Bray et al v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. et al
Filing
187
ORDER granting 125 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 130 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 131 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 132 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 133 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 135 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 138 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 2/19/2015. (Pannu, C.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
DEBRA BRAY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
No. 3:13-cv-1561 (SRU)
INGERSOLL-RAND CO., et al.,
Defendants.
RULING AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Debra Bray, executrix of the estate of Edgar St. Jean, and Marilyn St. Jean (collectively,
“the plaintiffs”) brought this action in Connecticut Superior Court asserting claims for product
liability, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-572m, et seq., loss of consortium (Marilyn St. Jean, only), and
punitive damages. 1 Notice of Removal, Ex. A (Complaint), Ex. C (doc. 1-1). Defendant Crane
Company (“Crane”) timely removed the case to federal court under the federal officer and
military contractor defenses, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 6–7, 10. At the close of
discovery, defendants Aurora Pumps (“Aurora”) (doc. 132), BW/IP, Inc. (“BW/IP”) (doc. 138),
Carrier Corporation (“Carrier”) (doc. 133), Crane (doc. 130), Nash Engineering Company
(“Nash”) (doc. 130), Warren Pumps (“Warren”) (doc. 135), and Weir Valves and Controls USA,
Inc. (“Weir”) (doc. 131), (collectively, “the defendants”) filed motions for summary judgment,
principally asserting that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their evidentiary burden on all claims.
Based on the record and all pleadings, the plaintiffs have failed to meet their evidentiary
burden on all of their claims. The defendants’ motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.
1. The plaintiffs also allege civil conspiracy and loss of enjoyment/earnings against defendant Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company. Notice of Removal, Ex. A ¶¶ 14–21.
I.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (plaintiff
must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must construe the facts of record
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970); see also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d. 520, 523 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965 (1992) (court is required to “resolve all ambiguities and draw all
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party”). When a motion for summary judgment is properly
supported by documentary and testimonial evidence, however, the nonmoving party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must present sufficient probative
evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
327 (1986); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).
“Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is
summary judgment proper.” Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991); see also
Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir. 1992). If the nonmoving
party submits evidence that is “merely colorable,” or is not “significantly probative,” summary
judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50.
The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
2
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact. As to materiality, the substantive law will
identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes
that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.
Id. at 247–48. To present a “genuine” issue of material fact, there must be contradictory
evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. at
248.
If the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of
his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof at trial, then summary judgment is
appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In such a situation, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to
any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 322–23; accord
Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (movant’s
burden satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of
nonmoving party’s claim). In short, if there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary
judgment may enter. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
II.
Background
The decedent, Edgar St. Jean, served in the military from 1953 to December 1956. Crane
Mot. Summ. J. Br., Ex. B, at 8 (Pls.’ Response to Standard Interrogs.) (doc. 127-2). He then
joined Electric Boat Corporation (“Electric Boat”), a division of General Dynamics Corporation,
as an outside machinist and later, as a general foreman, from approximately 1956 to April 1980.
Notice of Removal, Ex. A ¶ 2; St. Jean Aff. ¶ 3–4. His worksite was located in Groton,
Connecticut, where St. Jean worked on new construction and the overhauling of nuclear
3
submarines for the U.S. Navy. Notice of Removal, Ex. A ¶ 2; Crane Local R. 56(a)1 Statement ¶
2 (doc. 127); Pls.’ Opp’n Br., Ex. 4 (Electric Boat Records) (doc. 162-4). The plaintiffs allege
that the defendants manufactured 2 products used in Electric Boat’s shipbuilding and repair
business, and that St. Jean was exposed to when using or installing those products. Notice of
Removal, Ex. A ¶¶ 2, 5–13. On May 19, 2013, St. Jean died of mesothelioma and asbestosis,
which the plaintiffs allege was caused by St. Jean’s exposure to and inhalation of asbestos fibers
throughout his military and shipbuilding career. Id.; Pls.’ Opp’n Br., Ex. 7 (Letter from Dr.
Laura S. Welch (dated Oct. 8, 2014)) (doc. 151-7); St. Jean. Aff. ¶ 5; Pls.’ Opp’n Br., Ex. 10
(Death Certificate) (doc. 162-10).
