GEOMC Co, Ltd. v. Competitive Technologies, Inc.

Filing 241

ORDER granting 219 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 5/25/2018. (McDonough, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

GEOMC CO., LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 3:14-cv-1222 (VAB)
CALMARE THERAPEUTICS, INC.,
Defendant.

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
GEOMC Co., Ltd. (“Plaintiff”), has moved for attorneys’ fees and costs against Calmare
Therapeutics, Inc. (“Defendant” or “CTI”). Mot. for Fees, ECF No 219.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion for attorneys’ fees and
costs and awards GEOMC $836,442.05 in attorneys’ fees and $5,231.80 in costs.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural posture of this

case, and reiterates the facts and procedural history to the extent necessary for this ruling. See
Sept. 29 Ruling, ECF No. 212; Dec. 29 Ruling, ECF No. 238; Ruling on GEOMC’s Mot. Summ.
J. (“MSJ Ruling”), ECF No. 187.
This case arises out of a dispute over payment of pain management devices (“devices”)
that GEOMC provided to CTI. Sept. 29 Ruling at 2. The parties entered into several agreements
that governed the payment plans for the devices. Id. at 3–4. CTI, however, fell behind on its
payments and, by 2011, owed GEOMC $3,858,402. Id. at 4–5. CTI committed to a payment plan
that required the company to pay monthly installments of $200,000 in the remaining months of
2011 and $300,000 beginning in 2012, but CTI again failed to pay those bills. Id. at 5.
1 

In May 2012, the parties entered into a Security Agreement that granted GEOMC a
security interest in 273 devices located at CTI’s warehouse in Stamford, Connecticut, and 120
devices located in CTI’s warehouse in Charlotte, North Carolina, in consideration for the
delivery of the devices. Sec. Agmt., ECF No. 171-5; see also Dec. 29 Ruling at 3; MSJ Ruling at
4–5. The Security Agreement also stated that, if CTI defaulted on its payments, CTI would be
required to:
pay on demand all costs and expenses, including without limitation,
reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses, incurred by or on behalf of
[GEOMC], (a) in enforcing the Obligations and (b) in connection
with the taking, holding, preparing for sale or other disposition,
selling, managing, collecting or otherwise disposing of the
Collateral.
Sec. Agmt. ¶ 9. The agreement also provided that CTI would pay:
any and all expenses incurred or paid by [GEOMC] in establishing,
defending, protecting or enforcing its security interest or rights upon
or under the Obligations or with respect to the Collateral or in
collecting all amounts due, including, without limitation, all of
[GEOMC’s] reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . .
Sec. Agmt. ¶ 13.
In August 2014, GEOMC sued CTI for failing to pay for the devices. Compl., ECF No. 1;
Dec. 29 Ruling at 3; Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 137 at 13–18. After the parties engaged in
discovery and filed dispositive motions, the Court issued an Order granting summary judgment
on GEOMC’s breach of contract claim with respect to CTI’s liability for failing to pay GEOMC
for the devices sold after 2011, and denying summary judgment with respect to CTI’s liability
for any devices that had not yet been sold. MSJ Ruling at 1. The Court also granted GEOMC’s
motion on its claims for replevin, wrongful detention, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Id.
Finally, the Court denied the motion with respect to the claim under the Connecticut Unfair

2 

Trade Practices Act. Id. The Court also left for trial any disputes as to the amount of damages
owed under the contracts. Id.
On September 25 and 26, 2017, the Court held a bench trial, after which the Court
entered judgment in favor of GEOMC and against CTI. Dec. 29 Ruling at 5 (citing ECF Nos.
206–07, 212–13). On September 29, 2017, the Court awarded a judgment of $4,673,406.00 with
interest amounting to $5,678,764.41, together totaling $10,352,170.41. Judgment at 2, ECF No.
213. The Court also ruled that, if by December 31, 2017, CTI had failed to satisfy the judgment
GEOMC would be authorized to take possession of the devices. Id.; Dec. 29 Ruling at 5. The
judgment also directed GEOMC to submit any application for fees and costs within thirty days.
Judgment at 3.
On October 30, 2017, GEOMC applied for attorneys’ fees and expenses, claiming an
entitlement to recover attorneys’ fees under the parties’ Security Agreement. Memo. in Support
of Mot. for Fees (“Memo. for Fees”) at 1, ECF No. 219-1. GEOMC seeks $1,264,704.30, based
on fees and costs paid to two sets of lawyers—Cohen & Gresser LLP, which represented
GEOMC from the case’s inception until September 2015, and Dentons US LLP, which
represented GEOMC during the latter part of the case. Id.
On December 22, 2017, CTI filed an emergency motion to approve alternative security
or, in the alternative, a motion to stay the judgment pending appeal. Dec. 29 Ruling at 6 (citing
ECF Nos. 231–32). The Court ordered an expedited briefing schedule and, on December 29,
2017, denied CTI’s motion to approve alternative security or, in the alternative, to stay the
judgment pending appeal. Dec. 29 Ruling at 21. The Court also, however, granted a temporary
stay until January 5, 2018, and instructed that if CTI moved with the Second Circuit to stay the

