Hewett v. Triple Point Tech
Filing
451
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 231 Motion for Sanctions. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 10/30/2015. (Buttrick, A.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
KARA LEE HEWETT,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 3:13-cv-1382 (SRU)
TRIPLE POINT TECHNOLOGY,
Defendant.
RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
The pro se plaintiff, Kara Hewett, filed this civil action against the defendant, Triple
Point Technology (―TPT‖), alleging that TPT unlawfully terminated Hewett’s employment in
order to frustrate Hewett’s efforts to avail herself of medical leave under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (―FMLA‖), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq. Throughout the course of litigation, the parties
have maintained an extremely contentious relationship. After Hewett sent defense counsel
hundreds of e-mails, submitted dozens of unsolicited and non-relevant documents, and
repeatedly docketed copies of non-meritorious grievance complaints she had filed in an attempt
to suspend/disbar and disqualify defense counsel—including sealed documents from those
grievance proceedings—TPT filed a motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court’s
inherent power, seeking sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees and costs.
For the reasons set forth below, TPT’s motion for sanctions is granted in part, and
Hewett is ordered to pay TPT $4,380 to reimburse TPT for legal fees incurred as a result of her
bad faith conduct. Additionally, pursuant to Local Rule 16(g)(2), the Clerk is directed not to
accept for filing any paper from Hewett, with the exception of documents related seeking
reconsideration of this Order, until the sanctions have been paid in full.
I.
Background
Hewett worked as a Senior Business Analyst at TPT from July 11, 2011, until September
20, 2013, when TPT terminated her employment. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2. Hewett filed this lawsuit
on September 23, 2013, asserting two claims: (1) TPT unlawfully terminated her employment in
order to interfere with her ability to take FMLA leave; and (2) TPT unlawfully terminated her
employment in retaliation for her prior use of FMLA leave. Hewett additionally requested leave
to participate in electronic filing (doc. 8), which I granted (doc. 10),1 and filed a motion for
summary judgment (doc. 12). Despite the relative simplicity of her case, Hewett began to file
dozens of documents, many of which were inappropriate, repetitious, or misidentified; lacked a
basis in law or fact; violated the District of Connecticut’s Local Rules of Procedure; or were
submitted as ―draft‖ versions of pleadings that she would later move to strike, amend or dismiss.
TPT received service on October 1, 2013 (doc. 9), and counsel for TPT, Nicole Walsh
(neé Tuman), appeared on October 22, 2013 (doc. 13). Walsh timely filed a motion to dismiss
(doc. 14). Hewett was granted two motions for extensions of time to file her opposition brief
regarding TPT’s motion to dismiss (doc. 18) and to file a reply brief regarding her motion for
summary judgment (doc. 25). I held oral argument on both motions on February 14, 2014, at
which point I denied Hewett’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice to re-filing after
the conclusion of discovery, and granted and denied in part TPT’s motion to dismiss. Hewett
was permitted to amend her complaint to remedy certain defects by March 14, 2014 (doc. 59).
Hewett filed her Second Amended Complaint on February 17, 2014 (doc. 64), and she
1. In order to participate in electronic filing, a pro se litigant must adhere to the rules set forth in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Connecticut’s Electronic Filing Policy and Local Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as with
the Court’s Electronic Filing Order. The litigant must also affirm that she consents to the use of her e-mail address
for service and to receive notice of documents filed in her case; waives any claim to hard-copy editions of any
―orders, notices, and other documents filed‖ in her case; agrees to participate in a training session regarding the
proper use of the electronic filing system; and has access to a computer that meets the technical specifications
required for electronic filing.
2
additionally moved to ―stay all proceedings‖ until the close of discovery (doc. 67), which I
denied (doc. 69).
Although the parties had not held a Local Rule 26(f) conference, Hewett began to file
discovery demands, as well as her initial disclosures and damages analyses, on the electronic
docket. Chambers staff and the Clerk’s Office notified Hewett that both the Federal and Local
Rules of Civil Procedure provided that the parties were not permitted to file ―expert witness
reports, computations of damages, depositions, notices of deposition, interrogatories, requests for
documents, requests for admissions, and answers and responses‖ except by order of the Court.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d); Local R. Civ. P. 5(f)(1). Hewett disregarded those notices, continued to
file discovery materials on the docket, and began to file motions to compel discovery (docs. 78,
80, 82, 83, 84, 85), in addition to filing letters and ―notices‖ purporting to reveal Walsh’s
―dishonesty.‖ See Pl. Letter to Underhill, J. (Mar. 12, 2014, doc. 71); Pl. Letter to Underhill, J.
