Muschette et al v. West Hartford et al

Filing 111

RULING on Motion for Reconsideration 99 is granted in limited part. Signed by Judge Joan G. Margolis on 11/22/2016. (Campbell, A)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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A.M., a minor, by his parents and natural
:
guardians, AUDLEY MUSCHETTE and
:
JUDITH MUSCHETTE
:
:
v.
:
:
AMERICAN SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF;
:
TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD; PAUL W.
:
GIONFRIDDO, in his individual and official :
capacities; CHRIS HAMMOND, in his
:
individual and official capacities; ELWIN
:
ESPINOSA, in his individual and official
:
capacities; and CHRISTOPHER LYTH,
:
Lyth, in his individual and official capacities :
--------------------------------------------------------X

3:13 CV 1337 (WWE)

DATE: NOVEMBER 22, 2016

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Dkt. #99)
On September 11, 2013, plaintiff, A.M., a minor who is hearing impaired, commenced
this action by his parents and natural guardians, Audley and Judith Muschette (Dkt. #1),
which was later superseded by an Amended Complaint, filed April 22, 2015 (Dkt. #77), in
which plaintiff asserts claims of excessive force and municipal liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and of
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, and state law claims of negligence, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, arising out of encounters with defendants Elwin Espinosa (see Dkts. ##1, 51, 53)
and Chris Hammond, staff members at defendant American School for the Deaf ["ASD"], and
with defendant Town of West Hartford and its defendant police officers, Paul W. Gionfriddo
and Christopher Lyth [collectively "the West Hartford Defendants"]. (Dkt. #77; see also
Dkts. ##68, 76). On July 1, 2015, the West Hartford Defendants filed their Answer and
Affirmative Defenses (Dkt. #82), and on September 30, 2015, defendant ASD filed its Answer

and Affirmative Defenses. (Dkt. #85).
On November 12, 2015, plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel (Dkt. #86), and on
December 9, 2015, the West Hartford Defendants filed a brief in opposition and Motion for
Protective Order. (Dkt. #89; see also Dkt. #90). On January 20, 2016, Senior U.S. District
Judge Warren W. Eginton referred the pending motions to this Magistrate Judge (Dkt. #91),
and on March 22, 2016, this Magistrate Judge issued her Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion to
Compel and Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. #94)[“March 2016 Ruling”],
granting in part and denying in part both motions. On April 5, 2016, plaintiff filed an
Objection in part to this Magistrate Judge’s March 2016 Ruling (Dkt. #99),1 and nine days
later, the West Hartford Defendants filed a brief in opposition. (Dkt. #101).2 Seven months
later, on November 4, 2016, Judge Eginton referred the pending Objection, construed as a
Motion for Reconsideration, to this Magistrate Judge.

(Dkt. #109).

Under the latest

scheduling order, discovery closes on November 30, 2016, and dispositive motions are to be
filed on or before January 3, 2017. (Dkts. ##107-08).
For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. #99) is
granted, but the Magistrate Judge largely adheres to her previous conclusions.
I. DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)1., a party may move for reconsideration
of a decision or order of this Court by filing “a memorandum setting forth concisely the
matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Court overlooked in the initial

1

The March 2016 Ruling addressed nine Interrogatories and eighteen Requests
for Production; the objection addresses three Interrogatories and six Requests for
Production.
2

Attached to the West Hartford Defendants’ brief in opposition is a copy of
plaintiff’s Interrogatories and Requests for Production.
2

decision or order.” As the Second Circuit has made clear, the standard for granting such a
motion is “strict,” and “reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can
point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked–-matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)(citations omitted); see also Edible
Arrangement Int’l, Inc. v. Incredible Franchise Corp., No. 07 CV 1788 (WWE), 2010 WL
2802368, at *1 (D. Conn. July 13, 2010). Stated another way,
It is well-established that the function of a motion for reconsideration
is to present the court with an opportunity to correct manifest errors of law
or to consider newly discovered evidence. The scope of review on motions
for reconsideration is limited to ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent
the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging gaps of
a lost motion with additional matters . . . . Reconsideration will only be
granted if a party can point to an intervening change of controlling law, the
availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or to prevent
manifest injustice.
A motion for reconsideration may not be used to relitigate an issue the
court has already decided. A motion for reconsideration is not simply a
second bite at the apple for a party dissatisfied with a court’s ruling. . . .
Lego A/S, and Lego Sys., Inc. v. Best-Lock Construction Toys, Inc., No. 11 CV 1586 (CSH),
2013 WL 1611462 at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 15, 2013), quoting Morien v. Munich Reins. Am., Inc.,
270 F.R.D. 65, 69 (D. Conn. 2010)(internal quotations & citations omitted).
In this case, plaintiff objects to this Magistrate Judge’s determination that responses
to Interrogatories Nos. 4, 13 and 18, and Requests for Production Nos. 3-5, and 13 are
required only as they relate to the April 30, 2013 incident, and objects to this Magistrate
Judge’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to compel responses to Requests for Production Nos. 91
and 95 on the basis that they do not relate to the claims alleged in the Amended Complaint.

