Bartold v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA

Filing 77

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 69 Motion to Compel, 70 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 12/30/2016. (Williams, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
VINCENT BARTOLD,
Plaintiff,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.

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No. 14-cv-00865 (VAB)

RULING ON MOTION TO COMPEL AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
Plaintiff, Vincent Bartold, has sued Defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”),
alleging violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”) as well as breach
of contract and negligent misrepresentation, all arising out of a reverse mortgage agreement
between the two parties. Compl., ECF No. 1-2. This relatively simple lawsuit has been pending
since June 2014. Yet, discovery remains incomplete and several discovery disputes remain
unresolved.
As the parties have failed to move this case along effectively, this Court has set this case
for a June 2017 trial, to the extent that such a trial is necessary. See Dec. 2016 Scheduling
Order, ECF No. 76. To ensure that this trial date can be met, the Court now resolves the
outstanding discovery disputes that have kept the parties from moving forward in any
meaningful way for several months. Mr. Bartold seeks to compel the production of numerous
documents as well as responses to numerous interrogatories, and Wells Fargo seeks a protective
order prohibiting Mr. Bartold from inquiring into various topics during depositions of Wells
Fargo’s corporate representatives. Pl. Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 69; Def. Mot. for Prot. Order,
ECF No. 70.

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For the reasons outlined below, Mr. Bartold’s motion to compel is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART, and Wells Fargo’s motion for a protective order is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2009, Mr. Bartold, then 67 years old, reached an agreement with Wells Fargo for a
reverse mortgage, which he believed would provide him with a guaranteed income of $600 per
month for the rest of his life.1 Compl. ¶ 32. Mr. Bartold signed documents with Wells Fargo
providing for a “modified tenure” plan. Id. A “modified tenure” plan allows for the payment of
a fixed amount of money each month for the rest of the mortgagor’s life as long as the mortgagor
continues to live in the property. Id. at ¶ 7. To the contrary, a “modified term” plan similarly
allows for the payment of a fixed amount of money each month, but is set to expire after a set
number of years. Id. Both types of reverse mortgages include a line of credit that the mortgagor
can access on demand. Id.
Wells Fargo, however, misclassified Mr. Bartold’s modified tenure plan as a modified
term plan, which provided for monthly payments only for a fixed number of years rather than for
the rest of Mr. Bartold’s life. Id. at ¶ 43. When Mr. Bartold contacted Wells Fargo to address
this error, Wells Fargo, as it now concedes, repeatedly told Mr. Bartold that he was not entitled
to the type of mortgage to which he and Wells Fargo had initially agreed. Id. at ¶¶ 41-58. After
multiple communications from Mr. Bartold, Wells Fargo amended several of the terms of his
mortgage agreement, including lowering the amount of monthly payments in exchange for a
longer term. See id. During the course of this litigation, Wells Fargo eventually corrected the
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A reverse mortgage allows a homeowner, typically an elderly homeowner who has lived in his or her home for
long enough to pay off the underlying mortgage, to receive monthly payments by converting part of the equity in the
home into cash. See Compl. ¶ 16.

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error to reflect an agreement whereby Mr. Bartold would receive $600 monthly payments for the
remainder of his life as long as he continues living in his home.
Throughout the course of discovery in this matter, the parties have persistently been
unable to agree on the scope of Mr. Bartold’s discovery requests, interrogatories and deposition
topics. Mr. Bartold contends that Wells Fargo’s conduct reflects not only a breach of contract,
but also a broader trade practice of unfairly misleading customers in connection with these types
of mortgages. As a result, Mr. Bartold seeks extensive discovery, requesting access to a wide
variety of information pertaining to Wells Fargo’s business operations surrounding these
mortgages. Wells Fargo, on the other hand, believes that this dispute is limited to an isolated
decision made by lower-level Wells Fargo employees, and thus such broad discovery is not
warranted. Wells Fargo has expressed concern about multiple other lawsuits against Wells Fargo
that have been brought by Mr. Bartold’s counsel, and it believes that the information sought by
Mr. Bartold in this matter could be used against it in connection with those other matters. See
Def. Mem. in Opp. at 16 (arguing that “Plaintiff’s attorneys are really asking for this information
so that they can leverage whatever they learn through discovery for future cases”). Accordingly,
Wells Fargo has objected to the vast majority of Mr. Bartold’s discovery requests.
On December 2, 2016, the Court issued an Order directing the parties to confer and
resolve their numerous outstanding discovery disputes. Order, ECF No. 67. The Court also
indicated that it would be adopting an accelerated trial schedule in this case, given the age of the
case and the numerous delays involved. Id. at 2-3. The Court gave the parties a deadline of
December 9, 2016 to file either: (a) a proposed scheduling order ensuring trial by June 2017, or
(b) a motion to compel and/or a motion for a protective order outlining any discovery disputes

