Angione v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation et al

Filing 77

ORDER granting Defendants' 53 54 Motions for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum of Decision, the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and to close this file. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 7/29/2016. (Nadler, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
MICHAEL ANGIONE
Plaintiff,
v.
SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORP.,
ARNOLD HANAFIN CORP.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:14-cv-1049 (VLB)
July 29, 2016

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANTS SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT
CORP. AND ARNOLD HANAFIN CORP.’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Dkt. ## 53, 54]
Plaintiff Michael Angione (“Angione”) brings a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., against
Defendants Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. (“Sikorsky”) and Arnold Hanafin Corp.
(“Arnold”) (collectively the “Employer Defendants”). The Employer Defendants
have each moved for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the
motions are GRANTED.
I.

Factual Background
Defendant Arnold is a provider of temporary workers for various

companies, including Defendant Sikorsky. [Dkt. #53-1, Def. Arnold’s Rule 56(a)(1)
Statement at ¶ 1; Dkt. #66, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 1]. When a client
alerts Arnold of a need for a temporary worker, Arnold provides the client with
possible candidates who may be qualified to perform the work sought. [Dkt. #531, Def. Arnold’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 2; Dkt. #66, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2)
Statement at ¶ 2]. Thereafter, the client decides which candidate, if any, to
accept. [Id.]. Once a client accepts a temporary worker from Arnold, Arnold and

1

the temporary employee execute an “Employment Agreement,” which clearly
states that the employee’s work assignment is temporary and is at the will of the
client. [Dkt. #53-1, Def. Arnold’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 5; Dkt. #66, Pl.’s
Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 5]. Once the Employment Agreement is in place, the
employee performs all of his or her work at the client’s facilities, under the
direction and supervision of the client. [Dkt. #53-1, Def. Arnold’s Rule 56(a)(1)
Statement at ¶ 6; Dkt. #66, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 6]. When the client
ends the temporary assignment, the temporary employee’s Employment
Agreement with Arnold also ends. [Dkt. #53-1, Def. Arnold’s Rule 56(a)(1)
Statement at ¶ 7; Dkt. #66, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 7].
Plaintiff Angione began working for Sikorsky, as a temporary employee of
Arnold, on November 6, 2007. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement
at ¶ 1; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 1; Dkt. #53-1, Def. Arnold’s Rule
56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 15; Dkt. #66, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 15]. That
day, Angione signed an Employment Agreement with Arnold. [Dkt. #53-1, Def.
Arnold’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 15; Dkt. #66, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at
¶ 15]. The Agreement stated that Arnold
provides the services of its employees to clients on a temporary
contract or project basis. Therefore, the length of the assignment
will be based upon the project and/or supplemental work force
requirements of the Client. Any reference to the length of
assignment is an estimate and termination of employment will be
governed by the terms of this agreement.
[Dkt. #53-1, Def. Arnold’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 15; Dkt. #66, Pl.’s
Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 15; Dkt. #53-11, Ex. 1 to Callahan Aff. at ¶ 1]. It
further stated that Angione was “bound by any applicable rules, regulations, or
2

policies established by Client wherever Employee performs services.” [Dkt. #5311, Ex. 1 to Callahan Aff. at ¶ 12]. Finally, the Agreement provided that it was
“terminable at will by either party . . . . [E]ither the Employee or [Arnold] or both
may terminate this agreement at any time for any reason or no reason at all with
or without prior notice.” [Id. at ¶ 13].
Angione’s initial assignment at Sikorsky was as a materials analyst in
Sikorsky’s Avionics Department.

[Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1)

Statement at ¶ 9; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 9]. While working in
this Department, Angione was supervised by Robert Anderson (“Anderson”).
[Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 10; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule
56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 10].

After working approximately two years in the

Avionics Department, Angione was assigned to the Aerospace Services (“SAS”)
group. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 10; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s
Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 10, Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ.
J., Angione Dep. at 69:21-70:1]. The group within SAS in which Angione worked
was led by David Garbien, a materials manager. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule
56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 10; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 10].
Roughly two years later, in July 2011, Angione was assigned to a different group
within SAS, where he reported to a different materials manager, James Caldwell
(“Caldwell”). [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 11; Dkt. #67,
Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 11].

Caldwell, in turn, reported to Jeffrey

Laczkoski (“Laczkoski”). [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶
12; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 12]. Angione remained in this role

3

at SAS until February 22, 2012, when both his temporary employment at Sikorsky
and Employment Agreement with Arnold were terminated.

[Dkt. #54-1, Def.

Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 13; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement
at ¶ 13].
During his four years at Sikorsky, Angione contends that he applied for at
least five permanent positions within the company. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s
Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 14; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 14].
Three of these applications were for a position as a materials analyst, the position
in which Angione worked during his time at Sikorsky. [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def.
Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 255:15-19]. Angione otherwise
applied for positions in Sikorsky’s purchasing and finance groups. [Id.].
Angione asserts that in 2008, he applied and interviewed for a financial
analyst position at Sikorsky. [Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶¶ 15, 17;
Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶¶ 15, 17].

The position was located in Sikorsky’s

Finance Department, a different department from the one in which Angione
worked. [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at
209:18-20]. Angione was not hired.

[Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1)

Statement at ¶ 18; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 18]. Angione claims
a younger employee was hired, but offers conflicting accounts as to the identity
of the person. Compare [Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 19 (stating
that “[t]he financial analyst position was filled by an individual who was
approximately 30 years old” and citing to paragraph 17 of his affidavit); Dkt. #70,
Angione Aff. at ¶ 17 (stating that “Kevin Bova, a contract employee approximately

4

ten years younger than me was hired . . . for the position of buyer”) (emphasis
added)] with [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep.
at 193:24-194:3 (stating that Sikorsky “hired some kid . . . Thirty years old” whose
name Angione could not remember)].1 Regardless, Angione admits that he has
no knowledge of the alleged hiree’s qualifications, position he held, whether he
was an internal or external hire, or any other circumstances surrounding his hire.
[Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 20; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule
56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 20].
Sometime in 2008 or 2009, Angione applied for a materials analyst position
in the Avionics Department, where he was working as a contract employee. [Dkt.
#54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 21; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2)
Statement at ¶ 21]. Angione was interviewed by Anderson, his direct supervisor
at the time. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 22; Dkt. #67,
Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 22]. A week later, Anderson informed Angione
that he was not selected for the position.

[Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule

56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 23; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 23; Dkt. #546, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 258:4-10].
Anderson did not give a reason, nor did Angione ask him for one. [Dkt. #54-6, Ex.
1

In fact, Angione’s deposition testimony does not establish that the “kid” he saw
in the Finance Department was the same person who was hired for the position
for which he interviewed. [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J.,
Angione Dep. at 193:25]. Angione testified that at some unknown time after he
unsuccessfully interviewed, he noticed a younger male in the Finance
Department whom he did not recognize, and he asked the senior analyst who
submitted his resume for the finance position who the person was. [Id. at
194:14-23]. The senior analyst said only, “That’s the new guy.” [Id. at 194:6-8].
Angione asked no further questions, and for all he knew, the Finance
Department could have hired multiple financial analysts before, after, or at the
same time it declined to hire Angione. [Id. at 194:6-9, 195:1-2].
5

4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 258:12-16].

Angione

asserts that a younger male, Kevin Bova, was hired, and that later, he said to
Anderson, “Kevin [Bova] does not have a college degree. You want a college
[degree] . . . I don’t understand.” [Id. at 258:22-24]. Angione does not submit
evidence indicating what, if any, response Anderson gave him.2
Sometime in 2009 or 2010, Angione again applied for a materials analyst
position. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 24; Dkt. #67,
Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 24]. The position had been posted online, and
after applying, Angione received a call from an unidentified male manager
informing him that he was qualified for the position. [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def.
Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 183:1-184:20]. After a period of
silence, Angione followed up with the manager, who informed him that Sikorsky

2

Angione claims that at some unknown time, without any context or record
support, Anderson told him that if he “was younger [he] would be hired.”  [Dkt.
#70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 16]. At his deposition, Angione testified that Anderson,
Sue Sellers, David Garbien, Tom Gallo, Larry Lavorgna, and two other
unidentified Sikorsky employees told him that if he was “ten, fifteen years
younger, [he] would have been hired years ago.” [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def.
Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 213:19-214:10]. Other than
Anderson, Angione does not allege that the employees were involved in either
the hiring process of any of the jobs he applied for or his termination, nor does
he contend that they had personal knowledge about the facts and
circumstances of Sikorsky’s hiring decisions. Angione provides no other facts
regarding any of these conversations in his summary judgment briefing. The
Court’s independent review of the deposition transcripts reveals that Anderson
made this comment in a discussion concerning Angione’s temporary materials
analyst position. [Id. at 228:12-20]. Angione could not recall when this
discussion occurred, in particular, whether it was before or after Angione first
applied for a permanent materials analyst position in the Avionics Department.
[Id. at 252:14-253:8]. Also, Angione’s testimony regarding the substance of the
comment Anderson and the others allegedly made was inconsistent. See [id. at
220:20-221:4 (stating that they told him, “if you were ten to fifteen years younger
. . . [Sikorsky]’d probably hire you”)].

6

had decided not to fill the position. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1)
Statement at ¶ 25; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 25].3
Finally, in the spring of 2011 (or thereabout), Angione claims that he
applied for a materials analyst position for a third time, as well as for a buyer
position. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 26; Dkt. #67,
Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 26; Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 18]. The materials
analyst position was in Sikorsky’s Commercial Aircraft Department, a different
department from the one in which Angione worked. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s
Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 31 Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 31; Dkt.
#54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 209:10-13]. A
position in the group opened when an unknown individual was promoted, and
that person recommended Angione for the position he was vacating. [Dkt. #54-6,
Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 197:22-198:21].
Angione interviewed for the position, but he was not hired.

[Dkt. #54-1, Def.

Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 29; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement
at ¶ 29; Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 18]. Angione could not recall any details about
the individuals who recommended and interviewed him for the position, nor does
he know who, if anyone, was hired. [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for
Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 199:4-9, 19-22, 203:18-20]. However, he did recall that
the individual who recommended him “was totally stupefied” that Angione was

3

Angione did not believe this explanation, but could not offer any reason for his
disbelief beyond his own perception that Sikorsky “[s]eemed like they wanted to
hire younger people.” [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J.,
Angione Dep. at 186:4-10, 18-25].
7

not selected, and he believed that Sikorsky cancelled the requisition.

[Id. at

200:3-4, 203:20-204:12].
As for the purchasing position, Angione interviewed, and afterward, spoke
with the hiring manager, who allegedly told him that he was not hired for the
position because he did not have a college degree and did not have experience
with software required to perform the duties of the position. [Dkt. #54-1, Def.
Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 30; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement
at ¶ 30]. The manager also explained that Angione’s “background was more in
warehousing” and he was looking for someone with experience “in the overall
procurement end,” which Angione acknowledged “would have been hard to
learn.” [Id. at 213:1-5]. Angione does not know whether the buyer position was
ever filled. [Id. at 214:15-19]. Defendant Sikorsky maintains that it has no record
of Angione applying for any positions in 2011. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule
56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 32; Dkt. #54-8, Ex. 6 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J.,
Redlowsk Decl. at ¶ 3].
At the time Angione was working at Sikorsky, the company had a policy in
effect called the “Sikorsky Security and Access Requirements.” [Dkt. #54-1, Def.
Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 39; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement
at ¶ 39; Dkt. #54-8, Ex. 6 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Redlowsk Decl. at ¶
4].