(Mar. 18, 2014, doc. 73); Pl.’s Notice of Perjury (doc. 79); Pl. Letter to Underhill, J. (Apr. 12,
2014, doc. 85); Pl. Letter to Underhill, J. (Apr. 20, 2014, doc. 90). During this time, the parties
additionally began to submit lengthy and argumentative e-mails to one another and to my law
clerk.
I directed that the parties participate in a phone conference to address discovery disputes
and to clarify the process of discovery for Hewett. During that May 1, 2014 conference, I set
forth scheduling deadlines for the case; instructed the parties to attempt to resolve their disputes
regarding discovery, as required by Local Rule 37, and regarding requests for extensions of time,
as required by Local Rule 7(b)3; and ordered the parties to ―limit their communications, briefing,
and submissions to the court to issues requiring a decision or conference.‖ Mem. of Conf. held
May 1, 2014 (doc. 96). I additionally explained that, for several of Hewett’s concerns that Walsh
3
had ―lied‖ to her, Walsh had either accurately represented the procedures set forth by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or had articulated her client’s legal position in its defense against
Hewett’s suit, and I encouraged the parties to attempt to confer in good faith and to minimize adhominem attacks.
Within a month, Hewett began to violate the orders issued during the May 1 conference.
At the same time, Hewett’s filings regarding defense counsel became increasingly accusatory,
and Hewett began to inundate chambers with e-mails regarding Walsh’s alleged misconduct.
Mot. Hr’g Tr. 21:8–22:2 (July 7, 2014) (doc. 155). Hewett filed a motion for a phone conference
regarding outstanding discovery (docs. 107, 108), and also requested discovery sanctions for
TPT’s alleged failure to comply with the court’s May 1 order (docs. 109, 112). Hewett also
began filing documents to disqualify Walsh, to notify the court of Walsh’s alleged ―illegal
licensure,‖ and to hold Walsh in contempt (docs. 113, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129).
Hewett additionally docketed a copy of a grievance against Walsh that she submitted to the
Connecticut State Bar’s Disciplinary Committee (doc. 125).
On July 7, 2014, I held a phone conference with the parties in which I attempted to
diffuse the growing animosity between Hewett and Walsh, as well as resolve the substantive
discovery disputes between the parties. I denied Hewett’s motion to disqualify Walsh noting that
Hewett’s concerns regarding the active status of Walsh’s bar license involved concerns with
respect to Walsh’s admission to the Connecticut State Bar, not the District of Connecticut’s bar.
Conf. Mem. & Order (July 8, 2014, doc. 137). Hewett noted that because she had filed a
grievance against Walsh, Walsh should be disqualified on that basis alone (docs. 122, 123, 124,
124, 125, 129). I denied Hewett’s request and noted that as of the date of our conference (July
7), Walsh remained an attorney in good standing in the District of Connecticut bar. See Conf.
4
Mem. & Order (July 8, 2014, doc. 137); Mot. Hr’g Tr. 2:17–20, 5:8–11, (July 7, 2014) (doc.
155). TPT made a verbal request for sanctions, which I denied without prejudice. Mot. Hr’g Tr.
30:19–31:14 (July 7, 2014) (doc. 155). I cautioned Hewett that harassing, abusive, and
threatening statements constituted sanctionable conduct. Id. 32:11–33:7 (doc. 155). In a gesture
of goodwill, Hewett agreed to withdraw her motion for contempt and for summary judgment
(doc. 133), and both parties agreed to attempt to resolve their disagreements amicably and to
assume good intent in their dealings with one another.
By July 11, 2014, whatever truce had been brokered during the July 7 conference had
already fallen apart. Hewett resumed her campaign to disbar Walsh and filed numerous
documents that had been submitted under seal to the Connecticut State Bar Grievance Panel on
the public docket in her federal case (docs. 138, 141, 142). Hewett refused to accept electronic
service of discovery, and when Walsh sent discovery to the mailing address Hewett provided for
service, Hewett filed a police report against that mail courier and filed a ―notice of criminal
trespass and invalid delivery service.‖ (doc. 143). Hewett additionally stated that as the ―sister of
an active Federal Bureau of Investigation Supervisor,‖ she perceived ―any unauthorized trespass
of her property or home as a personal threat.‖ Id. TPT interpreted Hewett’s statement as a
threat.
