Francis v. Hartford Board of Education

Filing 67

ORDER granting 37 Motion for Summary Judgment. Please see attached Ruling & Order for details. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 9/30/17. (Jones, P.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
YVONNE FRANCIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Hartford Board of Education,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Case No. 3:14-cv-972 (RNC)

RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff Yvonne Francis brings this action under the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Title VII the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”)
and the Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act (“CWCA”).

She

alleges that defendant Hartford Board of Education subjected her
to various adverse employment actions because of discrimination
based on her disabilities and in retaliation for complaining
about discrimination.
all claims.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on

For reasons that follow, that motion is granted.

I. Background
The parties’ submissions show the following.

West Middle

School hired plaintiff as an Assistant Principal for the 20112012 school year based on the recommendation of Principal Sheilda
Garrison.

She and Garrison had disputes over compensation, food

1

ordering for a holiday luncheon, and Garrison’s request for
documentation when plaintiff requested sick leave.

On

plaintiff’s year-end evaluation, Garrison provided some positive
feedback but requested that plaintiff participate in certain
meetings, be more receptive to new ideas and practice better time
management.

At that time, plaintiff applied to other available

administrative positions because she wanted to advance her career
and felt the work environment with Garrison was not positive.
On September 26, 2012, plaintiff sprained her shoulder while
assisting a child who was having a temper tantrum.

She was

initially given medical restrictions limiting her from lifting
her right arm.

Her doctor later specifically restricted her from

“lifting trays repeatedly.”

(Adults typically had to help

younger students lift trays in the cafeteria.)

On November 28,

2012, she was fully released with no physical restrictions.
While plaintiff was injured, she had a number of workplace
disputes with Garrison.

The day after her injury, she missed a

scheduled meeting with Garrison after telling Garrison she would
attend.

According to plaintiff, Garrison gave her a hard time

about leaving to attend physical therapy appointments and gave
her unequal work assignments.

Plaintiff missed another meeting

and, as a result, was for several weeks uninformed about new

2

proficiency goals at the school.
In November 2012, plaintiff filed an internal complaint
against Garrison for racially-motivated harassment.

The Central

Harassment team later found insufficient evidence to support
plaintiff’s claim.

Plaintiff eventually came to believe Garrison

harassed her because of her disability.

After she filed the

complaint, Garrison expressed dissatisfaction with plaintiff’s
behavior: in December 2012, plaintiff received a written warning
for leaving the building unsupervised, and in January 2013, she
received a mid-year evaluation that rated her as “Needs
Improvement.”
On January 14, 2013, plaintiff notified the school she had
suffered another work-related injury.

This time it was a knee

injury – traumatic chrondomalacia of the patella - sustained on
December 17 as a result of a fall.

According to plaintiff, she

continued treatment through February 2014 and was diagnosed with
a 5% permanent impairment. Because of this injury, plaintiff
requested workers’ compensation and was on sick leave from
January 9 through February 20.
When plaintiff returned to work, she was directed to perform
most of her work while seated and to avoid stairs.

According to

plaintiff, Garrison made it impossible to comply with these

3

restrictions by moving her office to the basement.

Because there

were no classrooms on that floor, plaintiff could not do her job
duties, including evaluating teachers.

Eventually, she and

Garrison came up with a plan for her to stay on one floor a day
so she could perform evaluations.
On March 18, 2013, Garrison formally reprimanded plaintiff
for failure to fill out paperwork required for taking leave.
Plaintiff responded with a letter stating that she had filled out
the proper paperwork.

She also accused Garrison of harassment

and expressed the hope that it would be reflected in Garrison’s
evaluations.

She copied Garrison’s supervisor and the Director

of Human Resources.

Around this time, plaintiff was notified

that her position was going to be eliminated.

According to

defendant, West Middle School was to be temporarily co-located
with another school, resulting in a lower enrollment and no need
for an Assistant Principal.
On April 10, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint with the
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities
(“CHRO”).

Citing her shoulder and knee injuries, she complained

that defendant denied her reasonable accommodations based on her
disability.1 Shortly thereafter, on April 12, 2013, plaintiff
took another medical leave.

Despite being released by her doctor

1 Plaintiff also alleged she was discriminated against based on her
age, sex, race, and religion. She has not made these claims here.

4

on May 6, 2013, she did not return to work until June 17, 2013.
Throughout May and into the summer of 2013, plaintiff was
embroiled in several disputes.

