Jumpp v. Anaya et al

Filing 123

ORDER: To the extent Defendants seek an extension of time for which to file a motion for summary judgment, their motion is denied. Defendants are precluded from filing a motion for summary judgment. This case is now ready for trial, and the Court will refer it for appointment of pro bono counsel. After counsel's appearance is filed, counsel for both parties shall confer and file a supplemental 26(f) report. Signed by Judge Janet Bond Arterton on 2/18/16. (Harris, J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JUNIOR JUMPP
Plaintiff,
v.
ANAYA, et al.
Defendants.

Civil No. 3:13cv1228 (JBA)

February 18, 2016
ORDER

Following this Court’s Order [Doc. # 120] to Defendants to show cause why their
motion for summary judgment should not be precluded as untimely, Defendants filed a
Response [Doc. # 122] arguing, without citation to authority, that they had good cause to
delay filing their motion for summary judgment because they were engaged in settlement
discussions with Plaintiff, and they did not think it “appropriate” to do so “while
simultaneously advising the court that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”
“[A] party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until the time
limit for filing motions under a district court’s Rule 16(b) scheduling order expires.”
Julian v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 178 F.R.D. 10, 15 (D. Conn. 1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If a party requires additional time in which to file a motion, it must seek
a modified scheduling order from the court, which may be granted “only for good cause.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “A finding of ‘good cause’” under Rule 16 “depends on the
diligence of the moving party” in seeking to meet the deadline in the scheduling order.
Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir. 2000); see Johnson v.
Bryson, 851 F. Supp. 2d 688, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Whether ‘good cause’ exists turns

primarily on the ‘diligence’ of the moving party in seeking to meet the deadline in the
scheduling order.”).
In this case, the scheduling order called for motions for summary judgment to be
filed by September 21, 2014. (See Sched. Order [Doc. # 10] at 6.) Neither party filed a
motion for summary judgment by that date nor sought an extension of time for which to
do so. One month after the deadline passed, the parties began to engage in settlement
conferences which ultimately proved unsuccessful.
Defendants appear to contend that good cause exists to modify the scheduling
order here because they were diligent about attempting to settle this case. This argument
is however, belied by the timeline described above. Whatever Defendants’ belief about the
appropriateness of seeking summary judgment while simultaneously engaging in
settlement discussions, those discussions did not commence until after the deadline for
summary judgment had passed. Defendants have not shown that they diligently sought to
meet the deadline for filing a motion for summary judgment as required by Rule 16.
Therefore, to the extent Defendants seek an extension of time for which to file a
motion for summary judgment, their motion is denied. Defendants are precluded from
filing a motion for summary judgment. This case is now ready for trial, and the Court will
refer it for appointment of pro bono counsel. After counsel’s appearance is filed, counsel
for both parties shall confer and file a supplemental 26(f) report.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 18th day of February, 2016.
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