At the close of discovery, the defendants filed their motions for summary judgment.
Those motions raise the same grounds for summary judgment; the defendants argue that the
plaintiffs have failed to meet their evidentiary burden with respect to their product liability and
loss of consortium claims.
In support of their opposition to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the
plaintiffs offered the following evidence: a brief affidavit by the decedent, executed two days
before his death; a list of ships upon which St. Jean worked, Crane’s Mot. Summ. J. Br., Ex. B,
at 9–10 (doc. 127-2); an affidavit by the plaintiffs’ proffered expert witness, Captain R. Bruce
Woodruff, Pls.’ Opp’n Br., Ex. 4 (doc. 151-4); the deposition testimony of Charles Knapp, id.,
Ex. 2 (doc. 151-2); the deposition testimony of Timothy Mullane, id., Ex. 3 (doc. 151-3); and the
deposition testimony of Robert Choate, id., Ex. 4 (doc. 155-4). As discussed below, that
evidence is insufficient to meet the plaintiffs’ evidentiary burden on all claims.
2. Although many of the defendants are manufacturers, some are the successors-in-interest to businesses that
manufactured products for use by the U.S. Navy in the construction of its nuclear submarines. Notice of Removal,
Ex. A ¶¶ 3f (Crane), 3t (Weir Valves). Crane and Weir do not contest their alleged parent, alter-ego, or successorin-interest liability.
4
III. Discussion
A. Choice of Law
Several defendants have argued that federal maritime common law, not Connecticut state
law, should govern the plaintiffs’ claims. Aurora Mot. Summ. J. Br. 12–14 (doc. 132-1); Crane
Mot. Summ. J. Br. 3–8 (doc. 126); Warren Mot. Summ. J. Br. 3–5 (doc. 135-1). Others have
argued that the plaintiffs’ exclusive avenue for recovery is the Connecticut Product Liability Act
(“CPLA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-572m, et seq. BW/IP Mot. Summ. J. Br. 8 (doc. 138); Carrier
Mot. Summ. J. Br. 4–5 (doc. 133-2); Nash Mot. Summ. J. Br. 4–5 (doc. 130); Weir Mot. Summ.
J. Br. 8–9 (doc. 131).
A party seeking to invoke federal maritime jurisdiction over a tort claim must establish
that the activity giving rise to the alleged harm satisfies two criteria—the “location” and “nexus”
tests. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 532–34 (1995).
The location test requires that the invoking party demonstrate that the injury occurred on
navigable waters or was caused by a vessel on navigable waters. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City
of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249, 267–68 (1972). The nexus test requires that the harm suffered
have a potentially disruptive effect on maritime commerce and that the general character of the
allegedly tortious activity bears “a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.”
Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990); E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476
U.S. 858, 864 (1986); Tandon v. Captain’s Cove Marina of Bridgeport, 752 F.3d 239, 247–48
(2d Cir. 2014). If maritime jurisdiction applies and if there is no federal statute that addresses
the harm suffered, then a district court applies general maritime law to determine redress. E.
River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 864; see also Kermarec v. Campagnie Generale Transatlantique,
358 U.S. 625, 630–32 (1959) (discussing the development of federal common law in maritime
cases).
5
I need not decide whether this case is governed by Connecticut’s product liability statute
or whether it falls within the ambit of general maritime law. As discussed below, the plaintiffs
have failed to meet their evidentiary burden under either standard.
B.
Product Liability
1.
Standards
a. The Connecticut Product Liability Act
Under Connecticut law, a product liability claim includes all injures caused by the
defective manufacture, construction, design, preparation, installation, or packaging of any
product. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572m(b). The CPLA is the exclusive remedy for any product
defect action brought under Connecticut law, and it includes all actions related to the defect itself
and to defects related to placing a product “into the stream of commerce.” Conn. Gen. Stat. §
52-572n(a); Allard v. Liberty Oil Equip. Co., 253 Conn. 787, 806 (2000); Wagner v. Clark
Equip. Co., 243 Conn. 168, 195 (1997); Daily v. New Britain Mach. Co., 253 Conn. 562, 571
(1986). The elements of a CPLA claim are that
(1) the defendant was engaged in the business of selling the
product; (2) the product was in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer or user; (3) the defect caused the injury
for which compensation was sought; (4) the defect existed at the
time of the sale; and (5) the product was expected to and did reach
the consumer without substantial change in condition.
