Torres et al v. Gaines et al
Filing
63
ORDER denying 36 , 51 Motions to Dismiss. The Court nonetheless DISMISSES in part, STAYS in part, and administratively CLOSES the case. The Clerk of Court is directed to administratively close the case. The Marshals are ORDERED to personally ser ve Defendant Millie Landrock. Plaintiffs are granted leave to move to reopen within 28 days from the date of this order and at the expiration of the state proceedings. See attached order. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 09/11/2015. (Thomas, R.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
EDWARD TORRES and TERESA
MURRAY,
Plaintiffs,
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
v.
NANETE GAINES, KATHY MCGRIDE,
HERBY DORMECANT, and MILLIE
LANDLOCK,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:14-cv-372-VLB
September 11, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Edward Torres and Teresa Murray (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against employees of the Connecticut Department of
Children and Family Services (“DCF”) and a social worker for the Child and
Family Guidance Center (“CFGC”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants “without cause” and in violation of established federal and state
procedures continue to investigate and prosecute a state proceeding to remove
Plaintiffs’ eight-year-old son from their custody. The CFGC Defendant moves to
dismiss for insufficient service of process.
That defendant was not properly
served, but the complaint cannot be dismissed for insufficient service because
Plaintiffs are not responsible for the service defect. Accordingly, the motion to
dismiss for insufficient service of process is DENIED, and the Marshals are
ORDERED to serve the CFGC Defendant. Two defendants move to dismiss the
action for failure to state a claim. The Court does not address these motions
because abstention pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), is
appropriate: the case involves an ongoing, state-initiated custody proceeding.
1
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are DISMISSED
without prejudice, Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary relief are STAYED, the case is
administratively CLOSED with leave to reopen after the conclusion of the state
proceedings, and the motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are DENIED
as moot. Within 28 days and upon an exception to Younger applies, Plaintiffs
may move to reopen.
FACTS AND PRODUCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs bring a civil rights action against DCF employees Nanete Gaines,
Kathy McGride, and Henry Dormecant and CFGC social worker Millie Landlock.1
Dkt. No. 8 (Am. Compl.). Plaintiffs sue Defendants in their official and individual
capacities. Id. The complaint contains the following allegations. Around the first
or second week of September 2013, DCF brought a proceeding against Plaintiffs
to terminate their parental rights over their eight-year-old son. Id. at 4. Around
the same time, Defendant Dormecant went to Plaintiffs’ home and told them that
he would take away their son unless they signed some papers. Id. at 13, 15. In
2014, Defendant Gaines went to Plaintiffs’ home and spoke with neighbors about
the case. Id. at 12. Defendants Dormecant and Gaines called Plaintiffs numerous
times and told them that their son would be taken away. Id. at 17. The state
custody battle wages on despite the fact that “federal and state laws” not
specified in the complaint require the proceedings to be closed in six months. Id.
at 5.
Defendants continue to pursue this case without proof or cause of
1
Neither Gaines nor McGride have been served within 120 days from the
date this Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. A sua sponte
dismissal for failure to serve process might be appropriate here but only after the
Court provides both notice of its intent to do so and an opportunity to respond.
The Court chooses not to pursue this course because Younger applies.
2
mistreatment or abuse: Plaintiffs properly care for their son.
Id. at 5–7, 20.
Defendant Landlock told Plaintiffs that the case remains open because Plaintiff
Murray refuses to see a psychologist.
Id. at 10–11.
Defendant Gaines told
Plaintiffs that they must provide Defendant Landlock with their son’s medical and
school records to close the case, but Plaintiffs have already done so. Id. at 21.
Defendants’ investigatory and prosecutorial activities are defamatory and place
Plaintiffs in a false light. Id. at 5, 19–20. Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, monetary
damages, to enjoin the state proceedings, and unspecified declaratory relief. Id.
at 23–25.
Defendant Dormecant moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim. Dkt. No. 36 (Mot.). He articulates the following three reasons for doing so.
Dkt. No. 36-1 (Mem.).
First, the complaint “contains mere labels and
conclusions.” Id. at 4–5. Second, the complaint states only reputational claims
and such claims do not constitute a violation of a person’s constitutional rights.
Id. at 5–7.
Third, the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity claims for
monetary damages. Id. at 7–8. Plaintiffs oppose Defendant Dormecant’s motion
by reiterating the factual allegations from their complaint and by arguing that they
will be able to prove these allegations with future evidence.2 Dkt. No. 42 (Opp’n).
2
Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant Dormecant failed to comply with Local
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a) by failing to provide a “Notice to Pro Se Litigant
Opposing Motion to Dismiss.” Dkt. No. 42 (Opp’n) at 3. Plaintiffs are correct, but
Dormecant’s error is harmless. Cf. Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410, 414 (2d Cir. 2009)
(lack of Vital notice reviewed for harmless error). The purpose of the local rule is
to provide notice, and Plaintiffs must have had actual notice if they are able to
quote the applicable rule. And, in any event, Defendant Dormecant subsequently
cured this defect. Dkt. No. 43 (Reply) at 10–11.
