Sanderson v. USA

Filing 26

RULING terminating as moot 1 Motion to Vacate/Set Aside/Correct Sentence (2255); dismissing 25 Amended Motion to Vacate/Set Aside/Correct Sentence (2255), because Sanderson has not made a substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).The Clerk is directed to close the case. Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 2/24/2015. (Malone, P.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JARRELL SANDERSON,
Petitioner,

CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:14-CV-169 (JCH)

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

FEBRUARY 24, 2015

RULING RE: AMENDED/EXPANDED PETITION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO
VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL
CUSTODY (Doc. No. 25)
Petitioner Jarrell Sanderson is currently serving a 310-month sentence of
imprisonment following his plea of guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit sex
trafficking of children (Count One of the Indictment) and two counts of sex trafficking of
children (Counts Two and Four of the Indictment; the substantive crimes alleged to be the
objects of the conspiracy charged in Count One). See Judgment (Doc. No. 8-1 at 3–5);
United States v. Sanderson et al., No. 10-cr-56 (JCH) (D. Conn.) (Doc. No. 169). He
now moves to vacate his conviction and plea of guilty so that he may proceed to trial.
See Amended/Expanded Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (“Amended Petition”) (Doc. No. 25); 28
U.S.C. § 2255; Indictment (Doc. No. 1-1 at 38–41).
Although the repetitiveness and lack of clarity in parts of the Amended Petition
make it something of a challenge to discern what claims Sanderson purports to raise, the
court reads the Amended Petition to raise two primary claims as to Count One, and one
as to Counts Two and Four. As to the conspiracy charge in Count One, Sanderson
claims that he did not understand the basis of his guilty plea (specifically, (1) that proof of

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an agreement is a required element of a conspiracy charge, and (2) various burdens and
standards of proof at trial with respect to conspiracy charges), and would not have pled
guilty as to Count One but for the misunderstanding, which was caused by ineffective
assistance of counsel. As to Counts Two and Four, Sanderson claims that he did not
understand the basis of his guilty plea (specifically, that Counts Two and Four were not
merely based upon his liability for the acts of his alleged coconspirator) and would not
have pled guilty as to Counts Two and Four but for this misunderstanding, which was
caused by ineffective assistance of counsel. Disposing of these claims suffices to deny
the Amended Petition in toto because any other claims are predicated on, and thus must
fail in light of the analysis of, these primary claims. See infra n. 1 (impermissible
constructive amendment of the Indictment), n. 5 (cumulative weight of error). For the
reasons set forth below, the court rejects these claims and dismisses Sanderson’s
Amended Petition (Doc. No. 25).
I.

BACKGROUND
On February 25, 2010, in the case of United States v. Sanderson et al., No.

10-cr-56 (D. Conn.), a grand jury returned a five-count Indictment against Sanderson and
an alleged coconspirator charging, inter alia, that Sanderson had conspired to commit
sex trafficking of children as to two different victims (Count One), see 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c);
committed sex trafficking of children as to two different victims (Counts Two and Four,
with each corresponding to one victim), see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2); and committed
sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion as to two different victims (Counts Three and
Five, with each corresponding to one victim), see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1).
On the eve of trial, without a negotiated plea agreement, Sanderson proffered

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guilty pleas as to Counts One, Two, and Four, which the court (Kravitz, J.) accepted.
See Change of Plea Hearing Transcript (“Change of Plea Hrg. Tr.”) (Doc. No. 8-1 at 6–
47). The court permitted Sanderson to change his plea only after a lengthy colloquy
during which it ensured that Sanderson was “enter[ing] a guilty plea that [wa]s voluntary
and . . . ma[d]e related waivers knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S.
622, 629 (2002) (alterations and quotation marks from original omitted).
On June 7, 2011, the court sentenced Sanderson principally to 310 months’
imprisonment. See Judgment. Sanderson initiated the present action with a filing
docketed on February 10, 2014; on Sanderson’s Motion (Doc. No. 21), the court allowed
Sanderson to amend his original filing, and accordingly proceeds to consider the
Amended Petition (Doc. No. 25). See Order (Doc. No. 24).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Because requests for habeas corpus relief are in tension with society’s strong

interest in the finality of criminal convictions, the courts have established rules that make
it more difficult for a defendant to upset a conviction by collateral, as opposed to direct,
attack.” Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other
grounds by Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002). “[C]ollateral attack on a final
judgment in a criminal case is generally available under [section] 2255 only for a
constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact
that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in complete miscarriage of
justice.” Graziano v. United States, 83 F.3d 587, 589–90 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).

