Caruso v. Colvin

Filing 34

RULING AFFIRMING, ADOPTING and RATIFYING 26 Recommended Ruling; denying 20 Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner; granting 24 Motion to Affirm the Decision of the Commissioner. Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 3/23/2016. (Lewis, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
ELNORA J. CARUSO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
14-CV-1560 (JCH)

MARCH 23, 2016

RULING RE: OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDED RULING (DOC. NO. 31)
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Elnora J. Caruso (“Caruso”) brought this action under section 1631(c)(3)

of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the
“Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Magistrate Judge
Sarah A.L. Merriam issued a Recommended Ruling on Cross Motions (Doc. No. 26)
granting the Commissioner’s Motion to Affirm the Decision of the Commissioner (Doc.
No. 24) and denying Caruso’s Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner
(Doc. No. 20). Caruso objects to the Recommended Ruling, claiming that it erred (1) in
failing to consider whether, in combination, her symptoms were the “medical equivalent”
of one or more impairment listings, and (2) in its approval of the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ”) application of the treating physician rule. The court assumes familiarity
with the facts of this case and with the Recommended Ruling.
For the reasons set forth below, the court overrules Caruso’s Objection, and it
affirms, adopts, and ratifies the Recommended Ruling.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge’s

recommended ruling to which an objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The remainder of a recommended ruling will be set aside “only for
clear error.” Campbell v. Astrue, 596 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 n.1 (D. Conn. 2009). The
court may adopt, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, a magistrate judge’s
recommended ruling. 28 U.C.S. § 636(b)(1).
In review of a Social Security disability determination, a court will set aside the
decision of an ALJ “only where it is based upon legal error or is unsupported by
substantial evidence.” Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998). As the
Supreme Court has instructed, “substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Rather, substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Further, the substantial
evidence rule also applies to inferences and conclusions that are drawn from findings of
fact. See Gonzalez v. Apfel, 23 F. Supp. 2d 179, 198 (D. Conn. 1998).
Under this standard of review, absent an error of law, a court must uphold the
Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the court
might have ruled differently. See Eastman v. Barnhart, 241 F. Supp. 2d 160, 168
(D. Conn. 2003). In other words, “[w]here an administrative decision rests on adequate
findings sustained by evidence having rational probative force, the court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106,
111 (2d Cir. 1998).

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III.

DISCUSSION
A.

The ALJ Did Not Err in Declining to Find That Caruso’s Spinal Conditions
Met or Equaled a Listing

Caruso’s first objection to the Recommended Ruling is that it erred in holding that
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Caruso’s spinal conditions did
not meet or equal Listings 1.04(A) or 1.04(C). Objection at 1; see also 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §§ 1.04(A) & (C) (requiring, inter alia, “limitation of motion of the
spine [and] motor loss . . . accompanied by sensory or reflex loss,” and “inability to
ambulate effectively,” respectively). As an initial matter, the court observes that Caruso
is correct that the Recommended Ruling “only focuses on Ms. Caruso’s failure to meet
these listings, and does not address her argument that she does not meet, but equals
these Listings.” Id. at 3; see also Recommended Ruling at 19-23. Nonetheless,
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision that “[t]he medical evidence does not
substantiate listing-level severity of the claimant’s impairments, either individually or in
combination, and [that] no acceptable medical source [ ] mentioned findings equivalent
in severity to the criteria of any listed impairment, individually or in combination.”
Record at 557. 1 Consequently, the court declines to sustain Caruso’s objection to the
Recommended Ruling on this ground.
The Code of Federal Regulations provides that, even if a claimant does not
“meet” a listed impairment at “step three” of the Social Security benefit analysis (the
determination of “whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an
impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations,” Berry v. Schweiker, 675

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“The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments . . . .” Record at 557.

