that the defendant
had a clear and unequivocal duty to act immediately to prevent the harm.” Haynes v.
Middletown, 314 Conn. 303, 322-23 (2014).
Defendants assert that this exception is limited to intances predicated upon a
failure to act. However, courts within this district have applied the identifiable personimminent harm exception in the context of excessive force claims based on affirmative
acts. Crawford v. City of New London, 2014 WL 186417, *13 ( D. Conn. 2014). In this
instance, plaintiffs are at least arguably identifiable victims of the alleged harms caused
by the asserted excessive force. Disputed issues of fact relevant to the officers’
conduct and resulting harm preclude summary judgment on whether the identifiable
person exception applies to bar the negligence claims.
However, the Court will grant summary judgment on Mitto’s claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress. In Connecticut, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant’s
conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress,
plaintiff’s distress was foreseeable, the emotional distress was severe enough that it
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might result in illness or bodily harm, and defendant’s conduct was the cause of the
plaintiff’s distress. Olson v. Burlington-Bristol Health Dist., 87 Conn. App. 1, 5 (2005).
Summary judgment in favor of the defense is appropriate because, during his
deposition, Mitto admitted that he had not experienced any emotional problems as a
result of the incidents alleged in this case.
Accordingly, summary judgment will be denied on the claim of negligence
asserted by Elizabeth Edwards and Mitto; and it will be denied on the claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress asserted by Elizabeth Edwards but will be granted on
Mitto’s claim of emotional distress. 2
G.
Claims Under the Connecticut Constitution3
The Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized a private right of action for
money damages stemming from violations of Article I §§ 7, 9 of the Connecticut
Constitution, which prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures and unlawful arrests or
detentions. Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 33 (1988). However, Connecticut state
courts have limited the private right of action to circumstances involving egregious
violations. Bauer v. City of Hartford, 2010 WL 4429697, at *12 (D. Conn. 2010). In
Martin v. Brady, the Connecticut Appellate Court found that plaintiff had not alleged
sufficiently egregious conduct where plaintiff complained that state officers had entered
his home without a valid search warrant, pushed him to the ground, and smashed the
windows and doors of his house. 64 Conn. App. 433, 441 (2001). Here, the Court finds
that the circumstances and alleged injuries to plaintiff Elizabeth Edwards and Mitto do
2
Plaintiffs concede that they cannot prevail on their negligence claims to the extent that such claims are
predicated on allegations of false arrest and malicious prosecution.
3
Plaintiffs recognize that they cannot prevail on the claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution
pursuant to the Connecticut Constitution.
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not raise an inference of egregious conduct sufficient for a violation of the Connecticut
Constitution.
H.
Reckless and Intentional Conduct4
Defendants argue that summary judgment should enter on plaintiffs’ claims of
recklessness, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault and battery.
Specifically, defendants assert that the de minimis injuries sustained by Elizabeth
Edwards and Mitto do not give rise to liability.
a.
Recklessness
Recklessness requires a “reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others
or of the consequences of the action.” Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 532 (1988).
Recklessness involves “an extreme departure from ordinary care.” Martin v. Brady, 261
Conn. 372, 379 (2002). In light of the factual disputes concerning the circumstances
that resulted in the alleged injuries and the extent of such injuries, the Court will deny
summary judgment on the claims of recklessness. A reasonable jury could determine
that the officers’ conduct involved an extreme departure from ordinary care.
b.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
establish (1) that defendants intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should
have known that their conduct would likely result in emotional distress; (2) that the
conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the conduct in question was the cause of
plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress experienced by plaintiff was
severe. Appleton v. Board of Education of Town of Southington, 254 Conn. 205, 210
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Plaintiffs recognize that they cannot predicate any claims of recklessness or intentional infliction of
emotional distress on the claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution.
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(2000). Reasonable minds could disagree about whether the officers’ action were
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support liability. Jackson v. Town of Bloomfield,
2015 WL 1245850, *16 (D. Conn. March 18, 2015). Thus, the Court cannot grant
summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims on the basis
that plaintiff’s injuries are de minimis. However, summary judgment will be granted as
to Mitto in light of his admission that he had not experienced any emotional problems as
a result of the incidents alleged in this case.
c.
Assault and Battery
Defendants maintain that summary judgment should enter on the assault and
battery claims asserted by Elizabeth Edwards and Mitto in light of their de minimis
injuries. The tort of assault is “the intentional causing of imminent apprehension of
harmful or offensive contact in another.” DeWitt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 5
Conn. App. 590, 594 (1985). A person is liable for tort of battery if he or she causes a
harmful contact with another person, and he or she intended to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with another person or an imminent apprehension of such contact.
Alteiri v. Colasso, 168 Conn. 329, 334 n.3 (1975). Defendants have not advanced their
argument with supportive authority indicating that a certain level of injury is required to
assert actionable claims for assault and battery. Further, as previously discussed, the
extent of the injuries sustained by Elizabeth Edwards and Mitto remains disputed. The
motion for summary judgment will be denied as these claims.
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I.
Municipal Liability
Defendant City of Hartford asserts that it cannot be held liable for either negligent
or intentional conduct pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes §§ 7-101a, 7-465 and
52–557n.
Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-577n provides that “a political
subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages ... caused by ... [a]cts or
omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud,
actual malice or willful misconduct.” Section 7-101a requires that municipalities
indemnify municipal employees for negligent actions occurring in the scope of
employment. However, the statute does not provide for a cause of action against the
municipality itself. Similarly, Section 7-465 is an indemnity statute, providing that the
municipality’s duty to indemnify attaches when the employee is found to be liable and
the conduct does not fall within the exception for willful and wanton acts. Myers v. City
of Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395, 400 (2004).
As previously discussed, negligence claims against the officers will survive
summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court will deny summary judgment on the City of
Hartford’s argument that summary judgment should be granted in its favor on plaintiffs’
claims for municipal liability as to the negligence. However, the Court will grant
summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims for municipal liability predicated on
recklessness, intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery. See
Crawford, 2014 WL 202369, at *15.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the defendants officers’ motion for partial
summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and the City of Hartford’s
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Summary judgment is GRANTED on (1) the claims pursuant to the Fifth
Amendment based on Miranda violations; (2) Fabian Edwards’s, Kenville Edwards’s and
Mitto’s claims asserting Fourteenth Amendment violations; (3) the Fourth Amendment
claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution; (4) Elizabeth Edwards’s and Mitto’s
claims pursuant to the Connecticut Constitution; (5) Fabian Edwards’s and Kenville
Edwards’s claims sounding in negligence; (6) Mitto’s claims of negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (7) the claims for liability against the City of Hartford
based on the officers’ intentional tortious conduct.
Summary judgment is DENIED on (1) Elizabeth Edwards’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim of substantive due process violation; (2) the official capacity claims;
(3) the excessive force claims of Elizabeth Edwards and Mitto; (4) Elizabeth Edwards’s
and Mitto’s claims of negligence; (5) Elizabeth Edwards’s claim of negligent infliction of
emotional distress; (6) the claims of recklessness against the defendant officers; (7)
Elizabeth Edwards’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) Elizabeth
Edwards’s and Mitto’s claim for assault and battery; and (9) the claims for liability
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against the City of Hartford based on the officers’ negligent tortious conduct.
Within 15 days, plaintiff is instructed to file an amended complaint that is
consistent with this ruling.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this _23rd__ day of November, 2015.
/s/Warren W. Eginton
WARREN W. EGINTON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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