3 

judgment pending appeal, a temporary stay would remain in effect until the Second Circuit
resolved the motion to stay. Id.
On April 18, 2018, the Second Circuit granted CTI’s request for a stay. ECF No. 239.
The Court now addresses the pending motion for attorneys’ fees.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a lawsuit based on diversity, “[s]tate law creates the substantive right to attorney’s

fees[.]” Banker v. Nighswander, Martin & Mitchell, 37 F.3d 866, 873 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting
Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1992)). Connecticut’s
substantive law on attorneys’ fees therefore will apply because GEOMC asserted state law
contract claims against CTI. See Am. Compl. at 13–18 (asserting claims based on replevin,
wrongful detention, conversion, the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, and unjust
enrichment, each stemming from CTI’s breach of the parties’ contract).
“Connecticut adheres to the ‘American rule’ regarding attorney’s fees”—that is, “in the
absence of statutory or contractual authority to the contrary, a successful party is not entitled to
recover attorney’s fees or other ‘ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation . . . .’” Total
Recycling Servs. of CT., Inc. v. Connecticut Oil Recycling Servs., LLC, 308 Conn. 213, 326
(2013) (quoting TES Franchising, LLC v. Feldman, 286 Conn. 132, 148 (2008)). A specific
contract, however, may entitle a party to recover attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 327. In that
case, the court must “apply the well established principle that ‘[a] contract must be construed to
effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from [its] language . . . interpreted in the
light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction.’” Id.
(quoting FCM Group, Inc. v. Miller, 300 Conn. 774, 811 (2011)).

4 

Even when a prevailing party is entitled to fees and costs under a contract, that party still
must make an evidentiary showing that the application is reasonable. Id. at 327–28. To determine
whether an application for attorneys’ fees is reasonable, the court may consider its “general
knowledge” of the proceedings held before it and of reasonable compensation rates, but that
general knowledge may be defeated by countervailing evidence that the amount is unreasonable.
Id. (citing Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 472 (2004) (“Even though a court may employ its
own general knowledge in assessing the reasonableness of a claim for attorney’s fees, we also
have emphasized that ‘no award for an attorney’s fee may be made when the evidence is
insufficient.’”) (quoting Appliances, Inc. v. Yost, 186 Conn. 673, 680 (1982)).
The Court will calculate a reasonable fee award by determining a reasonable hourly rate
and multiplying that rate by the reasonable number of hours required for the litigation. See
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010)1; see also Arbor Hill Concerned
Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cty. of Albany and Albany Bd. of Elections, 522 F.3d 182, 186
(2d Cir. 2008) (abandoning the term “lodestar” and instead instructing the court, “in exercising
its considerable discretion, to bear in mind all of the case-specific variables that we and other
courts have identified as relevant to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees in setting a reasonable
hourly rate” and then “use that reasonable hourly rate to calculate what can properly be termed
the ‘presumptively reasonable fee’”).2 The result of multiplying reasonable hours by reasonable

1

The Court will rely primarily on Connecticut law in this case that arises under diversity
jurisdiction. See Banker, 37 F.3d at 873. Because Connecticut courts, however, also consider
federal cases in determining attorneys’ fees calculations, see, e.g., Rice v. Ryders Health Mgmt.,
Inc., 2016 WL 3769093, at *4–5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 16, 2016) (citing the United States
Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit), this Court will also consider federal caselaw on the
subject.
2
Certain courts in the Second Circuit have interpreted Arbor Hill as establishing a four-step
process, “as the court must: (1) determine the reasonable hourly rate; (2) determine the number

