Samuels v. Hassel et al
Filing
37
ORDER DISMISSING CASE: Petitioner's amended petition for writ of habeas corpus [Dkt. 25] is denied and no certificate of appealability will issue for the reasons set forth in the Decision attached. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the respondent and close this case. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 3/20/2017. (Hudson, C)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
RALSTON ENRICO SAMUELS,
Petitioner,
v.
SCOTT HASSEL and
SCOTT SATTERFIELD,
Respondents.
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PRISONER
CASE NO. 3:13-cv-1189 (VLB)
March 20, 2017
RULING ON AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The petitioner, Ralston Enrico Samuels, currently residing in Jamaica,
brings this action pro se for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(2000). He challenges his conviction for sexual assault and risk of injury to a
minor on the ground that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. For
the reasons that follow, the petition is denied.
I. Procedural Background
The petitioner was convicted, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the
second degree and risk of injury to a minor. On direct appeal, the petitioner
challenged his conviction on three grounds: the trial court improperly replaced a
juror with an alternate using a nonstatutorily sanctioned method, the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing the state to amend the long form information
after the jury had been impaneled, and the court improperly allowed the state to
call multiple constancy of accusation witnesses. The Connecticut Appellate
Court reversed the conviction based on its analysis of the third ground and
ordered a new trial. State v. Samuels, 75 Conn. App. 671, 677-96, 817 A.2d 719,
725-36 (2003). The Connecticut Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for
certification and, on May 10, 2005, reversed the judgment of the Connecticut
Appellate Court. State v. Samuels, 273 Conn. 541, 543-44, 871 A.2d 1005, 1009-10
(2005).
On July 12, 2005, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
state court. In his state habeas action, the petitioner raised four claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, all relating to medical and psychological
testimony. He argued that counsel should have retained a forensic pediatric
gynecologist, was ineffective in his cross-examination of the examining
gynecologist, should have retained a forensic psychologist or expert in
evaluating child sexual abuse claims, and was ineffective in cross-examining the
state’s expert. The state court denied the petition. Samuels v. Warden, State
Prison, No. TSR-CV05-4000544-S, 2010 WL 5064654, at *3-6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov.
19, 2010). The Connecticut Appellate Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal in a
per curiam decision and, on March 20, 2013, the Connecticut Supreme Court
denied certification. Samuels v. Commissioner of Correction, 139 Conn. App.
906, 55 A.3d 626 (2012), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 918, 62 A.3d 1132 (2013).
The petitioner commenced this action by petition dated August 14, 2013.
He included three grounds for relief. In the first ground, the petitioner alleged
that he was falsely accused. In the second ground, he argued that his conviction
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is the result of malicious prosecution and/or perjured testimony, that the severity
of his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, and that the state destroyed
evidence. In the third ground, the petitioner alleged that trial counsel was
ineffective because counsel failed to call certain witnesses to testify that the
petitioner took the victim and members of her family shopping on the days the
assaults occurred, investigate whether the victim had a boyfriend, investigate the
dates on which members of the victim’s family traveled to Grenada, consult
medical and psychiatric experts and challenge the testimony of the state’s expert
witnesses.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petitioner had
exhausted his state court remedies only with regard to a portion of the third
ground for relief. The Court granted the motion and dismissed the case. See
Doc. #20. In May 2015, the petitioner moved to reopen the case and proceed only
on the exhausted claims. The Court granted the motion and ordered the
respondents to address the merits of the exhausted claims, that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to consult medical and psychiatric experts and effectively
cross-examine the state’s experts.
II. Factual Background
The Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the jury reasonably could
have found the following facts. The victim, age thirteen, went to live with her
grandmother prior to the start of the 1998-99 school year. The grandmother, who
was partially blind, owned a three-story house. She lived on the first floor and the
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petitioner, who was twenty-four years old, rented a basement apartment. He
frequently spent time with the victim and her grandmother. Samuels, 273 Conn.
at 545, 841 A.2d at 1010.