The policy prohibited employees from “‘send[ing] or receiv[ing] mail or

electronic messages through [Sikorsky’s] mail or computer systems . . . or
conduct[ing] any personal or business activities unrelated to . . . the services the
contract employee is performing.”

[Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1)

8

Statement at ¶ 39; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 39]; see also [Dkt.
#54-10, Ex. 8 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J at 2]. Angione admits that he
received and opened a link to Sikorsky’s policies and procedures, including the
“Sikorsky Security and Access Requirements,” but could not recall which, if any,
of the policies he reviewed. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at
¶¶ 38-39; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶¶ 38-39].

Indeed, at his

deposition, Angione testified that he opened the link, noticed that it contained
“some rules and regulations policy,” but he “didn’t really read it.” [Dkt. #54-6, Ex.
4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 94:1-6]. Regardless of
whether he reviewed the policies he was given, Angione further admitted at his
deposition that at different times, his supervisors, Caldwell and Anderson, told
him that he was not supposed to be using Sikorsky’s email or internet for
personal, non-work-related purposes. [Id. at 107:25-108:4, 24-25]. Accordingly,
Angione testified that he understood that Sikorsky had a rule that he could not
use Sikorsky resources to perform personal work. [Id. at 107:7-24].4
Contrary to his sworn testimony that he was informed about the computer
policy in an email which he opened and read and recognized that it contained
rules prescribing the use of Sikorsky computers, Angione averred in a sworn
affidavit that while he was working at Sikorsky, he was never explicitly warned

4

Defendant Sikorsky identifies numerous additional written policies in effect at
the time of Angione’s employment which prohibited employees from using
Sikorsky equipment to conduct personal work or for other recreational
purposes. See [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶¶ 48-53;
Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶¶ 48-53]. By bare affidavit, Angione
contends that he did not receive copies of some of these communications.
[Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶¶ 19-20].

9

about his use of email, never informed that he was not permitted to send email
unrelated to his work during periods that he was not “direct billing/charging a
client” of Sikorsky for work on a project, and that he observed an unknown
number of unidentified Sikorsky employees “using email for non-employment
related matters.” [Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶¶ 33, 37, 39, 45-48;
Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 11].

Angione also points out that one of his

supervisors, Caldwell, admitted to occasionally sending personal emails while
working at Sikorsky. [Dkt. #68, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement of Disputed Facts at
¶ 17 (citing Ex. B to Pl.’s Opp’n, Caldwell Dep. at 39:1-25)].
On December 22, 2011, Angione sent an email from his Sikorsky-provided
email address to an individual named “Ron,” an employee of the Norwalk
Chamber of Commerce, on behalf of a company called “R3 Omni.” [Dkt. #54-1,
Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶¶ 54, 60; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2)
Statement at ¶¶ 54, 60]. The email discussed a kiosk that the United States Army
had purchased from R3 Omni, and a proposal R3 Omni had presented to the
Norwalk Chamber of Commerce.

[Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1)

Statement at ¶¶ 58, 60; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶¶ 58, 60; Dkt.
#54-15, Ex. 13 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J. at SIK0072-73]. Angione’s
email states that one of the attachments was “the offer we presented to the
chamber in Norwalk.” [Dkt. #54-15, Ex. 13 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J. at
SIK0073]. The parties agree that this email was unrelated to Angione’s duties at
Sikorsky. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 59; Dkt. #67,
Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 59].

10

At the time Angione sent the email he was not an employee of R3 Omni, but
he planned to become employed with the company if it got “off the ground.” [Dkt.
#54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 56; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2)
Statement at ¶ 56].

After his termination from Arnold and Sikorsky, Angione

became associated with R3 Omni.

[Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1)

Statement at ¶ 57; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 57; Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4
to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 125:1-7]. In particular, at
his deposition, Angione confirmed the accuracy of public documents referencing
him as R3 Omni’s director of procurement and logistics, and testified that he lists
his position at R3 Omni on his resume. [Id. at 124:3-9, 126:14-24].
Angione further avers in opposition to the Employer Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment that at the time he sent the email, he had no business
interest in R3 Omni, at no point did he have “a formal business affiliation with R3
Omni,” and that he sent the email as a personal favor for his friend, Jim Condron,
the owner of R3 Omni, because the recipient, “Ron,” was an acquaintance of
Angione’s at the Norwalk Police Department. [Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 21].5

5

Angione’s affidavit and his Rule 56(a)(2) Statement are at odds with respect to
the position held by “Ron.” In his Rule 56(a)(2) Statement, Angione admits that
he was affiliated with the Norwalk Chamber of Commerce. See [Dkt. #54-1, Def.
Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 60; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement
at ¶ 60]. In his affidavit, Angione contends, without any evidentiary support,
that Ron was an acquaintance from the Norwalk Police Department. [Dkt. #70,
Angione Aff. at ¶ 21]. The email itself has nothing to do with the police
department, references the “chamber in Norwalk,” discusses a business
proposition which Angione and others made to the chamber, and attaches a
brochure about R3 Omni and its products and a business proposal to the
Norwalk Chamber of Commerce. [Dkt. #54-15, Ex. 13 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for
Summ. J. at SIK0072-73; Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶
63; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 63].
11

On February 17, 2012, Kent Johnson, a Sikorsky purchasing manager,
forwarded Angione’s email to John Cerreta, a Sikorsky materials manager. [Dkt.
#54-15, Ex. 13 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J. at SIK0072].