5 

fees “is ‘only presumptively reasonable’; it is still within the court’s discretion to adjust the
amount upward or downward based on the case-specific factors.” Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v.
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-60 (JBA), 2012 WL 4092515, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 17,
2012) (quoting Robinson v. City of New York, No. 05-cv-9545 (GEL), 2009 WL 3109846, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009)).
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Entitlement to Fees

GEOMC, having prevailed at trial, seeks to recover attorneys’ fees and costs under
paragraphs nine and thirteen of the Security Agreement governing the parties’ relationship and
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). Memo. for Fees at 3; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). CTI
argues that GEOMC is not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees, first because the Security
Agreement is invalid, and second because GEOMC was required to establish the amount of its
fees at trial rather than in a post-trial motion. Opp. to Mot. for Fees at 1, ECF No. 230. The Court
agrees with GEOMC.
The Court has already determined that the Security Agreement is valid. MSJ Order at 25
(“[T]he undisputed facts demonstrate that the 2012 Security Agreement was valid and binding as
to both GEOMC and CTI.”); see also Reply to Opp. to Mot. for Fees at 2 (“By executing the
Security Agreement, CTI agreed to pay GEOMC’s attorneys fees.”); Opp. to Mot. for Fees at 3
(acknowledging that “this Court has already concluded that GEOMC is entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees in this action,” but arguing that the Court should reconsider that conclusion).

of hours reasonably expanded; (3) multiply the two to calculate the presumptively reasonable
fee; and (4) make any appropriate adjustments to arrive at the final fee award.” Adorno v. Port
Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 685 F. Supp. 2d 507, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Tyco
Healthcare Grp. LP v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-60 (JBA), 2012 WL 4092515, at
*2 (D. Conn. Sept. 17, 2012) (quoting Adorno and adopting four-step process).
6 

Moreover, the Court instructed GEOMC to file a motion for fees and costs within thirty days of
the entry of judgment. Judgment ¶ 6. And the valid Security Agreement requires CTI, in the
event of default, to pay “all costs and expenses,” including reasonable attorneys’ fees. See Sec.
Agmt. ¶¶ 9, 13.
The Court’s instructions and the law of the case therefore will apply, and the Court will
consider GEOMC’s application for fees and costs. See United States v. Carr, 557 F.3d 93, 102
(2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen a court has ruled on an issue that decision should generally be adhered
to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case.”). The Court therefore must determine
whether GEOMC’s application for $1,264,704.30, is reasonable.
B.

Reasonable Rates

In Connecticut, “[i]t is well established that a trial court calculating a reasonable
attorney’s fee makes its determination while considering the factors set forth under rule 1.5(a) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 259
(2003). Under that rule, the Court considers “the time and labor spent by the attorneys, the
novelty and complexity of the legal issues, fees customarily charged in the same locality for
similar services, the lawyer’s experience and ability, relevant time limitations, the magnitude of
the case and the results obtained, the nature and length of the lawyer-client relationship, and
whether the fee is fixed or contingent.” Id.
A reasonable hourly rate is determined by the prevailing market rate, which, in
Connecticut, typically means “‘the billing rates of [other attorneys in] the District of
Connecticut,’ even if counsel has its primary offices elsewhere.” Schuman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
3:15-cv-01006 (SRU), 2017 WL 2662191, at *8 (D. Conn. June 20, 2017) (quoting Smart SMR
of N.Y. v. Zoning Comm’n of Town of Stratford, 9 F. Supp. 2d 143, 149 (D. Conn. 1998)). The

7 

Court may, however, “award ‘out-of-district fees’ to attorneys from outside Connecticut ‘if a
reasonable, paying client would have retained out-of-district counsel.’” Id. (quoting Arbor Hill,
522 F.3d at 186). “[T]he fee applicant has the burden of showing by ‘satisfactory evidence—in
addition to the attorney’s own affidavits’—that the requested hourly rates are the prevailing
market rates.” Farbotko v. Clinton Cty. of New York, 433 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984)).
1.

