O'Brien v. Meriden Board of Education
Filing
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ORDER granting 14 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count Six of Plaintiff's Complaint. See attached memorandum of decision. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 09/12/14. (Rock, K.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CAROL O’BRIEN,
Plaintiff,
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v.
MERIDEN BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:13-CV-1521-VLB
SEPTEMBER 12, 2014
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT’S [DKT. # 14] PARTIAL
MOTION TO DISMISS
I.
Introduction
Defendant Meriden Board of Education (the “Board”) moves to dismiss the
sixth count of plaintiff Carol O’Brien’s complaint, a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress (“IIED”). Defendant does not move to dismiss any of the
other counts of plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff has failed to respond to this motion
but that failure alone is insufficient to warrant dismissal if the complaint is
sufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted. McCall v. Pataki, 232
F.3d 321, 322–23 (2d Cir. 2000). Therefore, the Court proceeds to consider
Defendant’s motion on the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s complaint. For the reasons
described below, the court grants defendant’s motion to dismiss count six of
plaintiff’s complaint.
II.
Relevant Facts
Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant as Hall Monitor at Maloney
High School (“Maloney High”) in October 2000 and continued in that position for
nearly twelve years, until June 20, 2012. Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff incurred a
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substantial number of absences due to personal and family health issues in the
last two years of her tenure at Maloney High. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4, 10–15. In October
2010, Plaintiff was diagnosed with breast cancer and applied for leave under the
Family Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”) to receive medical treatment. Id. at ¶ 11.
Plaintiff was absent on FMLA leave through July 2011 while she underwent
surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation, returning to work in September 2011. Id. at
¶¶ 12–13. From October to November 2011, plaintiff was again intermittently
absent for medical leave for testing on a new, benign mass on her breast. Id. at ¶¶
13–14. Additionally, plaintiff applied for FMLA leave in November 2011 as her
father was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and given a short time to live. Id. at
¶ 15. She cared for him, at home, until his death in April 2012. Id. at ¶ 16.
Upon plaintiff’s return to work, the principal at Maloney High spoke with
plaintiff about her approved leave time, tallying up the dates that she was out
since September 2011 and calling them “absences.” Id. at ¶¶ 17–19. The principal
stated that she knew of plaintiff’s breast cancer and of her father’s passing. Id. at
¶ 18. Plaintiff also informed the principal that she was now caring for her elderly
mother. Id. The principal stated that students were suffering due to plaintiff’s
approved leave and warned that she should have better attendance. Id. at ¶ 19.
Plaintiff explained that she was on approved FMLA leave to address her health
and family issues but the principal “did not seem to care.” Id. at ¶ 20.
On the last day of school, June 20, 2012, Plaintiff was called into the
principal’s office for her second performance review in twelve years. Id. at ¶¶ 21–
22. Overall, the performance review was good. Id. at ¶ 25. However, the principal
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criticized plaintiff for her “attendance” and rated her “Unsatisfactory” in this
category, marking in the category “see attached.” Id. at ¶¶ 23–24. The attached
document listed the days that plaintiff had been absent for approved medical and
family leave. Id. At the end of the review, defendant terminated plaintiff’s
employment for the express reason that it was for a “financial” reason. Id. at ¶¶
26, 28. Plaintiff claims that this is pretextual and that defendant terminated her
due to her actual or perceived disability. Id. at ¶¶ 27–28. Shocked and upset,
plaintiff went to speak with the personnel director of the defendant, who tried to
avoid speaking with her or giving her a written reason for her termination. Id. at
¶31.
III.
Standard of Review
“‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Sarmiento v. U.S., 678 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotations omitted). “Where a
complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it
‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
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court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court
should follow a “two-pronged approach” to evaluate the sufficiency of the
complaint. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). “A court ‘can
choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679). “At the second step, a court should determine whether the ‘wellpleaded factual allegations,’ assumed to be true, ‘plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal
quotations omitted).
IV.
Discussion
Defendant argues (i) that governmental immunity precludes Plaintiff’s claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and (ii) that the alleged conduct was
not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. Def.’s Mem., 1.
a. Governmental Immunity for Intentional Torts
Plaintiff’s claim for IIED, Compl. p. 8, is precluded under the doctrine of
governmental immunity. In Connecticut, governmental immunity bars intentional
tort claims against municipalities. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a)(2)(A); see
also O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 877 A.2d 860, 863, 863 n.4 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005),
cert. denied, 882 A.2d 675 (Conn. 2005). The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled the
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common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is one of the
intentional torts barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity. Miles v. City of
Hartford, 719 F. Supp. 2d 207, 218 (D. Conn. 2010) (“The Connecticut Supreme
Court has clearly held that a political subdivision of the state is immune to suit
based on intentional infliction of emotional distress by an employee.”) (citing
Pane v. City of Danbury, 841 A.2d 684, 695 (Conn. 2004)1). Therefore, the Court
holds that governmental immunity precludes plaintiff’s claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Even if governmental immunity did not bar plaintiff’s IIED claim, plaintiff’s
claim for IIED is insufficient because plaintiff has failed to allege facts to
conclude that defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous as a matter of
law.
b. Sufficiency of IIED Claim
In the State of Connecticut, to succeed on a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress a plaintiff must show
(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or that he
knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely
result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the
plaintiff’s distress and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by
the plaintiff was severe.
