Dwinnell v. Federal Express Corporation Long Term Disability Plan et al

Filing 45

ORDER RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: For the reasons in the attached ruling, plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. #27) is DENIED, and defendants' motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. #28) is GRANTED. The parties shall jointly submit an amended Rule 26(f) report in 14 days. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 3/9/16. (Gorsuch, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JENNIFER DWINNELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL EXPRESS LONG TERM
DISABILITY PLAN, et al,
Defendants.

No. 3:14-cv-01439 (JAM)

ORDER RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Jennifer Dwinnell appeals from a denial of her claim for long term disability
benefits under the terms of a disability plan furnished by her employer Federal Express
Corporation. The parties have cross-moved for partial summary judgment with respect to what
standard of review I should apply to adjudicate this claim. For the reasons set forth below, I
conclude that I should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review rather than de novo
review. Accordingly, I will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
Since at least 2006, Federal Express Corporation (FedEx) has offered a long term
disability benefit plan for its employees. The FedEx plan (the Plan) is subject to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the enormously complex federal statute that
governs employee benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. As relevant here, the Plan sets forth
detailed procedures for employees to file claims for disability benefits and also to appeal any
adverse determination. See Doc. #22-7.
In July 2012, plaintiff Jennifer Dwinnell was denied disability benefits under the Plan.
The specific grounds for denial of her claim are not presently relevant to the parties’ cross1

motions for partial summary judgment. What matters for now is that plaintiff’s claim was denied
at the first level of review by the Plan’s claims paying administrator and that this initial denial
was then upheld on administrative appeal. At the time that plaintiff’s claim was considered,
FedEx had retained Aetna Life Insurance Company (Aetna) to conduct both the initial claims
determination as well as to conduct the administrative appeal of the denial of this claim.
Plaintiff has filed this federal court action to seek review of the denial of her disability
claim. The parties have now cross-moved for partial summary judgment on a preliminary but
perhaps outcome-determinative issue in this case: whether I should apply de novo review of the
denial of plaintiff’s claim (as plaintiff argues) or whether I should conduct deferential, abuse-ofdiscretion review of the denial of plaintiff’s claim (as defendant argues).
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), the Supreme Court made
clear that when an ERISA claimant is denied benefits under his or her benefits plan, the
claimant’s denial is subject to de novo review in a court challenge like this one “unless the
benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility
for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan,” in which case the claimant’s denial is instead
subject to deferential, abuse-of-discretion review. Id. at 115. Here, plaintiff claims that no
deferential review should apply in this case because, according to plaintiff, Aetna was not
properly appointed with fiduciary authority under the Plan to conduct the administrative appeal
review of the denial of her claim.
A. Essential Roles and Provisions of the Plan
In order to understand plaintiff’s somewhat complex argument about why Aetna lacked
fiduciary authority, it is necessary at the outset to review in some turgid detail the specific
provisions and decision-making roles of several entities under the Plan. Insofar as relevant to this

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case, the Plan delegates key responsibilities to four different entities: (1) the Administrator, (2)
the Committee, (3) the Claims Paying Administrator, and (4) the appeal committee. Each of
these roles is described below.
1. The Administrator
The Plan designates FedEx as the Administrator, an entity charged with administering the
Plan through its employee benefits department. Plan, § 1.1(a). Article 6 of the Plan provides that
“[t]he Administrator is a named fiduciary of the Plan and shall have the absolute right and power
to construe and interpret the provisions of the Plan and administer it for the best interest of
Employees.” Plan, § 6.1. This interpretive power includes the ability “to construe any ambiguity
and interpret any provision of the Plan or supply any omission or reconcile any inconsistencies
in such manner as it deems proper.” Ibid. (emphasis added).
The Administrator also has authority “to determine eligibility for coverage under the Plan
in accordance with its terms,” as well as “to decide all questions of eligibility for, and determine
the amount, manner and time of payment of, benefits under the Plan in accordance with its
terms.” Plan, § 6.1(b)-(c). The Plan further provides that “[t]he determination of the
Administrator shall be made in a fair and consistent manner in accordance with the Plan’s terms
and its decision shall be final, subject only to a determination by a court of competent
jurisdiction that the Administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.” Plan, § 6.1.
2. The Committee
Notwithstanding that the FedEx company itself serves as the Plan’s Administrator, the
Plan further provides for the appointment of what it calls “the Committee” by the FedEx Board
of Directors “to perform the administrative duties hereunder” and to assume “general
administrative power” over the Plan and “with such other powers as may be necessary to

