Moore v. Ferron-Poole

Filing 40

Ruling granting 35 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Warren W. Eginton on 10/31/2016. (LaMura, K.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
SHARON MOORE,
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
No. 3-14-cv-1540 (WWE)
:
ASTREAD O. FERRON-POOLE,
:
Defendant.
:
RULING ON DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Sharon Moore alleges that defendant Astread Ferron-Poole denied
plaintiff a promotion to Social Work Supervisor in the Connecticut Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) due to plaintiff’s race and age in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff cannot show an
equal protection violation and that qualified immunity shields defendant from liability.
For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted in
defendant’s favor.
BACKGROUND
The parties have submitted statements of facts with supporting exhibits, which
reveal the following factual background.
Defendant is an African-American woman and the Chief of Staff/Affirmative
Action Administrator for DSS. She reports to the Commissioner of DSS.
Plaintiff is an African-American woman born in 1952. She has worked at DSS
since 2006 as a Child Support Investigator. From 1987 to 1999, she worked at the
Connecticut Department of Children and Families, first as a Social Worker and then as
a Social Worker Supervisor.

DSS is required by state law to develop and implement an affirmative action
plan. Goals are established each year through a formula developed by the Connecticut
Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”) and set forth in its regulations. Goal
candidates fall within the race and gender categories determined to be
underrepresented in a particular job classification. To comply with CHRO regulations
and state law, DSS must demonstrate a good faith effort to meet the hiring and
promotional goals in its affirmative action plan. Goal candidates need only meet the
minimum requirements of the position.
In September 2012, plaintiff applied for a promotion to a Social Work Supervisor
position in Adult Protective Services in DSS’s Hartford regional office. Each candidate
was rated by interviews as Superior, Acceptable, Marginal or Unacceptable in the areas
of technical competence, motivation, judgment, interpersonal skills, responsiveness to
questions, and overall.
There were three final candidates for the position: Plaintiff; an African--American
woman; and a Hispanic woman. All three of the candidates received an overall rating of
Acceptable. The hiring managers recommended that plaintiff be offered the position.
In January 2013, defendant considered the three candidates’ information, the
hiring managers’ recommendation, and the DSS affirmative action goals for the Social
Work Supervisor position. At the time, DSS had the following hiring goals relevant to
the Social Work Supervisor position: Five Caucasian males, one Hispanic female; one
other male.1

Defendant explained that new goals had been determined in March of the previous
year. Goals from a previous year are used until new goals are established.
1

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On January 26, 2013, the Secretary of the Office of Policy and Management
(“OPM”) sent a memorandum to all state agencies announcing a hiring freeze; it
instructed state agencies that any approval previously granted by OPM to refill positions
was revoked except for positions for which a bona fide offer of employment had been
made as of the close of business on January 28, 2013.
On January 28, 2013, defendant selected the Hispanic candidate. DSS’s
Human Resources Personnel Officer approved the selection for the position.
DISCUSSION
A motion for summary judgment will be granted where there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "Only when
reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment
proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F. 2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849
(1991).
The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any material
factual issue genuinely in dispute. American International Group, Inc. v. London
American International Corp., 664 F. 2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981). In determining
whether a genuine factual issue exists, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw
all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)
.

If a nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential

element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof, then summary
judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the nonmoving party
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submits evidence which is "merely colorable," legally sufficient opposition to the motion
for summary judgment is not met. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Disparate Treatment
Plaintiff claims disparate treatment based on her race and age in violation of the
United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. A plaintiff alleging denial of equal
protection under Section 1983 must show that the discrimination was intentional.
Patterson v. County Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004). An equal
protection claim pursuant to Section 1983 is analyzed according the burden shifting
framework established by McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973).
and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
Thus, to establish her prima facie claim of discrimination, plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was performing her duties
satisfactorily; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse
employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. Although the plaintiff’s initial burden is not onerous, she must show that
the alleged adverse employment action was not made for legitimate reasons. Thomas
v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 990 F. Supp. 81, 86 (D. Conn. 1998).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory business reason for the alleged discriminatory action. The
plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the supposed
legitimate reason is actually a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
For purposes of ruling on this motion, the Court assumes that plaintiff has met her

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burden on the prima facie case of discrimination. However, as an asserted legitimate
justification for her hiring decision, defendant asserts that she selected the Hispanic
candidate, who was rated equally with plaintiff and who satisfied the affirmative action
hiring goals. The record evidence fails to establish an inference that this justification is a
pretext for defendant’s discriminatory animus against plaintiff. Defendant’s selection
advanced the affirmative action goals in compliance with the statutory mandate “to
develop and implement, in cooperation with the Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities, an affirmative action plan that commits the agency ... to a program of
affirmative action in all aspects of personnel and administration.” Conn. Gen. Stat. §
46a-68; see Black v. State Dept. of Correction, 2012 WL 4902800, at *7 (Conn. Super.
Ct.) (Noting that it would be improper for courts to discourage affirmative action
programs by treating use of such programs as evidence of discrimination). The Court
should not second guess an employer’s business decision so long as that decision is not
taken for a discriminatory reason, and in this instance, plaintiff’s credentials are not so
superior to that of the selected candidate so as to raise an inference of a discriminatory
selection. See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell Bd. of Ed., 243 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, summary judgment will enter in defendant’s favor on the claim of equal
protection violation.
Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, the Court finds that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.

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Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Consequently, a defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity if (1) her conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right, or
(2) it was “objectively reasonable” for the officer to believe her conduct did not violate a
clearly established constitutional right. Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir.
2008).
The defense of qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, and a defendant
must prove that it would be clear to a reasonable public official that his or her conduct
was objectively reasonable. See Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 149 (2d Cir.
2012) (noting that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense for which defendants
have the burden of proof). With respect to summary judgment, a court should find
qualified immunity only where an official has met his or her burden demonstrating that
no rational jury could conclude that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right
that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Coollick v. Hughes,
699 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2012).
At the time relevant to this action, it was objectively reasonable for defendant to
believe that her selection of the Hispanic candidate, who was equally qualified and also
an affirmative action goal candidate, was legitimate and not discriminatory. See Black,
2012 WL 4902800, at *7. Summary judgment will be granted in defendant’s favor on
this basis.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment [doc. #35]
is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to close this case.
/s/Warren W. Eginton
Warren W. Eginton
Senior U.S. District Judge
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 31st day of October, 2016.

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