In the early summer of 1999, the petitioner and the grandmother were
involved in a dispute over an allegedly unpaid loan the grandmother had made to
the petitioner. After several arguments, the grandmother asked the petitioner to
move out of the apartment. The petitioner’s former girlfriend helped him move.
She told the grandmother that the victim had written letters to the petitioner.
The grandmother asked the victim’s uncle to determine whether anything
inappropriate had occurred between the petitioner and the victim. Id., 841 A.2d at
1010.
In response to her uncle’s questions, the victim said that she had sexual
intercourse with the petitioner on four separate occasions. The victim’s mother
immediately notified the police. A police officer interviewed the victim and her
family and filed an official report in July 1999. Id., 841 A.2d at 1010.
III. Standard of Review
The federal court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus
challenging a state court conviction only if the petitioner claims that his custody
violates the Constitution or federal laws. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The federal court cannot grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by a person in state custody with regard to any claim that was rejected on the
merits by the state court unless the adjudication of the claim in state court either:
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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The federal law defined by the Supreme Court “may be either
a generalized standard enunciated in the Court’s case law or a bright-line rule
designed to effectuate such a standard in a particular context.” Kennaugh v.
Miller, 289 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 909 (2002). Clearly
established federal law is found in holdings, not dicta, of the Supreme Court at
the time of the state court decision. See White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702
(2014) (“[C]learly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes
only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006)
(same). Second Circuit law which does not have a counterpart in Supreme Court
jurisprudence cannot provide a basis for federal habeas relief. See Renico v.
Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778 (2010) (holding that court of appeals erred in relying on its
own decision in a federal habeas action); see also Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S.
9, 10 (2005) (absent a Supreme Court case establishing a particular right, federal
court inference of right does not warrant federal habeas relief).
A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law where the state
court applies a rule different from that set forth by the Supreme Court or if it
decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on essentially the same facts.
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Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court unreasonably applies
Supreme Court law when the court has correctly identified the governing law, but
unreasonably applies that law to the facts of the case. The state court decision
must be more than incorrect; it must be “so lacking in justification that there was
an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103
(2011). See also Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013) (federal habeas relief
warranted only where the state criminal justice system has experienced an
“extreme malfunction”); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (objective
unreasonableness is “a substantially higher threshold” than incorrectness).
When reviewing a habeas petition, the federal court presumes that the
factual determinations of the state court are correct. The petitioner has the
burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (standard for
evaluating state-court rulings where constitutional claims have been considered
on the merits and which affords state-court rulings the benefit of the doubt is
highly deferential and difficult for petitioner to meet). The presumption of
correctness, which applies to “historical facts, that is, recitals of external events
and the credibility of the witnesses narrating them[,]” will be overturned only if
the material facts were not adequately developed by the state court or if the
factual determination is not adequately supported by the record. Smith v. Mann,
173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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In addition, the federal court’s review under section 2254(d)(1) is limited to
the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the
merits. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398-99. Because collateral review of a
conviction applies a different standard than the direct appeal, an error that may
have supported reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily be sufficient to
grant a habeas petition. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634 (1993).
IV. Discussion
In the amended petition, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to consult medical and psychiatric experts and to
effectively cross-examine the state’s experts.
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is reviewed under the standard
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail, the
petitioner must demonstrate, first, that counsel’s conduct was below an objective
standard of reasonableness established by prevailing professional norms and,
second, that this deficient performance caused prejudice to him. Id. at 687-88.
Counsel is presumed to be competent. Thus, the petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating unconstitutional representation. See United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 658 (1984). To satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the
petitioner must show that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different”; the probability must “undermine confidence in the outcome” of the
trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The court evaluates counsel’s conduct at the
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time the decisions were made, not in hindsight, and affords substantial deference
to counsel’s decisions. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005). To
prevail, the petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and
sufficient prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. Thus, if the court finds one
prong of the standard lacking, it need not consider the remaining prong.