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that remain outstanding. Id. In the absence of a proposed scheduling order, the Court
determined that it would take control over scheduling in this case and ensure trial by June 2017.
On December 9, 2016, Mr. Bartold and Wells Fargo each filed a separate discovery
motion in this matter, outlining a substantial number of unresolved discovery-related disputes.
Pl. Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 69; Def. Mot. for Prot. Order, ECF No. 70. Mr. Bartold seeks to
compel discovery of the following information:
(a) Responses to several of Plaintiff’s First Requests for Production (First RFP Nos. 4754) regarding nine separate categories of Wells Fargo policies and procedures related
to various aspects of reverse mortgages;
(b) Responses to over twenty of Plaintiff’s Second Requests for Production (Second RFP
Nos. 5-16, 18-21, 13-15, 28-38), requesting documents related to Wells Fargo
mortgage loans, communication logs from databases used by Wells Fargo customer
service representatives, and documents relied on by Wells Fargo in answering Mr.
Bartold’s interrogatories; and
(c) Responses to over fifteen of Plaintiff’s Interrogatories (Inter. Nos. 1-7, 9-11, 14-24).
Pl. Mot. to Compel. Wells Fargo’s Motion for Protective Order does not directly address any of
these requests; instead, it objects to all of the proposed deposition topics outlined in Mr.
Bartold’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice. Def. Mot. for Protective Order.
On December 20, 2016, on the eve of the scheduled oral argument for the parties’
discovery motions, Wells Fargo filed a supplemental opposition to Mr. Bartold’s Motion to
Compel, providing its responses to various of the contested interrogatories and requests for
production (Interr. Nos. 1-7, 9-11 and 14-19; Second RFP Nos. 5, 9-15). Def. Supp. Br., ECF
No. 74. With respect to the remaining disputed discovery matters (First RFP Nos. 47-54; Second

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RFP Nos. 6-8, 16, 18-21, 28-38), Wells Fargo insists that the requested information is either
irrelevant, confidential, or excessive in light of the narrow scope of Mr. Bartold’s claims. Def.
Mem. in Opp., ECF No. 73.
This impasse has significantly delayed the prompt and efficient resolution of this dispute.
Although many of the parties’ disagreements date back to as early as April of 2016, none of
these disputes were brought to the Court’s attention until November of 2016. In fact, Wells
Fargo did not provide a written explanation of the issues involved with the initial processing of
Mr. Bartold’s reverse mortgage until December 20, 2016, only two days before the scheduled
oral argument on the parties’ discovery motions. See Def. Supp. Br., ECF No. 74. Consistent
with the Court’s “inherent powers… to manage [its] own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases,” Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S.Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016), the Court has
entered a scheduling order to ensure that this matter will be tried before a jury by no later than
the end of June 2017. Scheduling Order, ECF No. 76.
The Court’s revised scheduling order provides for the following deadlines: dispositive
motions are due by March 3, 2017; the parties’ Joint Trial Memorandum is due by May 26,
2017; Jury Selection is set for June 12, 2017; the Final Pre-Trial Conference is set for June 23,
2017 at 2:00 PM; and Jury Trial is set to begin on the morning of June 26, 2017. Id. The
Court’s order states that these deadlines will not be extended further. Id.
II. Discussion
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), the parties “may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs
of the case” and this Court has broad discretion in deciding a motion to compel discovery.
Grand Cent. P’ship. Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 488 (2d Cir. 1999). Furthermore, the “party