Fees and Costs for Cohen & Gresser LLP

From June 2014 until September 2015, Cohen & Gresser represented GEOMC. Memo.
for Fees at 5; Invoices, id. Ex. D, ECF No. 219-6. GEOMC claims that, during that time, Cohen
& Gresser sent invoices totaling $916,000 for fees, and that GEOMC paid the firm $410,000,
leaving $506,000 unpaid. Mot. for Fees at 5 n.1; see also id. Ex. D (invoices from Cohen &
Gresser). GEOMC seeks to recover the $410,000 in attorney’s fees and costs paid to Cohen &
Gresser. Id.
The invoices submitted by GEOMC from Cohen & Gresser show that ten individuals
worked on GEOMC’s case, for the following rates:
Attorney/Paralegal 

Position

Billing Rate on Invoice

Lawrence T. Gresser 

Partner

$750 

S. C. Sohn 

Partner

$650–$725 

Oliver Haker 

Counsel

$595–$650 

Sophia Soejung Kim 

Associate

$425 

Sang Min Lee 

Associate

$300–$375 

Yejee Lee 

Not included in the record

$200 

Svetlana Malenkova 

Not included in the record

$165 

Huascar Matos 

Not included in the record

$165 

Jeff Sherman 

Not included in the record

$165 

8 

Jason Fischer 

Not included in the record

$165 

See Memo. for Fees Ex. D (Invoices), Ex. E (Biographies). GEOMC argues that, by “limiting its
fee application, for time devoted to this action by Cohen & Gresser, to an amount equal to what
GEOMC paid Cohen & Gresser . . . GEOMC ensures that the compensation sought does not
exceed fair compensation for time that was [reasonably] and necessarily expended by Cohen &
Gresser for GEOMC to prevail in this action, indirectly reduces the hourly rate sought, and
ensures that GEOMC does not seek compensation for duplication of effort that may have
occurred as a result of the change in GEOMC’s legal counsel.” Id. at 8.
The Court’s calculation of attorneys’ fees, however, should not be based on any amount
that GEOMC has or has not paid to Cohen & Gresser. The Court will instead calculate
“reasonable compensation for services” based on GEOMC’s evidentiary showing of the
reasonable market rate for attorneys’ fees and the reasonable hours that the attorneys spent on the
case. See Total Recycling Servs., 308 Conn. at 327–28 (explaining that, even when a contract
establishes entitlement to attorneys’ fees, “the party seeking the award of fees must first satisfy a
threshold evidentiary showing” and the Court may use its “‘general knowledge of what would be
reasonable compensation for services which are fairly stated and described . . . and . . . may rely
on their general knowledge of what has occurred at the proceedings before them to supply
evidence in support of an award of attorney’s fees . . .’”) (quoting Smith, 267 Conn. at 471–72);
see also Schuman, 2017 WL 2662191, at *8 (“Connecticut district courts typically ‘consider the
billing rates of the District of Connecticut,’ even if counsel has its primary offices elsewhere.”)
(citing Smart SMR of N.Y., 9 F. Supp. 2d at 149).
CTI argues that GEOMC has not carried its burden of establishing that the Court should
award out-of-district rates. Opp. to Mot. for Fees at 7 (citing, e.g., Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190

9 

(stating that a paying client would “in most cases hire counsel from within his district, or at least
counsel whose rates are consistent with those charged locally”). CTI therefore proposes the
following rates, which CTI argues are consistent with the Connecticut market:
Attorney/Paralegal 

Position

Billing Rate on
Invoice 

CTI’s
recommended
rate

Lawrence T. Gresser 

Partner

$750

$500 

S. C. Sohn 

Partner

$650–$725

$400 

Oliver Haker 

Counsel

$595–$650

$350 

Sophia Soejung Kim 

Associate

$425

$200 

Sang Min Lee 

Associate

$300–$375

$200 

Yejee Lee 

Not included in the record

$200

$125 

Svetlana Malenkova 

Not included in the record

$165

$125 

Huascar Matos 

Not included in the record

$165

$125 

Jeff Sherman 

Not included in the record

$165

$125 

Jason Fischer 

Not included in the record

$165

$125 

Opp. to Mot. for Fees at 15–17.
The Court agrees that GEOMC has not carried its burden to establish that Cohen &
Gresser’s fees should exceed those of the rates prevailing in this District. See Farbotko, 433 F.3d
at 209 (“[T]he fee applicant has the burden of showing by ‘satisfactory evidence—in addition to
the attorney’s own affidavits’—that the requested hourly rates are the prevailing market rates.”)
(quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). GEOMC argues that it should be awarded a flat sum of
$410,000 for Cohen & Gresser’s legal services and expenses because that number already
reflects a reduction in the amount that Cohen & Gresser billed. See Mot. for Fees at 5; Reply to
Opp. to Mot. for Fees at 5 (“If Cohen & Gresser’s fees were recalculated using [ ] local rates, its
fees would total $465,275. However, GEOMC seeks to recover less than that, seeking only the

