De La Noval v. Papa's Dodge, Inc

Filing 33

ORDER granting Defendant's 27 Motion to Dismiss; and denying as moot Defendant's 27 Motion for More Definite Statement and Defendant's 20 & 27 Motions to Strike. See attached Memorandum of Decision. The Clerk is directed to close this case. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 3/26/15. (De Palma, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

AGUSTIN DE LA NOVAL,
Plaintiff,
v.
PAPA‘S DODGE,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:14-CV-00460 (VLB)

March 26, 2015

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING
DEFENDANT‘S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF‘S AMENDED COMPLAINT,
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND MOTION TO STRIKE [Dkt. 27]
I.

Introduction
The Plaintiff, Agustin De La Noval (―De La Noval‖ or ―Plaintiff‖) brings this

action against Defendant Papa‘s Dodge, Inc. (―Papa‘s Dodge‖ or ―Defendant‖),
alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et
seq. (the ―ADA‖) (Count I); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S .C. § 2000 et
seq. (―Title VII‖) (Count II); the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act,
Connecticut General Statutes §§ 46a-58(a) et seq. (―CFEPA‖) (Count III); and
common law intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV). Defendant has
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); for a more definite statement of paragraph 13
and Count III of Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e);
and to strike paragraph 12 of Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(f). For the reasons that follow, Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED, and Defendant‘s Motion for a More Definite Statement and Motion to
Strike are denied as moot.
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II.

Factual Background
The following facts and allegations are taken from Plaintiff‘s Amended

Complaint [Dkt. 24] and are assumed to be true for purposes of this Motion.
However, the Court notes that the substantial majority of the Amended Complaint
does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that a
complaint consist of ―a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief‖ and that it ―give the defendant fair notice of what the .
. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.‖ Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am.
Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 182 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Instead, the Amended Complaint
is replete with irrelevant information about certain matters, while suffering from a
gross lack of detail in other places where such detail would be necessary to
establish the essential elements of Plaintiff‘s claims.
Plaintiff Mr. De La Noval is an individual residing at 545 Chimney Sweep
Hill Road, Glastonbury, Connecticut. [Dkt. 24 at ¶ 2.] Defendant Papa‘s Dodge is
an ―active, domestic, stock company‖ incorporated under the laws of the state of
Connecticut with a business address of 585 East Main Street, New Britain,
Connecticut. [Id. at ¶ 3.] Plaintiff alleges that he began working at Papa‘s Dodge
on April 11, 1988 as an Automotive Technician. [Id. at ¶ 8.] Between 1988 and the
date of Plaintiff‘s alleged termination on May 23, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that he
held several positions within Papa‘s Dodge. [Id.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that he was promoted to ―Shop Foreman‖ in the mid-1990s, and then became a
―Service Advisor‖ in 1998 ―due to an internal reorganization.‖ [Id.] Plaintiff

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further alleges that in 2000, he then became an ―Assistant Manager/Service
Advisor.‖ [Id.] When Papa‘s Dodge opened a new facility in November 2005,
Plaintiff alleges that he again became a Service Advisor, where he remained until
he was allegedly terminated in 2012. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges several disparate grievances against Papa‘s Dodge, each
of which the Court will summarize here. Plaintiff first alleges that in October
2011, Plaintiff‘s supervisor Mr. William Vetre (―Mr. Vetre‖) accused Plaintiff of
failing to cut a key for a customer who had requested an extra key for his wife‘s
car. [Id. at ¶¶ 9–10.] Plaintiff alleges that Papa‘s Dodge‘s policy was that
employees were not permitted to cut spare car keys if the requesting customer
was not named on the car‘s registration, and that in this instance, the customer‘s
identification and registration did not match. [Id. at ¶ 10.] As a result, it appears
that Plaintiff allegedly refused to cut the key, for which Mr. Vetre allegedly
threatened to write Plaintiff up for insubordination. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he
nevertheless ―refused to comply with a directive that would violate Defendant‘s
policy.‖ [Id.]
Plaintiff then alleges that sometime during the next month, November 2011,
Plaintiff developed pneumonia and was out of work for two weeks. [Id. at ¶ 11.]
While Plaintiff was out of work, Defendant allegedly implemented a new software
system for the Service Advisors. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that when Plaintiff
returned to work, all of the service advisors had been trained on the new system,
and that ―Plaintiff was not trained on the new system when he returned to work.‖
[Id.]