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Pane was overruled in part by Grady v. Town of Somers, 984 A.2d 684, 700
(Conn. 2009), on other grounds not pertinent to this case. See Miles, 719 F. Supp.
2d at 218 n.5.
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Rivera v. Thurston Foods, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 2d 330, 343 (D. Conn. 2013) (citing
Petyan v. Ellis, 510 A.2d 1337, 1342 (Conn. 1986)).
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant intentionally inflicted emotional
express by classifying her approved FMLA leave as absences, insisting that she
improve her attendance, conducting the June 20, 2012 performance review when
it had only evaluated her performance once before in her 12-year tenure, rating
her performance unsatisfactory based on her FMLA leave, and terminating her
pretextually by citing financial reasons while refusing to answer her questions
concerning her belief as to the true cause. Compl. at ¶¶ 19–26, 28.
The Connecticut Supreme Court provided the following guidance to
determine whether conduct is “extreme and outrageous.”
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires
conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society.
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is
one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead
him to exclaim, “Outrageous!” Conduct on the part of the defendant
that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt
feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Appleton v. Board of Educ., 757 A.2d 1059, 1062 (Conn. 2000) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). In considering whether a plaintiff’s claim for IIED
sufficiently alleges extreme and outrageous conduct, the court evaluates “the
employer's conduct, not the motive behind the conduct.” Miner v. Cheshire, 126
F. Supp. 2d 184, 195 (D. Conn. 2000) (citation omitted).
“Whether a defendant’s
conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous
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is initially a question for the court to determine.” Appleton, 757 A.2d at 1062
(citing Bell v. Bd. of Educ., 739 A.2d 321, 327 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999)). “Only where
reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury.” Id.
The facts alleged by Plaintiff do not describe conduct that rises to the legal
standard of extreme and outrageous conduct. Nothing described in the
allegations in the Complaint rises above conduct that is merely insulting or
results in hurt feelings. Nothing described in the Complaint is “beyond all
possible bounds of decency.” Little v. Yale Univ., 884 A.2d 427, 432 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2005) (quotation and citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges simply that she was
wrongfully terminated due to her disability or perceived disability and her use of
protected leave time. However, it is the defendant’s conduct, not the motive
behind the conduct, which must be extreme and outrageous to state an IIED
claim. Miner, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 195. Defendant’s alleged conduct does not rise to
the standard of extreme and outrageous conduct. See, e.g., Appleton, 757 A.2d at
1061–63 (holding that a teacher failed to state a claim for IIED when she alleged
the principal placed her on administrative leave, submitted her to two
psychological evaluations, called the police to have her escorted out of the
building, collected information on her and conducted meetings outside her
presence, made condescending comments to her in front of coworkers, and
telephoned the teacher’s daughter representing that the teacher had been acting
differently); Bator v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 808 A.2d 1149, 1150–51 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2002) (affirming decision of trial court to grant defendant’s motion to strike
plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where plaintiff alleged
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that defendants disciplined him for failing to report to work even though he was
under a physician’s care, paid him less than those with less experience, told him
to seek psychiatric help, gave him a written warning when he complained about a
rotation change, and recommended that plaintiff attend anger management
classes after having two verbal altercations).
Plaintiff also appears to allege that she was retaliated against for filing a
sexual harassment claim against a teacher at the school at which she worked,
and alleges that “[f]or an extended period of time continuing to the date of her
termination, the plaintiff was subjected to an ongoing pattern of harassment,
discrimination and disparate treatment based upon her actual or perceived
disability and her opposition to and complaints about the hostile and
discriminatory environment at the defendant.” Compl. ¶¶ 32, 36. The assertions in
paragraphs 36–37 and 39 are legal conclusions and not facts. “[M]ere conclusory
statements” are insufficient to support a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even if the
court were to consider these conclusory allegations, they are not sufficiently
outrageous as to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
for the reasons described above.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED and the court dismisses
Count Six of Plaintiff’s complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
________/s/____________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: September 12, 2014.
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