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resisting discovery bears the burden of showing why discovery should be denied.” Cole v.
Towers Perrin Forster & Crosby, 256 F.R.D. 79, 80 (D. Conn. 2009).
This case arises out of alleged errors made by Wells Fargo in connection with a reverse
mortgage issued to Mr. Bartold. Accordingly, the information sought by Mr. Bartold pertaining
directly to his reverse mortgage is relevant and discoverable, and Wells Fargo’s stated objections
do not establish that discovery of this information should be denied.
A. Motion to Compel
Mr. Bartold seeks discovery of a variety of Wells Fargo policies and procedures, copies
of database entries from multiple departments within the Wells Fargo organization, and
communications in various forms pertaining to Mr. Bartold’s loan. Wells Fargo has responded
with broad objections, claiming that the discovery requests are too expansive, burdensome,
confidential and irrelevant. Mr. Bartold’s [69] Motion to Compel is granted in part and denied in
part.
1. Policies and Procedures (First RFP Nos. 47-54)
Mr. Bartold originally asked Wells Fargo to produce complete copies of a series of
policies and procedures in effect from October 2009 to the present. First RFPs, White Aff. Ex. C
at 8-9, ECF No. 69-5. This list was later narrowed to include only nine categories of Wells
Fargo Policies from a slightly more limited time period. See Pl. Mem. in Supp. at 9. At oral
argument, counsel for Mr. Bartold further clarified that they were mostly seeking access to
policies governing the resolution of customer disputes.
Wells Fargo argues that none of the policies are relevant to Mr. Bartold’s claims. Def.
Mem. in Opp. at 23. However, Wells Fargo has admitted that its own employees erred at some
point during the loan onboarding process, resulting in the alleged actions that gave rise to this

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lawsuit. See Second Objections and Responses at 5, ECF No. 74-1 (explaining that "the Loan
Submission Schedule for Mr. Bartold's loan incorrectly reflects a modified term payment plan”
and further clarifying that, because “a Wells Fargo employee used and relied on the information
contained in the Loan Submission Schedule… Mr. Bartold’s loan was inadvertently onboard as a
modified term reverse mortgage loan”).
Wells Fargo’s practices regarding the investigation and correction of such errors would
be relevant to Mr. Bartold’s CUTPA claim, as they would help clarify whether this problem was
a systemic one that extended beyond only Mr. Bartold’s claims. Accordingly, Wells Fargo is
ordered to produce any existing policies governing the resolution of customer disputes in
connection with reverse mortgages.
To the extent that policies or training manuals for resolving customer disputes do not
exist, the Court notes that Wells Fargo’s failure to implement specific procedures or practices in
this area does not mean that Wells Fargo is not required to fulfill its discovery obligations under
Rule 26. Wells Fargo will not be required to produce the other policies requested in Mr.
Bartold’s amended RFPs, as the additional policies exceed the scope of Mr. Bartold’s claims.
2. Communications and System Notes (Second RFP Nos. 6-8, 16)
Mr. Bartold seeks to compel production of all system notes, database entries and
communications requested in his second Requests for Production Nos. 6-8 and 16. Wells Fargo
objects to the production of these documents, arguing that the documents are irrelevant and not
proportional to Mr. Bartold’s claims. Def. Mem. in Opp. at 15-16. To the extent that such
documents directly discuss Mr. Bartold’s loan, however, these notes may be relevant to Mr.
Bartold’s claims, as they could reveal additional information about how Wells Fargo handled
Mr. Bartold’s complaints and why it responded in the way it did. Accordingly, Wells Fargo is

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ordered to produce any non-privileged system notes, database entries or communications
pertaining directly to Mr. Bartold’s loan and the various recalculations of the amounts owed to
Mr. Bartold.
3. Documentation Regarding Interrogatory Responses (Second RFP
Nos. 18-21, 28-38)
Mr. Bartold also seeks production of the documents relied on in preparing responses to
interrogatories 3, 5-7, 9-11 and 14-24. Pl. Mem. in Supp. at 28. According to Mr. Bartold, these
interrogatory responses referenced documents that have not yet been provided. Wells Fargo
argues that it has not provided any responses to interrogatories 20-24, thus it is “premature” to
request documents relied on in connection with those responses. Def. Mem. in Opp. at 23.
To the extent that the requested documents are not privileged and relate directly to Mr.
Bartold’s loan, the documents are discoverable. Wells Fargo is ordered to produce the
documents relied on in connection with all listed interrogatories, including interrogatories 20-24
once those responses are produced.
4. Outstanding Interrogatories (Interr. Nos. 20-24)
Finally, Mr. Bartold seeks to compel responses to all outstanding interrogatories (Interr.
Nos. 20-24). These interrogatories seek relevant information pertaining to Wells Fargo’s
investigations of Mr. Bartold’s mortgage and its reasoning for its decisions regarding the
categorization of this mortgage. See Interr. At 15, White Dec. Ex. F, ECF No. 69-8. In addition
to its general objections regarding relevance and undue burden, Wells Fargo argues that these
interrogatories are compound and include more than one question, and thus they exceed the
permissible number of interrogatories. Def. Mem. in Opp. at 18-19.
To the extent that these interrogatories are in fact compound and in excess of the 25
interrogatories typically permitted, the Court now sua sponte grants leave for Plaintiff file