10 

$410,000 it paid to Cohen & Gresser. This represents 45% of what Cohen & Gresser billed.
Therefore no further reduction to Cohen & Gresser’s fees is needed to reflect local rates.”).
As discussed above, however, the Court declines to base the award amount on the amount
that GEOMC paid to Cohen & Gresser. Instead, based on knowledge of the rates prevailing in
the district and the history of this case, the Court will award attorneys’ fees to GEOMC for
Cohen & Gresser’s time at the following rates:
Attorney/Paralegal 

Position

Billing Rate on
Invoice

Awarded Rate

Lawrence T. Gresser 

Partner

$750

$500 

S. C. Sohn 

Partner

$650–$725

$425 

Oliver Haker 

Counsel

$595–$650

$375 

Sophia Soejung Kim 

Associate

$425

$275 

Sang Min Lee 

Associate

$300–$375

$225 

Yejee Lee 

Not included in the record

$200

$1253 

Svetlana Malenkova 

Not included in the record

$165

$125 

Huascar Matos 

Not included in the record

$165

$125 

Jeff Sherman 

Not included in the record

$165

$125 

Jason Fischer 

Not included in the record

$165

$125 

The Court finds these rates commensurate with billable rates in Connecticut. See Perdue, 559
U.S. at 551 (requiring that a fee award “roughly approximate[] the fee that the prevailing
attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed
by the hour in a comparable case”); see also In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 4679228,
at *8 (D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2017) (“The highest hourly rate awarded to date in a published

3

While the submission suggested a different hourly rate for Yejee Lee in contrast to four others
from Cohen and Gresser, Svetlana Malenkova, Huascar Matos, Jeff Sherman, and Jason Fischer,
there is nothing in the record to justifythis distinction. As a result, the Court treats all of these
employeesthe same.
11 

Connecticut case appears to be $525 per hour.”) (citing Barati v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 939 F.
Supp. 2d 153, 156 (D. Conn. 2013)).
2.

Fees and Costs for Dentons US LLP

Dentons represented GEOMC beginning in September 2015. Notice of Appearance, ECF
No. 111. The two primary lawyers on the case were Richard M. Zuckerman, Esq., and Kristen B.
Weil, Esq., with assistance from Timothy J. Straub, Esq., Karen Ogle, and Patrice Ho Sang.
Memo. for Fees at 5–6. GEOMC applies for fees based on the following rates for those
individuals:
Attorney/Paralegal 

Position

Billing Rate
Requested

Regular Billing Rates
(2015–2017)

Richard M. Zuckerman 

Partner 

$800

$900–$1,020 

Kristen B. Weil 

Senior Managing Associate

$600

$630–$715 

Timothy J. Straub 

Associate 

$265

$265 

Karen Ogle 

Senior Paralegal

$250

$345–$375 

Patrice Ho Sang 

Senior Paralegal

$250

$295–$325 

Id. at 6. GEOMC argues that these requested rates, which GEOMC argues are lower than each
individual’s typical rate and commensurate with the New York market, are reasonable. Id.
CTI, in contrast, argues that Dentons’s hours, like Cohen & Gresser’s hours, should be
calculated based on in-district rates. Opp. to Mot. for Fees at 9–10. CTI argues that the following
rates should apply:
Attorney/Paralegal 

