Holley v. Brighthaupt
Filing
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ORDER granting 8 Motion to Dismiss; denying 12 Motion for Default Judgment. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 12/17/2014. (Reardon, C)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
REGINALD L. HOLLEY
:
:
:
:
:
V.
WARDEN JON BRIGHTHAUPT
PRISONER
Case No. 3:14-cv-1041 (RNC)
RULING AND ORDER
Petitioner Reginald L. Holley, a Connecticut inmate, brings
this action pro se for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254.
Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition on
the grounds that the claims are not exhausted and the petition is
time-barred.
I.
For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
Procedural Background
On May 24, 2011, petitioner was sentenced to several
concurrent sentences resulting in a total effective term of
imprisonment of twenty years, execution suspended after twelve
years, plus five years of probation.
The sentence resulted from
guilty pleas entered in three cases on charges of home invasion,
assault in the first degree with a firearm, assault in the second
degree with the intent to cause physical injury and assault in
the first degree with intent to cause serious physical injury.
Petitioner did not appeal.
On February 24, 2014, petitioner commenced a state habeas
action, Holley v. Warden, State Prison, No. TSR-CV14-4006009-S.
In the state action, he raises the same claims he includes in his
federal petition.
See ECF No. 8, Attachment 2.
II.
Standard of Review
A federal court may entertain a petition for habeas corpus
challenging a state court conviction if the petitioner claims
that his custody violates the Constitution or federal laws.
U.S.C. § 2254(a).
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Before filing a habeas petition in federal
court, a state prisoner must exhaust state court remedies.
See
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144
L.Ed.2d 1 (1999); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
The exhaustion
requirement is satisfied by presenting the factual and legal
bases for the federal claims to the highest court of the state,
either through direct or collateral review.
See O'Sullivan, 526
U.S. at 845; Galdamez v. Keane, 394 F.3d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir.
2005).
In addition, a one-year statute of limitations applies to a
federal habeas petition challenging a state court conviction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
The limitation period begins to run
on the completion of direct appeal or the conclusion of the time
within which an appeal could have been filed.
It may be tolled
for the period during which a properly filed state habeas
petition is pending.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244; Williams v. Artuz,
237 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924
(2001).
A petitioner can overcome this time bar by demonstrating
that the limitation period should be equitably tolled.
2
But
equitable tolling is rarely available in habeas cases.
The
petitioner must show that he pursued his rights diligently and
extraordinary circumstances prevented him from timely filing his
petition.
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct.
1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005).
III. Discussion
At the time he committed the crimes underlying his sentence,
petitioner was a juvenile.
He states that in response to a
series of Supreme Court cases, the Connecticut Sentencing
Commission has recommended that the legislature create a
procedure permitting a juvenile sentenced to a lengthy prison
term to obtain release on parole by demonstrating maturity and
rehabilitation.
See ECF No. 1, at 4 ¶¶ 8-9 (citing Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012);
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161
L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)).
Although the Connecticut House of
Representatives passed such a bill in 2013, the legislative
session concluded before a Senate vote.
Petitioner argues that
the state legislature is delaying action on the bill to his
detriment.
He contends that he now is mature and has been
rehabilitated.
He acknowledges that he has commenced a state
habeas action, and has also filed a motion for re-sentencing in
state court.
Even so, he asks this Court to re-sentence him to
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render him eligible for consideration of immediate release by the
parole board.
A.
ECF No. 1, at 12.
Exhaustion of State Court Remedies
Respondent argues that the claims are not exhausted because
petitioner has a pending state habeas action asserting the same
challenge to his sentence.
Petitioner concedes that he has filed
a state habeas action containing the same claims.
He contends,
however, that he should not be required to exhaust his state
court remedies because exhaustion is futile: he expects that the
state court will conclude that he is not entitled to relief under
the Constitution.
He also argues that waiting for the state
court's decision will unjustly delay his release.
Petitioner's first argument is unavailing.
No case law
supports the proposition that a federal petitioner need not
exhaust state court remedies simply because he anticipates that
the state courts will find no constitutional infirmity in his
confinement.
The very purpose of the exhaustion requirement is
to ensure that state courts have an opportunity to address
federal constitutional claims.
Petitioner's second argument fares no better.