During the breakdown of the July 7 cease-fire agreement, Hewett also filed a letter
alleging that Walsh’s efforts to limit discovery to the legal issues in the case had ―prejudiced‖
Hewett, Pl. Letter to Underhill, J. (July 15, 2014, doc. 139), and began filing discovery-related
documents on the public docket, in direct contravention of my May 1 and July 7 orders, see, e.g.,
Pl.’s Request for Production & Admission (doc. 151); Pl.’s Notice of Discovery Demand (doc.
161); Pl.’s Proposed Witness List (doc. 162); Pl.’s First Amended Proposed Witness List (doc.
5
167 and 168); Pl. Letters to Underhill, J. (Sep. 18, 2014, doc. 170, and Sep. 23, 2014, doc. 173);
Pl.’s General Objections to Interrogatories & Requests for Production (doc. 174); Pl. Letter to
Underhill, J. (doc. 183).
On October 28, 2014, in response to a request from TPT, I held another telephone
conference with both parties. During that conference, I again notified Hewett that she risked
being sanctioned on the basis of her filings and communications with counsel. See Conf. Mem &
Order (Nov. 4, 2014, doc. 197). Although I declined to impose sanctions at that time, I cautioned
Hewett that a pro se litigant could be subject to monetary or other sanctions for abusive,
misleading, or harassing conduct. Id.
Following that conference, Hewett continued to ignore my May 1 and July 7 orders by
filing discovery-related documents on the public docket. See, e.g., Pl. Letter to Underhill, J.
(Nov. 24, 2014, doc. 211). On December 1, 2014, following numerous emails from Hewett to my
law clerk over the Thanksgiving holiday, I was also prompted to issue an additional Order
directing Hewett that any request for action by the court must be made by way of motion. (doc.
213)
On December 30, 2014, Hewett again renewed her efforts to disbar Walsh and docketed
the federal grievance claim she brought against Walsh. (doc. 229) Hewett notified Walsh of
those actions in several distressing emails, including statements such as the following:
I told my mother that Connecticut Bar allowed you to practice. I am going to call
and write the bar that the case will go trial despite your suspended license. LIFE
IS IMPORTANT. MY DOCTOR SAVED MY LIFE SO THAT YOU COULD
START A NEW LAW PRACTICE BY BLOOD BLOOD BLOOD BLOOD
BLOOD BLOOD MONEY FOR MY LIFE. BLOOD BLOOD BLOOD BLOOD
BLOOD KEEPS ME ALIVE.
I am telling the bar.
Pl. Letter to Nicole Walsh (Dec. 30, 2014, doc 231-3).
6
In response, on December 31, 2014, TPT filed the present motion, seeking monetary
sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the inherent powers of this court in the amount of costs
associated with Hewett’s federal court grievance, her Motion to Seal, and the sanctions motion
itself. (doc. 231) Over the course of December 31, 2014, Hewett filed several responses to TPT’s
motion, all of which primarily argued that that Walsh was ineligible to represent Triple Point
Technology, and, by virtue of that ineligibility, threatened Hewett’s life by profiting from delays
in the case. See Pl.’s Amended Opposition to Motion for Sanctions (doc. 233); Pl.’s Second
Amended Opposition to Motion for Sanctions (doc. 235). TPT filed a Reply Memorandum on
January 14, 2015 (doc. 244), to which Hewett responded with several additional briefs and
separately filed ―exhibits,‖ largely repeating the same arguments. See, e.g., Pl.’s Response (doc.
245); Pl.’s Amended Response (doc. 248); Pl.’s ―Exhibit 5 – Pro Hac Vice‖ (doc. 255); Pl. Letter
to Underhill, J. (Feb. 2, 2015, doc. 256); Pl.’s Reply to Defendant’s Reply to Motion for
Sanctions (doc. 248).
On February 2, 2015, Hewett renewed her motion to disqualify Walsh, restating her
allegations regarding Walsh’s Connecticut state admission, and adding a complaint regarding
Walsh’s Motion to appear Pro Hac Vice as required under Connecticut state rules. Pl. Letter to
Underhill, J. (Feb. 2, 2015, doc. 259). In this letter, Hewett stated that she planned to contact
Walsh’s former employer regarding those allegations, and was contemplating an additional
charge of negligent supervision against that employer. Id. She additionally stated that she
planned to file further complaints against Walsh with the New York Bar and the Grievance
Committee for the Southern District of New York. Id. Hewett subsequently docketed numerous
documents relating to her renewed motion and the grievances brought against both Walsh and
her former employer in the New York courts. (docs. 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 267, 268, 269, 271,
7
273, 274, 275, 276, 278) In addition, Hewett docketed several documents that, although filed as
relating to the Motion to Disqualify, in fact included irrelevant anecdotes about her medical and
personal history, see Pl. Letter to Underhill, J. (Feb. 24, 2015, doc. 272), or repeated allegations
of animal cruelty and other personal information about TPT’s employees, see Pl.’s ―Exhibit –
Other Sanction Topics‖ (doc. 277). Hewett also continued to send lengthy emails to my law
clerk, objecting strenuously to my clerk’s request that Hewett comply with local rules regarding
filing. (doc. 281)
The same day, TPT filed an additional letter in support of its motion for sanctions, stating
that Hewett ―had sent counsel nearly twenty emails about counsel’s supposed ethical violations‖
over the weekend, including threats to file an additional grievance as well as a Rule 37 motion
for sanctions against counsel for TPT’s alleged delays in discovery. Def.’s Letter to Underhill, J.