Johnson

explained that he received the email from another Sikorsky employee who, in
turn, had received the email from his brother, an intended recipient, who noticed
Angione’s Sikorsky email address and title and was curious if Sikorsky was
behind the kiosk sale. [Id.; Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶
66; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 66]. Eventually, Angione’s email
made its way to his supervisor, Laczkoski, and ultimately, to Amanda Weaver
(née Sanella), a human resources employee at Sikorsky. [Dkt. #54-15, Ex. 13 to
Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J. at SIK0072; Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule
56(a)(1) Statement at ¶¶ 67-68; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶¶ 67-68].
After receiving the email, Weaver decided to terminate Angione’s
temporary work assignment, due to Angione’s repeated “violation of multiple
company policies” prohibiting the use of company resources for non-business
purposes despite having been previously warned, “including but not limited to”
his December 22, 2011 email on behalf of R3 Omni. [Dkt. #54-17, Ex. 15 to Def.
Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Weaver Decl. at ¶ 3].

In making this decision,

Weaver asserts that she was aware Caldwell had previously warned Angione
about personal use of Sikorsky’s resources.

[Id. at ¶ 4].

After reaching this

decision, Weaver contacted Corey Lay (“Lay”), Arnold’s Director of Operations.
[Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 72; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule
56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 72].

12

On February 23, 2012, Lay emailed Weaver to inform her that he left a
phone message notifying Angione that his contract with Sikorsky had ended.
[Id.; Dkt. #54-18, Ex. 16 to to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J. at SIK0087-88].
Lay’s email stated that Angione “was given no additional information.” [Dkt. #5418, Ex. 16 to to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J. at SIK0087]. While it appears
Angione and Lay spoke regarding Sikorsky’s discharge decision, Angione offers
no evidence that he ever sought an explanation of the reason(s) for the decision
from anyone at Sikorsky or Arnold. See [Dkt. #53-9, Ex. 1 to Lay Aff. at 1].
At the time he was terminated, Angione asserts that he was 59 years old
and the oldest employee in his work group at Sikorsky. [Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at
¶ 13]. He further maintains that he was the only Arnold employee from his work
group who was discharged at the time. [Id.]. Finally, Angione contends that
approximately two months prior to his termination, Sikorsky hired a new contract
employee in his group, a female who was less than thirty years old. [Id. at ¶ 12].
His other coworkers at the time were between forty and fifty-five years old. [Id.].
Only one coworker was a permanent Sikorsky employee, and she was over forty
years old. [Id.].6
On March 13, 2012, Angione filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Connecticut Commission on Human
Rights and Opportunities (“CCHRO”) alleging age discrimination.

[Dkt. #54-1,

Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 74; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2)
Statement at ¶ 74]. Thereafter, he commenced the present action.
6

Angione asserts, without any support, that he was similarly or more qualified
than the other younger employees in his work group. [Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at
¶ 14].
13

II.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of
proving that no factual issues exist. Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98,
106 (2d Cir. 2010). “In determining whether that burden has been met, the court is
required to resolve all ambiguities and credit all factual inferences that could be
drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Id.
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). “If there is any evidence in the
record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the nonmoving party,
summary judgment must be denied.” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Hapag Lloyd
Container Linie, GmbH, 446 F.3d 313, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In addition, determinations of the weight to accord
evidence or assessments of the credibility of witnesses are improper on a motion
for summary judgment, as such are within the sole province of the jury. Hayes v.
New York City Dep’t of Corr., 84 F. 3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996).
“A party opposing summary judgment cannot defeat the motion by relying
on the allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere
assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible. At the summary
judgment stage of the proceeding, Plaintiffs are required to present admissible
evidence in support of their allegations; allegations alone, without evidence to

14

back them up, are not sufficient.” Welch–Rubin v. Sandals Corp., No. 3:03-cv481, 2004 WL 2472280, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 20, 2004) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); Martinez v. State of Connecticut, 817 F. Supp. 2d 28, 37 (D.
Conn 2011). Where there is no evidence upon which a jury could properly
proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it and upon whom the onus of
proof is imposed, such as where the evidence offered consists of conclusory
assertions without further support in the record, summary judgment may lie.
Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearance Co., 604 F.3d 712, 727 (2d Cir. 2010).
III.

Analysis
A. The ADEA
Under the ADEA, “it shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse

to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Claims of
discriminatory treatment under the ADEA are analyzed using the burden-shifting
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas, as modified by the Supreme Court’s
subsequent decision in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). See
Gorzynski v. Jetblue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding postGross that “we remain bound by, and indeed see no reason to jettison, the
burden-shifting framework for ADEA cases that has been consistently employed
in our Circuit”). Under McDonnell Douglas, a prima facie case of discrimination
consists of proof that a plaintiff: (1) was within a protected class; (2) was qualified
for her position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the

15

adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. U.S. v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 93 (2d Cir. 2011). Even at the
summary judgment phase, where a plaintiff must put forth evidence in support of
each of these elements, the “plaintiff's prima facie burden [i]s minimal and de
minimis.” Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, “[t]he inference of impermissible
discrimination, in order to survive summary judgment, must be reasonable.”
Thomesen v. West, No. 99-CV-3035 (NGG) (TEB), 2001 WL 1636311, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 20, 2001) (“The Second Circuit has upheld summary judgment for employers
on the grounds that the facts submitted by the plaintiff do not give rise to a
reasonable inference of discrimination.”) (citing Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196
F.3d 435, 451 (2d Cir. 1999)).
After the plaintiff has met the initial burden of establishing his prima facie
case, “the burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). “Once such a reason is provided, the
plaintiff can no longer rely on the prima facie case, but may still prevail if she can
show that the employer's determination was in fact the result of discrimination.”
Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 106. However, at this step, “Gross makes clear that ‘a
plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the
challenged adverse employment action' and not just a contributing or motivating
factor.” Id. (quoting Gross, 557 U.S. at 180).

16

B.