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In a section 2255 motion, the burden is on the petitioner to prove by
preponderance of the evidence his entitlement to relief. See Napoli v. United States, 45
F.3d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1995); Gotti v. United States, 622 F.Supp.2d 87, 91 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
Nonetheless, the general rule that a court must construe pro se litigants’ pleadings
liberally “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest” applies equally in the context
of section 2255 motions. Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001).
In deciding a section 2255 motion, the court will generally hold a hearing “unless
the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is
entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see also Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d
118, 130 (2d Cir. 2013) (no hearing is required where petitioner’s “allegations are ‘vague,
conclusory, or palpably incredible’”) (quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,
495 (1962)); United States v. Aiello, 814 F.2d 109, 113–14 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Airy
generalities, conclusory assertions and hearsay statements will not suffice because none
of these would be admissible evidence at a hearing.”). “The procedure for determining
whether a hearing is necessary is in part analogous to, but in part different from, a
summary judgment proceeding.” Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d 209, 213 (2d Cir.
2009). “To warrant a hearing, the motion must set forth specific facts supported by
competent evidence, raising detailed and controverted issues of fact that, if proved at a
hearing, would entitle [the petitioner] to relief.” Gonzalez, 722 F.3d at 131.

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III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Count One
1.

Inadequate elaboration of crime charged in Count One

Sanderson argues that the court should vacate his conviction and allow him to
withdraw his plea of guilty as to Count One (the conspiracy charge) because the
Indictment was inadequate to give him notice of the crime with which he was charged
(and, due to the ineffective assistance of counsel, he was unaware of and thus did not
challenge this inadequacy at any earlier stage in the proceedings). Specifically,
Sanderson contends that Count One was legally insufficient because it only charged that
he and another individual “did conspire to” do certain acts and not that there was an
agreement among two or more individuals.
To the contrary, the Indictment was legally sufficient, and it is unquestionable that
Sanderson did understand the nature of the crime to which he pled guilty. Because there
was nothing objectionable in these respects, a fortiori Sanderson’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel with respect to these issues, as well as any other claims stemming
therefrom,1 fail.
As Judge Learned Hand stated:
To allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to allege that they agreed to do
the matters which are set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. . . . [T]aken
at its lowest terms, to allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement. . . .
. . . It is true that allegations in an indictment must be allegations of fact; but this
requirement must not be pressed with a schoolman’s logic. In all pleadings, from

1

For example, Sanderson also claims that, to remedy the Indictment’s inadequacy, counsel or the
court, or both, impermissibly “constructively amend[ed]” at the change-of-plea hearing to charge that there
was an agreement. Amended Petition at 6. The posited inadequacy in the Indictment does not exist, so
this purported constructive amendment did not occur.