3

perform its duties hereunder,” apart from the specific functions of claims administration (which
are discussed below). See Plan, § 6.2 (describing functions of the Committee). 1 In addition to
vesting “the Committee” with general administrative power, the Plan further provides that “[t]he
Committee is a named fiduciary of the Plan.” Although the identity and composition of “the
Committee” is not further described in the Plan, it is undisputed here that the FedEx board
appointed an entity known as the Retirement Plan Investment Board to serve as “the Committee”
under the Plan.
3. The Claims Paying Administrator
The next important role under the Plan is that of the so-called Claims Paying
Administrator. The Plan specifically designates Aetna “or any other entity or person designated
as such by the Company” as the “Claims Paying Administrator,” Plan, § 1.1(e), and it provides
that “the administration of claims . . . is the responsibility of the Administrator and the Claims
Paying Administrator to the extent such duties are delegated to it by the Administrator.” Plan, §
6.2. The Plan otherwise describes in detail the procedure for an employee who is seeking
1

Section 6.2 of the Plan reads as follows:
Committee. A Committee shall be appointed by the board of directors of FedEx Corporation to
perform the administrative duties hereunder other than the administration of claims which is the
responsibility of the Administrator and Claims Paying Administrator to the extent such duties are
delegated to it by the Administrator. The Committee is a named fiduciary of the Plan and shall
adopt such rules and regulations that in its opinion are either necessary or desirable to implement
and administer the Plan and to transact its business. In addition to this general administrative
power, the Committee shall have such other powers as may be necessary to perform its duties
hereunder, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the power to engage counsel
and other agents at the expense of the Trust Fund, as it shall deem appropriate, subject to the
requirements of the Code and ERISA. The Committee shall be empowered to supervise the
investments of the Trust Fund and to establish investment guidelines including, without limitation,
the power to appoint and remove investment advisors and to determine the portion of the Trust
Fund to be set aside in short-term investments for the purpose of meeting the liquidity needs of the
Plan. The Committee shall keep or cause to be kept records of its proceedings and decisions and
shall keep such other records and data as may be necessary for the proper administration of its
duties. All decisions of the Committee shall be made in a fair and consistent manner in accordance
with the Plan's terms and its decision shall be final, subject only to a determination by a court of
competent jurisdiction that the Administrator's decision was arbitrary and capricious.

Doc. #22-7 at 88-89.

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disability benefits to file a claim with the Claims Paying Administrator and for the Claims
Paying Administrator to grant or deny the claim. See Plan, § 5.1.
4. The Appeal Committee
If the Claims Paying Administrator denies an employee’s disability claim, then the Plan
provides that an employee may appeal this denial to an “appeal committee” as appointed by the
Administrator: “The Administrator shall appoint an appeal committee for the purpose of
conducting reviews of denial of benefits and providing the claim with written notice of the
decision reach by such committee.” Plan, § 5.1(c). The Plan further describes the responsibilities
of the appeal committee to review claim eligibility and makes clear that “[t]he determination of
the appeal committee shall be made in a fair and consistent manner in accordance with the Plan’s
terms and its decision shall be final, subject only to a determination by a court of competent
jurisdiction that the committee’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.” Plan, § 5.1(d)
(emphasis added). The Plan provides that the appeal committee “shall . . . be empowered to
interpret the Plan’s provisions in its sole and exclusive discretion” as to matters properly before
it on appeal. Ibid. Beyond making clear that it is the responsibility of the Administrator to
appoint the “appeal committee,” the Plan does not otherwise specify the identity, membership, or
composition of the appeal committee.
B. Designation of Aetna as the Appeal Committee
Prior to 2008, the appeal committee consisted of a Fed Ex-appointed in-house group
called the Benefit Review Committee. But in 2008 the Federal Express Corporation Benefits
Appeals group, made up of FedEx Human Resources employees, recommended to FedEx
Human Resources executives that the function of the appeal committee be outsourced to Aetna

