Manon v. Hall et al
Filing
16
ORDER denying 12 Motion to Dismiss. See attached memorandum. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/7/2015. (Thomas, R.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
KELVIN MANON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHNATHAN HALL, WARDEN
AT BROOKLYN, CI, et al.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL ACTION NO.:
3:14-CV-1510 (VLB)
December 7, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DENYING DEFENDANTS‟ MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Kelvin Manon, pro se and incarcerated at the MacDougall-Walker
Correctional Institution in Suffield, Connecticut, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action against Defendants Warden Johnathon Hall, Warden Brighthaupt, Deputy
Warden Corey, and Deputy Warden Jane/John Doe (collectively, “Defendants”).
The complaint raises conditions-of-confinement and retaliation claims and seeks
monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. In its initial review order, this Court
dismissed all claims against Deputy Warden Corey for lack of personal
involvement and all the official-capacity claims for monetary relief against the
remaining defendants. Defendants now move to dismiss the remaining claims,
largely relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the following reasons, the Court
DENIES the motion.
Factual and Procedural Background
In a complaint dated August 20, 2014, Manon brings claims for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement against Wardens Hall and Brighthaupt
and claims for retaliation against Warden Brighthaupt and Deputy Warden
Jane/John Doe. ECF No. 1 (Compl.). As explained in this Court‟s initial review
order, Manon‟s complaint contains the following allegations:
[O]n February 19, 2014, prison officials transferred [the plaintiff] to
Brooklyn Correctional Institution. At Brooklyn, he had to sleep on the
gym floor, and there was dust in the air and only two bathrooms for
more than fifty inmates. The plaintiff wrote and spoke to Warden Hall
about his concerns[,] and Warden Hall told the plaintiff [that it was a
privilege to be at the jail and] that he would be off of the gym floor
soon. The plaintiff remained at Brooklyn until March 14, 2014, when
prison officials transferred him to Cheshire Correctional Institution.
At Cheshire, the plaintiff had to sleep on the floor and could only use
the bathroom once every two hours. The plaintiff wrote to Warden
Brighthaupt on March 16, 2014 and wrote to Deputy Warden
John/Jane Doe on March 18, 2014. On March 26, 2014, officers
issued the plaintiff a disciplinary report and transferred him to the
restrictive housing unit. The plaintiff contends that prison officials
issued him the disciplinary report because of his complaints about
prison conditions at Cheshire.
ECF No. 6 (Order) at 2. Manon seeks monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief.
ECF No. 1 (Compl.) at 8 (.pdf pagination).
In March 2015, the Court conducted its initial review order pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, ruling as follows. Id. The claims against Deputy Warden Corey
failed to state a claim because the complaint did not allege Deputy Warden
Corey‟s personal involvement. Id. at 3. The Eleventh Amendment barred the
official-capacity claims for monetary damages against the remaining defendants.
Id. Manon stated plausible claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement
against Hall, Brighthaupt, and Jane/John Doe. Id.
Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint, largely pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
ECF Nos. 12 (Mot.); 12-1 (Mem.).
2
Defendants raise the
following six arguments. ECF No. 12-1 (Mem.). The claims for injunctive relief are
moot because Manon was not subject to the allegedly unconstitutional conditions
when he commenced the action. Id. at 5–6. Manon lacks standing because he
failed to allege physical injury.
Id. at 6–9.
involved in the underlying allegations.
Defendants were not personally
Id. at 9–11.
The claims are “utterly
ridiculous” because “if such standard housing is adequate for our military
troops, it necessarily must be more than adequate for sentenced prisoners like
plaintiff.” Id. at 15. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because “[they]
would have no way of knowing that their conduct violated any clearly established
rights of the plaintiff.” Id. at 17. Sixth, the Eleventh Amendment bars the officialcapacity claims for monetary damages. Id. at 1.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
I.
Procedural Issues
The motion necessitates a preliminary discussion on the nuts and bolts of
procedure. Defendants largely rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) as the procedural
mechanism for seeking dismissal: the memorandum seeks dismissal pursuant to
that statute and borrows the Rule 12(b)(6) standard for purposes of evaluating
that request.
See ECF No. 12-1 (Mem.). Section 1915(e)(2) is peculiar because
that statute does not appear to provide litigants with a tool for seeking dismissal.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review an in forma pauperis action sua
sponte, does not mention an opposing party‟s motion to dismiss, and does not
say anything about superseding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C.