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Plaintiff next alleges that on April 16, 2012, Plaintiff was injured on the job
when he rolled back in a chair and the wheels on the chair fell into ―holes in the
floor‖. [Id. at ¶ 12.] Plaintiff alleges that when he ―was catapulted airborne off the
chair, his right knee hit the service counter hard and he landed on his buttocks
on the floor.‖ [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he stood up and ―got back to work‖ after
the fall but that he was ―in a lot of pain,‖ which was ―coming from the center of
Plaintiff‘s back and down the left leg.‖ [Id.] When Plaintiff reported to work the
next day and told Mr. Vetre that he was still in a lot of pain in his lower back and
left leg, Mr. Vetre directed him to fill out an accident report and Plaintiff was sent
to ―Concentra,‖ a ―third-party administrator for injuries on the job,‖ where he was
required to obtain a medical examination. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that Concentra
prescribed him muscle relaxers, pain killers, anti-inflammatories and physical
therapy for what was believed to be a sprained back. [Id.] Later that same day,
Plaintiff alleges that he went back to work, and it appears that after this day he
continued to work despite his injury. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of his injury, for which he received one
month of physical therapy, he ―could not sleep in bed or lay down because of the
pain‖ in his spine and left leg. [Id.] Plaintiff describes this pain as ―intense‖ and
claims that ―sitting or standing for too long a period of time was very painful‖ and
that Plaintiff‘s coworkers would comment on the difficulty Plaintiff was having
―on a daily basis.‖ [Id.] Plaintiff also alleges that at some unspecified point,
Concentra referred Plaintiff to an orthopedic surgeon who gave Plaintiff a shot of
cortisone in his back. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that as of the date of the Amended

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Complaint, which was filed approximately three months after his injury, Plaintiff
was still receiving treatment from the orthopedic surgeon on his back, and that
the surgeon ―recommended an epidural on Plaintiff‘s back before recommending
surgery,‖ but that despite this epidural, Plaintiff ―still has chronic pain.‖ [Id.]
Plaintiff also alleges that he received a cortisone shot and an MRI of his right
knee, although he does not allege that his right knee is the cause of any of the
pain and discomfort he describes. [Id.]
Without any explanation or elaboration, Plaintiff states that following this
injury, ―Plaintiff was harassed and retaliated against by Defendant over the
subjects of Pricing Discounts, Friends and Family Discounts and a United States
Post Office Repair Order for Body Work.‖ [Id. at ¶ 13.] Plaintiff summarily denies
that any of his ―actions concerning these subjects violated Defendant‘s policy.‖
[Id.] Plaintiff then alleges that ―Defendant terminated Plaintiff‘s employment on
May 23, 2012.‖ [Id. at ¶ 14.] Plaintiff claims that these ―adverse employment
actions,‖ which Plaintiff seems to believe were taken against him as a result of
his injury, have caused him to ―suffer past and future economic, physical and
emotional harm,‖ including ―severe, ongoing emotional distress.‖ [Id. at Counts
I–III at ¶¶ 15–16, Count IV at ¶ 19.]
III.

Standard of Review
―‗To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.‘‖ Sarmiento v. U.S., 678 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual

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allegations, ―[a] pleading that offers ‗labels and conclusions‘ or ‗formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.‘ Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders ‗naked assertion[s]‘ devoid of ‗further factual enhancement.‘‖
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotations omitted). ―Where a
complaint pleads facts that are ‗merely consistent with‘ a defendant's liability, it
‗stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‗entitlement to
relief.‘‖ Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). ―A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.‖ Id.
(internal citations omitted).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court
should follow a ―two-pronged approach‖ to evaluate the sufficiency of the
complaint. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). ―A court ‗can
choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.‘‖ Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679). ―At the second step, a court should determine whether the ‗wellpleaded factual allegations,‘ assumed to be true, ‗plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.‘‖ Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). ―The plausibility
standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.‖ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal
quotations omitted).
In general, the Court‘s review on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) ―is limited to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the

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complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any
documents incorporated in the complaint by reference.‖ McCarthy v. Dun &
Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court may also consider
―matters of which judicial notice may be taken‖ and ―documents either in
plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in
bringing suit.‖ Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir.1993);
Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144 (D. Conn.
2005)(MRK).
IV.

