Jumpp v. Anaya et al
Filing
10
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER, Answer deadline updated for Anaya to 3/7/2014; Linsey to 3/7/2014; Monette to 3/7/2014; Schold to 3/7/2014; Viera to 3/7/2014., ( Discovery due by 8/21/2014, Dispositive Motions due by 9/21/2014) Signed by Judge Janet Bond Arterton on 1/24/2014.(Payton, R.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JUNIOR JUMPP,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE NO. 3:13-cv-1228(JBA)
LIEUTENANT ANAYA, et al.,
Defendants.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
The plaintiff, Junior Jumpp, is currently living in
Hartford, Connecticut.
He filed this civil rights complaint pro
se pursuant and in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19151
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
1
The Complaint is dated August 20, 2013 and
It came to the Court’s attention after Magistrate Judge
Fitzsimmons had granted the plaintiff’s application to proceed in
forma pauperis that the plaintiff had “on 3 or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility,
brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that
was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28
U.S.C. 1915(g). In view of this information, it was then
necessary for the Court to determine whether the plaintiff could
continue to proceed in forma pauperis or whether he must pay the
filing fee. Under the statute, the plaintiff was required to pay
the filing fee to bring this action unless he had alleged facts
showing imminent danger of serious physical injury that was
fairly traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in the complaint and
that a favorable judicial outcome would redress the injury. See
Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 296-97 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“indigent three-strikes prisoner [may] proceed IFP in order to
obtain a judicial remedy for an imminent danger”). In addition,
the danger of imminent harm must have been present at the time
the complaint was filed. See id. at 296. Pursuant 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g), the Court carefully reviewed the Complaint to determine
whether the plaintiff had alleged facts to meet the exception to
the three strikes rule. The Court has concluded that the
plaintiff may continue to proceed in forma pauperis because the
imminent harm exception has been met.
was received by the Court on August 23, 2013.
The plaintiff
names Lieutenant Anaya and Correctional Officers Linsey, Monette,
Viera and Schold as defendants.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must review
prisoner civil complaints against governmental actors and
“dismiss ... any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.”
Id.
This requirement applies both
where the inmate has paid the filing fee and where he is
proceeding in forma pauperis.
(2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
See Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Although detailed allegations are not required, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
A complaint that includes only “‘labels and
conclusions,’ ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action’ or
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement,’ ” does not meet the facial plausibility standard.
Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557
(2007)).
Although courts still have an obligation to liberally
construe a pro se complaint, see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72
(2d Cir. 2009), the complaint must include sufficient factual
allegations to meet the standard of facial plausibility.
The plaintiff alleges that at approximately noon on July 24,
2013, he was in his cell at Northern Correctional Institution
when the defendants arrived and informed him that they would be
escorting him to the medical department.
The plaintiff submitted
to being placed in handcuffs and leg shackles and stood against
the wall of his cell.
Defendant Anaya then sprayed mace in his
face and defendant Viera slammed the plaintiff onto the floor.
Other officers then punched the plaintiff in the face and kicked
him in the back.
The defendants escorted the plaintiff to the
medical unit.
Due to the assault by the defendants, the plaintiff suffered
pulled muscles, a headache and pain in his neck and back.
Dr.
Wright treated the plaintiff and insisted that he remain in the
medical unit for observation.
Before leaving the plaintiff in
the medical unit, defendant Anaya told the plaintiff that it was
not over between them also threatened to kill the plaintiff
during their next encounter.
The following evening, Dr. Wright determined that the
plaintiff was well enough to return to his cell.
A nurse
accompanied the plaintiff as officers escorted him back to his
cell.
The plaintiff claims that prior to the July 24, 2013
incident, he had written to the Commissioner of Corrections
regarding various violations by correctional staff at Northern,
including defendant Anaya.
He contends that the assault by the
defendants on July 24, 2013 was carried out in retaliation for
his complaints to the Commissioner.
The plaintiff sues the defendants in their individual and
official capacities for monetary damages.
The request for
monetary damages against the defendants in their official
capacities is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985)
See Kentucky v.
(Eleventh Amendment, which protects
the state from suits for monetary relief, also protects state
officials sued for damages in their official capacity); Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979) (Section 1983 does not override
a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity).
All claims for monetary
damages against the defendants in their official capacities are
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).
After reviewing the Complaint, the court concludes that the
case should proceed at this time as to the claims of excessive
force and retaliation against all defendants in their individual
capacities.
ORDERS
The court enters the following orders:
(1)
The claims for money damages against the defendants in
their official capacities are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(2). The Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force and
First Amendment claims of retaliation will proceed against all
defendants in their individual capacities.
(2)
By February 4, 2014 the Clerk shall ascertain from
the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs the current
work address for each defendant and mail waiver of service of
process request packets to each defendant in his or her
individual capacity at his or her current work address.
Thirty
five days thereafter, the Pro Se Office shall report to the court
on the status of all waiver requests.
If any defendant fails to
return the waiver request, the Clerk shall make arrangements for
in-person service by the U.S. Marshals Service and the defendant
shall be required to pay the costs of such service in accordance
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d).
(3)
The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of the Complaint
and this Order to the Connecticut Attorney General and the
Department of Correction Legal Affairs Unit.
(4)
Defendants shall file their response to the Complaint,
either an answer or motion to dismiss by March 7, 2014.
If the
defendants choose to file an answer, they shall admit or deny the
allegations and respond to the cognizable claims recited above.
They may also include any and all additional defenses permitted
by the Federal Rules.
(5)
Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26 through 37, shall be completed by August 21, 2014.
Discovery
requests need not be filed with the court.
(6)
All motions for summary judgment shall be filed by
September 21, 2014.
(7)
If the plaintiff changes his address at any time
during the litigation of this case, Local Court Rule 83.1(c)2
provides that he MUST notify the court.
result in the dismissal of the case.
Failure to do so can
The plaintiff must give
notice of a new address even if he is incarcerated.
plaintiff should write “PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS.”
The
It is not
enough to just put the new address on a letter without indicating
that it is a new address.
If the plaintiff has more than one
pending case, indicate the case numbers in the notification of
change of address.
The plaintiff should also notify the
defendant(s) or the attorney for the defendant(s), if
appropriate, of his or her new address.
SO ORDERED this 21st day of January 2014, at New Haven,
Connecticut.
/s/
JANET BOND ARTERTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?