White v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 313 Conn. 610, 622 (2014) (internal marks omitted).
b. General Maritime Law
General maritime law provides a cause of action for product liability, brought either
under a theory of negligence 3 or strict liability. 4 E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 865–66
3. When bringing a product liability action under a theory of negligence, common law principles apply. Norfolk
Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 813 (2001); Becker v. Poling Transp. Corp., 356 F.3d 381,
388 (2d Cir. 2004). The elements of a negligence claim include duty, breach, proximate and factual causation, and
injury or harm deriving from that breach of duty. Garris, 532 U.S. at 513–14.
6
(gathering cases). Under both theories, a plaintiff must show, for each defendant, that “(1) he
was exposed to the defendant’s product, and (2) the product was a substantial factor in causing
the injury he suffered,” and (3) that the defendant manufactured or distributed the injurious
product. Lindstrom v. A-C Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Stark v.
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 21 F. App’x 371, 375 (6th Cir. 2001)). In order to demonstrate
that the allegedly defective product was a “substantial factor” in causing the plaintiff’s injury, a
plaintiff must show that it is “more likely than not” that exposure to the product caused his
injuries. Ruiz v. Victory Props., LLC, 315 Conn. 320, 324 (2015). Further, the alleged harm
must be “of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk” created by the defendant’s defective
product. Id.
2. Discussion
To prevail on a product liability claim brought under the CPLA or under general
maritime law, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendants manufactured or distributed a
defective product, that the defect existed at the time St. Jean utilized the product, that St. Jean
was exposed to that defective product without adequate warning or protection, and that exposure
to the defective product caused St. Jean’s death. Based on the record and pleadings, the
4. Several federal courts of appeal have drawn on the Restatement of Torts to define the parameters of a claim for
product liability brought under a theory of strict liability:
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a
chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an
unreasonable risk of causing substantial bodily harm to those who lawfully use it
for a purpose for which it is manufactured and to those whom the supplier
should expect to be in the vicinity of its probable use, is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for
which it is manufactured.
Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1945) (citing Restatement (First) of Torts § 395); see also
Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 492–93; Chavez v. Noble Drilling Corp., 567 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1978); Sheffield v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 595 So. 2d 443, 450 (Ala. 1992) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433b,
comment a).
7
plaintiffs have failed to establish that the defendants manufactured/distributed defective products
and that St. Jean was exposed to those allegedly defective products.
A party may prevail on an asbestos product liability claim through the use of direct or
circumstantial evidence. 5 In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 837 (2d Cir.
1992); Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1286 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920
(1990). Nevertheless, the plaintiffs in this case have offered little evidence 6—direct or
circumstantial—to support their claim.
In Johnson, the plaintiff provided the jury with “an unusually detailed circumstantial
case” to demonstrate proximate causation for his asbestos product liability claim. 899 F.2d at
1286. Johnson’s circumstantial case included testimony from eleven fact witnesses who had
worked at the Navy yard before, during, and after his employment there. Id. Those witnesses
were able to identify specific timeframes in which they recalled working with the plaintiff, as
well as the names for the specific ships that the plaintiff had worked upon and the prevalence of
asbestos dust and fibers at those specific work sites. Id. Those witnesses also were able to
identify specific manufacturers’ names and products, or, if they could not remember a brand
name, they were able to describe the asbestos-containing product with enough specificity to
5. Defendant Aurora argues that the plaintiffs must offer direct evidence of causation in order to prevail on their
product liability claim. Aurora Pumps Mot. Sum. J. Br. 22. The Second Circuit has soundly rejected that argument.
See O’Brien v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 944 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1991) (“it is beyond any doubt that circumstantial
evidence alone may suffice to prove adjudicative facts.”) (internal citations omitted); In Re Brooklyn Navy Yard
Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 837 (2d Cir. 1992).