In early May 2013, Garrison wrote

to plaintiff about her year-end evaluation.

Plaintiff ignored

offers to schedule an evaluation conference or provide
information.
Improvement.”

Once again, Garrison rated her as “Needs
Plaintiff refused to sign a copy of the evaluation

or meet with Garrison.

At the same time, Garrison requested that

plaintiff return an iPad, laptop and cell phone owned by the
district.

Plaintiff failed to respond to these requests.

Garrison enlisted Dr. Scott Nicol, Executive Director of
Performance Management, to reach out to plaintiff about signing
the evaluation and returning the district-owned items.

He told

her in writing and via email that her signature did not imply she
agreed with the evaluation and asked her to attend a meeting to
bring back the items.

Plaintiff failed to respond to these

requests and eventually filed a complaint with the Hartford
Police Department accusing Dr. Nicol of harassment.

She never

signed the evaluation form but eventually returned the items.
Because plaintiff’s position was eliminated for the 20132014 school year, she sought a new administrative position in the
district.

At the end of the 2012-2013 school year there were

over ten administrative positions.
5

Plaintiff interviewed for one

position but did not receive an offer.

Due to her negative

performance evaluations, she was not eligible for automatic
placement in a new position.

Defendant later demoted plaintiff

to teacher and continued her 2013-2014 salary.

Defendant cited

her failure to follow the directives to sign her evaluation and
failure to timely return the district’s property.
In July 2013, plaintiff filed a grievance over her placement
as a teacher and her salary continuation.

After a hearing, a

neutral arbiter ruled that defendant did not violate the union
contract.
II. Discussion
Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims, arguing
plaintiff has failed to raise triable issues of fact.

Summary

judgment may be granted when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
(1986).

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party must

point to evidence that would permit a jury to return a verdict in
his or her favor.
252 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

In determining whether this standard is met, the

evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Id. at 255.

6

A. Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff claims defendant discriminated against her because
of her disability when Garrison harassed her, gave her unequal
work assignments and refused to provide reasonable
accommodations.

Claims under the ADAAA and CFEPA are governed by

the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

See McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).2 To show a
prima facie case of disability discrimination under either
statute, plaintiff must prove that (1) her employer is subject to
the statute; (2) she is disabled within the meaning of the
statute; (3) she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential
functions of her job; and (4) she suffered an adverse employment
action because of her disability.

Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386

F.3d 192, 198 (2d. Cir 2004) (ADAAA); Jackson v. Water Pollution
Control Auth. City of Bridgeport, 278 Conn. 692, 705, 900 A.2d
498, 507-08 (Conn. 2006) (CFEPA).
Under the ADAAA, a “disability” is defined as “(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities . . . , (B) a record of such
impairment, or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”

2 Plaintiff also brings a discrimination claim under the CWCA, which
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees for filing
workers’ compensation claims. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-290a.
Because
this claim is akin to a retaliation claim, I address it along with the
other retaliation claims in Section II.B.

7

42 U.S.C. § 12102(a).

Factors to consider include: 1) “[t]he

nature and severity of the impairment,” 2) “[t]he duration or
expected duration of the impairment, and 3) “[t]he permanent or
long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact
of or resulting from the impairment.” Buotote v. Illinois Tool
Works, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 2d 549, 556 (D. Conn. 2011) (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)).

Under the CFEPA, a person is “physically

disabled” if she has a “chronic physical handicap, infirmity or
impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury,
organic processes or changes or from illness.”

Conn. Gen. Stat.

§ 46a-51(15).
Plaintiff has not established that she was disabled under
either the ADAAA or the CFEPA.

Her medical restrictions were

temporary and, as she states, “really minor.”

Neither her

shoulder injury, for which she had restrictions from September to
November, or her knee injury, for which she had restrictions from
January to May, qualify as a chronic impairment or a physical
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

See

Adams v. Citizens Advice Bureau, 187 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“[A] temporary impairment of seven months, by itself, [is] too
short in duration . . . to be substantially limiting.” (citations
and quotation marks omitted)); Caruso v. Siemens Bus. Commc'ns,
Inc., No. 3:00-CV-0924(EBB), 2004 WL 235365, at *7 (D. Conn. Feb.
8

5, 2004) (“It is not possible that a twenty-three-day old injury,
when Plaintiff had no prior back injuries, became a chronic
disability in this minute amount of time.”).