3

(Dkt. #99, at 2-3). 3
A. INTERROGATORIES NOS. 4, 13 & 18 AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NOS. 3-5
& 13
In his Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiff appropriately observes, with respect to
Interrogatories Nos. 4, 13 and 18, and Requests for Production Nos. 3-5 and 13, that “[b]y
limiting [d]efendant’s responses [to the April 30, 2013 incident], the Magistrate Judge agreed
with the Town’s position that [p]laintiff’s claims against the [West Hartford Defendants] arise
from the April 30, 2013 incident alone.” (Dkt. #99, at 4). However, without establishing
proper grounds for the Court to reconsider its prior order, plaintiff then reiterates the same
argument posited in the underlying Motion to Compel. Plaintiff has not identified controlling
decisions that the Court has overlooked, but rather, plaintiff seeks a different result.
Accordingly, plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration does not fall within the limited scope of
review available for such motions. However, in an abundance of caution, plaintiff’s arguments
will be addressed again below.
Just as stated in this Court’s March 2016 Ruling, the case law in the Second Circuit
regarding interactions such as the one between the West Hartford Defendants and A.M.
remains undecided. (March 2016 Ruling at 5-7; see Williams v. City of New York, 121 F.
Supp. 3d 354, 365, n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). This is a premise to which plaintiff does not
object in the current motion. As this Magistrate Judge then found: “At the discovery stage,
it is not for the Court to decide whether plaintiff’s cause of action exists” as it relates to the
incidents alleged in the Amended Complaint, but rather, the Court must determine whether

3

In his objection, plaintiff incorrectly refers to the March 2016 Ruling as a "Report
and Recommendation," which only applies to a Magistrate Judge's ruling on dispositive
motions; discovery motions, however, are non-dispositive motions, and accordingly result
in a ruling, not a recommended ruling. (Dkt. #99, at 2-4, 6). See pp. 8-9 infra.
4

the information plaintiff seeks is “relevant to . . . [his] claim[s] . . . and proportional to the
needs of the case[.]” (March 2016 Ruling at 7, quoting F ED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
Just as the Court did in the March 2016 Ruling, the Court directs plaintiff’s attention
to his allegations in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff asserts a claim for municipal liability
arising out the acts “complained of in [the] paragraphs” in which the April 30, 2013 incident
is alleged. (See Dkt. #77, at 12-15). To establish municipal liability, “there must be ‘a direct
causal link between a municipal policy or custom, and the alleged constitutional deprivation.’”
Gonzalez v. Waterbury Police Dept., No. 12 CV 478 (SRU), 2016 WL 953211, at *2 (D. Conn.
Mar. 11, 2016), quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)(additional citation
omitted). In their Objections and Responses, the West Hartford Defendants have responded
that they were aware that plaintiff is deaf, and they utilized the ASD personnel to
communicate with plaintiff. (See Dkt. #86, Exh. B, at 7-8). Plaintiff alleges that he was
tasered and handcuffed, and “[a]s a result of his traumatic encounter with the Town of West
Hartford police officers . . . [p]laintiff has suffered serious and permanent injuries . . . . "
(Dkt. #77,

¶¶ 2, 5)(emphasis added).

Plaintiff has not alleged facts of any similar

constitutional violations. See Russo v. City of Hartford, 341 F. Supp. 2d 85, 109 (D. Conn.
2004).4 Even assuming that a constitutional deprivation exists under the circumstances of
this case, plaintiff’s requests are not proportionate to the needs of the case. Plaintiff does
not allege any constitutional violations by the West Hartford Defendants against plaintiff
other than on the dates asserted in the Amended Complaint, or against any other person
affiliated with ASD, yet his discovery requests seek information regarding contacts with the

4

See also Estate of Robert Ethan Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., No. WMN-133089, 2016 WL 4721254, at *17-18 (D. Md. Sept, 9, 2016)(even in “single incident cases”
evidence of prior incidents must be put forward)(appeal filed).
5

West Hartford Defendants on “all occasions prior and thereafter from 2010-present[,]” and
“each and every date that ASD has contacted [the West Hartford Defendants] to have the
police come to the school regarding plaintiff[,]” presumably regardless of whether such
occasions, if any, involve encounters with the police that led to a use of force involving
tasering plaintiff. (Dkt. #101, Exh.).5 Plaintiff’s requests, as currently drafted, are not
limited to the scope of the constitutional deprivation alleged in this case, and as a result, the
Magistrate Judge does not alter the conclusion reached in the March 2016 Ruling.6 However,
on or before December 9, 2016,7 plaintiff may serve upon the Town of West Hartford

