Vineyard Vines, LLC v. Macbeth Collection, LLC

Filing 137

RULING denying 136 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Sarah A. L. Merriam on 1/9/2019. (Katz, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
------------------------------x
:
VINEYARD VINES, LLC
:
:
v.
:
:
MACBETH COLLECTION, L.L.C.,
:
et al.
:
:
------------------------------x

Civil No. 3:14CV01096(SALM)

January 9, 2019

RULING RE: MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION [Doc. #136]
On December 5, 2018, the Court issued a ruling (the
“December Ruling”) granting, in part, and denying, in part, a
motion filed by plaintiff Vineyard Vines, LLC (“plaintiff”)
seeking additional relief, including enforcement of the judgment
previously entered in this case. See Doc. #134. Defendants
MacBeth Collection, L.L.C., MacBeth Collection By Margaret
Josephs, LLC, MacBeth Designs LLC, and Margaret Josephs
(collectively, “defendants”), now move for “partial
reconsideration” of the Court’s December Ruling. See Doc. #136.
For the reasons set forth herein, the defendants’ Motion for
Partial Reconsideration [Doc. #136] is DENIED.
I.

STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION
The Local Rules of Civil Procedure provide the standard for

motions for reconsideration. “Motions for reconsideration shall
not be routinely filed and shall satisfy the strict standard
applicable to such motions. Such motions will generally be
~ 1 ~

denied unless the movant can point to controlling decisions or
data that the court overlooked in the initial decision or
order.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)(1).
Motions for reconsideration
must be narrowly construed and strictly applied in order
to discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments
on issues that have been thoroughly considered by the
court. A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for
relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new
theories, securing a rehearing on the merits or
otherwise taking a second bite at the apple.
Steiner v. Lewmar, Inc., No. 3:09CV1976(DJS), 2016 WL 9113438,
at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 12, 2016) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). For reconsideration to be appropriate,
the motion must demonstrate that newly discovered facts
exist that require consideration, that there has been an
intervening change in the law, or that the court has
overlooked and thus failed to consider an aspect of the
law presented by the moving party which, if left
unredressed, would result in a clear error or cause
manifest injustice.
Morien v. Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 65, 69 (D.
Conn. 2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
II.

DISCUSSION
Defendants appear to proceed under both prongs of the Local

Rule’s standard, asserting that (1) the Court applied the wrong
standard to its review of the plaintiff’s motion and (2) the
evidence previously submitted does not support the Court’s
finding or, in the alternative, new evidence is available that
would affect the Court’s decision.
~ 2 ~

A.

The Motion does not cite any intervening change in the
law or point to any controlling decision or aspect of
the law that the Court overlooked.

As the Court noted in the December Ruling, neither party
made any argument in the extensive briefing provided regarding
the burden of proof applicable to a claim that the terms of a
permanent injunction and/or consent judgment had been violated.
See Doc. #134 at 15 (“Neither party articulates the standard of
proof that must be met by plaintiff in establishing that the
Permanent Injunction has been violated for purposes of awarding
liquidated damages.”). The Court therefore made its own
determination as to the appropriate burden of proof, finding
that plaintiff would need to establish a violation of the
Permanent Injunction, for purposes of the award of liquidated
damages –- a remedy available here only by virtue of the
parties’ agreement to it in their settlement agreement -– by the
preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 15-17.
Defendants do not contend that there has been any change in
the law on this point. Rather, defendants argue, in effect, that
the only mechanism for enforcement of the settlement agreement
and consent judgment in this case is a finding of civil
contempt. See Doc. #136-1 at 3-4. Defendants are incorrect. See,
e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., No. 98CV7076(BSJ),
2007 WL 1741885, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2007) (“Visa argues:
(1) that as a procedural matter, a party may enforce a court
~ 3 ~

order only through a contempt proceeding; and (2) that contempt
standards should nevertheless apply here in light of the nature
of MasterCard’s proposed remedy. Visa is mistaken on both
accounts.”); Canada Dry Delaware Valley Bottling Co. v. Hornell
Brewing Co., No. 11CV4308(PGG), 2013 WL 5434623, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2013) (“Canada Dry bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence that Hornell violated the Judgment.”);
State of N.Y. by Abrams v. Primestar Partners, L.P., No.
93CV3868(JES), 1993 WL 720677, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1993)
(“[Plaintiffs] shall bear the burden of proving a violation of
this Final Judgment by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
In this case, the parties negotiated a settlement agreement
that included a liquidated damages clause, and detailed the
circumstances under which the liquidated damages could be
triggered. See Doc. #95 at 15. That settlement agreement was
confirmed and memorialized, and “so ordered” by the Court, in a
Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction. See Doc. #70. The
liquidated damages provision appears in that Final Judgment:
[I]n the event Defendants violate this Injunction,
breach the Settlement Agreement, or fail to timely pay
an installment payment, Vineyard Vines shall be entitled
to: (a) liquidated damages in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00)[.]
Doc. #70 at 6.
Plaintiff has every right to seek enforcement of this
liquidated damages provision of the settlement agreement. The
~ 4 ~

