Morgan, Jr. v. Dzurenda, et al

Filing 89

ORDER denying 63 Motion; denying 75 Motion for Default Entry 55(a); denying 76 Motion for Default Entry 55(a); denying 78 Motion; denying 80 Motion for Conference; finding as moot 81 Motion; denying 85 Motion to Stay; granting 86 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 4/21/2016. (Shin, D.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

LLOYD GEORGE MORGAN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 3:14-cv-966 (VAB)

COMMISSIONER DZURENDA, ET AL.,
Defendants.

RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS [Doc. Nos. 63, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, 85, 86]
Plaintiff, Lloyd George Morgan, Jr., is currently confined at Garner Correctional
Institution in Newtown, Connecticut (“Garner”). Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s
motions for consideration and remedy, motions for default, and motion for extension of
time and Defendants’ motions to submit unsigned affidavit and motion to stay. For the
reasons set forth below, the motion for extension of time is granted in part and the
remaining motions are denied.
I.

Motion for Consideration, Intervention and Remedy [Doc. No. 63]

Mr. Morgan complains about interference with his legal mail from November 1, 2015
to December 1, 2015 at Corrigan Correctional Institution (“Corrigan”) and from December
3, 2015 to December 22, 2015 at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution
(“MacDougall”). He also contends that “he has received threats that if he litigates this case
or file[s] other cases he will be assaulted or killed by prison officials.” Mot. Consideration,
Intervention and Remedy, Doc. No. 63 at 4. He asks the Court to investigate his
allegations regarding mail interference and to transport him to Court to meet with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice.

The allegations in the motion are unrelated to the allegations in the Complaint [Doc.
No. 1]. The allegations that remain in the case are related to Mr. Morgan’s confinement at
Carl Robinson and Osborn Correctional Institutions from July 2013 through May 2014.
See Initial Review Order, Doc. No. 11.
Preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy . . . that should
not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”
Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In this Circuit the standard for injunctive relief is well
established. To warrant preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must demonstrate
(a) that he or she will suffer “irreparable harm” in the absence of an injunction, and (b)
“either (1) a likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to
the merits [of the case] to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships
tipping decidedly toward the party requesting preliminary injunctive relief.” Cacchillo v.
Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 405-06 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Second Circuit has held that an inmate’s requests for injunctive and declaratory
relief against correctional staff or conditions of confinement at a particular correctional
institution become moot when the inmate is discharged or transferred to a different
correctional institution. See Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 2011) (“‘In this
circuit, an inmate’s transfer from a prison facility generally moots claims for declaratory or
injunctive relief against officials at that facility.’”) (quoting Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d
263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006)); Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The
hallmark of a moot case or controversy is that the relief sought can no longer be given or is
no longer needed.”). Mr. Morgan is no longer confined at Corrigan or MacDougall. He is

2

now incarcerated at Garner. Thus, the relief sought by Mr. Morgan relating to conditions at
Corrigan and MacDougall and to correctional employees who are not defendants in the
case is no longer needed.
In addition, it would be inappropriate for the Court to grant a request for injunctive
relief that is unrelated to the claims and the defendants in the Complaint. See De Beers
Consol. Mines Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) (preliminary injunction
appropriate to grant intermediate relief of “the same character as that which relief may be
granted finally,” but inappropriate where the injunction “deals with a matter lying wholly
outside the issues in the suit.”); Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, 111
F.3d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997) (“a preliminary injunction may never issue to prevent an injury
or harm which not even the moving party contends was caused by the wrong claimed in
the underlying action”); Lewis v. Johnson, No. 08-cv-482, 2010 WL 1268024, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2010) (denying motion for preliminary injunction based on actions taken
by staff at Great Meadow Correctional Facility in 2010 where complaint alleged
wrongdoing by staff at Franklin and Upstate Correctional Facilities in 2006 and 2007). The
Court notes that Mr. Morgan is litigating his claims regarding conditions of confinement at
Corrigan and MacDougall from August 2015 to December 2015 in another case he filed in
this Court in January 2016. See Morgan v. Semple, Case No. 3:16-cv-225 (VAB).
Accordingly, the request seeking consideration, intervention and injunctive relief in
connection with events that occurred at Corrigan and MacDougall from November to
December 2015 is denied.
Mr. Morgan also asks the Court to reconsider his request that pro bono counsel be
appointed to represent him in this case. In April and July 2015, Mr. Morgan filed motions