Though plaintiff

points to the 5% permanency rating to her knee, the permanency
rating came long after the adverse employment actions and, in any
event, a permanency rating does not equate to a disability.

See

Palmieri v. City of Hartford, 947 F.Supp.2d 187, 199 (D. Conn.
2013) (finding no disability where plaintiff had back injury with
twenty percent permanency rating).
Because plaintiff has failed to show that she had a
disability within the meaning of the ADAAA or CFEPA, defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is granted as to her claims of
disability discrimination.
B. Retaliation Claims
Plaintiff claims that defendant retaliated against her in
violation of the ADAAA, CFEPA, CWCA and Title VII.

Claims for

retaliation are analyzed under the same burden-shifting
framework.

To establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must show

that 1) she engaged in activity protected by the statute, 2) the
employer was aware of this conduct, 3) the employer took adverse
employment action against her, and 4) a causal connection exists
between the protected conduct and the adverse action.

Treglia v.

Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002) (ADAAA);
9

Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat'l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276,
292 (2d Cir. 1998) (Title VII); Marini v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
64 F. Supp. 3d 317, 332 (D. Conn. 2014) (CFEPA and ADAAA); Martin
v. Town of Westport, 108 Conn. App. 710, 718, 918 A.2d 921, 927
(CWCA) (Conn. App. 2007).

If the plaintiff establishes a prima

facie case, the defendant must articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action.

Treglia, 313 F.3d at 721.

Then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
defendant’s articulated reason is merely a pretext for
retaliation.

Id.

Plaintiff claims she engaged in the following protected
activities: requesting accommodations for her injuries,
complaining to Garrison about how she was being treated after her
shoulder injury, filing an internal harassment complaint, filing
a CHRO complaint about her injuries and requesting workers’
compensation.

She points to the following adverse employment

actions: Garrison mistreated her, gave her unequal work
assignments, reprimanded her and gave her negative mid-year and
year-end evaluations; Dr. Nicol pestered her about signing her
evaluation and returning the district’s property; and defendant
demoted her with a salary continuation.

Defendant argues that

each of these actions was taken for legitimate, non-retaliatory
reasons, specifically, that plaintiff did not act professionally.
10

Defendant points to plaintiff’s refusal to comply with requests
and directives of her supervisors, her failure to attend
meetings, perform her duties, return district-owned property, and
her failure to follow proper procedures.

Defendant also argues

that plaintiff’s position was eliminated for unrelated reasons
and her negative performance reviews were a legitimate basis for
her demotion.
Assuming plaintiff has met her burden of presenting a prima
facie case, defendant has satisfied its burden of providing
legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its actions: plaintiff’s
disputes with Garrison predated her injuries and complaints,
negating an inference of retaliation, and plaintiff admits to
missing meetings, not responding to communications, refusing to
sign her evaluation form and failing to timely return districtowned property.

See Jamilik v. Yale Univ., 362 F. App'x 148, 151

(2d Cir. 2009) (“In pointing to the exhaustive documentation
regarding [plaintiff]'s allegedly poor performance and
disciplinary issues, however, [defendant] has met its minimal
burden in rebutting [plaintiff]'s prima facie showing of
retaliation.”).
Plaintiff has not provided evidence to show defendant’s
legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons were a cover-up for
retaliation.

Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of her mid-year and
11

year-end evaluations and argues that defendant’s proffered
reasons are subjective, making it inappropriate for the Court to
resolve this case on summary judgment.

She points out that “a

sudden drop-off in performance evaluations” can support an
inference of retaliation.

Curcio v. Roosevelt Union Free Sch.

Dist., No. 10-cv-5612 (SFJ)(AKT), 212 WL 3646935, at * 15
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2012).

But plaintiff offers no evidence,

direct or circumstantial, that she received negative performance
evaluations because she engaged in protected activities.
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, defendant did not provide
solely subjective reasons for plaintiff’s negative performance
evaluations: the evaluations were supported by extensive evidence
regarding plaintiff’s behavior, much of which plaintiff does not
dispute.

Plaintiff provides no evidence that any of her

supervisors ever discussed her complaints, let alone that the
adverse actions were because of the complaints.
Because plaintiff has failed to present evidence permitting
a jury to find in her favor on the retaliation claim, defendant
is entitled to summary judgment.

12

III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 37] is
hereby granted.
So ordered this 30th day of September 2017.
/s/
Robert N. Chatigny
United States District Judge

13