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(who, of course, was already designated to conduct initial review of claims as the Claims Paying
Administrator under the Plan).
The Chief Human Resources executive at FedEx approved the proposal and brought it
before the company’s Retirement Plan Investment Board. As noted above, the Board—serving as
“the Committee” under the Plan—was vested with general administrative power under the Plan
and with power to amend the Plan as reflected in its meeting minutes. See Plan, §§ 6.2, 7.1.
The Board considered inter-office memoranda about the appeals process that included the
recommendation to “[o]utsource all LTD [long term disability] appeals to Aetna,” that described
how Aetna would be audited, and that explained how current appeals staff would train Aetna
appeal staff. Doc. #30-4 at 3. In July 2008, the Board approved the proposal, and this approval
was duly reflected in the Board’s minutes as follows:
The Investment Board next reviewed a proposal . . . to outsource
remaining long-term disability appeals . . . and effectively cease
the operation of the Benefit Review Committee . . . Following a
thorough discussion, the Investment Board voted to approve the
recommendation.
Doc.# 30-5 at 3.
As noted above, plaintiff filed her disability claim in 2012, several years after Aetna
begin its responsibilities to conduct reviews of appeals. Her claim was denied at the initial and
appeals stages, and she has filed this court action. The parties now disagree about what standard
of review I should apply, and this disagreement stems in turn from the parties’ dispute about
whether Aetna was properly entrusted with the fiduciary responsibilities of the appeal committee
as described in the Plan.

6

DISCUSSION
The principles governing a motion for summary judgment are well established. Summary
judgment may be granted only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
see also Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (per curiam). “A genuine dispute of
material fact ‘exists for summary judgment purposes where the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that a reasonable jury could decide in that party's
favor.’” Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Guilbert v.
Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007)). The evidence adduced at the summary judgment
stage must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and with all
ambiguities and reasonable inferences drawn against the moving party. See, e.g., Tolan, 134 S.
Ct. at 1866; Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 715 F.3d 417, 427 (2d Cir. 2013). All in all, “a
‘judge’s function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Here, there are crossmotions for summary judgment.
Courts use “familiar rules of contract interpretation” when addressing an ERISA plan.
Lifson v. INA Life Ins. Co. of New York, 333 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir. 2003). One such wellestablished rule is that I must read the “Plan as a whole, [and] giv[e] terms their plain meanings.”
Fay v. Oxford Health Plan, 287 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2002). I must also consider the intent of
the parties: “[w]here the words of a contract in writing are clear and unambiguous, its meaning is
to be ascertained in accordance with its plainly expressed intent.” M & G Polymers USA, LLC v.
Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 933 (2015) (interpreting a collective-bargaining agreement subject to