3
§ 1915(e); cf. Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007)
(“These cases demonstrate that the sua sponte screening and dismissal
procedure is cumulative of, not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6)
motion that the defendant may choose to bring.”).
This Court found few
examples where another court has ruled on a party‟s “Section 1915(e)(2) motion,”
but one case that this Court did come across highlights why a party should not
rely on Section 1915(e)(2) at the expense of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Landrith v. Gariglietti, 2012 WL 171339, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2012), the
defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2) rather than Rule
12(b). To avoid the application of default judgment, the Landrith court construed
the Section 1915(e)(2) motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id. at *2. This Court will
follow likewise given that the motion references Rule 12(b)(6), but other courts
may not be so generous.1
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain no
provision granting an extension of time to a party who files a noncognizable
motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
Construing the motion as brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) creates
problems of its own. Defendants‟ first two arguments are that Manon‟s claims are
moot and that Manon lacks standing to bring his claims. Mootness and standing
implicate the court‟s subject-matter jurisdiction. Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc.
1
In some ways, the Court here acts more generously than the Court in
Landrith. Unlike the defendants in Landrith, Defendants did not file any motion or
pleading in the time prescribed by this Court, i.e., Monday, May 15, 2015, and did
not seek an extension. ECF No. 6 (Order) at 4–5. The Court, however, now
extends the deadline sua sponte.
4
v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 88 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006) (Article III standing);
Fox v. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y., 42 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1994) (mootness).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is the proper procedure vehicle for
raising these challenges.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
The distinction between
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) matters because, inter alia, a dismissal for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction has no preclusive effect and permits a court to consider
evidence outside the pleadings and (in some circumstances) weigh that evidence.
See, e.g., Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc., 436 F.3d at 88 n.6.
The remaining arguments, which should have been asserted pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), are partially redundant.
The Court already conducted its initial
review pursuant to Section 1915A, the statute requiring a court to screen “a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of governmental entity” to ascertain whether the complaint “is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Section 1915A and Rule 12(b)(6) require the same substantive
analysis. Preston v. New York, 223 F.Supp.2d 452, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[A] court
evaluates whether a complaint „fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted‟ under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A under the same standard as a motion to dismiss
brought
under
Rule
12(b)(6).”).
Defendants‟
motion
in
effect
seeks
reconsideration of this Court‟s prior initial review order, but a party should pause
before making such a request absent particularly compelling reasons such as
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1);
5
see Olmos v. Ryan, 2013 WL 394879, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 31, 2013) (“The First
Amended Complaint has already been screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
which uses the same standard as Federal Rule of Civil procedure 12(b)(6) . . . .
Defendants do not cite sufficient grounds to reconsider.” (internal citation
omitted)).
Outside of the grounds identified in Rule 60(b), it would also be
appropriate for a party to move for dismissal on the basis of a waivable defense
because courts need not consider those defenses sua sponte. See Alvarado v.
Litscher, 2000 WL 34239113, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 16, 2000) (ruling on qualified
immunity defense despite prior initial review order). However, a party should
never move to dismiss claims that have already been dismissed or seek
dismissal of claims that the Court has determined to be non-frivolous solely on
the basis that the moving party disagrees.
II.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
With these procedural observations in mind, the Court first turns to the
substance of the standing and mootness arguments. As already discussed, such
arguments are properly asserted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a court may consider evidence
outside the pleadings. Dukes v. New York City Employees’ Ret. Sys., & Bd. of
Trustees, 581 F. App‟x 81, 82 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Makarova v. United States, 201
F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)).
The Court may also weigh that evidence when
assessing its subject-matter jurisdiction as long as the jurisdictional facts do not
overlap with factual questions going to the merits. Alliance for Envtl. Renewal,
6
Inc., 436 F.3d at 88 & n.6. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving standing,
Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 2011), but “[a] party seeking to
have a case dismissed as moot bears” the burden of proof, which is “a heavy
burden,” Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir.
2005).
A. Defendants’ “Mootness” Argument
Defendants argue that the claims for injunctive relief are moot because
Manon was not subject to the allegedly unconstitutional conditions when he
commenced this action.
ECF No. 12-1 (Mem.) at 5–6.
Defendants confuse
standing and mootness.