3
Defendant Landrock moves to dismiss “for lack of personal jurisdiction
and insufficient service of process” and for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 51
(Mot.). She argues as follows. Dkt. No 51-1 (Mem.). The Court lacks personal
jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ service of process was insufficient: the Marshals
left a copy of the summons and complaint with Defendant Landrock’s supervisor.
Id. at 2–5. The complaint also fails to state a claim because the complaint is
devoid of facts and because she was not acting under the color of state law. Id.
at 7–8. Defendant Landrock is not a government employee and did not act at the
direction of any local, state, or federal entity.3 Id. at 8. In opposition, Plaintiffs
again reiterate the allegations from their complaint and argue that dismissal for
insufficient service of process is not grounds for dismissal. Dkt. No. 54 (Opp’n).
3
Defendant Landrock provides two affidavits in support of her motion, both
for the purpose of assessing service of process and whether the complaint states
a claim. This evidence may be considered for the purpose of assessing the
method of service but not whether the complaint states a claim. Compare
Koulkina v. City of New York, 559 F.Supp.2d 300, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (court must
look to matters outside the complaint), with Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509
(2d Cir. 2007) (court generally limited to four corners of the complaint). Despite
Defendant Landrock’s implicit invocation of Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may be able
to consider this evidence for the purpose of assessing whether she was acting
under the color of state law because state action may be a question of subjectmatter jurisdiction. See Moher v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 580 F.Supp. 723, 725 (D.
Conn. 1984); cf. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 336 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (observing that “whether an employee acts under color of state law
[is] a determination that goes to a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over
a complaint”). However, even assuming that state action raises a jurisdictional
question, the Court declines to address it and instead addresses Younger
abstention. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)
(“[D]istrict courts do not overstep Article III limits when they . . . abstain under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), without
deciding whether the parties present a case or controversy.” (internal citations
omitted)).
4
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Court first addresses whether service of process was deficient and
begins by noting that “[a]n objection to personal jurisdiction is distinct from an
objection to process or service.”
§ 12.33[2] (2013).
2 Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
Thus, although Defendant Landrock labels her motion as a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the motion is properly raised
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5).
“When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5), the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving adequate service.” Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 752
(2d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). “In considering a motion
to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(5) for insufficiency of service of process, a Court
must look to matters outside the complaint to determine whether it has
jurisdiction.” Koulkina, 559 F.Supp.2d at 311 (quotation marks and alterations
omitted).
Under federal and state law (the application of which is permitted by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), service of process against a private individual
may only be accomplished in one of three ways: (A) personal delivery; (2) leaving
a copy at the individual’s usual place of abode; and (3) delivering a copy to duly
authorized agent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); Conn. Gen.Stat § 52-57(a). Here, the
Marshals left a copy of the summons and complaint with Defendant Landrock’s
supervisor at work. Dkt. No. 37 (Process Receipt & Return). Defendant Landrock
was not served personally or at her home, Dkt. No. 51-2 (Landrock Aff.) at ¶ 5, and
Landrock’s supervisor is not a duly authorized agent. Service of process was
therefore not properly effectuated.
5
However, insufficient service does not automatically entitle Defendant
Landrock to relief. The time for service may be extended if “plaintiff shows good
cause for the failure [to timely serve process].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see also
Gerena v. Korb, 617 F.3d 197, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2010) (observing that extensions are
“mandatory, not discretionary”).
Good cause exists here because Plaintiffs,
proceeding in forma pauperis, provided the information necessary for the
Marshals to identify Defendant Landrock: her full name and work address. See
Ruddock v. Reno, 104 F. App’x 204, 206–07 (2d Cir. 2004) (“So long as such a
[plaintiff] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, courts
have uniformly held that the Marshals’ failure to effect service automatically
constitutes good cause within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”).
Accordingly,
Defendant Landrock’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process is
denied, and the Marshals are ordered to serve Defendant Landrock.
The remaining grounds for dismissal rely on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). But the parties miss a threshold issue: Younger abstention,
the application of which a court may raise sua sponte. See Catlin v. Ambach, 820
F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1987).
Moreover, because the Supreme Court treats
Younger abstention as “jurisdictional,” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 100 n.3 (1998), the Court declines the parties’ implicit entreaties to
explore the limits of permissible hypothetical jurisdiction. See D.L. v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2004) (ruling that the Court had
no power to address the merits when confronted with the possibility of Younger
abstention); but compare Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (ruling that hypothetical
6
jurisdiction prohibited only to extent that lack of jurisdiction presents a
constitutional question), with Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728,
(1996) (observing that abstention doctrines “derive from the discretion
historically enjoyed by courts of equity”).
Because, as discussed below, the
Court rules that Younger abstention is appropriate, the Court denies as moot the
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Younger requires federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over
claims that implicate ongoing state proceedings. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44.