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ERISA). “A court must not rewrite, under the guise of interpretation, a term of the contract when
the term is clear and unambiguous.” Burke v. PriceWaterHouseCoopers LLP Long Term
Disability Plan, 572 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 2009).
Of course, if a term is ambiguous and intent is not clear, then I must construe ambiguities
against the drafter of the Plan, and in the favor of the beneficiary. See Lifson, 333 F.3d at 353. A
term in a plan is ambiguous when “it is capable of more than one meaning when viewed
objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire ...
agreement.” Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246, 256 (2d Cir. 2004).
Here, it is clear that the Plan delegates discretion to each of the entities who are
responsible for one or more of the Plan’s operations: to the Administrator, to the Committee, to
the Claims Paying Administrator, and to the appeal committee. I do not understand plaintiff to
challenge the discretionary authority of any of these entities and, most particularly, to dispute the
fiduciary discretion of the appeal committee as provided under the Plan.
Instead, plaintiff challenges the naming of Aetna as the appeal committee in place of the
former in-house Benefit Review Committee. An initial problem with this argument is that there
is no substantive limitation in the Plan that prohibits Aetna from serving in the role of the appeal
committee. The Plan does not identify who or what persons or entity must serve as “the appeal
committee,” but only that there must be an appointed appeal committee that conducts a review of
claim denials in accordance with the detailed fiduciary and discretionary criteria set forth in the
Plan.
Nor is there a disqualification provision in the Plan stating that the same company that
serves as the Claims Paying Administrator may not also serve as the appeal committee to sit in
review of claims that have been denied by the Claims Paying Administrator. Although it could

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be argued that these dual roles would saddle Aetna with a conflict of interest, no such argument
is advanced by plaintiff in her summary judgment briefing (and was disclaimed at oral
argument). And perhaps wisely so. After all, similar reasoning would allow for a claim that
FedEx itself had a financial conflict of interest when its in-house personnel of the Benefit
Review Committee performed the appeals function. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554
U.S. 105 (2008).
In any event, because there is no substantive limitation within the Plan that prevented the
appointment of Aetna—or any other particular person or entity—to serve as the appeal
committee under the Plan, plaintiff’s argument necessarily boils down to a claim that the
appointment of Aetna was procedurally improper. As I understand it, plaintiff’s argument is that
the procedures followed were not sufficient to constitute a valid appointment of Aetna as the
appeal committee under the Plan.
As an initial matter, it is clear that the Plan vests the Administrator with authority to
appoint the appeal committee. Section 5.1(c) of the Plan expressly provides without limitation
that the Administrator “shall appoint an appeal committee” to conduct an appellate review of
claims that have been denied in the first instance by the Claims Paying Administrator. Indeed,
the appointment of the appeal committee is a part of the Administrator’s fiduciary and
discretionary authority “to determine eligibility for coverage under the Plan in accordance with
its terms,” Plan § 6.1(b), and to do so “in a fair and consistent manner in accordance with the
Plan’s terms,” Plan, § 6.1(c), which terms—of course—expressly provide for the important
function of an appeal committee as a procedural safeguard to review initial denials of claims.
There is nothing in the Plan that precludes the Administrator from appointing a different
entity (i.e., Aetna) to serve as the appeal committee in place of a prior appointed entity (i.e., the

9

in-house Benefit Review Committee). The power to appoint under the Plan logically includes the
power to re-appoint, to un-appoint, and to newly appoint; the Plan does not vest perpetual tenure
in any one entity once chosen to serve in the role of appeal committee. No Plan beneficiary had
any vested interest in having any particular entity perform the role of the appeal committee,
provided that whatever entity that did so complied with its detailed fiduciary obligations for a
thorough review of appeal claims as required for appeals under the Plan.
From all this I conclude that the Plan allowed the Administrator to appoint the appeal
committee and that it allowed the Administrator to appoint Aetna as the appeal committee. But,
of course, the facts here show that it was “the Committee” (i.e., the Retirement Planning
Investment Board)—and not the Administrator—that approved the selection of Aetna, and so the
question remaining is whether “the Committee” was within its own delegated authority from the
Administrator when it acted upon the recommendation of FedEx management personnel to
approve Aetna to serve in place of the Benefit Review Committee as the appeal committee.
I conclude that the Committee clearly had authority under the Plan to do so. Section 6.2
of the Plan identifies the Committee as a named fiduciary under the Plan, with responsibility “to
perform the administrative duties hereunder” and to assume “general administrative power” over
the Plan and “with such other powers as may be necessary to perform its duties hereunder” the
Plan. Because it is the Committee—which itself is appointed by FedEx’s Board of Directors—
that carries out the general administrative functions of the Plan, there is no reason to suppose that
these functions do not include the delegated authority to appoint an appeal committee for the
review of claims that have been denied by the Claims Paying Administrator.
In short, plaintiff has not shown that it was improper under the Plan for Aetna to be
appointed as the appeal committee. The Plan did not substantively forbid the appointment of

