Torres et al v. Gaines et al

Filing 72

ORDER denying 65 Motion to Reopen Case; denying 65 Motion for Judgment; denying 66 Motion for Reconsideration ; denying 68 Motion for Order; denying 69 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Please see attached memorandum. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 04/04/2016. (Thomas, R.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
EDWARD TORRES and TERESA
MURRAY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NANETE GAINES, KATHY MCGRIDE,
HERBY DORMECANT, and MILLIE
LANDLOCK,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL CASE NUMBER:
3:14-cv-372-VLB
April 4, 2016

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Edward Torres and Teresa Murray (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against employees of the Connecticut Department of
Children and Family Services (“DCF Defendants”) and a social worker for the
Child

and

Family

“Defendants”).

Guidance

Center

(“CFGC

Defendant”)

(collectively,

Pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court

dismissed the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and stayed the claims
for monetary relief because any ruling would have interfered with an ongoing,
state administrative adjudicatory proceedings.

The Court raised the issue of

Younger abstention sua sponte and therefore granted Plaintiffs leave to file a
motion to reopen on the basis that an exception to Younger applies. Plaintiffs
move for reconsideration of the Court’s decision and to reopen the action. DCF
Defendants move for an order authorizing disclosure of confidential information
and for an extension of time to oppose Plaintiffs’ motions. For the following
reasons, the motions are DENIED.

1

I.

Motion for Reconsideration
This Court’s prior order described Plaintiffs’ demand for relief as follows:

“Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, monetary damages, to enjoin the state proceedings,
and unspecified declaratory relief.” ECF No. 63 (Order) at 3. Plaintiffs move for
reconsideration, arguing that the Court inaccurately described their demand for
relief because they sought clearly defined injunctive and declaratory relief.

ECF

No. 66 (Mot.) at 1. Plaintiffs’ argument does not warrant reconsideration because
the Court’s decision appropriately described Plaintiffs’ demand for relief. With
respect to Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, the Court did not describe
Plaintiffs’ request as unspecified; “unspecified” modified only the words
“declaratory relief.” With respect to Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief, the
Court did not construe Plaintiffs’ request “to (cease) (stop) of all civil violations –
a public apology on transcript – the inter alia of $160,000.00 dllrs [sic] –
Defendants to be (Job) terminated without pay for all violations” as articulating a
specific request for declaratory relief because none of these requests can
properly be described as a request for declaratory relief. Even assuming that the
Court’s description of Plaintiffs’ demand for relief was inaccurate, Plaintiffs do
not explain how the alleged error would have altered the outcome of the Court’s
decision. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
II.

Motion to Reopen
The Court’s prior order also granted Plaintiffs leave to file a motion to

reopen on the basis that some exception to Younger applies. ECF No. 63 (Order)
at 10. The Court explained that “[e]xceptions to Younger will be found only in the

2

narrowest of circumstances, such as ‘in cases of proven harassment or
prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining
a valid conviction’ or ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ Id. (quoting Diamond “D”
Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002)). Plaintiffs now move
to reopen, repeatedly describing Defendants actions as “illegal,” “unfair, “fail[ing]
‘due process,’” done “without legal weight or evidence,” in violation of
Defendants’ own regulations, and performed “without cause.” ECF No. 65 (Mot.).
With the exception of two letters concerning attempts by two of the defendants to
help Plaintiff Murray schedule substance abuse and mental health evaluations, to
inform Plaintiffs about community resources, and to assist in ensuring the safety
and well-being of their child, Plaintiffs offer little in the way of evidence or factual
allegations. Id.
Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts or produce evidence demonstrating
that either the “bad faith” exception to Younger applies.

The “bad faith”

exception applies only when “the state proceeding was initiated with and is
animated by a retaliatory, harassing, or other illegitimate motive.” Diamond “D”,
282 F.3d at 199. Egregious constitutional violations are insufficient. Id. Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated that this exception applies because the only evidence
offered in support of the motion to reopen demonstrates that the custody action
was initiated in good faith: the attached letters demonstrate a concern for the
well-being of Plaintiffs’ child, their family, and the physical and emotional health
of Plaintiff Murray. This conclusion remains true even if Defendants’ concerns
were misplaced or even if their actions were taken without cause or due process.

3

The “extraordinary circumstances” exception applies when “the challenged state
statute

is

flagrantly

and

patently

violative

of

express

constitutional

prohibitions . . . .” Donkor v. City of New York Human Res. Admin. Special Servs.
for Children, 673 F. Supp. 1221, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated that this exception applies because they argue that
“Defendants violate . . . their own regulations.” ECF No. 65 (Mot.) at 4 (emphasis
added). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to reopen.
III.

DCF Defendants’ Remaining Motions
Defendants move for an order authorizing the disclosure of confidential

DCF information. ECF No. 68 (Mot.). The Court DENIES this motion because the
documents are unnecessary given that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden
of establishing that an exception to Younger applies. Defendants also move for
an extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs motions. ECF No. 69 (Mot.). The
Court DENIES this motion because there is nothing to oppose now that the Court
has now ruled on Plaintiffs’ pending motions.

4

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration (ECF No. 66), Plaintiffs’ motion to reopen (ECF No. 65), DCF
Defendants’ motion for an order authorizing disclosure of confidential DCF
information (ECF No. 68), and Defendants’ motion for an extension of time to
oppose Plaintiffs’ motions (ECF No. 69).

IT IS SO ORDERED.
________/s/______________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge

Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: April 4, 2016

5