6. Several defendants have argued that the Court should ignore the plaintiffs’ proffered evidence as inadmissible
hearsay. A party “asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” must cite to “particular parts of materials
in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Although the rules of
evidence regarding admissibility do not change on a motion for summary judgment, Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d
55, 66 (2d Cir. 1997), a court may look to all materials in the record when evaluating a motion for summary
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). A
district court may consider evidence that would not be admissible if it finds that the evidence can be reduced to a
form that would be admissible or usable at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); Lyons v.
Lancer Ins. Co., 681 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d
290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008)); see also U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Elecs. Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 62 n.12
(D. Conn. 1988).
8
allow a jury to draw a reasonable inference between the company, its product, the alleged defect,
and the plaintiff’s exposure and harm. Id. The Second Circuit upheld the Johnson jury’s verdict,
concluding that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there was
sufficient circumstantial evidence in the record for reasonable jurors to resolve the dispute as
they did. Id. at 1286–87 (citing Pratt v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 853 F.2d 1329, 1337
(6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989) (internal citations omitted)).
Similarly, in O’Brien v. National Gypsum Company, 944 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1991), and In
Re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, 971 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1992), the Second Circuit
allowed jury verdicts to stand when the plaintiffs were able to provide corroborating
circumstantial evidence. In O’Brien, the defendant sought to overturn a jury verdict for the
plaintiffs by arguing that the jury erroneously had relied on two inadmissible hearsay statements
in reaching its liability finding. 944 F.2d at 72. The Second Circuit held that, even if the alleged
hearsay evidence had been excluded, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to
reach its conclusion. Id. at 72–73. In In Re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, the Second
Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a jury’s finding
of causation. 971 F.2d at 837. Specifically, the plaintiffs had introduced evidence that the
decedents had spent time at the naval yard when the site was “extremely dusty with asbestos
fibers,” that the defendants had supplied certain asbestos-containing products used in
construction at the yard, and that all employees at the yard worked across departments and
divisions such that all workers were exposed to asbestos. Id.
Unlike Johnson, O’Brien, and the other Brooklyn Naval Yard asbestos cases, the
plaintiffs here have not offered evidence connecting St. Jean’s exposure to asbestos to products
manufactured by Aurora, BW/IP, Crane, Carrier, Nash, Warren, or Weir. In his affidavit, St.
9
Jean attests that he “worked with and around asbestos-containing products during [his]
employment at General Dynamics Corp. / Electric Boat Division.” St. Jean Aff. ¶ 3. 7 St. Jean
goes on to note that he can “specifically recall today using and/or being exposed to asbestos
products and/or products containing, involving, or requiring the use of asbestos.” St. Jean. Aff. ¶
5. Additionally, St. Jean’s death certificate, medical report, and medical records indicate that he
died of complications from two diseases whose only known cause is exposure to asbestos,
mesothelioma and asbestosis. Death Certificate 1 8; W.W. Backus Hospital Records 7 9; Letter
from Laura S. Welch (dated Oct. 8, 2014). 10
St. Jean’s coworkers noted that as an outside machinist St. Jean worked on “basically
anything,” including “engines, valves, periscopes, torpedo tubes” and would assist other
divisions, including electricians and pipefitters. Mullane Depo. Tr. 12:4–23 11; Knapp Depo. Tr.
29:16–32:6. Those responsibilities extended to overhauls (i.e., retrofitting) and new
construction. Mullane Depo. Tr. 12:4–23. When St. Jean became a general foremen, his duties
shifted to include setting machinery, assembling and dissembling valves and piping, and
assisting in construction in the engine and reactor rooms. Id. 13:10–17:24, 25:7–26:3, 28:21–
29:6, 31:16–32:11, 78:22–79:6, 80:15–81:3. Mullane noted that pipefitting, particularly working
with gaskets, often involved contact with asbestos-containing products. Id. 20:15–21:6, 22:24–
7. St. Jean’s affidavit is likely admissible as a statement made under belief of imminent death. Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(2).
8.
St. Jean’s death certificate is admissible as a public record of vital statistics. Fed. R. Evid. 803(9).