(Feb. 2, 2015, doc. 257)
On April 19, 2015, apparently in response to the District of Connecticut Grievance
Committee’s dismissal of her complaint, Hewett withdrew her pending motion for Walsh’s
disqualification from the case, and instead moved for sanctions against Walsh under Rules 26(g),
30(d), and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the basis that Walsh’s alleged delays in
discovery denied Hewett assistance of counsel. (doc. 284, re-docketed as doc. 307) I orally
denied that motion on April 27, 2015 for lack of evidence that TPT had inappropriately delayed
discovery, or that there was any causal connection between the timing of discovery and Hewett’s
inability to obtain counsel. (doc. 297)
Hewett subsequently continued to make excessive filings,2 including documents
discussing new grievance complaints against other counsel for TPT. See Pl.’s ―Exhibit Attorney
Patrick Walsh – Opposition to Motion for Sanctions‖ (doc. 315); Pl.’s ―Exhibit Attorney Francis
2
At the time of writing, the electronic docket for this case contained 440 entries.
8
Taafee – Opposition to Motion for Sanctions‖ (doc. 316). In response to the calendar entry
scheduling a hearing on the present motion for sanctions, she filed six additional replies in
various formats (docs. 394–399), a ―counterclaim‖ against TPT requesting compensation for the
lost wages that she would suffer by attending the hearing (docs. 400, 401, 431, 432), as well as
twenty-four separately docketed exhibits and letters to the court purporting to support or explain
her earlier conduct (docs. 402–421, 427–30).
On October 19, 2015, TPT moved for additional sanctions on the basis of Hewett’s
conduct, requesting compensation for the cost of considering her latest round of filings. (doc.
422) Additionally, TPT moved to strike several of the exhibits that inappropriately cast
aspersions on Walsh’s character and personal relationships.3 (doc. 423)
On October 21, 2015, I held a hearing on TPT’s motion, as well as Hewett’s
counterclaim.4 (docs. 400, 401, 431, 432).
II.
Discussion
All district courts have the inherent power to supervise and control their own proceedings
and to sanction counsel or a litigant for disobeying a court’s orders or for bad-faith conduct.
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 49–50 (1991); F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. United States,
417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Mitchell v. Lyons Professional Servs., Inc., 708 F.3d 463, 467 (2d Cir.
2013) (citing Mickle v. Morin, 297 F.3d 114, 125 (2d Cir. 2002)). Bad faith may occur at any
time in the litigation—in the actions leading up to the filing of a lawsuit, or during the pendency
of a case. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986). A court may award
3
Although I agree with the defendant that the offending documents are scandalous and abusive, I would like to
preserve them for review on appeal. Accordingly, I have ordered the Clerk to seal the offending documents so that
they will not be visible to the public, and I informed the parties at hearing that I would not take any of those
documents into consideration. See Orders (Oct. 21, 2015, docs. 433, 434).
4
At that hearing, I dismissed Hewett’s counterclaim as a procedurally and substantively invalid attempt to amend
her complaint without leave of court.
9
attorneys’ fees against a litigant for bad-faith conduct only if the record demonstrates (1) ―clear
evidence‖ that the challenged actions ―are entirely without color‖ and are taken for ―reasons of
harassment or delay or for other improper purposes,‖ and (2) that the district court provided a
high degree of specificity in its factual findings regarding sanctions. Id.; see also Dow Chem.
Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 344 (2d Cir. 1986). A claim is ―entirely
without color when it lacks any legal or factual basis,‖ and it is colorable when it has ―some legal
and factual support, considered in light of the reasonable beliefs of the individual making the
claim.‖ Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlaifer
Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 336 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Additionally, when a court imposes sanctions by exercising its inherent authority, it must
first provide the subject of those sanctions with a warning that continued bad-faith conduct or
noncompliance with the court’s orders can result in sanctions, as well as an opportunity to be
heard. Mickle, 297 F.3d at 114; Ted Lapidus, S.A. v. Vann, 112 F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1997) (the
court must provide ―specific notice of the conduct alleged to be sanctionable and the standard by
which that conduct will be assessed, and an opportunity to be heard on that matter‖ prior to
imposing sanctions upon a litigant); In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 76 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1996);
Valentine v. Museum of Modern Art, 29 F.3d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam). ―[A]lthough
granting a hearing for oral argument would generally be the better practice,‖ the Second Circuit
has held that an opportunity to respond in briefing may also constitute a sufficient opportunity to
be heard in certain circumstances. Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323,
335–36 (2d Cir. 1999).
Federal courts are ―ordinarily obligated to afford a special solicitude to pro se litigants,‖
Koehl v. Bernstein, 740 F.3d 860, 862 (2d Cir. 2014); however, that solicitude does not protect a
10
pro se litigant who refuses to comply with court orders or who engages in abusive, vexatious, or
oppressive conduct. The Second Circuit also has noted that while ―pro se litigants may in
general deserve more lenient treatment than those represented by counsel, all litigants, including
pro ses, have an obligation to comply with court orders. When they flout that obligation they,
like all litigants, must suffer the consequences of their actions.‖ McDonald v. Head Crim. Ct.
Supervisor Officer, 850 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1988).
A. Triple Point Technology’s Motion for Sanctions
On December 31, 2014, Triple Point Technology filed the present motion, seeking
monetary sanctions in the amount of costs associated with Hewett’s communications to counsel
and to this court regarding her federal court grievance against Walsh; Hewett’s December 8,
2014 Motion to Seal and the documents sealed therein, which also related to the grievance;5 and
with the sanctions motion itself under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the inherent powers of this court.6
(doc. 231). Hewett has received adequate notice of the grounds for the motion for sanctions, has
been warned repeatedly about the possibility of sanctions, and has been able to defend herself
against these charges in significant briefing over the course of nine months. Her campaign to
smear Walsh’s credentials and character in this court has clearly been waged in bad faith.
Moreover, Hewett is a sophisticated and experienced litigant, and so she cannot hold up her pro
se status as an explanation for her determined refusal to comply with court orders. Instead, it is
clear that, through an onslaught of abusive and irrelevant filings, Hewett is wrongfully
5
I granted that motion to seal and will not impose sanctions on that basis (doc. 225); however, I agree with the
defendants that the filing of the underlying document (doc. 224), which consists of the ruling of the grievance board,
should not have been filed in this case.
6
This ruling takes into consideration TPT’s December 31, 2014 motion for sanctions and the subsequent briefing. It
does not, however, address the costs associated with TPT’s October 19, 2015 Reply Brief (doc. 422). Instead, that
motion is mooted by this ruling insofar as it contemplates additional sanctions should Hewett persist with her
objectionable conduct.
11
attempting to bully TPT into settlement. Accordingly, sanctions are warranted, and are imposed
under the inherent powers of this Court.7
i.
Notice
Hewett received adequate notice of the nature of her wrongful conduct and the risk of
sanctions, as well as the authority under which sanctions could be imposed upon her. See Mickel,
297 F.3d at 114; Ted Lapidus, S.A. v. Vann, 112 F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1997).
As set out above, Hewett was warned numerous times about filing documents related to her
personal attacks on Walsh. I denied Hewett’s first motion to disqualify Walsh during a phone
conference on July 7, 2014, on the basis that Walsh was, as of that conference date, an attorney
in good standing in the District of Connecticut. See Conf. Mem & Order (July 8, 2014, doc. 137);
Mot. Hr’g Tr. 2:17–20; 5:8–11 (July 7, 2014, doc. 155). Although I denied TPT’s verbal request
for sanctions at that time, I cautioned Hewett that harassing, abusive, and threatening statements
constituted sanctionable conduct. Id. at 32:11-33:7. In particular, I emphasized that pro se
litigants can be subject to sanctions, including monetary sanctions. Id.
During a telephone conference on October 28, 2014, I reminded Hewett of my previous
warning, and again notified Hewett that she risked being sanctioned on the basis of her filings
and communications with counsel. See Conf. Mem & Order (Nov. 4, 2014, doc. 197). I warned
7
Section 1927 provides in relevant part:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States . . . who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Hewett’s conduct violates section 1927 because she has unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the
proceedings in this case. In Sassower v. Field, 973 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1992), however, the Second Circuit held that
Section 1927 cannot be applied to pro se, non-attorney litigants. Id. at 80. It is unclear whether that rule still applies.