Position

Billing Rate
Requested

CTI’s Recommended
Rate

Richard M. Zuckerman 

Partner 

$800

$500 

Kristen B. Weil 

Senior Managing Associate

$600

$275 

Timothy J. Straub 

Associate 

$265

$200 

Karen Ogle 

Senior Paralegal

$250

$125 

12 

Patrice Ho Sang 

Senior Paralegal

$250

$125 

The Court agrees with GEOMC that, for Dentons, out-of-district rates should apply. See
Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 191 (“[A] district court may use an out-of-district hourly rate—or some
rate in between the out-of-district rate sought and the rates charged by local attorneys—in
calculating the presumptively reasonable fee if it is clear that a reasonable, paying client would
have paid those higher rates.”); see also Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP, 2012 WL 4092515, at *2
(“National rates have been recognized as warranted where the expertise and specialty justify
it.”). The Court finds that it is “reasonable under the circumstances” that, when GEOMC sought
replacement counsel for Cohen & Gresser, the “approximate market rate for an attorney’s
services” would increase. See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 192. That is, GEOMC’s failure to pay
Cohen and Gresser in full meant Dentons would be taking on a client with a greater risk of not
being paid. This risk is reasonably within the range of circumstances sufficient to justify rates
slightly above rates normally charged within this District See, e.g., Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP,
2012 WL 4092515, at *2 (awarding out-of-district rates, including $850 per hour for a patent
attorney partner at DLA Piper’s New York office, and noting, “the Court is persuaded that a
national rate is warranted here because of the high stakes, the technical complexity, and
multiplicity of claims and defenses regarding multiple patents and multiple products”).
The Court therefore awards GEOMC rates for Dentons, slightly above in-district rates as
follows:
Attorney/Paralegal 

Position

Billing Rate
Requested

Awarded Rate

Richard M. Zuckerman 

Partner 

$800

$675 

Kristen B. Weil 

Senior Managing Associate

$600

$500 

Timothy J. Straub 

Associate 

$265

$215 

13 

Karen Ogle 

Senior Paralegal

$250

$150 

Patrice Ho Sang 

Senior Paralegal

$250

$150 

B.

Reasonably Expended Hours

The second requirement of the lodestar is to determine “the number of hours.” Perdue,
559 U.S. at 546. As a general matter, hours should be determined using contemporaneous
records that specify the attorney, the hours spent, and “the nature of the work done.” Genn v.
New Haven Bd. of Educ., No. 3:12-cv-00704 (CSH), 2017 WL 3022321, at *3 (D. Conn. July 17,
2017) (quoting New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d
Cir. 1983)).
1.

Cohen & Gresser

Cohen & Gresser billed GEOMC for the following hours, based on invoices recorded
contemporaneously with the first part of this litigation: 
Attorney/Paralegal 

Position

Hours

Lawrence T. Gresser 

Partner

7.7 

S. C. Sohn 

Partner

74.7 

Oliver Haker 

Counsel

764.1 

Sophia Soejung Kim 

Associate

132.5  

Sang Min Lee 

Associate

622.9 

Yejee Lee 

Not included in the record

36 

Svetlana Malenkova 

Not included in the record

1.5  

Huascar Matos 

Not included in the record

26.7 

Jeff Sherman 

Not included in the record

2.9 

Jason Fischer 

Not included in the record

48.4 

Memo. for Fees, Ex. D.

14 

CTI argues that the hours billed by Cohen & Gresser should be reduced “in light of the
significant amount of non-compensable time spent on Plaintiff’s failed attempt to obtain a
temporary restraining order, and the numerous excessive, wasteful, and vague entries.” Opp. to
Mot. for Fees at 24. Specifically, CTI argues that GEOMC “cannot recover for any time related
to Cohen & Gresser’s failed attempt to obtain a temporary restraining order in this case.” Id. CTI
also argues that Cohen & Gresser has billed for excessive and duplicative hours for tasks such as
drafting the initial complaint, performing a default judgment analysis, and writing a response to a
motion to dismiss. Id. at 25. Finally, CTI argues that entries such as “Attention to strategies” or
“Emails with team” are vague. Id. at 26. CTI therefore argues that the Court should reduce the
number of hours that Cohen & Gresser has billed by ten percent. Id. (citing, e.g., Conn. Hosp.
Ass’n v. O’Neill, 891 F. Supp. 687, 691 (D. Conn. 1994) (“A percentage reduction method has
been approved by the Second Circuit ‘as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee
application.’ Accordingly, for those entries which are too vague to adequately assess
reasonableness, the court deducts ten percent from the fee request.”) (quoting Carey, 711 F.2d at
1146)).
The Court has discretion to reduce the hours billed when time entries are vague, overly
broad, or represent limited success on the part of the prevailing party. See U.S. Football League
v. Nat’l Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 414 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting district court’s “attempt to
identify specific hours that should be eliminated” or to “simply reduce the award to account for
limited success.” (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1983))); Kirsch v. Fleet
St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 172–73 (2d Cir. 1998) (district court has discretion to “deduct a
reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed as a practical means of trimming fat from
a fee application,” for “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” entries, or for