9. St. Jean’s hospital records are admissible as statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment. Fed. R. Evid.
803(4).
10. Dr. Welch’s letter is admissible as a statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment. Id.
11. Although Mullane noted that he never worked “side-by-side” with St. Jean, when drawing all inferences in the
plaintiffs’ favor, Mullane’s testimony can be interpreted as circumstantial evidence allowing a reasonable fact-finder
to infer that St. Jean was exposed to asbestos during the course of his employment with Electric Boat. Mullane
Depo. Tr. 15:8–16, 29:23–30:9, 36:4–20; see also Elec. Boat Records 4.
10
24:24. Thus, a reasonable fact-finder could find that St. Jean was exposed to asbestos and that
that exposure caused his injuries.
The plaintiffs have not, however, demonstrated that the defendants manufactured or
distributed asbestos-containing products utilized at the Groton shipyard. Mullane could not
identify the names of any manufacturers for the equipment most likely to have contained
asbestos—valves, pipes, and gaskets. Mullane Depo. Tr. 19:8–20:8 (“Q: Any other
manufacturers, brand names, trade names of valves that you recall during your work as an
apprentice, work leader or foreman? A: Not really, unless I looked at a list. I could pick them
out.”), 20:22–21:23, 32:12–21, 34:8–35:12. Another coworker, Charles Knapp, noted that Crane
check valves were used in a submarine’s nuclear compartment, but he went on to testify that
workers in the nuclear compartment were required to wear respirators to guard against asbestos
and radiation exposure. 12 Knapp Depo. Tr. 76:4–78:9, 86:24–89:1 (referring to work performed
by Robert Beckwith). Coworker Robert Choate recalled the use of Carrier air conditioning units,
as well as testing those units in a non-construction department, but he noted that he had no
personal knowledge or recollection of seeing those units installed or used in any of the
submarines. Choate Depo. Tr. 58:5–59:12, 62:3–22, 64:1–66:22, 67:12–68:4. 13 Unlike the
witnesses in Johnson, Mullane and Knapp were not asked to describe the equipment used during
new submarine construction or overhauling, so there was no testimony that could be used to
identify the manufacturers/distributors of asbestos-containing products at the Groton shipyard. 14
12. Knapp also identified Warren pumps, but he noted that those pumps were used in new construction on certain
nuclear submarines and that there was no contamination at new construction sites. Knapp Depo. Tr. 115:8–116:11,
117:3–118:5.
13. Choate worked at Electric Boat from 1965 to 1969, and again after 1973. Choate Depo. Tr. 60:1–2. When he
rejoined Electric Boat in 1973, he noted that he no longer had contact with equipment used on the ships. Id. 60:9–
13.
14. When prompted with specific brand or trade names, Mullane attempted to identify what parts that brand had
manufactured or distributed. Mullane Depo. Tr. 81:20–24 (Crane); 84:6–24 (same). He was able to recall only the
11
The plaintiffs have attempted to bolster the lack of identifying information with materials
that are either inadmissible or that invite speculation. For example, the plaintiffs offer their
expert’s “representative” equipment lists for different categories of submarines. Captain R.
Bruce Woodruff Aff. 7–9. Woodruff indicates that those lists are not unique or specific to the
boats overhauled or built at the Groton shipyard; instead, his lists are hypotheticals created by
reviewing the U.S. Navy’s equipment orders for those general classes of submarines and
extrapolating possible parts lists. Id. 7, 10 (noting that the specific vendors listed “supplied
significant amounts of machinery and valves” to the submarine shipbuilding program, but failing
to distinguish whether those products contained asbestos and were used at the Groton shipyard).
The plaintiffs invite the factfinder to speculate that Woodruff’s “representative list” reflects the
actual supply lists and equipment used at the Groton shipyard.
Similarly, the plaintiffs have submitted a document, “Exhibit A,” in response to the
defendants’ request for production. That document states, “Decedent recalled the following
manufacturers and/or products,” and proceeds to offer a list of manufacturers and general
categories of products. Pls.’ Response to Defs.’ Requests for Production, Ex. A. There is no
indication that that document was produced or dictated by the decedent, and further, there is no
way to authenticate the plaintiffs’ list. See Fed. R. Evid. 902–03. Exhibit A also does not appear
to fall into any of the hearsay exceptions provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed. R.