See Davey v. Dolan, 292 F. App'x 127, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming district court's imposition of sanctions on pro
se, non-attorney plaintiff pursuant to § 1927); see also Neroni v. Coccoma, No. 3:13-CV-1340 GLS/DEP, 2014 WL
3866307, at *1 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2014), aff'd sub nom. Neroni v. Hinman, Howard & Kattell, LLP, 607 F.
App'x 113 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing same). Regardless, this Order can be made under the inherent authority of this
Court.
12
her that many of her filings were inappropriate, and contained ad hominem attacks and factual
inaccuracies. Id. I ordered her to refrain from submitting such filings, and to restrict her filings to
documentation relevant to the issues in this case. Id.
TPT’s December 31, 2014 motion provided Hewett with clear notice regarding both the
legal and factual basis for sanctions. Def.’s Mot. (doc. 231). TPT’s motion discussed both
section 1927 and this court’s inherent power to impose sanctions for frivolous and vexatious
conduct. Id. at 10–11. And, contrary to Hewett’s post-hearing objections (doc. 44), the calendar
entry for the hearing on the instant motion on the electronic docket was accompanied by a notice
specifically stating that the legal grounds for potential sanctions included both section 1927 and
the inherent authority of the court. (doc. 393)
ii.
Opportunity to Be Heard
I held oral argument on the sanctions motion, which provided Hewett with an in-person
opportunity to be heard.
In addition, as set out above, before TPT’s formal motion was filed, Hewett had several
opportunities to speak to me in phone conferences regarding potential sanctions. Following the
October 28, 2014 conference, she also filed several letters to me objecting to any potential
sanctions. See Pl. Notice of Counsel for Threat of Sanctions (doc. 192); Pl. Letter to Underhill, J.
(Nov. 9, 2014, doc. 200).
Over the ten months since TPT’s motion was filed, Hewett has also been able to respond
with significant briefing. See, e.g., Pl.’s Amended Opposition to Motion for Sanctions (doc.
233); Pl.’s Second Amended Opposition to Motion for Sanctions (doc. 235); Pl.’s Response
(doc. 245); Pl.’s Amended Response (doc. 248); Pl. Letter to Underhill, J. (Feb. 2, 2015, doc.
256); Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s Reply to Motion for Sanctions (doc. 248); Pl.’s Response to Motion
13
for Sanctions (Sept. 21, 2015, doc. 394); Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Motion for Sanctions (Sept. 22,
2015, doc. 399).
iii.
Hewett’s Sanctionable Conduct
Hewett’s persistent personal attacks and her improper docketing and invocation of
confidential grievances in this proceeding despite repeated orders from this court prohibiting her
from so acting are grounds for sanctions.
a. Hewett’s actions violated orders of this court.
I have repeatedly ordered Hewett to refrain from filing documents including ad hominem
attacks against counsel, and further ordered that she restrict her filings to those relevant to this
case. See Mem. of Conf. held May 1, 2014 (May 2, 2014, doc. 96); Conf. Mem & Order held
July 7, 2014 (July 8, 2014, doc. 137); Conf. Mem & Order held Oct. 28, 2014 (Nov. 4, 2014,
doc. 197). I have also ordered her to cease emailing chambers staff with requests for substantive
actions from this court. (doc. 213)
As set out in the Background above, in direct contravention of these Orders, Hewett has
persisted in filing irrelevant, frivolous, and abusive materials. For instance, before TPT’s motion
for sanctions, Hewett had filed at least twenty-seven documents relating to various grievance
procedures she has instituted against Walsh, twenty-three of which were filed after my May 1
order directing that she keep those materials off of the docket. See (docs. 71, 73, 79, 85, 90, 113,
121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129). She has also filed dozens of documents related to her
discovery quarrels with Walsh, despite my repeated instruction that those documents do not
belong on this docket. She has sent hundreds of often-abusive emails to opposing counsel, as
well as dozens of demanding emails and letters to chambers.8
8
Since the filing of the present motion, Hewett has persisted with excessive filings. See, e.g., docs. 261, 262, 263,
264, 265, 267, 268, 269, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278. At the time of writing, a generous assessment of the docket
14
Hewett’s behavior cannot be excused by her pro se status. She is a sophisticated, welleducated party who has initiated several prior lawsuits in which she also proceeded pro se. See
Hewett v. Graham Capital Mgmt., et al., No 3:12-cv-556 (WWE) (D. Conn.); Hewett v. Murray,
No. 3:12-cv-558 (WWE) (D. Conn.); Hewett v. Leblang, No. 1:12-cv-1713 (PKC) (JLC)
(S.D.N.Y.); Hewett v. Barclays Capital, et al., 1:12-cv-3539 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y.). Moreover, even
if Hewett was initially confused about the appropriate use of the docket, she has been unwilling
to conform her conduct to the instructions she has received from myself, chambers staff, and
staff in the Clerk’s Office, regarding proper procedures, and in fact, has responded aggressively
to such advice. See, e.g., Pl.’s ―Exhibit of Emails from Ms. Pannu representing Judge Underhill,‖
(doc. 281) (comprising an email exchange between Hewett and my law clerk in which Hewett
argues strenuously against my clerk’s request that she comply with local rules).