“[A]n
inordinate and unjustified delay in the state corrective process”
may warrant consideration of a state prisoner’s habeas petition
notwithstanding the prisoner’s failure to exhaust his claims in
state court.
United States ex rel. Goodman v. Kehl, 456 F.2d
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863, 869 (2d Cir. 1972).
But when a state collateral proceeding
(as opposed to a direct appeal) is in issue, the delay must be
unusually lengthy to relieve the prisoner of the need to exhaust.
See, e.g., Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402, 405-06 (3d Cir. 1994)
(excusing exhaustion where prisoner encountered eleven-year delay
in deciding state collateral proceeding); Cristin v. Brennan, 281
F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that twenty-seven month
delay in state postconviction proceeding did not excuse
exhaustion).
months ago.
Petitioner filed his state habeas petition six
This delay is not unreasonable.
The motion to
dismiss is therefore granted on the ground that petitioner has
not exhausted state court remedies.
When a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition includes
both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the court may in limited
circumstances stay the proceeding pending completion of state
court review.
See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78, 125 S.
Ct. 1528, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 (2005).
Here, however, the petition
includes only unexhausted claims.
Accordingly, a stay is not
warranted.
B.
Statute of Limitations
Respondent also argues that the petition is time-barred.
As
explained above, petitioner was required to file his federal
habeas petition within one year of the date on which his
conviction became final either by completion of direct appeal or
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conclusion of the time within which an appeal could have been
filed.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
24, 2011.
Petitioner was sentenced on May
He did not appeal his conviction.
Thus, the
limitation period commenced on June 13, 2011, twenty days after
he was sentenced.
See Conn. Practice Book § 63-1(a) (“Unless a
different time period is provided by statute, an appeal must be
filed within twenty days of the date notice of the judgment or
decision is given.”).
The limitation period expired one year
later, on June 13, 2012.
Petitioner did not file his federal
petition until July 21, 2014, more than two years after the
limitation period expired.1
This petition would be timely only if equitable tolling
applies.
Tolling is appropriate only if the petitioner can show
that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from timely filing
his petition.
See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.
Petitioner does not
allege any facts suggesting the existence of extraordinary
circumstances, so tolling does not appear to be warranted.
But
because he has not addressed this issue, the petition will not be
dismissed as time-barred.
In the event petitioner files another
federal petition after exhausting his state court remedies, he
will have an opportunity to demonstrate in that petition
1
A properly filed application for state postconviction
review tolls the statute of limitations, but the petitioner did
not file his state petition until February 24, 2014– about twenty
months after the limitation period expired.
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extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling.
C.
Motion for Default Judgment
On August 1, 2014, the Court issued an order directing
respondent to show why the relief prayed for in the petition
should not be granted and directing respondent to address
petitioner’s claim that he is prevented from obtaining relief in
state court.
Respondent filed this motion to dismiss on
September 12, 2014.
In response, petitioner contends that
respondent has failed to comply with the Court's order and moves
for entry of a default judgment.
This motion must be denied.
First, petitioner’s motion for a default judgment is
premature.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides a two-
step process for obtaining a default judgment.
to obtain a default.
The first step is
Once a default has entered, the plaintiff
may move for entry of default judgment.
420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005).
See New York v. Green,
No default has entered in this
case.
Second, and more fundamentally, respondent has complied with
the Court’s order.
Respondent contends that petitioner can
obtain state court review of his challenge to his sentence
through the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in state
court.
Alternatively, it argues, petitioner can obtain review of
his sentence through his motion for sentence review.
These
arguments appropriately address the issues identified in the
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Court's order.
Accordingly, the motion for default judgment is
denied.
IV.
Conclusion
Petitioner’s motion for default judgment [ECF No. 12] is
denied.
Respondent’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 8] is granted on
the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust state court remedies
before commencing this action.
Reasonable jurists would not find it debatable that the
petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court remedies.
Accordingly, an appeal of this order would not be taken in good
faith and a certificate of appealability will not issue.
See
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146
L.Ed.2d 542 (2000).
The Clerk will enter judgment dismissing the action.
Petitioner may refile a federal habeas corpus action after he
exhausts his state court remedies.
Any new petition must
demonstrate why the petition is not time-barred.
So ordered this 17th day of December 2014.
/s/
Robert N. Chatigny
United States District Judge
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