Barnes v. Warden

Filing 28

ORDER: The petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner's motion for immediate release (Doc. # 27 ) is DENIED as moot. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case. Please see attached order. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 5/2/16. (Gorsuch, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

TUERE BARNES,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 3:14-cv-00848 (JAM)
WARDEN OF DANBURY FCI,
Defendant.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Tuere Barnes is a federal prison inmate at FCI Danbury in Connecticut. He has
filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 that principally
challenges the failure of the federal Bureau of Prisons to award him credit for certain time that he
previously served in prison. Because I conclude that Barnes‘ claims are without merit, I will
deny his petition.
BACKGROUND
Barnes is serving a federal sentence following his conviction after trial in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. At the time that he was federally
indicted in New York in late February 2004, he was already in New York state custody for a
violation of state parole for which he had been arrested in December 2003. See Doc. #1 at 12.
Following his federal indictment, Barnes remained in state custody serving his state parole
sentence until October 4, 2005, although he was transferred back and forth to federal authorities
numerous times in the interim in connection with the federal prosecution against him. He was in
temporary federal custody for a total of 207 days between March 2004 and October 2005.
On October 4, 2005, Barnes‘ state parole sentence ended. He was then transferred
permanently to continuous federal custody pending resolution of the federal charges. Barnes

remained in federal pre-trial custody until his federal jury trial in 2009, at which time the jury
found him guilty on seven criminal counts including conspiracy to commit murder in aid of
racketeering, kidnapping, conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and use of a firearm during a crime
of violence. In 2010, Barnes was sentenced to a federal prison term of 25 years of imprisonment
that he is presently serving at FCI Danbury. See generally United States v. Barnes, 693 F.3d 261
(2d Cir. 2012).
Barnes has now filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241. His petition claims that the federal Bureau of Prisons did not properly credit him for the
time that he served in state custody from March 1, 2004, to October 4, 2005, before he was
formally transferred to continuous federal custody for pre-trial detention. It appears that Barnes
exhausted this claim of improper sentence computation through the Bureau of Prisons‘
administrative review process. Doc. #1 at 11-15.
DISCUSSION
Federal law provides that a federal criminal defendant‘s sentence ―commences‖ when he
is received into custody at the official detention facility at which his sentence is to be served. 18
U.S.C. § 3585(a). A defendant may receive ―credit‖ for time that he has previously served in
detention prior to the formal commencement of his federal criminal sentence. Provided that such
pre-commencement-of-sentence detention time ―has not been credited against another sentence,‖
a defendant shall receive credit for time that he has previously spent in official detention ―as a
result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed,‖ or ―as a result of any other charge for
which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was
imposed.‖ § 3585(b).

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In essence, a federal prisoner ordinarily receives credit for pre-sentencing detention time
that he would not have served but for the fact of the federal prosecution for the sentence that he
is serving. See generally Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995) (explaining operation of federal
sentencing computation under 18 U.S.C. § 3585). On the other hand, many federally prosecuted
defendants are already serving out previously imposed state sentences, and a ―defendant has no
right to credit on his federal sentence for time that has been credited against [a] prior state
sentence.‖ United States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1998).
It is the federal Bureau of Prisons—and not the federal courts in the first instance—that
determines the credit (if any) that a defendant should receive for any pre-sentencing detention.
See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992). A defendant, however, may challenge the
Bureau of Prisons‘ credit determination by means of a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Lugo v. Hudson, 785 F.3d 852 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
Construing Barnes‘ allegations liberally, I understand him to raise several arguments why
he should have received credit for some or all of the time that he was in detention prior to
October 4, 2005. First, Barnes complains that the time he served for his state parole violation
was for the same conduct for which he was subject to federal criminal prosecution. See Doc. #1
at 7, 11. But even if that is true, it would not change the credit that Barnes should have received
under 18 U.S.C. § 3585. The credit to be received by operation of § 3585 does not depend on
whether pre-sentencing detention in state custody was served for the same conduct upon which a
federal prosecution was based. As the words of the statute make clear, credit towards a federal
sentence depends on whether the time spent in state custody was ―credited against another
sentence,‖ such as against a state sentence. There is no dispute here that the time that Barnes