The court considers the last reasoned state court decision in evaluating a
section 2254 petition. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). Here, the
last reasoned decision was issued by the habeas court. In that decision, the state
court applied the Strickland standard. As the state court applied the correct legal
standard, the state court decision cannot meet the “contrary to” prong of section
2254(d)(1). Accordingly, this Court must determine whether the state court
decision is a reasonable application of Strickland. The question the Court must
answer “is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is
whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s
deferential standard.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).
A.
Failure to Retain Experts
The plaintiff first argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he did
not retain a forensic pediatric gynecologist and a forensic psychologist or an
expert in evaluating child sexual abuse claims.
The state court found that trial counsel was unprepared because he did not
research the medical diagnoses in the case. Samuels v. Commissioner of
Correction, 2010 WL 5064654, at *3. However, the state court found that trial
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counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient. The petitioner did not
present any evidence at the habeas trial suggesting that the doctor’s findings
were wrong. Thus, Plaintiff did not present to the state court any facts from
which the court could have found that consultation with or retention of a medical
expert would have advanced his defense. In addition, the state court noted that
trial counsel’s strategy was to discredit the victim. He elected to use the doctor’s
prestige and expertise to attack the victim’s credibility. In closing, trial counsel
emphasized what the doctor’s findings did not show and noted that the victim
had not expressed concern about pregnancy to the doctor. The state court found
that criticism of the doctor would adversely affect that strategy. Id. at *3-4. The
state court found trial counsel’s strategy valid and concluded that trial counsel’s
performance was not deficient. Id. at *4.
In opposition, the petitioner directs the court to four Second Circuit cases
holding that trial counsel’s failure to consult with or retain a medical expert was
indicative of ineffective assistance. See Gersten v. Senkowski, 426 F.3d 588, 607
(2d Cir. 2005); Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2003); Pavel v.
Hollins, 261 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2001); Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191 (2d Cir.
2001). In reviewing a federal habeas petition, the court must determine whether
the state court decision was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law,
not Second Circuit law. See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778 (2010) (holding that
court of appeals erred in relying on its own decision in a federal habeas action).
Plaintiff has not cited, and research has not revealed, any Supreme Court cases
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holding that failure to retain or consult experts in child sexual abuse cases
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. Thus, any
argument that trial counsel’s failure to consult experts is conclusive evidence of
ineffective assistance is misplaced.
Further, to the extent that the petitioner asks the court to follow these
decisions to conclude that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally
deficient, the cases are distinguishable. In Gersten, as here, the issue was raised
in a state habeas action. Unlike this case, Gersten, presented evidence from
medical experts during the habeas trial showing what trial counsel could have
discovered through proper investigation and consultation with experts. See
Gersten, 426 F.3d at 608 (petitioner introduced affidavit of doctor describing what
counsel would have found had he conducted proper investigation and consulted
experts). In this case, the petitioner failed to present any expert witnesses at the
state habeas trial showing that the medical expert’s opinions were incorrect or
demonstrating what additional evidence might have been presented at trial to
counter the testimony of the state’s witnesses. Thus, the state court was unable
to determine what benefit retention of or consultation with experts would have
afforded.
In addition, in Gersten, the Second Circuit found particularly troubling the
fact that trial counsel had not examined all of the physical evidence prior to trial,
426 F.3d at 609. In Eze, counsel had not submitted evidence of medical
examinations of the victims prior to the alleged sexual abuse where the evidence
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would have questioned the expert’s conclusions or referenced current medical
studies critical of the expert’s analysis, 321 F.3d at 126-27, 128-29. In this case,
trial counsel testified at the habeas hearing that he reviewed all of the state’s
evidence and pursued alternate possible defenses. The petitioner presented no
contrary evidence and presented no witnesses suggesting that the failure to
consult an expert was incompetent performance.