Discussion
As an initial matter, the Court notes that although Defendant‘s Motion to

Dismiss raises substantive legal bases for dismissing each claim, the Plaintiff‘s
objection largely fails to respond to these grounds. Instead, Plaintiff restates
facts alleged in the Amended Complaint and summarily asserts that he should be
allowed to maintain his claims without establishing their legal sufficiency.
Nonetheless, the Court must address Defendant‘s assertions and review them in
light of the allegations of the Amended Complaint and Plaintiff‘s objection, and
ascertain whether the challenged claims are sufficiently pled.
A. Count I: Discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act
Plaintiff alleges that he ―was disabled within the meaning of the ADA . . .
was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or
without reasonable accommodation, and . . . suffered an adverse employment
action because of his disability.‖ [Dkt. 24 at Count I, ¶¶ 15–16.] Defendant moves
to dismiss this claim on the ground that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a

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―disability‖ under the ADA, because he has not alleged facts establishing that his
April 2012 injury substantially limited a ―major life activity.‖ [Dkt. 28 at 8–10.]
The ADA provides in relevant part that ―[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . .
. the . . . discharge of employees, . . . job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA defines
discrimination on the basis of disability as, among other things, ―limiting,
segregating, or classifying a[n] . . . employee in a way that adversely affects the
opportunities or status of such . . . employee because of the disability of such . . .
employee.‖ Id. at § 12112(b)(1).
To allege a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff
must show ―(a) that his employer is subject to the ADA; (b) that he is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA or perceived to be so by his employer; (c) that he
was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or
without reasonable accommodation; and (d) that he suffered an adverse
employment action because of his disability.‖ Brady v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 531
F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2008). A plaintiff suffers an ―adverse employment action‖
under the ADA when ―he or she endures a materially adverse change in the
terms, privileges, duration and conditions of employment.‖ Treglia v. Town of
Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 720 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
―Examples of materially adverse employment actions include ‗termination of
employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, [and] significantly diminished

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material responsibilities . . . .‘‖ Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir.
2004) (quoting Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.
2000)).
It is axiomatic that ―[i]n order to qualify as an individual with a disability
under the ADA plaintiff must: (1) have ‗a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;‘ (2)
have ‗a record of such an impairment‘; or (3) be ‗regarded as having such an
impairment.‘‖ Bryant v. Greater New Haven Transit Dist., 8 F. Supp. 3d 115, 139
(D. Conn. 2014) (citing Mitchell v. Girl Scouts of the U.S.A., No. 98 CV 3730, 2003
WL 22705121, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003)). ―Not every impairment is a disability
within the meaning of the ADA; rather, there are two requirements: the
impairment must limit a major life activity and the limitation must be substantial.‖
Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2005).
The regulations to the ADA define the phrase ―major life activities‖ as
those basic functions such as ―‗caring for oneself, performing manual tasks . . .
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, and working,‘ as well as
‗the operation of a major bodily function,‘ including ‗neurological, brain,
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.‘‖ Hutchinson v.
Ecolab, Inc., No. 3:09cv1848(JBA), 2011 WL 4542957, at *8 (D. Conn. Sept. 28,
2011) (quoting Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008)). In determining
whether a limitation is ―substantial,‖ courts should look to the nature and
severity of the impairment, the duration or expected duration of the impairment,
and the permanent or long-term impact of or the expected long-term impact of or