10

Aetna to serve as the appeal committee. And procedurally it is clear that the Administrator had
authority to appoint any entity—such as Aetna—to serve as the appeal committee and that “the
Committee” (i.e., the Retirement Planning Investment Board) had within its broadly delegated
authority the power to appoint an entity—such as Aetna—to serve in the appeal committee role.
It is true that the Fourth Circuit has ruled by unpublished decision on highly similar facts
that Aetna was not validly designated as the appeal committee under the Plan. See Bilheimer v.
Fed. Express Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 605 Fed. Appx. 172 (4th Cir. 2015). The Fourth
Circuit concluded that the meaning of the term “appoint” as used in the Plan was ambiguous—
either that it could have an informal meaning that would include mere “outsourcing” or
“channeling” to Aetna the function of the appeal committee or that it could have a formal
meaning that would include “some selection and designation process.” Id. at 178-79. As between
these two interpretations, the Fourth Circuit concluded that both interpretations were reasonable
but that it must opt for the more formal interpretation because it favored the claimant. Id. at 179.
And it found that, in order to satisfy the more formal requirements, the Retirement Plan
Investment Board needed “to actually designate Aetna as the appeal committee,” but that “[t]he
evidence does not demonstrate that the Board exercised this power,” because “it merely
approved an internal memorandum from FedEx’s Employee Benefits Department recommending
that all appeals be farmed out to Aetna,” and “there was not a process indicating a selection and
designation of a new appeal committee.” Ibid.
I am not persuaded by the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, because it overlooks the fact that
the Plan expressly gives authority and discretion to the Administrator to interpret the Plan. See
Plan, § 6.1(a). What this means is that the Administrator—and its duly designated agent, the
Retirement Planning Investment Board—had discretion with respect to its interpretation of the

11

term “appoint” as it is used in the Plan. And if they had interpretive discretion, it was permissible
to adopt the less formal interpretation of the term “appoint,” an interpretation that even the
Fourth Circuit found to be a reasonable one.
Because the Plan gives the Administrator discretion to interpret the terms of the Plan, I
cannot agree with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that any ambiguity must be construed in the
claimant’s favor rather than in favor of the Administrator’s interpretation. The Second Circuit
has ruled to the contrary. See O'Neil v. Ret. Plan for Salaried Employees of RKO Gen., Inc., 37
F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 1994) (declining to construe ambiguity in ERISA plan against drafter; “[w]e
are less inclined to rely on this principle of construction where, as here, the plan grants the
fiduciary discretion to interpret the plan.”)
Nor am I persuaded that the term “appoint” in its ordinary sense actually has a double
meaning as the Fourth Circuit suggests, including both a distinctly formal and informal
processes. It does not matter that FedEx’s internal documents refer to an “outsourcing” of the
appeal committee function, rather than an “appointment” to describe Aetna’s new role. Nothing
in the Plan requires that an appointment of an entity as the appeal committee be accompanied by
formal deliberation procedures or that it be ritually solemnized with specific language, smoke
signals, wax seals, or the like.
Nor do I agree with the Fourth Circuit’s alternative ruling—ventured by means of a
footnote—that “Aetna itself is not a committee as that term is commonly understood” and used
in the Plan. 605 Fed. Appx. at 15 n.4. This interpretive objection again overlooks the discretion
afforded to the Administrator (and as delegated to the Retirement Investment Planning Board) to
interpret the Plan’s terms. In any event, there is no reason that the term “committee” may not
reasonably include a single entity, such as a classic “committee of one.” Nor is there reason why