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time immemorial, there have been allegations of so-called fact which presuppose
for their truth the existence of certain rules of law. Allegations regarding ‘real
property,’ ‘seisin,’ ‘possession,’ ‘ownership,’ and others, have been common from
the earliest times, and no one has ever thought that it was necessary to allege all
the facts from which the ‘mixed’ conclusion arose. To do so would be to
enormously incumber the pleadings, and the law, even in its pedantic days, has
not been theoretically consistent to that degree.
United States v. White, 171 F. 775, 776–77 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) (emphasis added); see
also United States v. Kushner, 135 F.2d 668, 673 (2d Cir. 1943) (“The indictment charged
appellant with specific violations of the particularly cited statutes, in substantially the
statutory language. Ordinarily an indictment in this form is sufficient.”); see also Wright v.
United States, 108 F. 805, 811 (5th Cir. 1901) (“When it was charged that they ‘conspired’
. . . [i]t was meant that they had agreed together. . . . [N]o one reading the indictment
could come to any other conclusion in regard to its meaning, ‘and when this is the case an
indictment is good enough.’” (quoting Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311, 315 (1897))).
Even assuming that there were some deficiency with the Indictment, “[c]onvictions
are no longer reversed because of minor and technical deficiencies which did not
prejudice the accused. . . . [I]mperfections of form [in an indictment] that are not
prejudicial are disregarded, and common sense and reason prevail over technicalities.”
United States v. Goodwin, 141 F.3d 394, 400–01 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Moreover, “[a] court is not required to follow any particular formula” when it
“question[s] the defendant to confirm that he possesses the requisite understanding” of
the charges. United States v. Blackwell, 199 F.3d 623, 626 (2d Cir. 1999) (first alteration
in original).
As a question of prejudice (and, thus, Sanderson’s subjective understanding of the
proceedings), there simply is no merit to Sanderson’s contention that the Indictment was

6

inadequate (i.e., that he did not understand the nature of the crime charged against him).
During the plea colloquy, the court explained that it would have the government recite the
elements of the crimes charged, see Change of Plea Hrg. Tr. at 23, immediately following
which a government attorney explained that, to prove the conspiracy charged in Count
One, “the government must prove that two or more persons entered into [an] unlawful
agreement . . . ,” id. at 23–24. Sanderson confirmed that he understood the elements
that needed to be proved. See id. at 24. He then explained “in [his] very own words
what [he] did that [he] th[ought] ma[d]e[ him] guilty of this offense.” Id.
The discussion at this point was not one-way: Sanderson described the facts of the
case as he understood them, and even discussed the scope of the agreement. The
following exchange reflects some of what was said, and is just one example confirming
that Sanderson understood that entering an agreement was an element of the offense
conduct for Count One:
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, we didn't make a pact, like a conspiracy, to have the girls
work for us per se, but I did show her how to post the ads.
THE COURT: Right. A conspiracy is really just an understanding or an agreement
with another person to accomplish a goal. It doesn't have to be something in
writing; it can just be an understanding.
THE DEFENDANT: All right.
THE COURT: Okay?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: So you did have an understanding with Ms. Delia that these victims
were going to be, these minors were going to be, used for prostitution purposes?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Id. at 28–29 (emphasis added).

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“A defendant’s statements during the plea colloquy are not to be taken lightly
because ‘[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. . . .
[S]ubsequent . . . contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible’” are
“subject to summary dismissal.” See United States v. Cabrera, 563 F. App’x 861, 863
(2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)).
Thus, not only is the Indictment sufficient from a purely legal perspective but, as a
question of prejudice to the defendant (i.e., from a subjective perspective), the court can
only conclude that Sanderson was not prejudiced by any putative lack of clarity in the
Indictment—that is, that he did understand the nature of the crime charged when he
proffered his guilty plea. The court thus rejects as baseless the entirety of Sanderson’s
claims arising from the purported inadequacy of the Indictment as to Count One, including
any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that arise therefrom.
2.

Ignorance of certain details of burdens and standards of proof at trial

Sanderson also contends that his “Trial Attoeny never discussed any of the
remaining critical Evidentiary Burdens and Standards Of Proof necessary to establish the
existence of Conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. $ 1594(c).” Amended Petition at 9 (thus in
original); see also id. at 22 (“Trail Attorney never discussed any of the remaining
Evidentiary Burdens and Standards Of Proof necessary to establish the existence of
Conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c).” (thus in original)). Sanderson goes on to
specify by providing a litany of observations (apparently drawn from case law or other
authorities, although without any citations) about how a conspiracy charge may and may
not be proved:
AS IT PERTAINS TO THE CONSPIRACY COUNT,
this Petitioner was never informed of such Burdens/Standards Of Proof as: (1)