b. Hewett’s filings discussing her grievance actions were made in bad faith.
A court may award attorneys’ fees against a litigant for bad-faith conduct only if the record
demonstrates (1) ―clear evidence‖ that the challenged actions are ―entirely without color‖ and are
taken for ―reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes,‖ and (2) that the
district court provided a high degree of specificity in its factual findings regarding sanctions.
Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d at 1272.
Grievances brought in before the relevant bodies for the District of Connecticut, the
Southern District of New York, and the Connecticut State Bar are confidential, and should not be
disclosed to the Judge overseeing the case in which the allegedly grievous conduct occurred. See
District of Connecticut Local Rule 83.2(c); Southern District of New York Local Civil Rule
1.5(d)(3); Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee’s Procedural Rule 1(D). The protection
would find that Hewett has filed upwards of 200 frankly irrelevant and often inappropriate entries in the course of
this proceeding.
15
of confidentiality ensures that such grievances are not used as a tool to threaten or discredit
opposing counsel. Accordingly, I directed Hewett not to docket any information regarding her
grievances against Walsh in this case, a direction that Hewett has determinedly ignored. Instead,
Hewett’s repeated efforts to publicize her baseless campaign to have Walsh disbarred and
removed from this case plainly constitute bad-faith conduct.
Although Walsh appears to have had an administrative suspension of her Connecticut
license at the outset of this case, Hewett’s attempts to attack her have been unfounded and
abusive. First, Hewett filed several documents moving to disqualify Walsh from this case and to
have her held in contempt. See, e.g., (docs. 113, 121–27, 129). Those documents included
inflammatory accusations against Walsh, and were labeled with similarly inflammatory titles on
the public docket, using language such as ―illegal licensure,‖ (doc. 121), ―fraud of employer,‖
(docs. 125, 129), and ―Class C Felony,‖ (doc. 127) to describe Walsh’s professional standing. I
denied Hewett’s motion for disqualification on July 7, 2014. (doc. 137) At that time, I explained
to Hewett the distinction between the administrative hold that she had identified and a material
sanction, and warned her about the possibility of sanctions for abusive and harassing conduct. Id.
Hewett subsequently docketed information regarding her formal grievance against Walsh
with the Connecticut State Bar. See, e.g., (docs. 125, 138, 141, 224). Hewett then filed a ―notice‖
suggesting that TPT and Walsh had engaged in ―criminal trespass‖ when TPT sent a courier to
deliver documents to her house, as Hewett had requested. (doc. 143) On December 30, 2014,
Hewett also docketed a federal grievance she made against Walsh. (doc. 229) And, further
demonstrating her intent to use the grievance procedure as a weapon in this litigation, Hewett
chose to inform Walsh herself of the latter action through distressing and threatening emails. See,
e.g., Pl. Letter to Nicole Walsh (Dec. 30, 2014, doc. 231-3).
16
On February 7, 2015, Hewett renewed her efforts to have Walsh disqualified from the case,
relying on increasingly irrational and alarming arguments. (doc. 261) For instance, she alleged,
among other things, that Walsh was literally threatening Hewett with death by continuing to
represent TPT in this case. (doc. 274) On April 5, 2015, Hewett filed a motion for sanctions
against Walsh, including yet another baseless allegation against Walsh—namely, that her alleged
delays in producing discovery had somehow denied Hewett of counsel—in addition to once
again invoking the federal grievance. (doc. 284) That conduct continued up to the date of the
hearing on the instant motion. In total, Hewett has filed at least 55 documents making personal
attacks on Walsh in this case.