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F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam)), she may nonetheless be deemed to have
“equaled” a listing if her “impairment(s) is medically equivalent to a listed impairment [for
being] at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed impairment.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1526(a).
As the ALJ’s decision discusses at length, the record contains considerable
evidence tending to show that the “claimant consistently demonstrated intact sensation
to light touch, intact motor strength in the upper and lower extremities, negative straight
raises, intact deep tendon reflexes in the upper and lower extremities, and a normal
gait.” Record at 558 (citing, inter alia, Record at 509-10 (rehabilitation center evaluation
indicating, inter alia, that Caruso was sensitive to light touch and could “ambulate
normally”); see also infra at 5-6 (discussing evidence of record tending to show that
Caruso could ambulate normally, did not have atrophied musculature, and did not have
“significant neurologic complaints”). The evidence cited in the ALJ’s decision consists
of “substantial evidence” that Caruso’s conditions are not, singly or in combination, the
“medical equivalent,” in terms of “severity and duration,” of Listings 1.04(A) or 1.04(C).
B.

The ALJ Did Not Misapply the “Treating Physicians Rule”

Under the Social Security regulations, the opinion of a physician who personally
treated a claimant is generally given more weight than the opinion of a physician who
did not treat the claimant; indeed, the ALJ ought normally to give such treating
physicians “controlling” weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). However,
an ALJ is not inextricably bound to the opinion of a treating physician and may deviate
from such opinion—and accord more weight to a non-treating physician—if, among
other things, the opinion is not consistent with other, substantial evidence of record.

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See Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008). “Before discrediting the
medical conclusions of a treating physician, the ALJ must ‘explicitly consider’ several
factors, including: ‘(1) the frequency of examination and length, nature, and extent of the
treatment relationship; (2) the evidence in support of the physician’s opinion; (3) the
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (4) whether the opinion is from a
specialist; and (5) other factors brought to the Social Security Administration’s attention
that tend to support or contradict the opinion.’” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32
(2d Cir. 2004); see also Crossman v. Astrue, 783 F. Supp. 2d 300, 308 (D. Conn. 2010).
In this case, the ALJ declined to accord controlling weight to two treating
physicians, Dr. Joseph Cherneskie and Dr. Arpad Fejos, who both opined that Caruso
had functional limitations, opinions that are discussed in detail in the Recommended
Ruling. Recommended Ruling at 24-27. The ALJ found that there “is little objective,
clinical evidence to support” these physicians’ opinions, because they were
“inconsistent with the clinical examinations of record reflecting intact upper and lower
extremity motor strength, sensation, deep tendon reflexes, and gait[, and t]hey are also
inconsistent with [Caruso]’s subjective report of improvement in pain with treatment
(medication and physical therapy) to Dr. Fejos, her personal therapist, her prior pain
management provider, and [another physician].” Record at 566.
As the Recommended Ruling thoroughly discusses, the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence. Recommended Ruling at 27-28 (citing, inter alia,
Record at 1121 (Dr. Cherneskie) (“in no acute distress”); 1123, 26 (Dr. Cherneskie)
(“MUSCULATURE: Good strength. Normal tone. No atrophy;” “Steady and normal
gait.”); 1170 (Dr. Fejos) (“The upper and lower extremity muscle strength testing are

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5/5.”); 1239 (Dr. Fejos) (same; “There is a negative straight leg raise.”); 1133 (Bristol
Hospital) (“Full range of motion of the elbows, wrists, and knees.”); 1197 (Dr. Jonathan
Grauer) (Caruso “really does not have significant neurologic complaints or any clear
evidence of myelophathy;” “Upper and lower extremity motor testing is 5/5
throughout.”)); see also Record at 1062 (Comprehensive Pain & Headache Treatment
Centers) (“Gait: Not antalgic”).
The ALJ did not err in his decision to accord more weight to non-treating
physicians, where the opinions of the physicians who treated Caruso were contradicted
by their own previous reports and by such evidence of record “as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support [his] conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971). Further, the ALJ adequately stated his reasons for not giving Caruso’s
treating physicians controlling weight. Barnhart, 362 F.3d at 32.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and because the court finds no clear error in the parts

of the Recommended Ruling not addressed by Caruso in her Objection, the court
OVERRULES the Objection (Doc. No. 31) and AFFIRMS, ADOPTS, AND RATIFIES
the Recommended Ruling (Doc. No. 26). Therefore, as explained in the Recommended
Ruling, the Commissioner’s Motion to Affirm the Decision of the Commissioner (Doc.
No. 24) is GRANTED and Caruso’s Motion to Reverse the Decision of the
Commissioner (Doc. No. 20) is DENIED.

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SO ORDERED.
Dated at new Haven, Connecticut, this 23rd day of March, 2016.

/s/ Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge

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