Evid. 803, 804, 807. Accordingly, the information in Exhibit A is barred by the rule against
hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 802. Even if the list were admissible, it has little probative value. The
brands Westinghouse and General Electric without prompting. Choate was prompted to describe certain elements of
the products he recalled, such as their label, Choate Depo. Tr. 66:10–22, or the color of the units. Id. 68:6–8. He
was able to answer some of those questions, but he could only recall units as they were used in his department and
had no specific recollection of seeing the units installed on the ships. Id.; see also id. 77:3–79:2, 91:9–91:17.
12
categories offered are general and too vague to allow a reasonable juror to find that a specific
defendant’s products contributed to St. Jean’s asbestos exposure.
Consequently, the plaintiffs have failed to meet their evidentiary burden on the issue of
causation, and they have not offered evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a causal
link between the defendants’ products and St. Jean’s exposure to asbestos. Thus, under both the
CPLA and general maritime law, the plaintiffs’ product liability claim fails.
C. Loss of Consortium
Although general maritime law does not provide relief for a claim for loss of consortium,
Miles v. Apex Marine Corporation, 498 U.S. 19, 37 (1990), a party may bring a common law
claim for loss of consortium under state law. 15 Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516
U.S. 199 (1996) (finding maritime law does not preempt recovery under state law for loss of
society when maritime jurisdiction applies); Mueller v. Tepler, 312 Conn. 631 (2014); cf. Am.
Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980) (holding that general maritime law allows for an
independent common law cause of action for loss of society for a spouse’s nonfatal personal
injury). 16 Under Connecticut law, a loss of consortium claim is an indirect claim that is
“derivative of the injured spouse’s cause of action” and is “barred when a suit brought by the
injured spouse [or his estate] ha[s] been terminated by settlement or by an adverse judgment on
the merits.” Mueller, 312 Conn. at 662; Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 203 Conn. 305, 312–14
(1987); Ladd v. Douglas Trucking Co., 203 Conn. 187, 195 (1987) (citing Hopson v. St. Mary’s
15. Loss of consortium may also be referred to as “loss of society.”
16. Some defendants have argued that general maritime law does not allow recovery for loss of consortium claims.
Aurora Mot. Summ. J. Br. 31–32; Warren Mot. Summ. J. Br. 11–12. Those arguments conflate the statutory
limitations placed on recovery for cases brought under the Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”), 46 U.S.C. §
762, and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, with actions brought under common law. Since 1980, the Supreme Court
has held that DOHSA and the Jones Act do not preclude claims made under state common law for wrongful death
and loss of society, as well as other personal injury torts. Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. at 213–216; Jerome B.
Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 545 (maritime jurisdiction “does not result in automatic displacement of state law”); cf. In
Re Dammers & Vanderheide & Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V., 836 F.2d 750, 756 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that
general maritime law allows a spouse to bring a common law claim under state law for loss of consortium).
13
Hosp., 176 Conn. 485, 494 (1979)); see also DeMarinis v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n Cas. Ins.
Co., 44 Conn. App. 172, 177–78 (1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-555a.
As noted above, the plaintiffs have failed to meet their evidentiary burden with respect to
their product liability claims. Because Connecticut law does not allow recovery for a loss of
consortium claim when the injured spouse’s claim has been terminated, Marilyn St. Jean’s loss
of consortium claim also fails.
IV. Conclusion
The plaintiffs have failed to meet their evidentiary burden on their product liability
claims against defendants Aurora, BW/IP, Carrier, Crane, Nash, Warren, and Weir. Because the
plaintiffs’ product liability claims have failed, Marilyn St. Jean’s derivative state law claim for
loss of consortium cannot be sustained. Accordingly, Aurora, BW/IP, Carrier, Crane, Nash,
Warren, and Weir’s motions for summary judgment are GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter
judgment for those defendants and close this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 19th day of February 2015.
/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge
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