Mootness concerns the timing of the dispute.
See
Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 1980) (“This „time element of
standing‟ comes under the rubric of mootness doctrine.”).
In other words,
“[w]hile standing focuses on the status of the parties when an action is
commenced, the mootness doctrine requires that the plaintiffs‟ claims remain
alive throughout the course of the proceedings.” Etuk v. Slattery, 936 F.2d 1433,
1441 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). Mootness does not apply here because
Manon remains incarcerated in the same correctional institution as when he filed
the action, i.e., no transfer occurred during the life of this litigation.
This
distinction matters because, inter alia, the capable-of-repetition-yet-evadingreview exception does not apply to standing. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000).
argument to dismiss based on mootness is DENIED.
7
Accordingly, Defendants‟
Defendants‟ mootness argument actually concerns standing, a question
this Court must address sua sponte. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514
(2006) (“[C]ourts, including this Court, have an independent obligation to
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a
challenge from any party.”). The relevant issue in this case is whether Manon has
standing to enjoin and declare unconstitutional Wardens Hall‟s and Brighthaupt‟s
housing policies when Manon was not subject to those policies when he
commenced this action. Article III standing requires a plaintiff to show injury-infact, causation, and redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560–61 (1992). Injury in fact requires Manon to allege the existence of “a real or
immediate threat that [he] will be wronged again.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. There
are several facts demonstrating that Manon experiences a real, as opposed to a
speculative, threat of again being wronged by the Wardens: (1) Connecticut
inmates have no federal or state right to be incarcerated at a particular facility
and thus may be transferred at any time; (2) Manon in particular has been
transferred several times in a short period of time; (3) Connecticut is a small state
with only a handful of prisoners and prison facilities; (4) according to Warden
Hall, Manon has a “privileged” classification, limiting the number of facilities
where he will be incarcerated; and (5) these conditions occurred at more than one
facility. The Court therefore rules that Manon has demonstrated, at this stage in
the litigation, that he has standing to bring claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief.
8
B. Defendants’ Standing Argument
Defendants explicitly raise a different standing challenge, arguing that
“plaintiff has failed to allege any injury from any of the conditions which he
alleges existed at Brooklyn or at Chesire.
discomfort, let alone pain and suffering.”
Plaintiff doesn‟t even allege
ECF No. 12-1 (Mem.) at 9.
This
argument confuses physical injury with injury in fact. The Constitution does not
require a plaintiff to suffer a physical injury; a constitutional violation is
sufficient. Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 185 (2d Cir. 2001) (“By contrast,
where the right at issue is provided directly by the Constitution or federal law, a
prisoner has standing to assert that right even if the denial of that right has not
produced an „actual injury.‟”). Accordingly, Defendants‟ motion to dismiss based
on standing is DENIED.
III.
Sufficiency of the Complaint
The Court considers the remaining arguments in the context of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), a court “accept[s] all factual allegations as true and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P.,
634 F.3d 706, 715 (2d Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
9
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court affords a pro se litigant
“special solicitude” by interpreting a pro se complaint “to raise the strongest
claims that it suggests.” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). Additionally, “[a] pro se complaint
should not be dismissed without the [c]ourt‟s granting leave to amend at least
once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid
claim might be stated.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir.
2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
A. Personal Involvement
Defendants argue that Wardens Hall and Brighthaupt lack personal
involvement because the complaint does not allege that “either Warden was
aware of a serious and imminent risk to plaintiff‟s health or safety.” ECF No. 12-1
(Mem.) at 9. This argument fails for several reasons. As Defendants correctly
observe, some courts have ruled that informing a higher official of an
unconstitutional act does not automatically imply personal involvement. Rivera
v. Fischer, 655 F.Supp.2d 235, 238 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). However, Defendants fail to
cite a key sentence of the Rivera opinion: “[t]hat does not necessarily mean,
however, that a plaintiff can never establish a defendant‟s personal involvement
based on the fact that the plaintiff wrote to that defendant about the alleged
violations.” Id. The allegations in this case make clear that the Wardens were
personally involved because they responded to the complaints.
See id.
(“If,
however, the official does personally look into the matters raised in the letter, or
10
otherwise acts on the prisoner‟s complaint or request, the official may be found
to be personally involved.”).
Manon alleges that Warden Hall ignored his
complaints and that Warden Brighthaupt placed Manon in the restrictive housing
unit in retaliation for complaining.