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resulting from the impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2); see Capobianco, 422 F.3d
at 57. ―A temporary impairment lasting only a few months is, by itself, too short
in duration to be substantially limiting.‖ De La Rosa v. Potter, 427 F. App'x 28, 29
(2d Cir. 2011) (citing Adams v. Citizens Advice Bureau, 187 F.3d 315, 316–17 (2d
Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts indicating that his
back injury substantially limited one or more major life activities. Plaintiff alleges
that sitting or standing for ―too long‖ a period of time was very painful. [Dkt. 24
at ¶ 12.] However, sitting or standing for an indeterminate amount of time does
not reasonably constitute a ―major life activity‖ as that term is used under the
ADA. See, e.g., Colwell v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 643–45 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that difficulty standing ―at attention‖ for ―any period of time,‖
standing ―in one spot,‖ standing ―for a long period of time,‖ and need to perform
sedentary work does not indicate a substantial limitation in the ability to stand);
Hopkins v. Digital Equip. Corp., 93-CV-8468(JSM), 1998 WL 702339, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1998) (holding that plaintiff‘s inability to stand for a prolonged
period did not establish an impairment that would substantially limit a major life
activity); Beason v. United Technologies Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 103, 110 (D. Conn.
2002) (―A belief that one cannot stand for longer than two hours, can only
perform sedentary work, and has difficulty keeping his [neck] extended or flexed
for long periods of time does not constitute a belief that one is severely restricted
in his ability to stand as compared with the average person.‖).

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Plaintiff also alleges without elaboration that he ―could not sleep in bed or
lay down‖ because of his pain. [Dkt. 24 at ¶ 12.] Although the Second Circuit has
held that sleep is ―undoubtedly a major life activity,‖ Plaintiff‘s vague allegation
does not provide any facts to support the inference that Plaintiff‘s inability to lie
down was long-lasting enough to produce the kind of chronic, profound insomnia
typically required to establish a substantial limitation on this major life activity.
See Colwell, 158 F.3d at 643–44 (holding that because ―[d]ifficulty sleeping is
extremely widespread,‖ a plaintiff must show ―that his affliction is . . . worse than
is suffered by a large portion of the nation‘s adult population.‖); cf Felix v. New
York City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 324 F.3d
102 (2d Cir. 2003). Plaintiff‘s allegation of ―chronic‖ pain, by itself, is insufficient
to establish that his inability to lie down was permanent or long-term: it is the
limitation on the claimed major life activity, not the mental or physical condition
that causes it, that must be permanent or have a long-term impact in order to be
―substantial.‖ See Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,
198 (2002) (holding that diagnosis alone does not establish a disability within the
meaning of the ADA; the impairment's impact must also be permanent or longterm).1

1

Plaintiff attempts to re-amend his Amended Complaint through his opposition
brief by adding additional claims that Plaintiff‘s injury has substantially limited
the major life activities of ―his ability to concentrate at work‖ and ―to not feel
stressful and anxious‖ [sic] due to his chronic pain. [Dkt. 30 at 4.] Plaintiff
cannot amend his complaint in his memorandum. See, e.g., MacGillivray v.
Whidden, No. 3:04CV1523(CFD), 2006 WL 587593, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2006).
Moreover, even if the Court did consider these claims, they would do nothing to
cure the deficiencies in the Amended Complaint.
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Courts have held that ―dismissal is appropriate where a plaintiff fails to
allege how an impairment limits a major life activity.‖ Baptista v. Hartford Bd. of
Educ., 427 Fed. App‘x 39, 42 (2d Cir. 2011) (―But while Baptista conclusorily
alleges that his firing constituted discrimination on the basis of his alcoholism or
HIV-positive status, in none of his complaints did he describe how either
impairment limited any major life activity—a requirement for a condition to
constitute a disability for purposes of the laws on which he relies.‖); Hedges v.
Town of Madison, 456 Fed. App‘x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting Plaintiff's
argument that the district court should have inferred that plaintiff was disabled
because he alleged that he suffered from a variety of medical conditions such as
Lyme Disease and holding that ―even the most liberal standard of pleadings does
not require a court to make such inferences ... Assuming the most minimal of
notice pleading standards, a plaintiff is still required to give fair notice to the
defendants of the factual bases for his claims.‖). Consequently, dismissal is
appropriate here.
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had adequately alleged a ―disability‖ as that
term is defined by the ADA, Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint is completely devoid
of factual content regarding the adverse employment actions Defendant allegedly
took as a result of Plaintiff‘s alleged disability. Plaintiff‘s conclusory claim that
after his injury, Plaintiff ―was harassed and retaliated against by Defendants‖
over such vague and inscrutable subjects as ―Pricing Discounts‖ and ―a United