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Conspiracy, as an Inchoate Crime, commences with the Agreement; that (2)
Actual Knowing and Willing Participation is established through the specifics
deriving from the Agreement; (3) Evidence of an explicit Agreement is NOT
required, and that the Fact of an existing Agreement may be established through
CIRCUMSTANTIAL Evidence; (4) such as by proof of a TACIT Understanding will
suffice; that (5) it is UNNECESSARY to prove that an alleged Conspirator knew of
or agreed to all of the Details of the Conspiracy; and/or, that (6) it is
UNNECESSARY to prove that an alleged Conspirator knew of or agreed to every
Criminal Objective arising out of the Conspiracy.
SUMMARILY, THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSPIRACY (7) merely
requires that there be some Evidence from which it can be reasonably INFERRED
that the Person charged with Conspiracy, knew of the existence of the Scheme
alleged in the Indictment, then KNOWINGLY joined/participated therein; or, at the
very least, (8) that the Defendants merely SHARED SOME KNOWLEDGE of the
Conspiracy’s unlawful Aims/Objectives; of which (9) can be proven by Evidence
that the Defendant either participated in nothing more than Conversations directly
related to the Substance of the Conspiracy; and/or, (10) by Evidence that the
Defendant possessed certain Items deemed important to the Conspiracy
MOREOVER, (11) all Evidence, even Evidence related to Acts committed BY
CODEFENDANTS IS ADMISSIBLE AGAINST ANOTHER DEFENDANT; and
being that this Petitioner’s Case contained various Testimonys it should have been
discussed that (12) a Conviction may be made on the Testimony of A SINGLE
ACCOMPLISH! ! !
Amended Petition at 37 (all capitalization, punctuation, and spelling thus in original). A
few lines of this page purport to reflect limits on the government’s ability to prove a
conspiracy charge, while many others are observations about the many liberties that the
government has in proving such a charge. Id.
Assuming arguendo that, because of his counsel’s advice, Sanderson was
unaware of certain rules that constituted his rights to be free of a conspiracy conviction
without the government’s meeting certain standards and burdens of proof at trial and that,
had he known some or all of them, Sanderson would not have pled guilty, there is still no
merit to the argument that his plea was less than fully voluntary as a consequence of his
lack of knowledge of these rights. A criminal defendant has no right to know of every
facet of the trial rights that he gives up when he pleads guilty. “[T]he law ordinarily

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considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully
understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the
circumstances—even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed
consequences of invoking it. A defendant, for example, may waive his right to remain
silent, his right to a jury trial, or his right to counsel even if the defendant does not know
the specific questions the authorities intend to ask, who will likely serve on the jury, or the
particular lawyer the State might otherwise provide.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S.
622, 629–30 (2002) (emphases in original); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 757 (1970) (“The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not
require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess
every relevant factor entering into his decision. A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his
plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus
misapprehended the quality of the State's case or the likely penalties attached to
alternative courses of action.”).
At the change-of-plea hearing, the court engaged in a thorough colloquy to ensure
that Sanderson understood the trial rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty. See
Change of Plea Hrg. Tr. at 10–13. Moreover, Sanderson confirmed that he had “read
[the Indictment] carefully,” id. at 8, and “discussed it thoroughly with” his attorney, id., and
that he was, except for “concern[s] about his trial preparation, . . . satisfied with his
[attorney’s] legal services to date,” id. at 8–9. In light of these confirmations, the court
rejects Sanderson’s present contention that he was without sufficient guidance about the
nature of the charge against him in Count One to enter a voluntary guilty plea.
Accordingly, the court rejects this claimed basis for the Amended Petition.

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B.