The complaint thus sufficiently alleges
personal involvement of Wardens Hall and Brighthaupt.
The complaint plausibly suggests personal involvement for a second
reason. A prison warden is likely the most appropriate official to sue concerning
the living conditions of the prisoners he is in charge of housing. Cf. Turkmen v.
Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 237 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing Bivens claim for conditions of
confinement against warden).
That is particularly true where, as here, the
conditions are structural and reflect a specific policy decision. As the persons in
charge of managing the conditions of confinement, the Wardens would obviously
be aware of those conditions and how those conditions affected their wards.
Even if the evidence eventually demonstrates that Defendants are not the
responsible persons, they are the appropriate parties to this action at this stage
in the litigation. See Davis v. Kelly, 160 F.3d 917, 921 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[C]ourts
have pointed out the appropriateness of maintaining supervisory personnel as
defendants in lawsuits stating a colorable claim until the plaintiff has been
afforded an opportunity through at least brief discovery to identify the
subordinate officials who have personal liability.”). The Court therefore declines
to dismiss the claims for lack of personal involvement.
11
B. Conditions-of-Confinement Claims
Defendants next argue that Manon‟s conditions-of-confinement claims are
“utterly ridiculous” and that a reasonable official would have no way of knowing
that their conduct violated the Constitution. ECF No. 12-1 (Mem.) at 11–17. The
Court disagrees. Specifically, Defendants argue that forcing inmates to sleep on
the floor is perfectly acceptable.2 Connecticut prison officials had a reason to
know that requiring inmates to sleep on the floor in the ordinary course was
unconstitutional. Over 30 years ago, the Second Circuit ruled that “forcing men
to sleep on mattresses on the floors” violates the Constitution, but “[p]erhaps
[may] be excused in the event of a genuine emergency situation, like a fire or
riot.” Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 107–08 (2d Cir. 1981). The Lareau court also
stated that placing as many 60 inmates in a dayroom with one correctional officer
“does not comport with the duty to provide for adequate personal safety.” Id. As
one district court explained after holding a trial on a similar issue, “[p]roviding for
the housing of inmates [in large dayrooms and forcing them to sleep on the floor]
threatens the physical, mental[,] and emotional health and certainly threatens
their personal and property safety.
Such conditions are dehumanizing,
intolerable[,] and certainly of no penological benefit.” Balla v. Bd. of Corr., 656
F.Supp. 1108, 1114 (D. Idaho 1987). Manon‟s allegations of sleeping on a floor in
a gymnasium with more than fifty inmates therefore suggests plausible Eighth
2
Despite Defendants unsupported allegations to the contrary, the
complaint does not allege that Manon was provided a mattress.
12
Amendment claims, and the Second Circuit‟s prior holding would have put a
reasonable official on notice that these conditions, if proven to be true, would be
unconstitutional.
Manon‟s allegations concerning the inadequate amount of bathroom
facilities and (at one point) his inability to access those facilities also states
plausible Eighth Amendment claims. Prison officials must furnish prisoners with
“the minimal civilized measure of life‟s necessities,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 349 (1981), and it cannot seriously be disputed that access to a
functioning toilet constitutes a basic human need, LaReau v. MacDougall, 473
F.2d 974, 977–79 (2d Cir. 1972) (five days in small cell with only “a hole in the
floor in the corner of the cell covered with a grate” constitutes a constitutional
violation). Moreover, with respect to a restrained prisoner, the Supreme Court
has recognized that “a deprivation of bathroom breaks . . . created a risk of
particular discomfort and humiliation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002).
A prisoner‟s right to adequate bathroom facilities was therefore clearly
established at the time of the alleged violations. See Masonoff v. DuBois, 336
F.Supp.2d 54, 63 (D. Mass. 2004) (“The right to „adequate and hygienic means to
dispose of [a prisoner‟s] bodily wastes‟ was clearly established at the time of the
violation, which began . . . in 1991.” (alterations in the original)).