15 

“vagueness, inconsistencies, and other deficiencies in the billing records”); see also Green v.
City of New York, 403 Fed. App’x 626, 630 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s review of
block billing that resulted in a “15% across-the-board reduction” for unreasonableness and
vagueness); Adorno v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 685 F. Supp. 2d 507, 515
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding block-billed time records provided sufficient detail to award fees but
noting that “[w]hile ‘block-billing’ is disfavored and may lack the specificity required for an
award of attorneys’ fees, it is not prohibited as long as the Court can determine the
reasonableness of the work performed”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The Court agrees with CTI that the hours recorded, totaling 1717.40 hours, are excessive,
given the scope of this case and that much of this work occurred two years before the case went
to trial. See, e.g., Jaeger v. Cellco P’ship, No. 3:11-cv-1948 (SRU), 2015 WL 1867661, at *4 (D.
Conn. 2015) (reducing number of hours after considering scope and complexity of case).
GEOMC, however, is not arguing anything different, since it seeks to recover less than 50% of
what Cohen and Gresser billed it. See Reply to Opp. to Mot. for Fees at 4–5 (stating that
$410,000 “represents 45% of what Cohen & Gresser billed”). As a result, in light of this
concession on the issue of “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary entries,” the Court
will issue a fifty (50) percent across-the-board reduction of the hours expended by Cohen and
Gresser and will reduce the number of hours from 1,717.40 to 858.7 hours.4

4

For example, as CTI points out, the law firm spent a considerable amount of questionable time
seeking a motion for a temporary restraining order, but produced little to no evidence probative
of irreparable harm. See ECF No. 78 (denying relief sought and noting that “[w]ithout additional
facts regarding the condition of the devices at issue and the timing of CTI’s alleged plans to sell
those devices, the Court cannot conclude that irreparable harm is likely in the absence of an
injunction, and therefore GEOMC has not made a clear showing that it is entitled to the
extraordinary remedy it seeks.”). The Court finds this and similar expenditures of time not
compensable.
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2.

Dentons

The motion for fees also includes a schedule of legal services performed by Dentons.
Mot. for Fees Ex. B, ECF No. 219-4. GEOMC states that, “[i]n compiling this Application,
Plaintiff’s counsel exercised billing judgment in eliminating time entries that were not deemed
appropriate.” Mot. for Fees at 8. GEOMC represents that Dentons spent a total of 1,622.60 hours
on this litigation:
Attorney/Paralegal 

Position

Total Hours

Richard M. Zuckerman 

Partner

275.45 

Kristen B. Weil 

Senior Managing Associate

818.45 

Timothy J. Straub 

Associate

118.90 

Karen Ogle 

Senior Paralegal

205.90 

Patrice Ho Sang 

Senior Paralegal

203.90 

Zuckerman Decl. ¶ 8; Mot. for Fees Ex. B.  
CTI argues that the attorneys’ fees award for Dentons should be reduced by an additional
twenty percent “to account for a significant number of non-compensable, excessive, and vague
entries.” Opp. to Mot. for Fees at 20. CTI argues that GEOMC cannot recover for any time
related to a breach of contract claim based on a 2007 License Agreement. Id. In addition, CTI
argues that Dentons has billed for excessive time, including by billing over seventy-five hours
for an opposition to a motion for leave to file an amended or corrected answer, and at least two
hundred hours for pre-trial preparation. Id. at 21–22. Finally, CTI argues that Dentons included
many excessive and vague entries, including time for reviewing discovery, trial preparation, and
reviewing client documents. Id. at 22–23 (citing Perez v. Lasership, Inc., 3:15-mc-00031 (CSH)

17 

2015 WL 8750965, at *8 (D. Conn. Dec. 14, 2015) (“A number of courts have reduced hours for
vagueness at a rate of 10%.”)).
The Court disagrees that GEOMC is not entitled to any attorneys’ fees based on
GEOMC’s breach of contract claim against CTI for the 2007 Agreement. The 2007 Agreement,
in addition to the 2012 Security Agreement, was a part of the facts underlying the claims against
CTI in this case. See MSJ Order at 2–4, 11–13 (including 2007 Agreement in statement of facts
and discussing it in light of breach of contract claim); Total Recycling Servs. of Ct., Inc., 308
Conn. at 333 (“[W]hen certain claims provide for a party’s recovery of contractual attorney’s
fees but others do not, a party is nevertheless entitled to a full recovery of reasonable attorney’s
fees if an apportionment is impracticable because the claims arise from a common factual
nucleus and are intertwined.”).
The Court agrees, however, that some of the entries in Dentons’s time sheets are vague or
excessive, to some extent the result of the “‘block billing,’—i.e., billing a large number of hours
for multiple tasks—which do not permit the Court to determine actual time spent on particular
tasks . . . .” Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP, 2012 WL 4092515, at *3. As a result, the Court reduces
the number of reasonable hours expended by fifteen percent from 1622.60 hours to 1,379.21
hours to ensure that GEOMC is compensated only for reasonable time spent. Id.
C.