12

the “appeal committee” must have in its name the word “committee,” when in fact it performs
the same decision-making review function. Indeed, “the Committee”—that is, the other entity
that is designated by a “committee” name in the Plan—is the Retirement Investment Planning
Board, an entity that also lacks the term “committee” in its name; there has been no suggestion
that the Board may not serve as “the Committee” under the Plan because it is not called a
“committee” as the Fourth Circuit might prefer to interpret that term.
Plaintiff focuses on a provision of the Plan that states that “[n]othing contained in this
section shall prevent the Administrator from delegating non-fiduciary administrative duties to the
Claims Paying Administrator or others as described in this Plan, the Plan’s summary plan
description or other document.” Plan, § 6.1. From this provision, plaintiff draws an inference that
the Plan assumes that the Administrator may not delegate a fiduciary duty to Aetna. But this
negative-implication argument is tenuous and unpersuasive: the issue here is not the authority in
general of the Administrator to delegate either fiduciary or non-fiduciary duties; rather, the issue
here is the specific provision of Section 5.3 of the Plan that vests authority in the Administrator
to appoint the appeal committee. As I have discussed above, the Plan vests interpretive authority
in the Administrator to construe any ambiguous terms, and—as even the Fourth Circuit would
agree—it was at least a reasonable interpretation of the Plan to allow for the appointment of
Aetna as was done to serve as the appeal committee.
The fact that the Plan vests the Administrator (a named fiduciary) with authority to
appoint the appeal committee (which is also vested with discretionary fiduciary responsibilities)
is consistent with a provision of ERISA that “(1) The instrument under which a plan is
maintained may expressly provide for procedures . . . (B) for named fiduciaries to designate
persons other than named fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary responsibilities (other than trustee

13

responsibilities) under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1105; Rubio v. Chock Full of Nuts Co., 254 F.
Supp.2d 413, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Accordingly, because the appointment of an appeal
committee involves the Plan’s express delegation and assignment of fiduciary duties, there is no
merit to plaintiff’s argument that some further change to the Plan document was required in
order for Aetna to be appointed as the appeal committee. 2
Because I conclude that Aetna was properly appointed to serve as the appeal committee
in accordance with the Plan, it is unnecessary for me to consider the alternative argument
debated by the parties about whether the designation of Aetna to serve as appeal committee
amounted to a permissible amendment of the Plan. See Plan, § 7.1 (describing amendment
procedure). I would be inclined to conclude that the appointment of Aetna was not an
amendment of the Plan at all, because the Plan does not identify in the first instance who or what
entity would serve as the “appeal committee.” The appointment of one entity in place of a prior
entity to serve as the appeal committee was no more than an effectuation of the existing powers
authorized under the Plan and did nothing to alter, modify, or amend the terms of the Plan.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude as a matter of law that Aetna was validly appointed
as the appeal committee with fiduciary and discretionary authority in that capacity under the
Plan. Accordingly, its appeal review decision warrants arbitrary-and-capricious review, rather
than de novo review. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. #27) is DENIED,
and defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. #28) is GRANTED. The parties
shall jointly submit an amended Rule 26(f) report in 14 days.
2

Plaintiff misplaces her reliance on McDonnell v. First Unum Life Insurance Co., 2013 WL 3975941
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). The benefit plan in that case explicitly granted discretionary authority only to First Unum and
lacked a provision for further delegation of authority to outside actors. Id. at *10 -*11. Here, by contrast, the Plan
expressly delegates authority to the Administrator to appoint the appeal committee, and plaintiff does not otherwise
challenge the authority of “the Committee” to act on behalf of the Administrator.

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It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven this 9th day of March 2016.
/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

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