Defendants seek dismissal by way of analogy, but their analogy
demonstrates why it would be inappropriate at this stage in the litigation to
dismiss the claims. Defendants argue that “men and women who serve in our
13
military forces are often housed in large, dormitory-style housing with fifty to one
hundred or more soldiers, sailors, airmen[,] or marines housed . . . with only one
or two bathrooms.” ECF No. 12-1 (Mem.) at 15. Putting aside the innumerable,
material differences between enlisted members of our armed services and
forcibly incarcerated persons, the Court has no way of evaluating the truth of
Defendants‟ assertion. Aside from a few exceptions not relevant here, the Court
may only consider Manon‟s allegations that he shared one or two bathrooms with
over fifty inmates and was at one point permitted to use one only every two
hours.
Relying on its experience, its common sense, and other information of
which it may take judicial notice, the Court rules that these allegations state a
plausible claim for the deprivation of adequate bathroom facilities and that a
reasonable official, aware of his duty to furnish such facilities, would know that
the alleged conditions constituted a deprivation.
Manon does not seek a
personal bathroom or unrestricted access to one, yet he also does not allege that
the entire prison contained a single bathroom for a hundreds of inmates or
entailed patently intolerable queues. His allegations fall somewhere in between
these two extremes. The Court lacks sufficient expertise in deprivations of the
commode to engage in the requested line-drawing exercise to determine whether
a ratio of one bathroom per 50 inmates or even one bathroom per 25 inmates
would be constitutionally intolerable.
Without evidence from knowledgeable
persons, the Court will not adopt some standard out of thin air. Further, common
14
sense suggests that these conditions would be unacceptable: there are few
situations in this society where fifty or even twenty-five people share a single
bathroom for months at a time, most likely because it would be unhygienic and
occasionally entail insufferable wait times.
The Court is not alone in its
assumption that the alleged facilities could constitute punishment. Richardson v.
Sheriff of Middlesex Cnty., 407 Mass. 455, 464 (1990) (“The judge‟s observations
that in some areas there were as many as sixty men confined with access to only
two toilets and one shower provide ample support for his conclusion that the lack
of facilities in the multiple-occupancy areas rose to the level of punishment.”
(emphasis added)); cf. 29 C.F.R.1910.141 (OSHA regulation mandating that there
be three toilets for every 36 to 55 employees and 4 toilets for every 56 to 80
facilities); CORE JAIL STANDARDS, American Correctional Association, available at
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc012203.pdf
(“Inmates,
including those in medical housing units or infirmaries, have access to showers,
toilets, and washbasins with temperature controlled hot and cold running water
twenty-four hours per day.” (emphasis added)). Perhaps with some evidence the
Court could confidently opine on the requisite number of toilets per inmate, but
the Court cannot say as a matter of law whether these conditions caused pain
and humiliation without penological justification or were simply the ordinary,
less-than-ideal circumstances confronted everyday by incarcerated persons who
are constitutionally entitled only to life‟s basic necessities. The Court DENIES
Defendants‟ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and qualified immunity.
15
C. Further Observations
The
Court
adds
several
further
observations
before
concluding.
Defendants argue that the official-capacity claims for monetary damages should
be dismissed. ECF No. 12-1 (Mem.) at 1. This argument is moot because the
Court has already dismissed these claims.
ECF No. 6 (Order) at 3. Manon‟s
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are properly asserted against
Defendants Warden and Hall in their official capacities, not their individual
capacities. Ziemba v. Armstrong, 2004 WL 1737447, at *1 (D. Conn. July 30, 2004)
(“Injunctive relief may only be recovered from parties in their official capacities.”).
Further, because the Court did not explicitly rule that the complaint stated
plausible retaliation claims, it does so now.
The filing of a grievance is a
protected activity. Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003). Causation
can be inferred from temporal proximity. Id. Restrictive housing constitutes an
adverse action. See Davis v. Kelly, 160 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[P]rison
authorities may not transfer an inmate in retaliation for the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights.”). Every reasonable official should know that a
prisoner cannot be sent to a restrictive housing unit for complaining about
allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Manon seeks only monetary damages in
connection with these retaliation claims, not prospective relief (getting out of
restrictive housing), and he does not allege that he is currently in restrictive
housing or allege facts suggesting that he will be retaliated against again.
16
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants‟ motion to
dismiss. The conditions-of-confinement claims shall proceed against Wardens
Hall and Brighthaupt in their individual capacities for monetary damages and
against them in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief. The
retaliations claims shall proceed against Warden Brighthaupt and Deputy Warden
Jane/John Doe in their individual capacities for monetary damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
_
Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut, December 7, 2015.
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?