Morgan, Jr. v. Dzurenda, et al

Filing 71

ORDER granting 68 Motion for Extension of Time; denying 68 Motion for Reconsideration; denying 68 Motion for Conference; denying 69 Motion for Order; denying 69 Motion to Appoint Counsel; denying 70 Motion to Appoint Counsel. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 2/22/2016. (Shin, D.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

LLOYD GEORGE MORGAN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 3:14-cv-966 (VAB)

v.
COMMISSIONER DZURENDA, ET AL.,
Defendants.

RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiff, Lloyd George Morgan, Jr., is currently confined in the MacDougall building at
the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution in Suffield, Connecticut (“MacDougall”).
Pending before the Court are the plaintiff’s motions for extension of time, for appointment of
counsel, and to access the court.
I.

Motion for Extension of Time [Doc. No. 68]
On December 29, 2015, Mr. Morgan filed a motion seeking intervention regarding the

processing of legal mail and documents to be filed with the Court. The motion included
allegations against prison staff at Corrigan-Radgwoski Correctional Institution and prison staff at
MacDougall. The defendants filed an objection to the motion on January 22, 2016 and Mr.
Morgan seeks a sixty day extension of time to file a reply. The motion is granted in part.1 Any
reply to the defendants’ objection to his motion for intervention must be filed on or before March
25, 2016.
II.

Motions for Appointment of Counsel [Docs. Nos. 69, 70]
Mr. Morgan also seeks the appointment of pro bono counsel. As a preliminary matter,

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To the extent that the title of the motion includes requests for reconsideration, relief, reasonable
remedy, and settlement conference, the motion does not include any description of the nature of
the relief sought and thus is denied in all other respects.
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civil litigants, unlike criminal defendants, do not have a constitutional right to the appointment of
counsel. See Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (district judges are
afforded “broad discretion” in determining whether to appoint pro bono counsel for an indigent
litigant in a civil case); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may request an attorney to represent
any person unable to afford counsel.”) (emphasis added). The Second Circuit has made clear
that before an appointment is even considered in a civil action, the indigent person must
demonstrate that he or she is unable to obtain counsel or legal assistance. See Hodge, 802 F.2d
at 61.
In the first motion seeking the appointment of counsel, Mr. Morgan indicates that, on
January 15, 2016, he was in segregation and unable to meet with an attorney from the Inmates’
Legal Aid Program who came to the prison that day. He does not indicate, however, that he has
made any attempts to contact the Inmates’ legal Aid Program by telephone or letter since January
15, 2016. In the second motion, Mr. Morgan mentions a conflict of interest with the Inmates’
Legal Aid Program, but does not otherwise describe the nature of the conflict. The possibility
that the plaintiff may be able to secure legal assistance independently precludes appointment of
counsel by the court at this time. See Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61.
III.

Motion for Adequate Access to Court [Doc. No. 69]
Mr. Morgan reiterates his allegations regarding mail interference by correctional staff at

MacDougall in the first two weeks of December 2015. Those allegations are also included in the
plaintiff’s pending motion for intervention and remedy. As indicated above, the plaintiff seeks to
file a reply to the defendants’ objection to that motion. Thus, the present motion for access to
court is denied to the extent it raises allegations that will be addressed when the Court rules on
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the prior motion for injunctive relief.
In addition, Mr. Morgan claims that, in mid-January 2016, he drafted a new complaint
against thirty defendants and attempted to file it with this Court. He contends that a captain at
MacDougall stole his lawsuit before it could be filed. He seeks an order directing prison
officials to transport him to court to be heard regarding his allegations that prison officials have
denied him the opportunity to file documents and new lawsuits.
The Court notes that since his transfer to MacDougall on December 3, 2015, the plaintiff
has filed four motions for injunctive relief, one motion for extension of time and one motion for
appointment of counsel in this action. Thus, it does not appear that prison officials have
hindered the plaintiff from filing motions with the Court or litigating this case.
In addition, Mr. Morgan’s allegations that prison officials at MacDougall prevented him
from filing a new lawsuit are without merit. On February 11, 2016, the plaintiff filed a
complaint naming over thirty defendants. See Morgan v. Semple, Case No. 3:16-cv-225 (VAB).
The complaint is dated January 28, 2016, and is 299 pages in length. Thus, the plaintiff was able
to file his new lawsuit and the case remains pending. Because the plaintiff has not shown that he
will suffer imminent harm if the Court does not grant his request for relief, the motion for
injunctive relief is denied to the extent that it relates to alleged interference with his legal mail in
January 2016.
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time [Doc. No. 68] to file a reply to the defendants’
objection [Doc. No. 66] to the motion for intervention and remedy is GRANTED in part. Any
reply to the defendants’ objection must be filed on or before March 25, 2016. This Motion [Doc.
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No. 68] is DENIED in all other respects. The Motions for Appointment of Counsel [Docs. Nos.
69, 70] are DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a new motion at a later stage of the
litigation, after he has made additional attempts to secure the assistance of counsel from the
Inmate Legal Aid Program. The Motion for Adequate Access to the Court [Doc. No. 69] is
DENIED to the extent that it relates to alleged interference with his legal mail in January 2016
and DENIED without prejudice to the extent that it raises allegations relating to mail
interference in December 2015 because those allegations will be addressed when the court rules
on the prior motion for injunctive relief [Doc. No. 63].
SO ORDERED this 22nd day of February, 2016, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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