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spent in state custody from March 2004 to October 2005 was for a state parole violation that was
credited toward the service and completion of a prior state sentence.
Nor does the Constitution require that a federal criminal defendant receive credit for the
time that he has previously served in state custody when based on the same conduct that gave
rise to his federal prosecution. ―Under the dual sovereignty principle, a defendant may be
prosecuted for the same conduct by more than one sovereign without offending the Double
Jeopardy Clause because breaking the laws of each constitutes separate offenses.‖ United States
v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 229 (2d Cir. 2010).
Barnes has further contended that he was subject to a form of state parole violation that
ordinarily ends after 90 days but that it did not end after 90 days in his case solely because
federal charges were pending. See Doc. #18 at 2-5. For a while, I thought this argument might be
persuasive. See, e.g., Rosemond v. Menifee, 137 F. Supp. 2d 270, 274-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(noting that ―‗[t]ime spent in state custody, even if for an unrelated offense, must be credited
toward time served on a federal sentence if the continued state confinement was exclusively the
product of such action by federal law-enforcement officials as to justify treating the state jail as
the practical equivalent of a federal one‘‖) (quoting Shaw v. Smith, 680 F.2d 1104, 1106 (5th Cir.
1982)). I asked respondent to address this issue (Doc. #20), and respondent has helpfully
furnished additional information by way of a supplemental memorandum to show that Barnes‘
argument about a 90-day limit relied on a misunderstanding of the terms of his state parole
violation and that his state parole detention period was not in fact extended by reason of the
federal prosecution. See Doc. #24 at 3-4. Barnes has filed a reply to respondent‘s supplemental
memorandum that concedes that respondent is correct in this respect, see Doc. #26 at 2-3, and

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there is no longer any factual basis to suppose that his state parole detention was extended by
reason of the federal prosecution.1
Barnes next contends that he should have received credit for the 207 days that he
intermittently spent in federal custody between March 2004 and October 2005 in connection
with federal court proceedings while he was still serving out his state parole sentence. See Doc.
#26 at 3-4. But the law is clear that the time during which federal authorities temporarily
―borrow‖ a state prisoner for federal prosecution purposes and pursuant to a writ for habeas
corpus ad prosequendum is not credited under 18 U.S.C. § 3585, provided of course that this
―borrowed‖ time continues to count for purposes of the prisoner‘s service of his state sentence.
See Lugo, 785 F.3d at 855-56.
Finally, based on Barnes‘ suspicion that the federal government may have lodged a
detainer with New York state prison authorities, Barnes contends that the federal case against
him should have been dismissed for violation of his rights under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers. See Doc. #18 at 5-6; Doc. #26 at 6-7. This type of claim—involving a challenge to the
validity of his conviction or sentence rather than a challenge to the manner in which the Bureau
of Prisons is executing his sentence—must be brought by way of a motion for post-conviction
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Ellis v. Quay, 88 F. Supp. 3d 77, 81 (D. Conn. 2015). Moreover, a claim
based upon a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is not cognizable under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. See Edwards v. United States, 564 F.2d 652, 653–54 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
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Notwithstanding his concession, Barnes further argues that his federal trial counsel should have been
more ―alert‖ and ―moved the Sentencing Court to specifically Order the sentence date to begin as of the date of his
arrest on the Federal charges.‖ Doc. #26 at 3. This argument appears to lack merit, because a federal sentencing
court does not determine in the first instance what credit a defendant should receive for his prior detention. See
Wilson, 503 U.S. at 333. In any event, if Barnes wishes to challenge the constitutional adequacy of his representation
by trial counsel, such a claim should be pursued in the first instance by means of a motion before the sentencing
court in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

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Accordingly, there is no basis for relief or for me to grant Barnes‘ request for relief on his claim
of a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, or for me to transfer this claim to the
Second Circuit for consolidation with another § 2255 motion that Barnes alleges is before the
Second Circuit at this time.
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. Petitioner‘s motion for immediate
release (Doc. #27) is denied as moot. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven this 2nd day of May 2016.
/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

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