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additional interrogatories. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1) (“Leave to serve additional
interrogatories may be granted to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(2)”). Wells Fargo is
ordered to respond in full to interrogatories 20-24.
B. Motion for Protective Order
Wells Fargo has objected to all 34 of the proposed deposition topics reflected in Mr.
Bartold’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice, arguing that the proposed topics are “overbroad” and
“burdensome.” Def. Mem. in Supp. at 1. Disputed topics include Wells Fargo’s knowledge of
the facts pled in Mr. Bartold’s complaint; Wells Fargo’s actions in connection with servicing Mr.
Bartold’s mortgage; the disciplinary records of the various Wells Fargo employees who were
involved with Mr. Bartold’s mortgage; and record-keeping practices applicable to Mr. Bartold’s
mortgage. See Pl. 30(b)(6) Notice, Bizar Dec. Ex. A, ECF No. 71-2. Wells Fargo’s [70] Motion
for Protective Order is granted in part and denied in part.
1. Wells Fargo Policies and Procedures (Topics 14-16, 19, 21, 26-27)
Mr. Bartold seeks to inquire about a series of policies and procedures similar to those
requested in Mr. Bartold’s Second RFP Nos. 47-54. For the reasons described above, this topic
will be narrowed to only those policies and procedures governing the resolution of customer
complaints regarding reverse mortgages at the time of the alleged actions in connection with Mr.
Bartold’s reverse mortgage. Accordingly, Wells Fargo’s motion for a protective order is granted
with respect to Topics 14-16, 21 and 26-27. The motion is denied with respect to Topic 19.
2. Wells Fargo Record-Keeping Practices (Topics 17-18)
Mr. Bartold also seeks to inquire into the record-keeping practices applicable Mr.
Bartold’s loan. Wells Fargo argues that this topic is irrelevant and not proportional, claiming

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that it would impose an “unreasonable if not impossible burden on Wells Fargo” to prepare a
corporate designee to testify on these matters. Def. Mem. in Supp. at 26. The Court disagrees.
Mr. Bartold seeks information relevant to his claims, particularly given Wells Fargo’s
admission that erroneous record-keeping on the part of its employees essentially led to the
underlying dispute between the parties. These sorts of procedures are properly discoverable in
the context of a 30(b)(6) deposition. See, e.g. Cipriani v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc., No. 3:12
CV 910 JBA, 2012 WL 5869818, at *1 (D. Conn. Nov. 19, 2012) (allowing a 30(b)(6) corporate
designee to testify regarding wage and hour record keeping). Wells Fargo’s motion for a
protective order is denied with respect to Topics 17 and 18.
3. Employment and Disciplinary Records (Topics 11, 22, 31)
Mr. Bartold seeks information regarding the “employment and disciplinary history of the
individual(s) that onboarded Plaintiff’s reverse mortgage[.]” Pl. 30(b)(6) Notice at 4. Wells
Fargo objects, arguing that this information violates the privacy rights of its employees and
citing a Connecticut statute that prohibits disclosure of personnel information in the absence of
either written authorization from employees or a court order. Def. Mem. in Supp. at 20-21. The
Court disagrees.
This topic is sufficiently narrow, as it is limited to only those employees who were
involved in the onboarding process for Mr. Bartold’s reverse mortgage. Furthermore, any
sensitive information can be sealed from public access as needed to ensure the protection of
employee privacy, and the parties are directed forthwith to draft and propose to the Court any
such order by Friday, January 13, 2017. Accordingly, Wells Fargo’s motion for a protective
order is denied with respect to Topics 11, 22 and 31.