Angione Fails to Set Forth a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination as He Has
Failed to Raise Any Circumstances Giving Rise to an Inference of
Discrimination
Angione raises two sets of adverse employment actions: (i) Sikorsky’s

failure to hire him as a permanent employee and (ii) wrongful termination by both
Employer Defendants. See, e.g., McKinney v. Dep’t of Transp., ---F. Supp. 3d ----,
2016 WL 2944522, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 7, 2016) (“‘[A]dverse employment actions
include discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, demotion, reduction in pay,
and reprimand.’”) (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999),
abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 64 (2006)). However, the facts he offers in support of each do not raise a
reasonable inference of discrimination.
1. The circumstances surrounding the denial of Angione’s applications for
permanent positions at Sikorsky are insufficient to raise an inference of
discrimination.
First, Angione claims that during the four-year period he worked as a
temporary employee at Sikorsky, he unsuccessfully applied for five permanent
positions within the company despite being more qualified than similarly situated
candidates who were younger than him. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1)
Statement at ¶ 14; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 14].
[A] plaintiff alleging failure to hire must prove a prima facie case by
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that []: (1) he is a
member of a protected class; (2) he is qualified for the position
sought; (3) he was rejected from the position; and (4) after his
rejection, the employer continued to seek applica[tions] from
persons with the same qualifications [as] plaintiff or that the
rejection occurred under circumstances that can be reasonably seen
as supporting an inference of discrimination.

17

Rodriguez v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 14 Civ. 4960 (BMC),
2015 WL 5229850, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2015) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802 and Gaffney v. Dep’t of Info. Tech. & Telecomms., 536 F. Supp. 2d 445,
462 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
Beginning with the purchasing and finance positions, Angione does not set
forth any facts establishing that he was qualified for either of them. Angione
worked exclusively at Sikorsky as a materials analyst. See [Dkt. #54-1, Def.
Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶¶ 9-13; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2)
Statement at ¶¶ 9-13]. Angione does not introduce any evidence of the
qualifications for or the duties of either position, or any relevant experience he
possessed at the time he applied for each position. Indeed, Angione admits that
the hiring manager for the purchasing position said that he lacked experience
with the software required to perform the position, and explained that Angione’s
“background was more in warehousing,” whereas the manager was looking for
someone with experience “in the overall procurement end,” which Angione
acknowledged “would have been hard to learn.” [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule
56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 30; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 30; Dkt. #546, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 213:1-5].
In addition, Angione does not set forth any facts tending to show that
Sikorsky’s decision not to hire him for either of these positions had anything to
do with unlawful discrimination. With regard to the finance position, Angione
claims a younger employee was hired (a claim which itself is subject to doubt
given his conflicting accounts as to the identity of the hiree), but he readily

18

admits that he has no understanding of the employee’s qualifications, the
position he held, whether he was an internal or external hire, or any other
circumstances surrounding his hire. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1)
Statement at ¶¶ 19-20; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶¶ 19-20; Dkt. #70,
Angione Aff. at ¶ 17]. Standing alone, the fact that Sikorsky may have hired
someone who was younger than Angione does not raise an inference of
discrimination. See O’Sullivan v. New York Times, 37 F. Supp. 2d 307, 319
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[A]llegations of replacement by younger workers do not, without
more, prove discrimination.”) (citing cases); see also Stouter v. Smithtown Cent.
School Dist., 687 F. Supp. 2d 224, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting summary
judgment to defendant on ADEA claim where only admissible “fact upon which
plaintiff bases her ADEA claim is that she was replaced by someone who is
significantly younger”).
As for the purchasing position, Angione admitted that the hiring manager
informed him that he was unqualified for the position, and he acknowledged that
there were legitimate substantive deficiencies in his employment background.
[Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 213:1-5].
Moreover, Angione has no idea whether the position was even filled. [Id. at
214:15-19].7 In light of these facts, Angione has not come close to establishing
7

 Given Angione’s admitted lack of experience with the required software and with

Sikorsky’s procurement business, it makes no difference whether or not the
manager’s decision was also based on a false belief that Angione lacked a
college degree. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 30; Dkt.
#67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 30; Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot.
for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 213:1-5]. Indeed, Angione contemporaneously
corrected any misunderstanding about his degree, and with this knowledge, the
manager stood by his decision not to hire him for the position. [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4
19

that Sikorsky’s decision not to hire him for either the finance or purchasing
position was the product of unlawful discrimination.
Angione is similarly unsuccessful in raising an inference of discrimination
in connection with his three materials analyst applications. As an initial matter,
Defendant Sikorsky asserts, and Angione does not dispute, that at least two of
these applications fall far outside the 300-day limitations period, which, in this
case, ended on May 18, 2011. See [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1)
Statement at ¶ 74; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 74]; 29 U.S.C. §
626(d)(2) (establishing 300-day time bar for ADEA claims). However, this does
not preclude the Court from considering these untimely applications as “‘relevant
background evidence’ in support of [Angione’s] timely claim.” Magnello v. TJX
Cos., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119-20 (D. Conn. 2008) (quoting Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 112 (2002)).
Turning to his first, untimely, application, sometime in 2008 or 2009,
Angione was approached and interviewed by his supervisor, Bob Anderson.
[Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 22; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule
56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 22]. A week after the interview, Anderson told him he was
not selected. Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 23; Dkt. #67,
Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 23; Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for
Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 258:4-10]. Angione neither sought nor received any
explanation for the decision. [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ.
to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 210:1-7]. Angione offers
no facts to suggest that this unidentified manager manufactured a pretext not to
hire him for a position for which Angione himself acknowledges he was not
qualified. 
20