Misadvice about basis of liability for substantive charges (Counts Two and
Four)

Sanderson also claims that, on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and
(at least in part) the court’s statements at the plea colloquy, he misunderstood the nature
of the charges to which he pled guilty and that, had he not been under those
misimpressions, he would not have pled guilty.
Construed to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests in this regard,
Sanderson’s Amended Petition appears to complain that his counsel misled him to
understand that he was pleading guilty to Counts Two and Four on the basis of Pinkerton
liability, see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), for his coconspirator’s acts
(and that he could be so liable even though the Indictment failed adequately to charge
him with conspiracy,2 see discussion of putative claim in Part III.A.1 supra).3
However, the record conclusively establishes that Sanderson’s liability for the
crimes charged in Counts Two and Four arose from his own acts, and nothing in the
record reflects that Sanderson was charged on the basis of the acts of an alleged
coconspirator. The Indictment specifically states that Sanderson (and his alleged
coconspirator) committed the acts in Count Two and Four. See Indictment at 2, 3. At
the plea colloquy, the government’s attorney stated that, as to each of the several

2

The Amended Petition states that counsel advised Sanderson that “ . . . even if the ("unlawful
agreement'') was not charged in the grand jury's indictment and that count one, in the indictment failed to
charge an offense . . .” Amended Petition at 15 ¶ 58.
3

The Amended Petition states that Sanderson was misled to believe that “that Count's two and
four were both in furtherance of Count one,” Amended Petition at 11 ¶ 45 (all capitalization, punctuation,
and emphasis in original); see also id. at 13 ¶ 50; 15 ¶ 58; 15 ¶ 60 (stating that Sanderson “believe[d] that
count's two and four were the same as the first count, meaning in furtherance of both said counts” (thus in
original)).

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elements in both Count Two and Count Four, “the defendant” (i.e., Sanderson) and no
one else was the person whose acts made him liable for the crime charged.4
Immediately following the government’s recitation of the elements, Sanderson
confirmed that he “underst[oo]d those elements,” Change of Plea Hrg. Tr. at 33, and then
“t[old the court] in [his] own words what [he] did that [he] th[ought] ma[d]e[ him] guilty of”
the crimes charged in these two counts. He confirmed that he, and not someone else,
did all of the acts that were required to establish guilt of the offense charged—stating,
inter alia, that “[he] transported [the victims] . . . to the hotels . . . [a]nd while [he] may not
have known that they were under 18, [he] acted with reckless disregard about that . . . that
[he] knew they were going to engage in a commercial sex act, that is to say [someone]
would be paid . . . for their sex acts.” Change of Plea Hrg. Tr. at 33–34. These facts
suffice as predicates for Sanderson’s guilty pleas as to Counts Two and Four.
Nothing in the Indictment, the transcript of the change of plea hearing, or any other
source presented to the court corroborates Sanderson’s allegations as to this claim in the
Amended Petition. Accordingly, the court rejects the claim.

4

The government’s attorney stated:

[T]here are four elements: First, that the defendant knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored,
transported, provided, obtained, or maintained, by any means, a person under the age of 18;
Second, that the defendant knew or was in reckless disregard of the fact that the person was under
the age of 18; Third, that the defendant knew or was in reckless disregard of the fact that the person
would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act; And fourth, that the offense was in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
Change of Plea Hrg. Tr. at 32–33.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
Sanderson has identified no error in any of his individual claims.5 Accordingly, the

Amended Petition (Doc. No. 25) is DISMISSED. In an earlier Order (Doc. No. 24), the
court allowed Sanderson’s Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 21). Because the Amended
Petition supersedes the original Petition (Doc. No. 1) and includes all of the claims made
in the original Petition, such that the court has considered all of Sanderson’s allegations in
both of the Petitions in issuing this Ruling, the Clerk is directed to terminate the original
Petition (Doc. No. 1) as moot. Moreover, because Sanderson has not made a
“substantial showing” of denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not
issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The Clerk is directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 24th day of February 2015 at New Haven, Connecticut.

/s/ Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge

5

The Petitioner also points to the “cumulative weight of error” alleged in the Amended Petition.
Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2001); Amended Petition at 21 ¶ 84. That cumulative
weight is likewise nil.

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