Lundstedt v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al

Filing 398

RULING ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS. For the reasons set forth in the attached opinion, the Court DENIES plaintiff Lundstedt's post-trial motions (Docs. # 364 , # 365 , # 367 , # 376 ). It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 2/10/2020. (Al-Jarani, Y.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

PETER LUNDSTEDT,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 3:13-cv-01423 (JAM)

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
COMPANY et al.,
Defendants.

RULING ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
Plaintiff Peter Lundstedt alleges that defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (“the Bank”)
negligently inflicted emotional distress on him when the Bank called him multiple times with
respect to a mortgage debt he owed. A federal jury concluded that Lundstedt did not prove his
claim. For the reasons stated in this ruling, I will deny Lundstedt’s post-trial motions for
judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and to amend the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Lundstedt filed this pro se action against several financial institution defendants alleging
that he was fraudulently induced to take out a high-interest mortgage loan in 2006 and that he
was subject to improper debt collection efforts after he failed to make his payments. Doc. #88.
On June 2, 2016, I granted a motion to dismiss all of Lundstedt’s claims against all of the
defendants except for two claims against defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank that arose from
Lundstedt’s allegations that the Bank improperly called him by telephone hundreds of times to
try to collect on the mortgage debt. Doc. #137; Lundstedt v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 2016
WL 3101999 (D. Conn. 2016). On November 9, 2017, I granted the Bank’s motion for summary

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judgment with respect to one of the remaining claims but denied summary judgment as to
Lundstedt’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Doc. #269.
I appointed a pro bono attorney to represent Lundstedt solely for purposes of trial. Doc.
#306. 1 The case proceeded to trial, and Lundstedt testified about the many telephone calls he had
received from the Bank and the effect that these telephone calls had on his emotional condition.
The Bank defended in part on the ground that any emotional distress that Lundstedt experienced
was due to other stressful events in his life apart from the telephone calls that the Bank made to
him. For example, the Bank introduced evidence of Lundstedt’s financial distress involving other
creditors and Lundstedt’s allegations of emotional injury made in lawsuits filed against other
parties. See Doc. #351 (witness and exhibit list reflecting documents admitted into evidence from
Lundstedt v. Peoples United Bank, No. 3:14-cv-01479-JAM (D. Conn. 2014), and Lundstedt v.
I.C. System, Inc., No. 15-cv-00824-JAM (D. Conn. 2015)).
The jury returned a verdict against Lundstedt on July 18, 2018. Although it concluded
that Lundstedt had proven that he had experienced serious emotional distress, it also concluded
that Lundstedt had failed to prove that the Bank’s conduct involving telephone calls was the
cause of his emotional distress. Doc. #352 (jury verdict form).
Following trial and in accordance with the limited scope of the pro bono attorney’s
appointment, I granted Lundstedt’s attorney’s motion to withdraw. Doc. #358. Lundstedt has
filed several pro se post-trial motions, including a motion for judgment as a matter of law (Doc.
#364), a motion for a new trial (Doc. #365), a motion to alter the judgment (Doc. #367), and a

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Although Lundstedt proceeded pro se prior to the appointment of counsel, he did not proceed in forma pauperis,
Doc. #32, and I appointed counsel only after Lundstedt failed to follow through on his promise to retain counsel,
Doc. #269. I appointed counsel in light of Lundstedt’s fragile mental condition (which was evident from his filings
and from his demeanor at court appearances) and because I knew that Lundstedt’s case would largely depend on his
own testimony about what happened and that it would be impractical for Lundstedt to attempt to conduct a direct
examination of himself before a jury at trial. Lundstedt’s appointed trial counsel was capable, diligent, and prepared,
and there is no merit to any of Lundstedt’s complaints about the quality of his counsel.

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motion to set aside the judgment (Doc. #376). The Bank and other defendants have filed
objections (Docs. #368, #369, #377).
DISCUSSION
Under Rule 50, a motion for judgment as a matter of law will be granted only if “a
reasonable jury [did] not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party” that
prevailed at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). A party seeking judgment on this basis bears a “heavy
burden,” and will succeed only if “the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of
the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one
conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable [persons] could have reached.” Matusick v. Erie
Cnty. Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31, 52 (2d Cir. 2014). I must view the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion was made and . . . give that party the benefit of
all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence.” Harris
v. O’Hare, 770 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir. 2014), as amended (Nov. 24, 2014). Moreover,
notwithstanding a movant’s reliance on trial evidence that favored the movant’s version of
events, a court considering a Rule 50 motion “must disregard all evidence favorable to the
moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” ING Glob. v. United Parcel Serv. Oasis
Supply Corp., 757 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2014).
Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court may grant a
new trial “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in
federal court.” The standard for granting a motion for a new trial is lower than the standard for
granting a Rule 50 motion—a judge “may weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
and need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.” Raedle v.
Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Still, the Second

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Circuit has emphasized “the high degree of deference [that should be] accorded to the jury’s
evaluation of witness credibility, and that jury verdicts should be disturbed with great
infrequency.” Ibid. Nor is a motion for a new trial “a vehicle for relitigating old issues,
presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a
second bite at the apple.” Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998). The
Court may only grant a motion for new trial “if the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result
or [its] verdict is a miscarriage of justice,” or “if substantial errors were made in admitting or
excluding evidence.” Stampf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 761 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 2014).
To establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show
that “(1) the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional
distress; (2) the plaintiff’s distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough
that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the
plaintiff’s distress.” Lundstedt, 2016 WL 3101999, at *3; Packer v. SN Servicing Corp., 2008
WL 359411, at *12 (D. Conn. 2008); Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 444 (2003).
As noted in defendants’ objections, Lundstedt’s various post-trial motions delve into a
broad range of topics, including the validity of the underlying mortgage and a separate state
foreclosure action, as well as stock market strategy. These topics were not the subject of the trial
and have nothing to do with whether the trial evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict
in favor of the Bank. Nor has Lundstedt identified any grounds for me to grant relief from my
initial ruling in 2016 that dismissed Lundstedt’s claims against the other defendants.
At trial, Lundstedt testified at length and presented additional witness testimony
concerning his emotional condition and what the Bank allegedly did to cause his distress. It is
evident to me that the jury declined to credit Lundstedt’s testimony that the Bank’s phone calls to

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him were the cause of his emotional distress. Lundstedt’s motions make no meaningful showing
that the jury’s verdict was unsupported or the product of a trial error or miscarriage of justice.
Indeed, consistent with the Bank’s defense at trial that there were many causes of stress in
Lundstedt’s life beyond any of the phone calls made to him by the Bank, Lundstedt’s own posttrial submissions describe how the acts of other financial institutions “devastated the plaintiff
financially, spiritually and emotionally.” Doc. #365 at 14; see also Doc. #376 at 24-25 (alleging
“emotional” injury “caused” to Lundstedt by another bank in 2006).
To the extent that Lundstedt argues that his trial counsel should have introduced
additional medical records (Doc. #364 at 8-13), I agree with the Bank that Lundstedt has not
established that any additional medical records would have made any difference to the jury’s
verdict, premised as it was on the issue of causation. The evidence was sufficient, and Lundstedt
has not established grounds as a matter of law or discretion for me to overturn the jury’s verdict.
In light of my conclusion that the trial verdict was supported by the evidence and not the result of
any trial error, I need not consider the Bank’s additional argument that Lundstedt failed to timely
move for judgment as a matter of law as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). See, e.g., Kirsch
v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir. 1998).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff Lundstedt’s post-trial motions
(Docs. #364, #365, #367, #376).
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven this 10th day of February 2020.
/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

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