Torres v. Bristol et al

Filing 55

ORDER denying 47 Motion to Compel. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 3/24/2015. (Pollack, R.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ELIEZER TORRES,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF BRISTOL, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:13-cv-1335 (SRU)

RULING ON MOTION TO COMPEL
The plaintiff, Eliezer Torres, seeks to compel the defendants to respond to interrogatories
and requests for production of documents he served on November 18, 2014, in response to the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the plaintiff’s motion is
denied.
In this action, Torres asserts claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, illegal forfeiture
of property, intentional infliction of emotional distress, deliberate indifference, municipal
liability and invasion of privacy stemming from his arrest on October 26, 2010. His complaint,
liberally construed, also makes out an excessive force claim, though he does not specifically
enumerate it along with the others. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all
claims. In the motion Torres argues that he requires the discovery responses to enable him to
oppose the pending motion for summary judgment.
Rule 56(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., allows the court to defer consideration of a motion for
summary judgment if the non-moving party “shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Torres has not submitted such
an affidavit as part of his opposition papers. However, as Torres is proceeding pro se, the court

will consider this motion as submitted pursuant to Rule 56(d) and determine whether deferral is
warranted.
Torres notes that several of the defendants state in their affidavits that Detective Brasche
and other police officers arranged for a confidential informant to conduct three purchases of
heroin from Torres. He argues that he needs to know which officers knew of the actions. Torres
argues that the statements were false and that these false statements were used to obtain the
search warrant of his residence. He further argues that the motor vehicle stop and arrest at issue
in this case was based on the allegedly improper search warrant that was not executed until after
his stop and arrest.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment on Torres’s false arrest and false
imprisonment claims on the ground, inter alia, that Torres cannot state a cognizable claim
because he was convicted of the charges. Although the information Torres seeks might be used
to challenge a conviction based on the search warrant, it is not useful in opposing the defendants’
argument. In response to the claims that the motor vehicle stop was unlawful, the defendants
have presented evidence that Torres was stopped because defendants Brasche and Plasczynski
observed activity suggesting that Torres was selling narcotics. Torres does not challenge these
statements. The court concludes that the information sought through this motion to compel does
not satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(d). The court will consider the motion for summary
judgment based on the papers previously submitted by the parties.
In conclusion, Torres’s motion to compel [Doc. #47 ] is DENIED
SO ORDERED this 24th day of March 2015 at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

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/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge

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