J., Angione Dep. at 258:12-16]. At some unknown time thereafter, Angione
learned that Anderson had hired Kevin Bova, an applicant ten years younger than
Angione, who lacked a college degree. [Id. at 257:13-14; Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at
¶ 17]. Angione presents no facts concerning whether the position required a
college degree, the nature and relevance of Angione’s college degree to the
position, or any comparison between his and Bova’s credentials which would
undercut the possibility that, while lacking a college degree, Bova had some
other attribute Sikorsky reasonably could have deemed more significant, such as
more experience working as a materials analyst. In fact, after learning of Bova’s
hire, Angione claims he mentioned this distinction to Anderson, but tellingly, he
offers no evidence of Anderson’s response. See [id. at 258:22-24]. Given the
dearth of any additional evidence, the mere fact that Angione had a college
degree and Bova lacked one offers little, if any, evidence of discriminatory intent.
Angione also contends that at some point, Anderson (and six other
Sikorsky employees) told him that if he was “ten, fifteen years younger, [he]
would have been hired years ago.” [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for
Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 213:19-214:10]. This stray remark fails to raise an
inference of discrimination for at least two reasons. First, while the remark
references Angione’s age, it expresses no opinion about Angione’s present or
future success as an applicant for any particular position at Sikorsky; only the
vague sentiment that had he been younger, he would have been hired at some
prior time for some unidentified position. Indeed, elsewhere, Angione claims he
was told something different, that “if you were ten to fifteen years younger . . .

21

[Sikorsky]’d probably hire you.” [Id. at 220:20-221:4 (emphasis added)]. This
version of the statement raises even less of an inference of discrimination, as it
offers no certainty that Sikorsky would have ever hired Angione, regardless of his
age.
Second, and more importantly, while Anderson was both Angione’s
supervisor and a decision-maker with respect to the permanent materials analyst
position, Angione offers no concrete facts as to when Anderson made this
remark, and the context in which he made the remark indicates that it was not
related to the decision-making process. See Virag v. Goodwill Indus. of Western
Connecticut, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-1499 (DJS), 2015 WL 540607, at *5 (D. Conn. Feb.
10, 2015) (“In determining whether a comment is a probative statement that
evidences an intent to discriminate or whether it is a non-probative ‘stray remark,’
a court should consider . . . (1) who made the remark . . . (2) when the remark was
made in relation to the employment decision at issue . . . (3) the content of the
remark . . . and . . . (4) the context in which the remark was made.’”) (quoting
Pronin v. Raffi Custom Photo Lab, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 628, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
Angione could not recall when Anderson made the statement, and he testified
that when he made it, the two were discussing Angione’s temporary materials
analyst position—not the permanent position for which he interviewed. [Dkt. #546, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 228:12-20].
Accordingly, Angione “has failed to demonstrate a nexus between [Anderson’s]
remarks and [Sikorsky’s] failure to hire [him]” for the permanent materials analyst
position. Virag, 2015 WL 540607, at *5 (holding that although a manager stated

22

that the company “likes [to] hire younger people. You know, we like younger
people at [the company],” the timing and context of the remark did “not come
close to demonstrating ‘that a nexus exists between the allegedly discriminatory
statements and a defendant’s [adverse employment action]’”) (quoting Silver v.
North Shore Univ. Hosp., 490 F. Supp. 2d 354, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).8
Angione’s second, untimely, application for a materials analyst position is
even less compelling. The position had been posted online, and after applying,
Angione received a call from an unknown male manager informing him that he
was qualified for the position. [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ.
J., Angione Dep. at 183:1-184:20]. After a period of silence, Angione followed up
with the manager, who informed him that Sikorsky had decided not to fill the
position. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 25; Dkt. #67,
Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 25]. As for evidence of discriminatory intent,
Angione offers only his subjective belief that Sikorsky “[s]eemed like they wanted
to hire younger people.” [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J.,
Angione Dep. at 186:4-10, 18-25]. Without any factual support, this belief is
plainly insufficient to raise an inference of discriminatory intent. See AsanteAddae v. Sodexo, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00489 (VLB), 2015 WL 1471927, at *11 (D.
Conn. Mar. 31, 2015), aff’d 631 F. App’x 68 (2d Cir. 2016) (“‘A plaintiff’s
speculations, generalities, and gut feelings, however genuine, when they are not
supported by specific facts, do not allow for an inference of discrimination to be

8

None of the other employees whom Angione claims also made this statement
played any role in the decisions not to hire him for a permanent position or to
terminate him.
23

drawn.’”) (quoting Whethers v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 956 F. Supp. 2d 364,
379 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)).
Angione fares no better in raising an inference of discrimination in
connection with his third and final materials analyst application. The position
was in a different department from the one in which he worked, and Angione
interviewed with a different (unidentified) Sikorsky employee. [Dkt. #54-1, Def.
Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 31 Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement
at ¶ 31; Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at
199:19-200:1, 209:10-13]. Nothing in his vague description of his interview or his
subsequent conversation with the unidentified employee who recommended him
for the position suggests any discriminatory motive. That the individual was
“totally stupefied” that Angione was not selected does not alone support a theory
of discrimination, nor does Sikorsky’s decision to cancel the requisition. [Dkt.
#54-6, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 200:3-4, 203:20204:12].
Given the absence of any evidence to suggest that Sikorsky’s decision not
to hire Angione for a permanent position was motivated by discriminatory intent,
he is unable to set forth even a prima facie case of age discrimination.
2. Angione was properly terminated for violating Sikorsky’s policies
restricting employee use of its equipment and computer system.
In addition to his failure to hire claim, Angione maintains that Sikorsky’s
and Arnold’s decisions to terminate his contract employment constituted
unlawful age discrimination. However, the undisputed facts surrounding the