Further indicating Hewett’s intent to harass, these actions are consistent with Hewett’s
history of targeting opposing counsel before the court. See Hewett v. Leblang, 1:12-cv-1713
(S.D.N.Y.) (unsuccessful suit against opposing counsel); Hewett v. Graham Captial, 3:12-cv-556
(D. Conn.) (unsuccessful motion to disqualify opposing counsel). Indeed, in the present case,
Hewett has already begun to instigate similar campaigns against two additional attorneys. See
Pl.’s ―Exhibit Attorney Patrick Walsh – Opposition to Motion for Sanctions‖ (doc. 315); Pl.’s
―Exhibit Attorney Francis Taafee – Opposition to Motion for Sanctions‖ (doc. 316).
They are also consistent with Hewett’s attempt to embarrass and harass in the present case
the person who supervised her while she worked at TPT. Hewett has made repeated and
duplicative filings suggesting that her previous supervisor was guilty of animal cruelty, and
suggested that her termination was an attempt to similarly harm her. See Pl.’s Letter to Underhill,
J. (Oct. 29, 2014, doc. 191) (discussing those filings). Even after I directed that such filings were
inappropriate, Hewett continued to repeat the same statements in multiple filings. See id.; see
also (doc. 277).
17
To be clear, I am not imposing sanctions on the basis of the grievances themselves, or any
statement that Hewett made in any of the related complaints or hearings. As I informed Hewett
in our July 7, 2014 phone conference, she has always had the option to file such grievances. See
Conf. Tr. 3:4–9 (doc. 155). This ruling, however, concerns Hewett’s use of the grievance
proceedings and the public docket in this case as a tool to embarrass and bully the defendants
into settlement. That behavior will not be tolerated.
Moreover, Hewett cannot now hide behind the grievance procedures. At the hearing,
Hewett attempted to insulate some of her most disturbing statements to Walsh, including
repeated assertions that Walsh was literally killing Hewett by continuing to represent TPT, by
claiming that those statements were somehow immunized because they related to her grievances
against Walsh. The fact that Hewett filed grievances does not give her a right to send abusive
emails to opposing counsel, or to file outrageous accusations on the docket for this case.
Similarly, Hewett is not absolved now that many of the offending documents have been
sealed to the public. The documents and communications discussed in this ruling have no place
in this litigation. They have rendered the electronic docket practically unusable. In additon, they
have required review and response, thereby imposing a burden on the defendant, opposing
counsel, and this court.
B. Sanctions Award
Pro se litigants are to be afforded extra leeway by the courts, and I have given Hewett
multiple opportunities to change her behavior. As the docket will attest, nothing has worked.
Monetary sanctions are now clearly warranted. Furthermore, they are necessary to restore a
minimal level of civility and focus on the merits of the present case.
18
Walsh has provided two affidavits detailing the costs expended responding to Hewett’s
inappropriate conduct. (docs. 231-1; 422-1) Setting aside the costs related to Hewett’s December
8, 2014 Motion to Seal (doc. 223), and the updated Motion for Sanctions (doc. 422), TPT has
incurred $6,570 in attorneys’ fees.9 In light of Hewett’s claim that she has limited resources, I
will require Hewett to pay only two-thirds of that amount, for a total of $4,380.
To ensure the efficacy of this sanction, the Clerk of Court is directed not to accept any
filings from Hewett until the amount is paid in full, unless those filings relate to a motion for the
reconsideration of this ruling. See L. R. Civ. P. Rule 16(g)(2).
C. On-going sanctions
In addition to the specific findings of bad faith in this ruling, this Order should put Hewett
on notice that further activity threatening opposing counsel, filing frivolous and irrelevant
documents, or otherwise impeding the proceedings may subject her to additional sanctions.
Specifically, Hewett is warned that, in the event of an additional violation, the next sanction can
include the dismissal of this case, as well as an additional monetary sanction.
III. Conclusion
TPT’s motion for sanctions is granted in part, and Hewett is ordered to pay $4,380 to
the Clerk of Court for the benefit of TPT. The Clerk of Court shall not accept any additional
filings from Hewett until that amount is paid, unless those filings relate to a motion for reconsideration of this ruling.
It is so ordered.
9
Walsh affirms that TPT has incurred $750 communicating with Hewett, her client, and the court regarding
Hewett’s threats of a federal grievance; $2,160 filing the first motion for sanctions; $2,280 reviewing Hewett’s
subsequent communications and drafting the February 2, 2015 letter to the court; and $1,380 reviewing the
pleadings associated with Hewett’s second motion to disqualify. Walsh Affs. (docs. 231-1; 422-1) That is, no doubt,
a conservative accounting.
19
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 30th day of October 2015.
/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge
20
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