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States Post Office Repair Order for Body Work‖ utterly fails to put Defendant on
notice of the nature of the allegations against it. [Dkt. 24 at ¶ 13.]2
Moreover, Plaintiff‘s allegations of retaliation and termination provide no
basis upon which to infer a causal connection—or any connection at all—
between Plaintiff‘s alleged mistreatment and his alleged disability. To the extent
that Plaintiff is alleging retaliation under the ADA, he is required to show that: ―(1)
the plaintiff participated in a protected activity under the ADA; (2) the defendant
knew of the protected activity; (3) the plaintiff experienced an adverse
employment action; and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.‖ See Treglia, 313 F.3d at 719
(emphasis added). Plaintiff does not allege that he attempted to assert his rights
against discrimination or engaged in any other protected activity under the ADA,
and the Amended Complaint provides no basis for inferring that Defendant‘s
alleged actions were undertaken with the requisite retaliatory intent. Id. To the
extent that Plaintiff is alleging discriminatory discharge, Plaintiff must show that
―he was fired because of his disability.‖ Reeves v. Johnson Controls World
Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has failed to allege any

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Defendant has moved for a more definite statement as to this paragraph of the
Amended Complaint, on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege ―the
conduct by the defendant‖ forming the basis of plaintiff‘s harassment and
retaliation claim. [Dkt. 28 at 11.] Plaintiff addressed Defendant‘s motion by
―elaborating‖ upon these allegations in his opposition brief. [Dkt. 30 at 5–6.]
Plaintiff‘s attempt to amend his complaint through his memorandum—especially
by introducing a litany of irrelevant detail that nonetheless fails to shed light on
the nature of Defendant‘s conduct or its connection to Plaintiff‘s disability—is
both improper and futile. See MacGillivray, 2006 WL 587593, at *3.
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facts tending to suggest that Defendant dismissed Plaintiff because of his back
injury.
Because the Amended Complaint cannot support a prima facie case of
disability discrimination under either theory, Count I of the Complaint is
DISMISSED.
B. Count II: Discrimination under Title VII
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant is liable under Title VII for regarding
Plaintiff ―as a person who was limited from working and retaliat[ing] against
Plaintiff by subjecting Plaintiff to an adverse employment action when Defendant
terminated Plaintiff‘s employment as pretext based on an actual or perceived
disability of Plaintiff.‖ [Dkt. 24, Count II at ¶ 15.] Defendant moves to dismiss
Count II of Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint on the ground that the sole basis of
Plaintiff‘s Title VII claim is disability discrimination, which is not a colorable claim
under Title VII. [Dkt. 28 at 7–8.]
Defendant is correct. Title VII makes it unlawful ―for an employer . . . to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against
any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Disability is not a protected class
under Title VII, and that statute does not provide a remedy for employment
discrimination based on disability. See, e.g., Milione v. City Univ. of New York,
950 F. Supp. 2d 704, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 567 Fed. App‘x 38 (2d Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 964 (2015). Plaintiff‘s Title VII claim is dismissed.

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C. Counts III and IV: State Law Claims
Having dismissed both federal law claims against the Defendant, the Court
declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff‘s state law
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of the
Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. ―Supplemental or pendent
jurisdiction is a matter of discretion, not of right. Thus, the court need not
exercise supplemental jurisdiction in every case.‖ Nicholson v. Lenczewski, 356
F. Supp. 2d 157, 165–66 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 715–26 (1966)). ―The federal court should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction and hear a state claim when doing so would promote judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants. The court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction, however, when state law issues would
predominate the litigation or the federal court would be required to interpret state
law in the absence of state precedent. In addition, the court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction where the court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.‖ Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)); Carnegie
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (―in the usual case in which all
federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be
considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine––judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity––will point toward declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims‖).
Because in granting Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss Counts I and II of the
Amended Complaint, the Court has dismissed Plaintiff‘s claims over which it has

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original jurisdiction, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Counts III and IV, both of which arise under state law and are analyzed under
different standards. See Zito v. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, LLP, 869
F. Supp. 2d 378, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138
(2d. Cir.1994) (―Under 28 U.S.C. 1367(a)(c), a Court has the discretion to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims. If, however, ‗the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional
sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.‘‖).
V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants‘ [Dkt. 27] Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint is GRANTED, and Defendant‘s Motion for More
Definite Statement and Motion to Strike are denied as moot. The Clerk is directed
to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

________/s/______________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge

Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: March 26, 2015

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