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4. Similar Complaints from Other Customers (Topics 32-33)
Mr. Bartold’s 30(b)(6) Notice also originally sought discovery of “[a]ll instances from
2008 to the present” involving mistakes made by Wells Fargo in connection with boarding,
calculating, or making payments for a reverse mortgage plan, as well as “[a]ll lawsuits and
customer complaints… for the period from 2008 to the present alleging” such errors. Pl.
30(b)(6) Notice at 6-7. Mr. Bartold has now narrowed these requests to focus only on specific
customer complaints, lawsuits, and previously identified concerns of which Wells Fargo’s
compliance department was aware from 2009 to 2014. Def. Mem in Supp. at 30. Wells Fargo
argues that these topics are not “proportional to the needs of this case” and that they would
impose “impossible burdens” on Wells Fargo. Id. at 31-32. The Court disagrees.
In Topics 32 and 33, Mr. Bartold seeks to understand whether the Wells Fargo
compliance department knew of similar mistakes that had been made in other customers’ reverse
mortgages at the time that Wells Fargo engaged in the underlying dispute with Mr. Bartold. This
would not be “impossible” for Wells Fargo to prepare; rather, it would simply require Wells
Fargo to determine whether it was aware of any relevant prior instances where mistakes were
made in connection with the onboarding or correction of a reverse mortgage. This information is
relevant to Mr. Bartold’s CUTPA claim, as it would help demonstrate whether the problems
faced by Mr. Bartold raised broader systemic issues as to how Wells Fargo conducted its reverse
mortgage business.
Wells Fargo’s motion for a protective order is denied in part with respect to Topics 32
and 33. Deposition questioning will be permitted with respect to specific customer complaints or
lawsuits of which Wells Fargo’s compliance department is already aware, if any, involving
mistakes allegedly made by Wells Fargo in connection with onboarding, calculating or making

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payments for a reverse mortgage. Questioning will not be permitted with respect to errors or
lawsuits of which Wells Fargo is not currently aware.
5. Communications and Investigations Concerning Mr. Bartold;
Servicing of Mr. Bartold’s Loan; Allegations in Complaint (Topics
1-10, 12-13, 20, 23-25, 28-30)
The remainder of Mr. Bartold’s proposed deposition topics relate to the specific actions
taken by Wells Fargo in connection with Mr. Bartold’s reverse mortgage. As these topics relate
directly to the factual allegations made by Mr. Bartold, they are neither irrelevant nor unduly
burdensome. Accordingly, Wells Fargo’s motion for protective order is denied with respect to
Topics 1-10, 12-13, 20, 23-25, and 28-30.2
III. Conclusion
Mr. Bartold’s [69] Motion to Compel and Wells Fargo’s [70] Motion for Protective Order
are each GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Wells Fargo is ordered to respond
to all outstanding RFPs and Interrogatories except for First RFP Nos. 47-48 and 51-54. Mr.
Bartold is permitted to proceed with the 30(b)(6) deposition on all topics except for Topics 1416, 21 and 27, as discussed above. Also, to the extent that a more specific protective order is
needed regarding any employee disciplinary records to be provided in discovery, the parties are
required to work together and submit any such proposed order by January 13, 2017.

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Topic 34 of Mr. Bartold’s 30(b)(6) Notice originally sought information regarding the “scope of Wells Fargo’s
reverse mortgage origination and servicing business and its revenue, organizational structure, and key employees at
the time of the events described in the Plaintiff’s complaint.” Pl. 30(b)(6) Notice at 7. This topic has since been
substituted for an inquiry regarding Wells Fargo’s answers to Mr. Bartold’s complaint: “Wells Fargo’s corporate
knowledge of facts concerning or refuting ¶¶ 31, 32, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 49, 56, 57, 59, 62, 69, 79 of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, which it denies in its Answer, and its Second through Fourteenth Special Defenses, excluding any
privileged information.” Def. Mem. in Supp. at 22. As this inquiry relates directly to the factual allegations in Mr.
Bartold’s Complaint, this topic will be permitted as amended.

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SO ORDERED this 30th day of December at Bridgeport, Connecticut.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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