24

decision to terminate Angione simply do not raise any inference of
discrimination.
Angione does not dispute that during his time at Sikorsky, he received
policies which stated that he was prohibited from using Sikorsky’s computer
systems to conduct personal business. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1)
Statement at ¶¶ 38-39; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶¶ 38-39; Dkt. #546, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 94:1-6]. At his
deposition, he further admitted that he understood it was a rule that he could not
use Sikorsky resources to perform personal work, and that he was specifically
advised of this at different times by two Sikorsky employees. [Id. at 107:7-108:4,
24-25].
None of Angione’s attempts to get out from under this critical (and
devastating) testimony are sufficient to do so. First, his bare affidavit asserting
that he was never explicitly warned about his use of email, never informed that he
was not permitted to send email unrelated to his work during periods that he was
not “direct billing/charging a client” of Sikorsky for work on a project, and that he
observed an unknown number of unidentified Sikorsky employees “using email
for non-employment related matters” is legally insufficient to refute these
admissions. [Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 11]. See, e.g., Keepers, Inc. v. City of
Milford, 807 F.3d 24, 35 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ‘sham-affidavit-rule’ prevents a party
from manufacturing an issue of fact ‘by submitting an affidavit in opposition to a
summary judgment motion that, by omission or addition, contradicts the affiant’s

25

previous deposition testimony.’”) (quoting Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt.
Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 482 (2d Cir. 2014)).
Second, Angione’s assertion that there was no policy prohibiting personal
use of Sikorsky’s computer system is baseless. The deposition testimony of
Laczkoski, one of Angione’s supervisors, does not, as Angione claims, call into
doubt the existence of Sikorsky’s personal email policy. See [Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule
56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 39 (citing Dkt. #64, Ex. B to Pl.’s Opp’n, Laczkoski Dep. at
39:1-25)]. Instead, Laczkoski testified that while he was not aware of any rule at
Sikorsky “that prohibits sending emails,” whether or not an email was
permissible “depends on its content.” [Dkt. #64, Ex. B to Pl.’s Opp’n, Laczkoski
Dep. at 39:11-13, 21-23]. He further explained that Angione was terminated after
he sent an email which “was inappropriate in itself” because it “indicated
[Angione] was representing the company in a separate business venture other
than Sikorsky Aircraft business.” [Id. at 39:6-10]. Laczkoski said nothing to
undercut the existence of a personal email policy. Indeed, his testimony was
exactly the opposite. Similarly, Angione’s contention that he observed an
unknown number of unidentified Sikorsky employees “using email for nonemployment related matters" is unavailing. [Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 11].
Angione did not offer any evidence that he informed anyone at Sikorsky with a
duty to enforce the policy of the violations, nor does he offer any evidence that
such a person was otherwise aware of the violations. In addition, Angione does
not offer any evidence that the individuals who violated the policy were warned
and persisted in violating the policy, as he did.

26

Finally, Angione’s assertion that he did not violate the computer use policy
is utterly specious. Neither Laczkoski’s testimony nor any other evidence in the
record supports Angione’s rationalization that he was permitted to send personal
emails whenever he was not “direct billing/charging a client” of Sikorsky for work
on a project. [Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 11]. He references no provision of the
policy or any statement from any responsible Sikorsky employee to support his
claim. Such a belief is both illogical and self-serving, since, if true, Angione
would seemingly have been able to claim that anytime he was drafting a personal
email, he was not also working on a client matter, thereby enabling him to send
personal emails and conduct personal business on Sikorsky equipment
whenever he wanted, in complete contravention of the plain intent of the rule. In
addition, Angione fails to identify any circumstances during his employment at
Sikorsky when he would have been permitted to use Sikorsky equipment while
not working on Sikorsky-related matters.
With the undisputed record establishing a clear policy prohibiting the use
of Sikorsky equipment for personal business, as well as Angione’s knowledge of
this policy, the parties further agree that Angione sent an email from his Sikorsky
email account to promote the business interests of R3 Omni, a start-up business
with which Angione was seeking to, and ultimately did, become associated
following his departure from Sikorsky. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1)
Statement at ¶¶ 56-57; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶¶ 56-57; Dkt. #546, Ex. 4 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Angione Dep. at 125:1-7].9 They
9

Angione’s suggestions to the contrary in his bare affidavit are barred by the
sham affidavit rule. See [Dkt. #54-6, Ex. 6 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J.,
27

further agree that this email was unrelated to Angione’s duties at Sikorsky. [Dkt.
#54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 59; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2)
Statement at ¶ 59]. In fact, given the overlap between R3 Omni’s and Sikorsky’s
businesses, as evidenced by the mistaken belief held by one of the intended
recipients of Angione’s email that Sikorsky was behind the kiosk sale, it is quite
plausible that the two companies competed in some form with one another. [Dkt.
#54-15, Ex. 13 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J. at SIK0072]. Finally, in
reaching the decision to terminate him, Sikorsky human resources employee
Amanda Weaver determined that during his time with Sikorsky, Angione had
violated multiple company policies through his improper use of Sikorsky’s
computer system on multiple occasions, and had been instructed on these
policies. See [Dkt. #54-17, Ex. 15 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J., Weaver
Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4].
Against the weight of this evidence, Angione offers not one iota of support
for his contention that Sikorsky’s decision to terminate him had anything to do
with his age. First, Angione asserts (again via bare affidavit) that approximately
two months before he was terminated, Sikorsky hired a new contract employee in
his group who was a female between twenty and thirty years old. [Dkt. #68, Pl.’s
Rule 56(a)(2) Statement of Disputed Facts at ¶ 10 (citing Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at
¶ 12)]. Beyond her age, Angione offers no evidence regarding her role in the
Angione Dep. at 124:3-9, 125:1-7, 126:14-24; Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 21];
Keepers, 807 F.3d at 35. Indeed, his own contemporaneous email belies his
post-deposition claim that he was never associated with R3 Omni, as the email
he drafted referenced “the offer we presented to the chamber [of commerce] in
Norwalk.” [Dkt. #54-15, Ex. 13 to Def. Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J. at SIK0073
(emphasis added)].
28

