Jones et al v. East Hartford Police Department et al

Filing 47

RULING denying 43 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Holly B. Fitzsimmons on 12/2/2014. (Katz, Samantha)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JUMA JONES, MARK ALLEN, AND
KENNETH COMBS
v.
EAST HARTFORD POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
CHIEF MARK SIROIS

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CIV. NO. 3:13CV1007 (WWE)

RULING ON PLAINTIFFS‟ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DOC. #43]
Plaintiffs Kenneth Combs and Mark Allen (“plaintiffs”) seek
reconsideration of the Court‟s November 5, 2014 ruling granting
defendants‟ motions for sanctions. [Doc. #41]. Defendants object
to plaintiffs‟ motion for reconsideration. [Doc. #44] For the
reasons articulated below, the motion for reconsideration [Doc.
#43] is DENIED.
The Second Circuit has held that “[t]he standard for
granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and
reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party
can point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked – matters, in other words, that might reasonably be
expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted).

“There are three grounds that justify granting a

motion for reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) the availability of newly discovered
evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.” Whitserve, LLC v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 3:11CV-948 JCH, 2013 WL 1442449, at *1 (D. Conn. Apr. 9, 2013)
(citing Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat‟l Mediation Bd., 956

F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)).

“However, it is not

“appropriate to use a motion to reconsider solely to re-litigate
an issue already decided.”

Conn. Com‟r of Labor v. Chubb Grp.

of Ins. Companies, 3:11CV00997 AWT, 2013 WL 836633, at *1 (D.
Conn. Mar. 6, 2013) (quoting SPGGC, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 408 F.
Supp. 2d 87, 91 (D. Conn. 2006)); see also Lego A/S v. Best-Lock
Const. Toys, Inc., No. 3:11cv1586 CSH, 2013 WL 1611462, at *2
(D. Conn. Apr. 15, 2013) (citation omitted) (“A motion for
reconsideration is not simply a second bite at the apple for a
party dissatisfied with a court‟s ruling…”).
Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court‟s ruling
because counsel, Josephine Miller, was out of the country from
July 31 through August 17 and returned to “1100 emails, multiple
motions for summary judgment, motion for protective order, and
motions to strike that were filed during that absence that
required review and/or response.” [Doc. #43, 1]. Attorney Miller
further represents that she has been suffering from a medical
condition which required bed rest for three weeks.

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Plaintiffs

further represent that their failure to produce responsive
documents was inadvertent and that they should not be penalized
with a preclusion order because of “these various matters
related to counsel.” Plaintiffs further argue that monetary
sanctions should stand only where the Court determines that
counsel‟s actions were without cause. Defendants respond that
1

Attorney Miller submitted an ex parte affidavit via letter dated November
22, 2014, where she further details her medical condition and the resulting
impact on her work.
2

Attorney Miller‟s representations are not excusable grounds for
reconsideration and that Attorney Miller had ample opportunity
to object to defendants‟ motions and/or move for extensions of
time to do so. The Court agrees.
Plaintiffs have not met the strict standard for granting a
motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs fail to establish any of
the three grounds warranting reconsideration. Although the Court
appreciates the burdens faced by many solo practitioners,
particularly when compounded by a medical condition, this does
not excuse Attorney Miller‟s complete neglect of all deadlines
or her failure to respond to motions and court orders. Here,
Attorney Miller failed to respond to defendants‟ motion to
compel, failed to fully comply with the Court‟s order granting
defendants‟ motion to compel, failed to respond to defendants‟
motions for sanctions, and failed to heed the Court‟s warning
that unless plaintiffs verified their interrogatory answers by
November 10, 2014, they would be precluded from introducing into
evidence any facts contained therein to support their claims.
The time for plaintiffs to oppose the motions for sanctions
arose at the time the motions were filed, not after the Court
had ruled. See Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., Ltd., 186 F. Supp.
2d 402, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Polsby v. St. Martin‟s
Press, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 690, 2000 WL 98057, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 18, 2000)) (“A party seeking reconsideration „is not
supposed to treat the court‟s initial decision as the opening of
a dialogue in which that party may then use such a motion to
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advance new theories or adduce new evidence in response to the
court‟s rulings.‟”); see also In re Rezulin Prod. Liability, 224
F.R.D. 346, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that a litigant
cannot decline to address an issue, either through inadvertence
or as a strategic maneuver, and then expect the court to grant
reconsideration to advance arguments that it previously could
and should have made). Finally, to the extent plaintiffs argue
that the failure to produce documents was “inadvertent,” this is
belied by their September 14 responses to defendants‟ requests
for production that documents were “to be supplied.” Even if
this omission was inadvertent, plaintiffs have, as of November
21, 2014, failed to produce any responsive documents.
Accordingly, plaintiffs‟ motion for reconsideration [Doc.
#43] is DENIED.

This is not a Recommended Ruling. This is a

discovery ruling or order which is reviewable pursuant to the
“clearly erroneous” statutory standard of review. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); and D. Conn. L. Civ. R.
72.2. As such, it is an order of the Court unless reversed or
modified by the district judge upon motion timely made.
ENTERED at Bridgeport this 2nd day of December 2014.
_____/s/_ ______________
HOLLY B. FITZSIMMONS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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