3

for appointment of counsel. On August 24, 2015, the Court denied the motions on the
ground that it could not determine whether it was likely that Mr. Morgan would succeed on
the merits of his claims and on the ground that he had not made efforts to contact the
Inmate Legal Aid Program with regard to any questions he had about litigating the case.
See Ruling Pending Mots., Doc. No. 48. To the extent that Mr. Morgan seeks
reconsideration of that ruling, the request is untimely and is denied. See Rule 7(c), D.
Conn. L. Civ. R. (“Motions for Reconsideration shall be filed and served within fourteen
(14) days of the filing of the decision or order from which relief is sought . . . .”).
Even if the Court were to construe this motion as a renewed motion for appointment
of counsel, Mr. Morgan has not shown that he cannot secure legal assistance on his own.
He has recently filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint with the assistance of
an attorney from the Inmate Legal Aid Program.
The motion for consideration, intervention and remedy is denied to the extent that it
seeks reconsideration of the Court’s ruling denying his prior motion for appointment of
counsel and to the extent that it could be construed as a renewed motion for appointment
of counsel. Accordingly, the motion for consideration, intervention and remedy is denied in
all respects.
II.

Motion for Relief From Judgment and for Consideration and
Objection to Motion for Extension of Time [Doc. No. 78]
Defendants’ Motion for Stay [Doc. No. 85]
Plaintiff has filed a three-part motion. Defendants have filed a motion seeking to be

relieved of the obligation to respond to Plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment and
consideration.
Mr. Morgan first objects to Defendants’ motion for extension of time to file a motion

4

for summary judgment. He claims that Defendants have had more than enough time to file
a motion for summary judgment and that he would be prejudiced if the Court were to grant
Defendants an extension of time to file a motion for summary judgment. The objection is
overruled.
Mr. Morgan next complains about interference with legal mail. He informs the Court
that a counselor at Garner is conspiring with the Attorney General’s Office to withhold
copies of docket sheets from cases filed in this Court that were sent to him by the Clerk.
Mr. Morgan also contends that the same counselor has also failed to deliver to him a copy
of a motion for extension of time filed by counsel for Defendants.
The counselor that Mr. Morgan refers to as having failed to deliver documents is not
a defendant in this action. The allegations that remain in the case are related to Mr.
Morgan’s confinement at Carl Robinson and Osborn Correctional Institutions from July
2013 through May 2014, and do not involve claims of interference with legal mail. As
indicated above, it would be inappropriate for the Court to grant a request for injunctive
relief that is unrelated to the claims and the defendants in the complaint. See De Beers
Consol. Mines Ltd., 325 U.S. at 220; Omega World Travel, Inc., 111 F.3d at 16; Lewis,
2010 WL 1268024, at *3. The Court will, however, direct the Clerk to re-send copies of the
docket sheet from this case and the docket sheet from Morgan v. Semple, Case No. 3:16cv-225 (VAB), to Mr. Morgan.
In his final request for relief, Mr. Morgan again asks the Court to reconsider
appointing pro bono counsel to represent him in this action. Mr. Morgan claims that the
Court has been unfair in denying his previous motions for counsel. In addition, he
contends that the Court has not appointed him pro bono counsel in the last twenty years

5

and the Court is biased against him.
Previously, in this matter, on February 22, 2016, the Court denied Mr. Morgan’s
renewed motions for appointment of counsel because he had not shown that assistance
was unavailable from the Inmates’ Legal Aid Program. See Ruling Pending Mots., Doc.
No. 71 at 2. The present motion was filed on March 15, 2016. Any request for
reconsideration of the Court’s February 22, 2016 Ruling on his most recently filed motions
for appointment of counsel is denied as untimely.
To the extent that the motion may be construed as a renewed motion for
appointment of counsel, it is denied. The fact that the Court has not regularly appointed
counsel to represent Mr. Morgan in his various civil actions has no bearing on whether
counsel should be appointed in this action.1 As indicated above, Mr. Morgan has not
shown that he cannot secure legal assistance on his own. An attorney from the Inmate
Legal Aid Program has assisted him in filing a motion to amend the complaint. See Mot.
Amend, Doc. No. 88. Furthermore, Mr. Morgan has moved for an extension of time to
respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because he intends to ask counsel
at Inmates’ Legal Aid Program to assist him with his response. The motion is denied to the
extent that it is construed as renewed motion for appointment of counsel.
Defendants ask the Court to excuse them from responding to Plaintiff’s motion for
relief from judgment because they have moved for summary judgment. Defendants’
provide no basis for their motion. Because the Court has denied the motion for relief from
judgment and consideration in all respects and has overruled Plaintiff’s objection to

1

Furthermore, a review of cases filed by Mr. Morgan in this Court reflects that the
Court did appoint pro bono counsel in at least one case within the last twenty years. See
Morgan v. Meachum, Case No. 3:93-cv-28 (AVC), Docket Entry 86.
6

Defendants’ motion for extension of time, Defendants’ motion seeking an order that any
response to the motion for relief from judgment be stayed is denied as moot.
III.