group, whether she assumed his position after he was terminated, and whether or
not she complied with Sikorsky’s email policies. More significantly, Angione
admits that at the time he was terminated, his work group was otherwise
comprised of three employees all over forty years old, one who was over fifty
years old, and one who was the only permanent employee in the group. [Id.].
Given that each of these employees falls within the age class protected by the
ADEA, their presence in Angione’s work group at the time of his termination
serves as powerful evidence rebutting any inference of discrimination. See 29
U.S.C. § 631(a); see also Coccareo v. AT&T Corp., No. 3:03-cv-914 (DJS), 2005 WL
171196, at *5 (D. Conn. Jul. 20, 2005) (granting summary judgment to employer on
ADEA claims and finding that employer’s “treatment of other employees negates
any inference” of discrimination where employer gave benefit employee claimed
he was denied because of his age “to members of the protected class”).
Second, Sikorsky’s decision not to terminate any other Sikorsky employee
(contract or permanent) at the time it discharged Angione fails to raise any
inference of discrimination. See [Dkt. #68, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement of
Disputed Facts at ¶ 11 (citing Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 13)]. Angione has not
identified any other similarly-situated employees whom Sikorsky determined, at
or around that time, had violated its computer policies and whom it declined to
terminate or discipline. Indeed, the lone employee he identifies as having also
sent personal emails was one of his supervisors, Caldwell, a permanent Sikorsky
employee, who testified that he did so “very infrequently” and never in the
context of a separate, and potentially competitive, business venture. See [Dkt.

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#68, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement of Disputed Facts at ¶ 17; Dkt. #65, Ex. B to Pl.’s
Opp’n, Caldwell Dep. at 39:14-17]. In short, Angione and Caldwell could hardly be
less similarly-situated. See Rubinow v. Ingelheim, No. 3:08-cv-1697 (VLB), 2010
WL 1882320, at *5 (D. Conn. May 10, 2010) (“[I]n order for evidence related to
other employees to be relevant in a disparate treatment case, those employees . .
. ‘must have reported to the same supervisor as the plaintiff, must have been
subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline,
and must have engaged in conduct similar to the plaintiff’s, without such
differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct
or the appropriate discipline for it.’”) (quoting Mazella v. RCA Global Commc’ns,
642 F. Supp. 1531, 1547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
Third, Angione incorrectly contends that the manner in which he was
terminated supports an inference of discriminatory intent. Angione maintains
that his termination was in violation of Sikorsky’s alleged policy requiring
Sikorsky supervisors to meet with contract employees to discuss performance
issues before deciding to terminate them. See [Dkt. #68, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2)
Statement of Disputed Facts, at ¶¶ 18-19]. However, the single page of deposition
transcript Angione cites in support of this alleged policy does not provide any.
The deponent, Caldwell, stated explicitly that contract employee performance was
not formally evaluated and that it was his personal practice to perform a general
assessment and to discuss performance issues with the employee before
contacting the contract employer. See [Dkt. #65, Ex. C to Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’
Mots. for Summ. J., Caldwell Dep. at 51:1-5, 9-14]. Nowhere did Caldwell state

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that he was required to speak with the contract employee before contacting their
employer, or that he was otherwise not permitted to reach out immediately to the
employer. There is also no evidence that Caldwell had any involvement in
Angione’s termination. See [id. at 55:10-25].
Fourth, Angione asserts that the information with which he was provided in
connection with his termination supports his discrimination claim. The Court
respectfully disagrees. By voicemail, Arnold employee Corey Lay informed
Angione that his contract with Sikorsky had ended, and he provided him with no
additional information. [Dkt. #54-1, Def. Sikorsky’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶
72; Dkt. #67, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at ¶ 72; Dkt. #54-18, Ex. 16 to to Def.
Sikorsky’s Mot. for Summ. J. at SIK0087-88]. Angione challenges the accuracy of
Lay’s statement that the contract had ended because Angione’s work group
continued to order and provide spare parts. [Dkt. #68, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2)
Statement of Disputed Facts, at ¶ 12; Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 8]. Angione’s
argument assumes that the contract which ended was the contract between
Sikorsky and its customer, rather than the contract between Arnold and Angione.
There is no factual support for this conclusion. In addition, even if the contract
between Sikorsky and its customer ended, there could be additional work in
progress to be completed. That Angione’s work group and “job duties”
continued to exist says nothing about whether and why Sikorsky had decided to
remove Angione from this role. [Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 8].
Equally unpersuasive is Angione’s assertion that Lay’s decision not to
provide Angione with a reason for his discharge constitutes evidence that the

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reason Sikorsky now raises is pretextual. [Dkt. #68, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement
of Disputed Facts, at ¶ 15; Dkt. #70, Angione Aff. at ¶ 14]. Angione offers no
evidence of any duty owed him by either of the defendants to provide him with a
reason. Angione was a temporary, at-will employee, whose Employment
Agreement could be cancelled with or without any stated reason. See [Dkt. #53-1,
Def. Arnold’s Rule 56(a)(1) Statement at ¶ 5; Dkt. #66, Pl.’s Rule 56(a)(2) Statement
at ¶ 5; Dkt. #53-11, Ex. 1 to Callahan Aff. at ¶ 13]. Moreover, Angione does not
contend that he ever asked Lay, or anyone else at Arnold or Sikorsky, why he was
terminated.
Finally, given the overwhelming undisputed evidence to support Defendant
Sikorsky’s decision to discontinue Angione’s temporary work assignment, even if
Angione were found to have set forth a prima facie case of discrimination, he
does not come close to refuting Sikorsky’s legitimate, non-discriminatory,
explanation for his discharge.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Sikorsky’s motion for summary
judgment. In the absence of any evidence of discriminatory conduct in
connection with his discharge, and in light of the terms of his Employment
Agreement, the Court further GRANTS Defendant Arnold’s motion for summary
judgment.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Employer Defendants’ Motions for Summary

Judgment are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. The

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Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and to close the
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED
_________/s/______________
Vanessa L. Bryant,
United States District Judge

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