Award of Attorneys’ Fees

The Court therefore awards GEOMC a total award of attorneys’ fees of $836,442.05.
The total award for attorney’s fees for Cohen & Gresser, based on the hourly rates
discussed above and the total number of hours discussed above and further addressed below,
therefore equals $256,581.25, calculated as follows:

18 

Attorney/Paralegal 

Position

Hours x Rate = Fee

Lawrence T. Gresser 

Partner

3.85 x 500 = $1,925.00

S. C. Sohn 

Partner

37.35 x 425 = $15,873.75

Oliver Haker 

Counsel

382.05 x 375 = $143,268.75

Sophia Soejung Kim 

Associate

66.25 x 275 = $18,218.75

Sang Min Lee 

Associate

311.45 x 225 = $70,076.25

Yejee Lee 

Not included in the record

18 x 125 = $2,250.00 

Svetlana Malenkova 

Not included in the record

0.75 x 125 = $93.75 

Huascar Matos 

Not included in the record

13.35 x 125 = $1,668.75

Jeff Sherman 

Not included in the record

1.45 x 125 = $181.25

Jason Fischer 

Not included in the record

24.2 x 125 = $3,025.00
Total: $256,581.25 

The total award for attorney’s fees for Dentons, based on the hourly rates discussed
above and the total number of hours discussed above and further addressed below, therefore
equals $579,860.80 calculated as follows:
Attorney/Paralegal 

Position

Hours x Rate = Fee

Richard M. Zuckerman 

Partner

234.13 x 675 = $158,037.75

Kristen B. Weil 

Senior Managing Associate

695.69 x 500 = $347,845.00

Timothy J. Straub 

Associate

101.07 x 215 = $21,730.05

Karen Ogle 

Senior Paralegal

175.01 x 150 = $26,251.50

Patrice Ho Sang 

Senior Paralegal

173.31 x 150 = $25,996.50
Total: $579,860.80 

Having determined that GEOMC is entitled to a total award of attorneys’ fees of
$256,581.25 for Cohen & Gresser’s time and $579,860.80 for Dentons’s time, for a total of
$836,442.05, the Court determines that further adjustments, both with respect to the requested
hourly rate and the number of hours, are not warranted. See Tyco Healthcare Group, 2012 WL

19 

4092515, at *1 (“The amount [resulting from multiplying reasonable hours by reasonable rates]
‘is only presumptively reasonable; it is still within the court’s discretion to adjust the amount
upward or downward based on the case-specific factors.’”). The reductions noted above
sufficiently address any concerns about the appropriateness of the attorneys’ fee award sought
here.
The Court therefore finds that a total award of attorneys’ fees of $836,442.05 is
appropriate.
D.

Costs

Finally, GEOMC seeks reimbursement for Dentons’s filing and transcript fees,
interpretation services, and court expenses in the amount of $5,231.80. Mot. for Fees at 13; id.,
Ex. C (itemized list of expenses). CTI does not object to GEOMC’s application for costs. Opp. to
Mot. for Fees at 30. The Court therefore approves this application for costs of $5,231.80.5
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, GEOMC’s application for attorneys’ fees and costs is
GRANTED. The Court awards GEOMC $836,442.05 in attorneys’ fees and $5,231.80 in costs.
SO ORDERED this 25th day of May, 2018, in Bridgeport, Connecticut.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

5

GEOMC requested $410,000 for both fees and expenses incurred by Cohen & Gresser. See
Zuckerman Decl. at 13 (seeking “$410,000 in fees and expenses for services rendered by
GEOMC’s prior counsel, Cohen & Gresser”). Because GEOMC did not separately request costs,
the Court limits its analysis to the extent expenses from Cohen & Gresser have been discussed
above.
20