In Lindstadt, the federal court considered four instances of ineffective
assistance together. In addition to the failure to consult an expert, trial counsel
had failed to raise an error regarding the alleged dates of abuse which cast
serious doubt on the victim’s credibility, announced in open court that his client
would not testify unless the state had proven its case, and failed to make an
obvious relevancy argument regarding the testimony of two witnesses.
Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 199-203. The court considered all four instances together
and concluded, with special emphasis on the factual error, that trial counsel was
ineffective. Here, Plaintiff points to no other errors in counsel’s performance.
Instead, he challenges his counsel’s trial strategy to challenge the alleged
victim’s credibility rather than the doctor’s conclusion, using the doctor’s report
to buttress his credibility challenge. A disagreement with trial counsel’s logical
trial strategy cannot serve as a basis for habeas relief. See Murden v. Artuz, 497
F.3d 178, 197 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding trial court’s finding that petitioner’s
ineffective assistance claim sounded in mere disagreement with trial counsel’s
“strategy or tactics” and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance).
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Similarly, in Pavel, the petitioner raised three instances of ineffective
assistance. His attorney assumed the charges would be dismissed and failed to
prepare a defense, failed to call two fact witnesses when he was aware of their
purported testimony and failed to call a medical expert witness. Pavel, 261 F.3d
at 211. The Court of Appeals considered the cumulative effect of all three
instances with emphasis on the failure to prepare any defense and a “glaring
mismatch” between the medical evidence and the victim’s allegations. Id. at 224.
In this case, trial counsel did prepare a defense. Trial counsel testified that his
understanding of the case was that the critical issue was the victim’s credibility.
He chose not to undermine the integrity of the doctor and psychologist but rather
to use their testimony to identify inconsistencies in the victim’s statements. The
state court considered this a valid strategy. Nor did the petitioner identify any
glaring discrepancies between the evidence and allegations.
“[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary
conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied
Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. at 105. Applying this stringent standard
and considering the lack of evidence provided by the petitioner, the Court
concludes that the state court’s determination that trial counsel was not
ineffective in failing to consult experts, but was pursuing a valid trial strategy, is
not an unreasonable application of federal law. The amended petition for writ of
habeas corpus is denied on this ground.
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B.
Ineffective Cross-Examination
The plaintiff’s second claim is that trial counsel was ineffective in crossexamining the state’s expert witnesses. The state court again concluded that trial
counsel was pursuing a valid trial strategy in avoiding an attack on the integrity
of the witnesses. The state court noted that much of the petitioner’s argument
was based on one answer the psychologist gave during the habeas trial that was
taken out of context. During her testimony, the psychologist explained that her
role was an objective interviewer. She did not assume the truth of the victim’s
statements or make a determination whether the statements were fabricated. Her
role was to summarize what the victim reported, not to draw conclusions. Even if
the report were fabricated, she still would conduct an interview of the victim.
Samuels v. Comm’r of Corr., 2010 WL 5064654, at *5. The petitioner focused on
the fact that the psychologist stated that she did not consider fabrication as a
possible alternative explanation for the victim’s statements and argued that trial
counsel should have emphasized this fact. Id. at *6.
The state court determined that trial counsel had a valid reason to avoid
attacking the psychologist’s integrity as an interviewer. As noted above, trial
counsel was focused on the victim’s credibility. Thus, he used the psychologist
to illustrate inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony. Id. Attacking the
psychologist’s integrity would have undermined this strategy. The state court
concluded that trial counsel’s strategic choice was appropriate and did not show
deficient performance. Id.
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The Court concludes that the state court’s analysis is a reasonable
argument that counsel satisfied the deferential standard set forth in Strickland.
See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. The amended petition for writ of habeas corpus
is denied on this ground.
V. Conclusion
The amended petition for writ of habeas corpus [Doc. # 25] is DENIED. The
court concludes that an appeal of this order would not be taken in good faith.
Thus, a certificate of appealability will not issue.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the respondent and
close this case.
SO ORDERED this 20th day of March 2017, at Hartford, Connecticut.
/s/
Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
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