Paiva v. Severn Trent Services, Inc.
Filing
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ORDER: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 14 ) is hereby GRANTED. The Complaint is dismissed. The Clerk shall close this case. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 2/5/2015. (Wang, M.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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CAROLOS PAVIA,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
SEVERN TRENT SERVICES, INC., :
:
Defendant.
:
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Civil Action No. 14cv659 (AWT)
RULING ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Carolos Pavia brings two causes of action, breach
of contract and promissory estoppel, against defendant Severn
Trent Services, Inc. (“Severn Trent”).
dismiss the Complaint.
The defendant moves to
For the reasons set forth below, the
motion is being granted.
I.
Factual Allegations
“The complaint, which [the court] must accept as true for
purposes of testing its sufficiency, alleges the following
circumstances.”
Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 244 (2d Cir.
1997).
On August 14, 2013, the defendant extended an offer of
employment to the plaintiff.
The offer was contingent on the
plaintiff‟s successful completion of pre-employment screening
requirements.
The plaintiff completed the screening
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requirements.
Relying on the defendant‟s promise of employment,
the plaintiff did not seek employment elsewhere.
On December 27, 2013, the defendant rescinded its offer of
employment based on its contention that the plaintiff failed the
drug screening test.
After being informed by the defendant that
he had failed the drug screening test, the plaintiff, on two
separate occasions, submitted to tests by an independent drug
testing facility which refuted the defendant‟s contention.
In the Complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant
breached its offer of employment based on its erroneous
contention that the plaintiff had failed its drug screening test.
The plaintiff also alleges that he was injured because he relied
on the defendant‟s promise of employment.
II.
Legal Standard
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court must accept as true all factual allegations in the
complaint and must draw inferences in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,
a plaintiff‟s obligation to provide the „grounds‟ of his
„entitle[ment] to relief‟ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 550, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
2
286 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation”)).
“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
“Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
Twombly, 550
However, the plaintiff must
plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570.
“The function of a motion
to dismiss is „merely to assess the legal feasibility of the
complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might
be offered in support thereof.‟”
Mytych v. May Dep't Store Co.,
34 F. Supp. 2d 130, 131 (D. Conn. 1999) (quoting Ryder Energy
Distrib. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779
(2d Cir. 1984)).
“The issue [on a motion to dismiss] is not
whether [the] plaintiff will prevail, but whether he is entitled
to offer evidence to support his claims.”
United States v. Yale
New Haven Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Conn. 1990)(citing
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232).
In its review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the court may consider “only the facts alleged in the
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pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by
reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice
may be taken.”
Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12,
15 (2d Cir. 1993).
III. Discussion
A.
First Cause of Action (Breach of Contract)
“In Connecticut, an employer and employee have an at-will
employment relationship in the absence of a contract to the
contrary.
Employment at will grants both parties the right to
terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any
time without fear of legal liability.”
Thibodeau v. Design Grp.
One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 697-98 (2002).
“[N]o
distinction [is] drawn between the offer of employment and the
actual act of employment when the employment relationship is at
will.”
Petitte v. DSL.net, Inc., 102 Conn. App. 363, 371 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2007).
“[T]herefore, . . . the employment at will
doctrine extends to offers of at-will employment.”
Id.
Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant extended an
offer of employment on August 14, 2013.
The plaintiff also
alleges that on December 27, 2013, the defendant rescinded its
offer of employment based on its contention that the plaintiff
failed a drug screening test.
The plaintiff has not alleged the
existence of a contract that would supersede his at-will offer
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of employment from the defendant.1
In fact, the defendant‟s
August 14, 2003 letter of offer of employment, which is attached
to the Complaint, states: “This offer is, of course, not an
employment contract . . . .
employer.
Severn Trent Services is an at-will
As an employee you may resign at any time.
Similarly,
Severn Trent may terminate the employment relationship at any
time, with or without cause or notice.”
No. 1.)
(Compl., Exhibit A, Doc.
Therefore, under Connecticut law, in the absence of a
contract to the contrary, the defendant was able to rescind its
offer of employment, and the plaintiff‟s First Cause of Action
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B.
Second Cause of Action (Promissory Estoppel)
“A claim for promissory estoppel requires „[1] a clear and
unambiguous promise; [2] a reasonable and foreseeable reliance
by the party to whom the promise is made; and [3] an injury
sustained by . . . reason of his reliance.‟”
Dacourt Grp., Inc.
v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 157, 161 (D. Conn. 1990)
(citing R.G. Grp. Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 78
(2d Cir. 1984)).
The plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that the defendant
promised the plaintiff employment, that the plaintiff relied on
1
While the plaintiff alleges, based on a collective bargaining agreement to
which the defendant is a party, that “upon becoming an employee of the
defendant, Severn Trent Services, Inc., he could not be terminated except for
„just cause‟” (Compl., ¶ 19), the plaintiff concedes that he “does not allege
that he was currently covered by the collective bargaining agreement.” (Mem.
in Opp., Doc. No. 16, at 4.)
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that promise and did not seek employment elsewhere, and that the
plaintiff suffered a loss of employment as a result of his
reliance on the promise of employment.
Based on the plaintiff‟s
allegations, he has not alleged sufficient detrimental reliance
injury.
“Forbearance from seeking job opportunities is not
sufficient to show detrimental reliance for purposes of
promissory estoppel because it is too speculative to establish
detriment.”
Curcio v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., 472 F. Supp.
2d 239, 245 (D. Conn. 2007) (internal brackets omitted).
Therefore, because the plaintiff alleges no other form of
detriment, his Second Cause of Action fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
IV.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant‟s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 14) is
hereby GRANTED.
The Complaint is dismissed.
The Clerk shall close this case.
It is so ordered.
Signed this 5th day of February 2015 at Hartford,
Connecticut.
/s/
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge
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