5

In Interrogatory No. 4, plaintiff seeks information regarding whether ASD staff
requested an American Sign Language interpreter from the Town of West Hartford when
they contacted police from 2010 to present, including on April 30, 2013 and June 21,
2013; the dates on which the interpreter was requested; the name of the person making
the request; to whom the request was made; the response of defendants; and whether
an interpreter was provided. (Dkt. #101, Exh. at 1). Similarly, in Interrogatory No. 13,
plaintiff seeks "each and every date that ASD has contacted [d]efendants to have the
police come to the school regarding plaintiff, A.M.," the name of the person who
contacted the police, the responding officers, the actions taken by the officers, whether
any charges were filed against plaintiff, and the disposition thereof, if any . (Id., Exh. at
2). In Interrogatory No. 18, plaintiff seeks a response as to whether defendants
"contacted any interpreting agency in an effort to accommodate plaintiff's disability and
to ensure effective communication[.]" (Id., Exh. at 3). Requests for Production Nos. 3, 4
and 5 similarly request information relating to interpreters for encounters with plaintiff. (Id.,
Exh. at 4; Dkt. #86, Exh. B). Request for Production No. 13 goes even further: plaintiff
requests documents relating to plaintiff’s or any ASD staff member’s “request for auxiliary
aids and services prior to the police officers being dispatched on April 30, 2013 and June
21, 2013, as well as on all occasions prior and thereafter from 2010-present.” (Dkt. #86,
Exh. B). This latter request is not even limited to interactions involving plaintiff.
6

Implicitly acknowledging the extraordinary breadth of his requests, plaintiff
asserts that this Magistrate Judge “failed to recognize that [p]laintiff claims those
discriminatory actions were the result of the Town’s potentially deficient policies,
procedures and trainings[,]” and such discovery includes "evidence of previous events
that may have put the [West Hartford Defendants] on notice that interactions with deaf
individuals were sufficiently likely, or that the Town’s training with respect to the needs of
deaf individuals was potentially deficient.” (Dkt. #99, at 4)(emphasis added)(citations
omitted). The language used is speculative in nature.
7

See note 8 infra.
6

revised interrogatories on this particular issue which are proportionate to the facts alleged
in this case, consistent with this Ruling.

7

B. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NOS. 91 & 95
In Requests for Productions Nos. 91 and 95, plaintiff seeks documents relating to
telecommunication devices, video remote interpreting and any accommodations provided by
the West Hartford Defendants’ facility, as well as policies relating to auxiliary aids at the West
Hartford Defendants’ facility. (See Dkt. #101, Exh.). “Plaintiff acknowledges that [the West
Hartford] Defendants’ discriminatory actions did not take place at [the West Hartford]
Defendants’ facility,” but repeats his exact argument, almost verbatim, to claim that such
information is discoverable as it relates to his failure to train claim. (Compare Dkt. #86, at
13 with Dkt. #99, at 6). As discussed above, “[a] motion for reconsideration may not be
used to relitigate an issue the court has already decided. A motion for reconsideration is not
simply a second bite at the apple for a party dissatisfied with a court’s ruling. . . . ” Lego,
2013 WL 1611462 at *2, quoting Morien, 270 F.R.D. at 69 (internal quotations & citations
omitted). Accordingly, this Court adheres to its conclusion that plaintiff's Requests Nos. 91
and 95 do not relate to the claims in plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. #99) is
granted in limited part, as the Magistrate Judge largely adheres to the March 2016 Ruling;
however, plaintiff may serve revised Interrogatories Nos. 4, 13 and 18, and Requests for
Productions Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 13 on or before December 9, 2016.8
This is not a Recommended Ruling, but a ruling on a non-dispositive motion, the
standard of review of which is specified in 28 U.S.C. § 636; FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a) & 72; and

8

In light of this deadline, the deadline for completion of discovery is postponed
until January 31, 2017, and the deadline for filing dispositive motions is postponed until
March 10, 2017.
8

Rule 72.2 of the Local Rules for United States Magistrate Judges. As such, it is an order of
the Court unless reversed or modified by the District Judge upon timely made objection.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(written objections to ruling must be filed within
fourteen calendar days after service of same); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a) & 72; Rule 72.2 of
the Local Rules for United States Magistrate Judges, United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut; Impala v. United States Dept. of Justice, 2016 WL 6787933 (2d Cir.
Nov. 15, 2016)(summary order)(failure to file timely objection to Magistrate Judge’s
recommended ruling will preclude further appeal to Second Circuit); cf. Small v. Sec'y, H&HS,
892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989)(failure to file timely objection to Magistrate Judge's
recommended ruling may preclude further appeal to Second Circuit). 9
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 22nd day of November, 2016.

/s/ Joan G. Margolis, USMJ
Joan Glazer Margolis
United States Magistrate Judge

9

If any counsel believes that a continued settlement conference would be
productive, he or she may contact this Magistrate Judge's Chambers accordingly.
9