Court need not find any party in contempt in order to find that
the settlement agreement, including its liquidated damages
clause, as embodied in the Final Judgment and Permanent
Injunction, is valid and enforceable. That was, and remains, the
Court’s finding. The proper standard by which to evaluate any
breach of the agreement is preponderance of the evidence. The
cases cited by defendants in support of reconsideration do not
alter the Court’s conclusion; rather, the cases cited simply
confirm the Court’s own holding, in the December Ruling, that
the standard for a finding of civil contempt is clear and
convincing evidence. See Doc. #134 at 37-38.
Plaintiff moved for various forms of relief in its motions,
asking the Court, inter alia, to enforce the Judgment and
settlement agreement, including by an award of liquidated
damages. See Doc. #77 (seeking “$500,000 in liquidated damages
in accordance with the Consent Judgment”); Doc. #113; Doc. #1132 at 2 (seeking “$500,000 in liquidated damages in accordance
with the Final Judgment and Settlement Agreement”). Plaintiff
also sought “coercive sanctions,” Doc. #133 at 2, and an order
of contempt against defendants, see Doc. #113-2 at 7 (arguing
that the Court should find defendants liable for civil
contempt). In the December Ruling, the Court addressed these
alternative requests for relief separately, under the standard
appropriate to each, and found plaintiff was entitled to one (an
~ 5 ~

award of liquidated damages) but not the other (a finding of
contempt). Defendants have offered no legitimate basis on which
the Court should reconsider the standard applied to either
inquiry.
B.

The Motion does not provide any “newly discovered
evidence” that would affect the outcome.

Defendants next argue that the evidence previously provided
to the Court was not sufficient to establish a violation of the
Permanent Injunction, by a clear and convincing evidence
standard. See Doc. #136-1 at 8 (“[T]he plaintiff has not
established by clear and convincing evidence that MacBeth
violated the Permanent Injunction.”). This argument does not
support reconsideration, for two reasons. First, as set forth
above, the relevant standard under which the Court found a
violation of the Permanent Injunction was preponderance of the
evidence, not clear and convincing evidence. Second, if
defendants are asking the Court to reconsider the evidence
already received, that is the quintessential purpose for which a
motion to reconsider is not permitted. Torcasio v. New Canaan
Bd. of Ed., No. 3:15CV00053(AWT), 2016 WL 1275028, at *3 (D.
Conn. Apr. 1, 2016) (“[P]laintiff simply attempts a second bite
at the proverbial apple; namely, relitigation of an issue which
has already been decided. This does not justify the Court’s
granting reconsideration.”).

~ 6 ~

The Court did not overlook any of the evidence pointed to
by defendants. To the contrary, the Court reviewed all of the
evidence in the record, including each item pointed to by
defendants. There is no basis for reconsideration of that
evidence simply because defendants disagree with the Court’s
evaluation of it.
Defendants have also submitted two additional affidavits
with the motion for reconsideration, presumably asking that the
Court rely upon this “new” evidence to reverse its December
Ruling. One is an affidavit of Margaret Josephs, who submitted
an affidavit in the original briefing on this matter. The other
is an affidavit of Ralph Nasar, who notably did not provide any
affidavit in connection with the original briefing. See Doc.
#134 at 27 (“Indeed, defendants have not even offered an
affidavit of Nasar to attest to the truthfulness and accuracy of
the email to counsel.”). The evidence offered, however, is not
new. “In order to succeed on a motion for reconsideration based
on newly discovered evidence, the evidence must be truly newly
discovered or could not have been found by due diligence.”
Kopperl v. Bain, No. 3:09CV01754(CSH), 2016 WL 310719, at *3 (D.
Conn. Jan. 26, 2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Ordinarily, a “party seeking reconsideration may not advance new
facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the
Court.” Hayes v. Bruno, No. 3:14CV1203(AWT), 2015 WL 13644604,
~ 7 ~

at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 7, 2015) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). That is precisely what defendants seek to do here.
Defendants offer no explanation as to why Josephs could not
have provided the information now offered in her original
affidavit, nor why Nasar could not have provided an affidavit
while the matter was under consideration. The evidence offered
at this late hour not only could have been presented with the
original briefing, it is in fact largely repetitive of the
evidence already before the Court. The “new” evidence offered
provides no basis for reconsideration of the December Ruling.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, defendants’ Motion for
Partial Reconsideration [Doc. #136] is DENIED.
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 9th day of January,
2019.
/s/
HON. SARAH A. L. MERRIAM
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

~ 8 ~