Desaulniers v. Desaulniers et al

Filing 148

ORDER granting 107 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff's ERISA claim (Count I) remains. Plaintiff is instructed to submit an amended complaint that corresponds with this ruling within seven days. Signed by Judge Warren W. Eginton on 9/11/14. (Ladd-Smith, I.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
VICTORIA DESAULNIERS, individually,
as a beneficiary of the DEVON INDUSTRIES,
INC. PROFIT SHARING/401(k) PLAN,
and as EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
DENIS DESAULNIERS,

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v.
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LORRAINE DESAULNIERS, individually,
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and as fiduciary of the DEVON INDUSTRIES, :
INC. PROFIT SHARING/401(k) PLAN,
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YVON DESAULNIERS, individually and as :
fiduciary of the DEVON INDUSTRIES,
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INC. PROFIT SHARING/401(k) PLAN,
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DAVID DESAULNIERS, DONALD
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DESAULNIERS, DEVON INDUSTRIES,
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INC. PROFIT SHARING/401(k) PLAN,
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ALDEN CORPORATION; and
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SILVERSWORD PROPERTIES, LLC.,
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Defendants.
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3:13-cv-01899-WWE

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
This is an action by Victoria Desaulniers, individually, as a beneficiary of the Devon
Industries Profit Sharing/401(k) Plan, and in her representative capacity as the executrix of the
estate of her late husband against family business entities and family members. Plaintiff alleges
(1) violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Program pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§
1132(a) and 1132(c) as to defendants Lorraine Desaulniers, Yvon Desaulniers and Devon
Precision Industries, Inc. Profit Sharing/401(k) Plan (Count I); (2) breach of contract relating to a
$200,000 loan as to defendants Lorraine Desaulniers, Yvon Desaulniers, David Desaulniers,
Donald Desaulniers, Devon Precision Industries, Inc., Alden Corporation, and Silversword
Properties, LLC (Count II); (3) breach of contract relating to a 401(k) withdrawal of $46,000 as
to defendants Lorraine Desaulniers, Yvon Desaulniers, Donald Desaulniers, David Desaulniers,
Devon Precision Industries, Inc., Alden Corporation, and Silversword Properties, LLC (Count

III); (4) conversion of the proceeds of the $200,000 loan as to defendants Lorraine Desaulniers,
Yvon Desaulniers, David Desaulniers, Donald Desaulniers, Devon Precision Industries, Inc.,
Alden Corporation, and Silversword Properties, LLC (Count IV); (5) conversion of the proceeds
of the 401(k) loan of $46,000 from the subject account as to defendants Lorraine Desaulniers,
Yvon Desaulniers, David Desaulniers, Donald Desaulniers, Devon Precision Industries, Inc.,
Alden Corporation, and Silversword Properties, LLC (Count V); (6) civil theft under Connecticut
General Statutes Section 52-564 relating to the balance of the $200,000 loan, $46,000 loan, and
the entire remaining balance of the subject account as to defendants Lorraine Desaulniers, Yvon
Desaulniers, David Desaulniers, Donald Desaulniers, Devon Precision Industries, Inc., Alden
Corporation, and Silversword Properties, LLC (Count VI); (7) unfair trade practices under
Connecticut General Statutes Section 42-110b(a) et seq. as to Lorraine Desaulniers, Yvon
Desaulniers, David Desaulniers, Donald Desaulniers, Devon Precision Industries, Inc., Alden
Corporation, and Silversword Properties, LLC (Count VII); (8) unjust enrichment as to Lorraine
Desaulniers, Yvon Desaulniers, David Desaulniers, Donald Desaulniers, Devon Precision
Industries, Inc., Alden Corporation, and Silversword Properties, LLC (Count VIII); (9)
intentional infliction of emotional distress as to defendants Lorraine Desaulniers, Yvon
Desaulniers, David Desaulniers, and Donald Desaulniers relating to threats to cut plaintiff’s
insurance coverage within weeks of her late husband’s death (Count IX); (10) negligent infliction
of emotional distress as to defendants Lorraine Desaulniers, Yvon Desaulniers, David
Desaulniers, and Donald Desaulniers, also related to the threats to cut plaintiff’s insurance
coverage (Count X); (11) entitlement to a valuation and buyout of plaintiff’s share of Desaulniers
business entity defendants as to all defendants except the Plan (Count XI); (12) entitlement to

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forced dissolution, or in the alternative, a buyout pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes
Section 33-900 et seq. against all defendants except the Plan (Count XII).
DISCUSSION
This Court has original jurisdiction over Count I involving ERISA because it presents a
federal question. Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s state law claims (Counts II - XII) because they do not form part of the same case or
controversy as Count I, as required to permit supplemental jurisdiction.
“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, “[t]he
district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a)
if– . . . the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court
has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).
Plaintiff’s state law claims include unrelated claims of breach of contract, infliction of
emotional distress, and the buyout of business interests. The breach of contract claims include
claims based upon a loan alleged to have been made in 2005. The loan was unrelated to
retirement funds and occurred five years before the death of plaintiff’s husband. The state law
claims also include a dispute as to the valuation of inherited business interests and a claim for
dissolution of the business or a forced statutory buyout under Connecticut law based upon
alleged “oppressive and unfair conduct.” While there are some minimal overlapping facts, there
is not a sufficient common nucleus of operative facts with plaintiff’s ERISA claim to support

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supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims. Moreover, power to hear all of
plaintiff’s claims aside, the Court will follow the Supreme Court’s guidance by leaving the
predominant state law claims to state tribunals.
Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to
promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of
applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even
though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed
as well. Similarly, if it appears that the state issues substantially predominate,
whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the
comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state claims may be dismissed without
prejudice and left for resolution to state tribunals. There may, on the other hand, be
situations in which the state claim is so closely tied to questions of federal policy that
the argument for exercise of pendent jurisdiction is particularly strong.
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
Here, plaintiff’s state claims substantially predominate the proof, scope of issues and
comprehensiveness of the remedy sought. Moreover, federal policy is not implicated by
plaintiff’s state claims. Accordingly, plaintiff’s state law claims will be dismissed without
prejudice. Plaintiff’s ERISA claim (Count I) will remain.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s ERISA claim (Count I) remains.
Plaintiff is instructed to submit an amended complaint that corresponds with this ruling within
seven days.
Dated this 11th day of September, 2014, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

/s/Warren W. Eginton
WARREN W. EGINTON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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