Younger applies if the federal action involves ongoing: (1) “state criminal
prosecutions”; (2) “civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions”; or
(3) civil proceedings that “implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and
judgments of its courts.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S.Ct. 584, 588
(2013). Both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have observed that a
“state-initiated proceeding to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their
parents” falls within the second category.4 Davis v. Baldwin, 594 F. App’x 49, 51
(2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, 134 S.Ct. at 592). If the federal action
falls into one of these three categories, a Court may then consider the additional
factors described in Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,
457 U.S. 423 (1982).
See Sprint Commc’ns, 134 S.Ct. at 593.
Those factors
examine, inter alia, whether the state interest is vital and whether the state
proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims.
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432.
4
The Court does not suggest that the underlying proceedings or Plaintiffs’
conduct is in any way criminal. It is simply following precedent.
7
Here, Plaintiffs claims involve ongoing, state-initiated proceedings to gain
custody of their minor son: they explicitly seek to enjoin those proceedings and
raise only claims calling them into question. Moreover, the Middlesex factors
weigh in favor of applying Younger. In an analogous case decided before Sprint
Commc’ns, a couple sought to regain custody of their two daughters, alleging
that they were taken away without cause and without following the proper
procedures for removal. Donkor v. City of New York Human Res. Admin. Special
Servs. for Children, 673 F.Supp. 1221, 1222–23 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The Donkor Court
applied Younger to dismiss the action, which was construed as being brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C §§ 1983, 1985, because of the “state’s compelling interest in
protecting the welfare of children” and because of the opportunity to raise
constitutional claims in state court. Id. at 1224, 1226–27. The proceedings here
similarly involve the state’s compelling interest in protecting the welfare of
children, and Plaintiffs may raise their federal constitutional claims during the
state proceedings.
See Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499 (2013) (addressing,
pursuant to expedited appeal process, appellant’s federal due process challenge
to child custody proceedings). Accordingly, Younger abstention is appropriate
with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. See Hansel
v. Town Court, 56 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1995) (observing that Younger applies to
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief). Those claims are dismissed without
prejudice. See Siegel v. Apergis, 2015 WL 1812649, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2015)
(observing that jurisdictional dismissals are without prejudice).
8
The Supreme Court, however, has not addressed whether Younger applies
to claims for monetary relief, ruling only that a stay rather than a dismissal of
those claims would be appropriate.
Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202
(1988). The Second Circuit has reiterated that a stay may be appropriate but has
not explicitly articulated whether a stay is made pursuant to Younger or some
other equitable principle. See Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir.
2000). The Court holds that Younger abstention is appropriate with respect to the
claims for monetary relief. See Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 138 & n.6 (7th Cir.
1995) (observing that “a plurality [of Circuits] now applies Younger in some
fashion to damage claims” and that the Second Circuit has taken an “ambivalent
approach”). As the Supreme Court has observed, abstention principles, where
appropriate, may be applied to actions at law to permit federal courts to stay
adjudication. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 719–20. The application of Younger
is appropriate here because the resolution of the claims for monetary damages
still places the Court in the awkward position of having to question the validity of
the underlying state proceedings, the sum and substance of Plaintiffs’ claims.
See Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1253 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying Younger to
monetary claims arising out of ongoing to criminal proceedings because those
claims would require “rulings by virtue of which the validity of a conviction in
contemporary state proceedings would be called in question”); Saunders v.
Flanagan, 62 F.Supp.2d 629, 637 (D. Conn. 1999) (Droney, J.) (observing similar
concerns). Accordingly, the claims for monetary relief are stayed pursuant to
Younger.
The action, however, will be administratively closed with leave to
9
reopen at the conclusion of the underlying state proceedings.
See Carter v.
Allen, 2012 WL 32667, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2012) (administratively closing stayed
claims for monetary relief).
Because the Court has raised the issue of Younger abstention sua sponte,
Plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to address whether an exception applies.
Exceptions to Younger will be found only in the narrowest of circumstances,
such as “in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state
officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction” or
“extraordinary circumstances.” Diamond “D” Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d
191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). “A plaintiff who
seeks to head off Younger abstention bears the burden of establishing that one of
the exceptions applies.” Id.
Plaintiffs have not met this high burden based on the current pleadings.
Like the plaintiffs in Donkor, Plaintiffs have neither challenged a state statute nor
the adequacy of established state procedures.
673 F.Supp. at 1227. Moreover,
like the plaintiffs in Donkor, Plaintiffs have rebutted their assertion of “bad faith”
by alleging facts such as Murray’s mental state and Plaintiffs’ failure to timely
disclose information. Id. Plaintiffs should nonetheless be permitted to introduce
evidence in an attempt to show that some exception to Younger applies.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs may seek to reopen the case within 28 days of the entry of
this order. The motion to reopen must be accompanied by facts, not simply legal
conclusions, showing that an identified exception on which the Plaintiffs rely is
implicated.
10
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Landrock’s motion
to dismiss for insufficient service of process; ORDERS the Marshals to serve
Landrock; DISMISSES without prejudice the claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief; STAYS the claims for monetary relief; CLOSES the case with leave to
reopen within 28 days from the date of this order and at the expiration of the state
proceedings; and DENIES as moot the motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
________/s/______________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: September 11, 2015
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?