Hewett v. Triple Point Tech
Filing
522
ORDER. For reasons stated in the order, construing 485 Notice as a motion for recusal, that motion is denied. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 1/11/2016. (Buttrick, A.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
KARA LEE HEWETT,
Plaintiff,
No. 3:13-cv-1382 (SRU)
v.
TRIPLE POINT TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER
On December 4, 2015, the pro se plaintiff, Kara Lee Hewett, docketed a letter, doc. 485,
requesting that I recuse myself from this case because of my alleged “anger and rage” during a
hearing to determine whether financial sanctions should be imposed against Hewett. Construing
that letter as a motion for recusal, it is denied.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a federal judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), a federal
judge shall also disqualify himself “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party.” “Discretion is confided in the district judge in the first instance to determine whether to
disqualify himself.” In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 540 (1989) (citation omitted). The judge must recuse himself if
circumstances exist which constitute an objectively reasonable basis upon which to question the
judge‟s impartiality, such as circumstances showing “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that
would make fair judgment almost impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555
(1994). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion” and “can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or
antagonism required.” Id.
Hewett‟s motion is based on my “rage” during a hearing to discuss financial sanctions
against her, as well as subsequent decisions regarding the sanctions that were ultimately
awarded. On October 21, 2015, I held a hearing on the defendant‟s motion for sanctions. At that
hearing, I spoke sternly to Hewett about her conduct throughout the litigation, in particular about
her habit of sending voluminous and occasionally threatening emails to opposing counsel. (doc.
435) I subsequently issued a ruling describing Hewett‟s inappropriate conduct at length, and
awarding the defendant monetary sanctions that were reduced to reflect Hewett‟s financial
condition. (doc. 451) That ruling conditioned Hewett‟s ability to file documents in this case on
her payment of the sanctions in full. Hewett moved for reconsideration, asserting, inter alia, that
the latter condition would effectively end the case because of her inability to pay. (doc. 452) I
granted Hewett‟s motion in part, lifting the filing ban, but leaving in place the monetary award.
(doc. 472) Defense counsel then moved for a telephone conference, pointing out that my ruling
on the motion for reconsideration failed to set a schedule for sanctions payments so that the
defendant could bring a claim if Hewett failed to follow the ruling. (doc. 473) I corrected that
error on December 1, 2015, ordering Hewett to pay the sanctions in full within 21 days of that
order. (doc. 481)
Hewett now argues that I should recuse myself because she believes that I displayed
anger toward her during the hearing, and further asserts that the December 1 order was an act of
anger or retribution because Hewett had filed an appeal of the sanctions order. To the extent that
Hewett is moving for recusal simply because she disagrees with my rulings, her motion must
fail. See Liteky, 510 U.S. 555 (asserting that such an argument is “almost never” sufficient).
Moreover, taking as true Hewett‟s allegations that I became angry at her during the hearing, she
has nevertheless failed to show that such a “deep-seated antagonism” that a fair ruling would be
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impossible—indeed, several of the rulings that Hewett challenges have been favorable to her,
including a grant of reduced sanctions and my willingness to reconsider my previous ruling to
allow her to continue in the case. See Jones v. Hirschfeld, 348 F. Supp. 2d 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (holding that “the Court‟s expressions of irritation toward the defendant and his lawyer”
were insufficient to merit recusal, and instead were appropriate “admonishments to the defendant
to take the case seriously and cease his haphazard behavior”); see also In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d at 1316 (observing that some “sharpness in colloquy between judge and
counsel” can be “well within the acceptable boundaries of courtroom exchange”). Hewett has
also has not shown, nor even tried to show, “„any personal connection, relationship or
extrajudicial incident which accounts for the alleged personal animus of [this court].‟” Clemmons
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-CV-1645 KAM, 2011 WL 6130926, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8,
2011) (quoting In re Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir.1980)) (alterations in
original).
Accordingly, Hewett‟s request for recusal is wholly without merit and is therefore
denied.
So ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 11th day of January, 2016.
/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge
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