Motion for Consideration and Remedy [Doc. No. 80]
Mr. Morgan asks the Court to schedule a settlement conference. He claims that he

has made attempts to settle this case by sending offers of settlement to counsel for
Defendants, but he has not received any responses to his offers. Counsel for Defendants
has recently filed a motion for summary judgment. Thus, at this time, it does not appear
that a settlement conference would be beneficial.
Mr. Morgan also states that he did not receive a copy of Defendants’ Answer to the
Complaint or their motion for extension of time to file a motion for summary judgment. Mr.
Morgan is unsure whether counsel for Defendants is sending him copies of the motions
and other documents that she files with the Court. Mr. Morgan suggests that it is also
possible that prison officials at Garner who are responsible for the receipt and delivery of
copies of motions filed in the case are not delivering the copies of motions and other
documents filed by counsel for Defendants. Neither prison official whom Mr. Morgan
identifies as being involved in delivering copies of motions is a defendant in this case.
Furthermore, the case does not involve interference with legal mail. For all of these
reasons and the fact that Mr. Morgan has not alleged that he will suffer imminent harm if
his request for injunctive relief is not granted, the motion is denied.
The Court directs counsel for Defendants to re-send a copy of the Answer to the
complaint and a copy of the motion for extension of time to file summary judgment to
Plaintiff. In addition, counsel shall verify that the Answer and motion for extension of time
are delivered to Plaintiff by prison officials at Garner and file a notice with the Court to that

7

effect.
IV.

Motions for Default [Docs. Nos. 75, 76]
Mr. Morgan seeks to default Defendants for failure to plead. Defendants filed an

answer to the Complaint on March 18, 2016. The motions for default are denied.
V.

Motion for Extension of Time [Doc. No. 86]
Plaintiff seeks a four-month extension of time to file a response to the motion for

summary judgment. Mr. Morgan states that he thinks it will take an attorney from the
Inmate Legal Aid Program about 120 days to assist him in filing a response to the motion
for summary judgment. The motion is granted in part. The Court will permit Mr. Morgan
ninety days to file a response to the motion for summary judgment.
Mr. Morgan also states that he has not received a copy of the motion for summary
judgment, the memorandum or its attached exhibits. Instead, he has only received the
Court’s notice of electronic filing indicating that the motion was filed. Counsel for
Defendants shall verify with correctional officials at Garner that the motion for summary
judgment, the memorandum in support and all exhibits and affidavits filed in support of the
motion are in fact delivered to Mr. Morgan. Counsel shall file a notice with the Court
confirming the date of delivery of these documents to Plaintiff.
VI.

Motion to Submit Unsigned Affidavit [Doc. No. 81]
Defendants seek to submit the unsigned affidavit of Warden Chapdelaine in support

of their motion for summary judgment. Counsel for Defendants indicates that Warden
Chapdelaine was unable to sign her affidavit before the filing of the motion for summary
judgment. The unsigned affidavit is not attached to the motion for leave to file it.
Furthermore, counsel for Defendants has moved for leave to file the signed affidavit of

8

Warden Chapdelaine and the Court has granted her motion. Accordingly, the motion to file
the unsigned affidavit of Warden Chapdelaine is denied as moot.
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Motion for Consideration, Intervention and Remedy [Doc. No. 63] is
DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief of Judgment or Order and for Consideration [Doc.
No. 78] is DENIED and the Objection to Motion for Extension of Time [Doc. No. 78] is
OVERRULED. Defendants’ Motion for Stay [Doc. No. 85] and Plaintiff’s Motions for
Default [Docs. Nos. 75, 76] are DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Consideration and
Remedy [Doc. No. 80] is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion to File Unsigned Affidavit of
Warden Chapdelaine [Doc. No. 81] is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension
of Time [Doc. No. 86] to respond to the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in
part. The Court will permit Plaintiff ninety days to file a response to the motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiff’s response to the motion for summary judgment is due on
or before July 22, 2016.
The Court directs the Clerk to re-send a copy of the docket sheet from this
case and a copy of the docket sheet from Morgan v. Semple, Case No. 3:16-cv225 (VAB), to Plaintiff.
The Court directs counsel for Defendants to re-send a copy of the Answer
to the Complaint and a copy of the motion for extension of time to file summary
judgment to Plaintiff. Counsel shall also verify whether the motion for summary
judgment and the memorandum, exhibits and affidavits filed in support of the
motion were previously delivered to Plaintiff. If the motion and memo and its
supporting documents were not delivered to Plaintiff, counsel shall make

9

arrangements for the delivery of those documents to Plaintiff. Counsel shall file a
notice with the Court within fourteen days of the date of this order indicating the
date or dates on which the Answer, motion for extension of time and motion for
summary judgment and memorandum, affidavits and exhibits in support of the
motion were delivered to Plaintiff by prison officials at Garner.
SO ORDERED this 21st day of April, 2016, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE