Demski v. Enfield et al
Filing
85
ORDER granting 61 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 2/6/2017. (Williams, C)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CHRISTOPHER DEMSKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF ENFIELD, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:14-cv-01568 (VAB)
RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Christopher Demski, alleges multiple federal and state civil rights claims
against Defendants, the Town of Enfield and various officers of the Enfield Police Department
(“EPD”). Mr. Demski’s claims arise out of actions taken by EPD officials in connection with
Mr. Demski’s arrest in October of 2013. The following parties are named as Defendants in this
action: the Town of Enfield (“Town”); Chief Carl Sferrazza, Sergeant James Lefebrvre, Officer
Christopher Dufresne, Officer Brendan Devine, Officer Nicholas Raigon, Officer Kevin Cwirka,
Officer Michael Colantuono, and Officers Jane Doe and John Doe.
Mr. Demski has alleged the following federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: excessive
force in violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count One); failure to intervene in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count Ten); failure to render adequate
medical assistance in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count Twelve); false
arrest and malicious prosecution (Count Fourteen); and municipal liability for constitutional
violations on the part of the Town and Chief Sferrazza (Count Fifteen).
Mr. Demski has also alleged the following state claims: excessive force under the
Connecticut constitution (Count Two); common law negligence (Count Three); liability under
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n (Count Four); dog bite liability under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-357
1
(Count Five); common law recklessness (Count Six); intentional infliction of emotional distress
(Count Seven); negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count Eight); common law assault and
battery (Count Nine); failure to intervene in violation of the Connecticut Constitution (Count
Eleven); failure to render adequate medical assistance in violation of the Connecticut
Constitution (Count Thirteen); and indemnification under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465 (Count
Sixteen).
Defendants have moved for summary judgment with respect to several of Mr. Demski’s
claims. Mot. for Summ. Judgment, ECF No. 61. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I.
FACTUAL SUMMARY1
On the evening of October 10, 2013, Mr. Demski walked outside his home without
wearing a shirt.2 Am. Compl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 41. At around midnight that night, Mr. Demski’s
neighbors called 911 to report a shirtless man acting strangely. L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶ 1. Shortly after
that call, Mr. Demski broke into the home of another neighbor, Charles Strider. Id. at ¶ 2.
According to Mr. Demski, Mr. Strider’s house closely resembles the house of Mr. Demski’s
mother and stepfather, which was next door, and Mr. Demski “mistakenly entered” Mr. Strider’s
home thinking it was the home next door. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15. Upon discovering that
someone had entered his home, Mr. Strider also called the police. Id. at ¶ 2. The EPD Incident
Report notes that Mr. Strider reported hearing “loud banging,” seeing a “male with long hair and
no shirt pacing back and forth in his living room,” and thinking “there was someone trying to kill
him.” Incident Report, Defs. Ex. C, ECF No. 61-5.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are undisputed.
Mr. Demski explains that he was sleepwalking due to the side effects of Ambien, a prescription sleep medication.
Compl. ¶¶ 9-11.
2
2
Three EPD officers, Sergeant Lefebrve, Officer Dufresne and Officer Devine, arrived at
Mr. Strider’s home in response to the two calls. Am. Compl. ¶ 3. A police dog, Bruin,
accompanied Officer Dufresne. Id., L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶ 3.
The parties offer divergent accounts of the events immediately following the police
officers’ arrival. According to Defendants, when the police arrived, they saw Mr. Demski run
out of the house, bleeding from his hands and feet. Id. at ¶ 4. When the police officers ordered
him to get on the ground, he lowered himself to his knees, screaming incoherently, and when the
police officers attempted to handcuff him, he resisted. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. The police officers
deployed their taser gun multiple times, and each deployment was allegedly ineffective. Id. at ¶
7. The police officers were ultimately required to use a “drive stun deployment,” which allowed
Officer Devine to handcuff Mr. Demski. Id. at ¶ 8.
Mr. Demski, on the other hand, insists that he was handcuffed early on, before the police
officers tased him repeatedly. L.R. 56(a)(2) ¶ 11. Mr. Demski also alleges that the police
canine, following an “attack” command from Officer Dufresne, latched on to his right foot and
ankle, resulting in injuries to his Achilles tendon. Am. Compl. ¶ 27. The parties dispute whether
the police canine actually bit Mr. Demski. L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶ 9.
After Mr. Demski was handcuffed, Officer Dufresne called for a medic, and the officers
kept Mr. Demski in the police cruiser until the ambulance arrived. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. According to
Defendants, Mr. Demski was exhibiting aggressive behavior while in the police cruiser and
while in the ambulance, including screaming, kicking the windows and spitting. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14.
Mr. Demski does not have any independent recollection of his behavior during this time, and he
does not remember the majority of the events described above. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10, 15. He only
3
remembers seeing a dog barking at him and being shocked with a taser gun. Id.
While at the hospital, Mr. Demski initially continued acting aggressively. See Johnson
Memorial Hospital Records, Defs. Ex. J at 3, ECF No. 61-12 (noting that Mr. Demski was
“fighting with us and being aggressive” and describing the need to place an oxygen mask on Mr.
Demski “as a spit shield”). Mr. Demski gradually became more lucid at the hospital, and he was
discharged later that same night. Johnson Memorial Hospital Admission Record, Pl. Ex. 20,
ECF No. 73-34. After he was discharged from the hospital and returned to police custody, Mr.
Demski alleges that Defendants forced him to walk with a leg injury and kept him in a holding
cell. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36-37 (alleging that Mr. Demski was “made to limp and hobble, with a
fully torn Achilles tendon… without assistance”).
Following his arrest, Mr. Demski was charged with criminal trespass, criminal mischief,
interfering with a police officer, and breach of peace. L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶ 18. By paying a $50 fine,
Mr. Demski was able to reduce these charges to a single charge of creating a public disturbance.
Id. at ¶ 19.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court shall grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has carried that
initial burden, “the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the
existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d
Cir. 2011). If no reasonable jury could find in favor of the opposing party because “the evidence
to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary
4
judgment is proper.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d
Cir. 1994).
A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue
of fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . .” Id.
Disputes concerning immaterial facts do not prevent summary judgment. See id.; Howard v.
Gleason Corp., 901 F.2d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[S]ummary judgment cannot be avoided
by immaterial factual disputes.”). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court
must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all
inferences in its favor. Dalberth v. Xerox Corp., 766 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2014).
II.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Mr. Demski has failed to establish the existence of a genuine
dispute of material fact with respect to the following claims: Monell municipal liability on the
part of the Town and Chief Sferrazza (Count Fifteen); failure to provide adequate medical
assistance under federal and state law (Counts Twelve and Thirteen); and false arrest and
malicious prosecution (Count Fourteen).3 Defendants have not challenged Mr. Demski’s
excessive force and failure to intervene claims under either the Fourth Amendment or the
Connecticut Constitution, nor have they challenged Mr. Demski’s remaining state law claims.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment also seeks dismissal of Mr. Demski’s excessive force and failure to
intervene claims as to the Fourteenth Amendment only (Count One, Count Ten); his dog bite liability claim under
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22-357 (Count Five); and all claims with respect to Defendants Cwirka, Colantuono, Raigon, and
Doe. Mot. for Summary Judgment 1-2. Mr. Demski has conceded that these claims fail as a matter of law and has
agreed to withdraw those claims. Pl. Mem. in Opp. Accordingly, Counts One, Five and Ten are dismissed.
3
5
A. Monell claim (Count Fifteen)
Mr. Demski seeks to hold the Town of Enfield and Chief Sferrazza (“Town Defendants”)
liable for their allegedly inadequate policies and training regarding the use of force by police
officers. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77-82. Specifically, Mr. Demski alleges that (1) the Town Defendants
have a policy and practice of inadequate supervision and discipline of Enfield police officers
who have backgrounds of misconduct in connection with arrests and seizures, and (2) the Town
Defendants have maintained a policy and practice of inadequate supervision and training
regarding the proper implementation of accepted police practices in various areas. Id. He claims
that these policies proximately caused the alleged misconduct of the Defendant Enfield police
officers in connection with his arrest. Id. at ¶ 79.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the
United States Supreme Court determined that, in order for an individual plaintiff to bring a
Section 1983 action against a municipality and its officials for monetary relief, the municipality
must have officially adopted and promulgated policies that caused unconstitutional actions. Id.
“Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory,
or injunctive relief where … the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body’s officers.” Id. at 690. “To hold a city liable under § 1983 for the
unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three
elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a
denial of a constitutional right.” Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007)
(internal marks and citations omitted). Defendants argue the absence of a genuine dispute of
6
material fact with respect to the first element, the existence of an official policy or custom, which
is fatal to Mr. Demski’s Monell claim. Def. Mem. in Supp. 14-15, ECF No 61-1.
“Courts have recognized four ways for plaintiffs to demonstrate a ‘policy or custom’: (1)
‘a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body's officers’[]; (2) conduct ordered by a municipal official with policymaking authority[]; (3)
actions taken ‘pursuant to governmental “custom” even though such a custom has not received
formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels’[]; or (4) a ‘failure to train’
municipal employees that ‘amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom
the [employees] come into contact[.]’” Walker v. City of N.Y., No. 12 CIV. 5902 PAC, 2014 WL
1259618, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2014) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691; Pembaur v. City
of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483–84 (1986); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127
(1988); and City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Mr. Demski contends
that the Town Defendants violated Mr. Demski’s constitutional rights through two types of
policies and/or customs: (1) a custom of inadequate supervision and discipline of police officers,
and (2) a custom of failing to adequately train police officers in the use of force during arrests
and seizures. For the reasons set forth below, both of these arguments fail as a matter of law.
1. Inadequate Supervision
Mr. Demski first alleges that the Town Defendants have adopted a “de facto” policy of
inadequate supervision of their police officers, which resulted in the excessive use of force and
related actions taken by the various EPD officers involved in his arrest. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77-82.
In support of this contention, he specifically describes a series of incidents where EPD officers
used force in the context of an arrest or seizure, those officers filed use-of-force reports, and the
EPD approved the use of force as reasonable. Pl. Mem. in Opp. 9-17, ECF No. 73; Use of Force
7
Reports, Pl. Ex. 6, ECF No. 73-8. He alleges that, in all of the described incidents, the EPD
conducted only “superficial” investigations and failed to discipline the officers involved,
contributing to a policy of inadequate supervision that caused Defendants to use excessive force
against Mr. Demski in the context of his arrest.
“In order to establish the liability of a municipality in an action under § 1983 for
unconstitutional acts by a municipal employee below the policymaking level, a plaintiff must
establish that the violation of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal custom or
policy.” Vann v. City of N.Y., 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995). “This does not mean that the
plaintiff must show that the municipality had an explicitly stated rule or regulation… A § 1983
plaintiff injured by a police officer may establish the pertinent custom or policy by showing that
the municipality, alerted to the possible use of excessive force by its police officers, exhibited
deliberate indifference.” Id. In order to meet this standard, Mr. Demski must show (1)
deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality sufficient to constitute a “custom or
policy” of inadequate supervision, and (2) a “direct causal link” between that policy and the
alleged constitutional deprivation. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
Mr. Demski fails to establish either of these requirements.
a. Deliberate Indifference
“To prove … deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that the need for more or
better supervision to protect against constitutional violations was obvious.” Vann, 72 F.3d at
1049 (citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). “An obvious need may be demonstrated through proof of
repeated complaints of civil rights violations; deliberate indifference may be inferred if the
complaints are followed by no meaningful attempt on the part of the municipality to investigate
or to forestall further incidents.” Id. (citing Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 941 F.2d 119,
8
123 (2d Cir. 1991); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 328 (2d Cir. 1986)). In the
excessive force context, inadequate supervision may give rise to deliberate indifference where a
plaintiff presents “evidence that the municipality had notice of but repeatedly failed to make any
meaningful investigation into charges that police officers had used excessive force in violation of
the complainants' civil rights.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir.
1991).
According to Mr. Demski, deliberate indifference can be inferred here because (1) the
EPD was aware of repeated civil rights violations on the part of EPD officials through numerous
multiple use-of-force reports filed by EPD officers, and (2) this alleged pattern of excessive force
was not followed by any meaningful investigation on the part of Town officials. Mr. Demski
fails to establish a genuine dispute of material fact, however, as to the municipality’s awareness
and inaction regarding constitutional violations; thus, the Town and Chief Sferrazza were not
deliberately indifferent as a matter of law.
i.
Notice of Constitutional Violations
According to Mr. Demski, the EPD was aware that officers used force on civilians on
more than a dozen occasions before Mr. Demski’s arrest. He claims that these use-of-force
incidents gave notice to the Town and to Chief Sferrazza that EPD officers inappropriately:
kicked and pushed a woman during an arrest;4 punched college students during an arrest;5
attacked arrestees and fleeing suspects with police canine units on multiple occasions;6 and
deployed a taser gun on an individual while escorting him to an ambulance for psychiatric care.7
See Pl. Mem. in Opp. 10-17. In each of the reported use-of-force incidents, EPD officers
4
See Crowley Dep. Tr. (Crowley v. Enfield), Pl. Ex. 5, ECF No. 73-6.
See Salas v. Town of Enfield Compl., Pl. Ex. 8, ECF No. 73-10.
6
See McDaniel v. Enfield Compl., Pl. Ex. 17, ECF No. 73-31.
7
See Olschafskie Dep. Tr. (Damato v. Enfield), Pl. Ex. 12, ECF No. 73-16.
5
9
prepared detailed reports describing the circumstances surrounding the use of force, the EPD
reviewed those reports internally, and the EPD approved the use of force. Id.; Pl. Ex. 6 at 17125. Although none of these incidents has been found to constitute a constitutional violation in a
court of law, Mr. Demski contends that, taken together, these incidents gave the Town and Chief
Sferrazza “obvious red flags that abuses were occurring,” putting the municipality on notice that
the EPD had serious problems with excessive force. Pl. Mem. in Opp. at 9.
Courts in this Circuit have found that unsubstantiated or unfounded civilian complaints
have limited probative value in the context of an inadequate supervision Monell claim;
nonetheless, even unfounded civilian complaints can, in some circumstances, be probative of
deliberate indifference. See Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, N.Y., 783 F.2d 319, 328 (2d Cir. 1986)
(“The fact that none of the claims had yet been adjudicated in favor of the claimant was not
material; if the City’s efforts to evaluate the claims were so superficial as to suggest that its
official attitude was one of indifference to the truth of the claim, such an attitude would bespeak
an indifference to the rights asserted in those claims.”); see also Berkovich v. Hicks, 922 F.2d
1018, 1023 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming the exclusion of prior civilian complaints from evidence in
Monell claim trial where officers accused in prior complaints were ultimately acquitted and
misconduct alleged in prior complaints was too dissimilar to establish a “pattern of conduct” by
defendant officer); Lewis v. City of Albany Police Dep't, 547 F. Supp. 2d 191, 201 (N.D.N.Y.
2008), aff'd, 332 F. App'x 641 (2d Cir. 2009) (allowing evidence of prior complaints where “the
relevant prior complaints had substantial probative value in that only one exonerated [the
defendant] and all were of sufficiently similar circumstances to merit admission to prove … the
City's failure to discipline, train, and supervise him.”).
10
Here, however, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that the reported incidents
constitute a pattern of excessive force on the part of EPD officers. The cited use-of-force reports
were not formal civilian complaints. Instead, police officers, themselves, not individuals
accusing police officers of misconduct, filed each of the referenced use-of-force reports. Pl. Ex.
6; Pl. Mem. in Opp. 10-17. Although many of the referenced incidents ultimately did result in a
formal lawsuit, those lawsuits were not initiated until after Mr. Demski’s arrest, and none of
those lawsuits resulted in a determination that excessive force was used.8 Id. Furthermore,
neither Chief Sferrazza nor the Town was directly involved in any of the reviews of the listed
use-of-force reports, and none of the police officers identified in those incidents was named as a
Defendant in this action. Def. Reply Br. at 4, ECF No. 79; Pl. Ex. 6.
Contrary to Mr. Demski’s assertions that the reported incidents presented Chief
Sferrazza and the Town with “obvious red flags,” these reported incidents do not suggest a
pattern of constitutional violations, nor do they suggest the requisite notice on the part of the
municipality that the EPD had any problems with excessive force.9 Thus, Mr. Demski cannot
establish that the Town and Chief Sferrazza were deliberately indifferent for purposes of Monell
liability. See Ricciuti, 941 F.2d 119, 123.
ii.
Failure to Investigate
Even if the prior use of force incidents had been sufficient to give the Town notice that
constitutional violations were occurring, the record demonstrates that the supervisory efforts of
the Town and its officials were not constitutionally inadequate as a matter of law. A
8
See Crowley v. Enfield, 3:14-cv-1903 (MPS) (complaint filed November 14, 2014); Salas v. Enfield, 3:14-cv-1883
(WWE) (complaint filed November 14, 2014); McAlmond v. Enfield, 3:15-cv-158 (JAM) (complaint filed January 8,
2015); Olschafskie v. Enfield, 3:15-cv-67 (MPS) (complaint filed December 1, 2014);
9
Of note, the reported incidents may not even be admissible if this claim were to proceed to trial. See Berkovich,
922 F.2d at 1023.
11
municipality’s supervision may be constitutionally inadequate “where a local government is
faced with a pattern of misconduct and does nothing, compelling the conclusion that the local
government has acquiesced in or tacitly authorized its subordinates’ unlawful actions.” Reynolds
v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007). Here, however, the municipality did more than
“nothing” – in each instance, when presented with potential misconduct on the part of Enfield
police officers, EPD officers prepared use-of-force reports, and EPD supervisors reviewed those
reports to ensure that the officers’ actions were appropriate under the circumstances. See Pl. Ex
6; Pl. Mem. in Supp. 10-17. Mr. Demski nonetheless alleges that these investigations were
“perfunctory” and reflect governmental acquiescence to police misconduct, constituting a policy
for purposes of liability under Monell. Id.
Where the municipal entity or officer, rather than ignoring an alleged pattern of
misconduct, has made attempts to address the problem, a Monell plaintiff “face[s] a heavy
burden of proof in showing that the state’s response was so patently inadequate to the task as to
amount to deliberate indifference.” Reynolds, 506 F.3d at 192-193. The Second Circuit has
clarified that, in order to give rise to Monell liability, the inadequacy of such investigations must
reflect more than negligence: “Such inadequacy must reflect a deliberate choice among various
alternatives, rather than negligence or bureaucratic inaction.” Id. at 193 (citing Pembaur v.
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)).
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the undisputed record
evidence surrounding the series of EPD use-of-force reviews described here suggests that the
alleged inadequacies of the EPD’s supervision cannot rise to the level of “deliberate
indifference” as required for a viable Monell claim. The record shows that the EPD
demonstrated concern, not indifference, when made aware of potential excessive force on the
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part of its police officers. After receiving numerous use of force reports involving one officer in
particular—Officer Worden, an individual who is not named as a Defendant in this action—the
EPD prepared a report to Chief Sferrazza showing that numeral Internal Affairs investigations
had been initiated examining this officer’s conduct. Worden Rep., Pl. Ex. 16, ECF No. 73-30.
While the EPD report ultimately determined that formal discipline was not appropriate at that
time, the report recommended supplemental training and closer supervision, emphasizing the
need for “frequent reminders of what this department expects from its officers.” Id.10
The facts in the record show that an “obvious need” had not been clearly presented to the
Town Defendants at the time of Mr. Demski’s arrest and that the EPD was not “deliberately
indifferent” to that need. Vann, 72 F.3d at 1049. Thus, “Plaintiff's claims are insufficient to
support an inference that the Town was ‘on notice’ of misconduct by its police officers, but
failed to act, such that the Town exhibited deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of
its citizens.” Triano v. Town of Harrison, NY, 895 F. Supp. 2d 526, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Mr.
Demski’s Monell claim based on inadequate supervision fails as a result.
b. Causation
Finally, the record evidence fails to provide a causal link between the alleged policy of
inadequate supervision and the harm experienced by Mr. Demski, as none of the prior use-offorce incidents described by Mr. Demski resembles the circumstances of this case.11 Mr. Demski
insists that the Town and Chief Sferrazza proximately caused his injuries by “promot[ing] and/or
10
After the initiation of this lawsuit, Officer Worden was ultimately required to step down from the police force in
connection with concerns about his pattern of misconduct. Pl. Ex. 6 at 10-16.
11
Most of the incidents described by Mr. Demski involved the use of force in response to relatively minor criminal
activity; to the contrary, the EPD officers named as Defendants here were responding to a reported home invasion in
which a frightened caller had stated that someone had broken down their door, which had been locked with a
deadbolt, and was inside their house “trying to kill him.” Incident Report, Defs. Ex. C. Furthermore, none of the
described incidents involved an arrestee who was in an altered mental state, whereas Mr. Demski claims to have
been sleepwalking and incapable of comprehending police orders.
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encourag[ing] an environment conducive to the related violations of [his] Constitutional rights.”
Am. Compl. ¶ 80. Nonetheless, in light of the significant gap between the unique circumstances
of Mr. Demski’s arrest and the described incidents in which the EPD has used force in the past,
as well as the lack of involvement on the part of both Chief Sferrazza and the Town in those
prior incidents, no reasonable jury would be able to conclude that the Town’s approach to the
review of use-of-force reports had any causal relationship to the use of force in connection with
Mr. Demski’s arrest.
“[A] municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself
causes the constitutional violation at issue... Thus, our first inquiry in any case alleging
municipal liability under § 1983 is the question whether there is a direct causal link between a
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 385;
see also Miller v. City of New London, No. 3:13-CV-619 VAB, 2015 WL 2240269, at *12 (D.
Conn. May 12, 2015) (denying Monell claim based on finding that “there are no facts in the
record establishing a causal link between the alleged problems with use-of-force reporting and
[plaintiff]’s alleged constitutional injuries”). Mr. Demski is unable to establish either a
recognizable “municipal policy or custom” or a “direct causal link” to his injuries. Accordingly,
his Monell claim of inadequate supervision fails as a matter of law.
2. Failure to Train
In the alternative, Mr. Demski argues that the Town Defendants have failed to provide
adequate training to their officers. According to Mr. Demski, this inadequate training also
played a role in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of the Defendant police officers.
As a preliminary matter, in order to move forward with a Monell claim based on failure
to train “at the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs must ‘identify a specific deficiency in the
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city's training program and establish that that deficiency is closely related to the ultimate injury,
such that it actually caused the constitutional deprivation.’” Jenkins v. City of New York, 478
F.3d 76, 94 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 81 (2d Cir. 2006)).
To survive summary judgment, naming potentially relevant training deficiencies is not enough:
“to satisfy the applicable legal standard for a failure to train claim, even if a plaintiff identifies
specific training deficiencies, there also must be proof that these deficiencies are the result of
deliberate indifference.” Miller, 2015 WL 2240269, at *8 (citing Wray, 490 F.3d at 196); see
also Canton, 489 U.S. at 379 (“The inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for §
1983 liability only where the failure to train in a relevant respect amounts to deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”);
Reynolds, 506 F.3d at 192 (“a city's failure to train its subordinates satisfies the policy or custom
requirement only where the need to act is so obvious, and the inadequacy of current practices so
likely to result in a deprivation of federal rights, that the municipality or official can be found
deliberately indifferent to the need.”).
Mr. Demski, however, has not established that the alleged deficiencies in training had any
causal relationship to the alleged constitutional deprivation, as he has not provided any factual
basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that the training provided by the EPD was deficient in a
way that caused his injuries. Mr. Demski provides a list of categories in which the EPD’s
training was allegedly insufficient, including investigation techniques in connection with police
calls; proper handling of police canines; and preparing adequate use of force reports. Am.
Compl. ¶ 78. However, he does not specify how the training was deficient in any of the named
areas. See Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d 415, 440–41 (2d Cir.
2009) (stating that in order to prevail on a Monell claim on a failure-to-train theory, the “plaintiff
15
must offer evidence to support the conclusion that the training program was inadequate … and
that a ‘hypothetically well-trained officer’ would have avoided the constitutional violation.”
(quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91)).
Defendants, on the other hand, have provided copies of formal policies governing various
aspects of arrests and seizures, including the use of less than lethal force, Def. Ex. F, ECF No.
61-8; the use of tasers, Def. Ex. H, ECF No. 61-10; and the review of civilian grievances through
Internal Affairs, Def. Ex. G, ECF No. 61-9. Defendants have also provided documentation
showing that the Enfield Police Department was accredited by the Commission on Accreditation
for Law Enforcement Agencies (“CALEA”) and the Police Officer Standards and Training
Council (“P.O.S.T.”). Defendants state that, at the time of Mr. Demski’s arrest, the EPD was one
of only twelve police departments in the state to be accredited by both entities. Def. Mem. in
Supp. at 8. Mr. Demski does not contradict these statements. L.R. 56(a)(2) ¶¶ 26, 29-30.
The only policies that Defendants have not provided are policies governing the use of
canines and policies governing the treatment of individuals in altered mental states. Drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the absence of formal training in these two areas
could arguably constitute “a specific deficiency in the city’s training program… [that] is ‘closely
related to the ultimate injury,’ such that it ‘actually caused’ the constitutional deprivation.”
Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 129 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Canton, 489
U.S. at 391). Nevertheless, Mr. Demski has failed to establish deliberate indifference with
respect to these two training deficiencies.
There are no facts in either the Amended Complaint or the record suggesting that the
Town or Chief Sferrazza knew “to a moral certainty” that EPD officers would confront a
sleepwalker who was capable of breaking into someone else’s home. Id. Nor has Mr. Demski
16
alleged any facts suggesting a history of EPD officers mishandling situations involving
individuals in altered mental states in general, sleepwalkers in particular, or the use of canines in
connection with the arrests of such individuals. Thus, there is no evidence that the absence of
training in these areas would “frequently” cause constitutional deprivations, and neither the
Town nor Chief Sferrazza can be found to have been deliberately indifferent based on their
failure to provide training on the use of canines or interactions with sleepwalkers.
Based on the undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that Chief Sferrazza or
the Town of Enfield failed to train their police officers in such a way that would constitute
deliberate indifference to violations of people’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, Mr. Demski’s
Monell claim fails as a matter of law, and summary judgment is granted with respect to Count
Fifteen of Mr. Demski’s Amended Complaint.
B. Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Assistance (Counts Twelve and
Thirteen)
Defendants also challenge the legal sufficiency of Mr. Demski’s Fourteenth Amendment
§ 1983 claim that Defendants failed to provide adequate medical assistance. Mr. Demski claims
that he suffered severe injuries due to the force used against him during his arrest, and that the
Defendant police officers denied him adequate medical care by: (1) forcibly transporting him to a
police cruiser while injured; (2) keeping him in the police cruiser for twenty minutes before
transferring him to an ambulance; and (3) transferring him to a holding cell after his discharge
from the hospital. Pl. Mem. in Supp. 6-7. The Court concludes that this claim, too, fails as a
matter of law.
A detainee who has not yet been convicted may bring a Section 1983 claim of deliberate
indifference to medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment, while a convicted prisoner may
bring such a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir.
17
2009) (“the district court correctly concluded that a claim for indifference to the medical needs
of Caiozzo, as a pretrial detainee in state custody, was properly brought under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment… Claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
condition or other serious threat to the health or safety of a person in custody should be analyzed
under the same standard irrespective of whether they are brought under the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment”). In order to prevail on a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim, two
elements must be satisfied: “[the plaintiff] must show that []he had a ‘serious medical condition’
and that it was met with ‘deliberate indifference.’” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d
Cir. 2000).
1. Serious Medical Need
The parties dispute whether Mr. Demski suffered from a sufficiently serious medical
condition, which is the first element of a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim. “The
‘serious medical need’ requirement contemplates a condition of urgency, one that may produce
death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1990). The
parties have presented competing factual accounts regarding the extent of Mr. Demski’s injuries
and whether they caused “extreme pain.”
Mr. Demski has submitted the sworn testimony of three separate witnesses stating that
Mr. Demski was bitten on the ankle by a police canine for an extended time. Strider Dep. at 68,
Pl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 73-3; E. Kenney Dep. at 63, Pl. Ex. 3, ECF No. 73-4; C. Kenney Dep. at 67,
Pl. Ex. 18, ECF No. 73-32. Mr. Demski further testified that, although he does not remember
most of the circumstances of his arrest, he does remember his “inability to walk” after being
released from the holding cell, “bleeding through everything” while in custody, and requesting
medical attention. Demski Dep. at 88, 92-94, Pl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 73-1. He also stated that he
18
suffered from a fracture to his right toe as well as a swollen tongue and a cracked tooth, injuries
that were not there before his arrest. Id.
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could
conclude that Mr. Demski suffered from sufficiently serious injuries for purposes of a Fourteenth
Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim. See, e.g. Benjamin v. Galeno, 415
F. Supp. 2d 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd sub nom. Benjamin v. Koeningsmann, 204 F. App'x
979 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding fact issue regarding whether rotator cuff injury constituted a “serious
medical need” for first prong of deliberate indifference claim where plaintiff alleged that injury
resulted in “extreme pain”); cf. Nance, 912 F.2d at 607-608 (finding “sore feet and alleged need
for orthopedic sneakers” not “sufficiently serious” for purposes of constitutional deliberate
indifference claim).
2. Deliberate Indifference
In order to survive summary judgment, however, Mr. Demski must also establish a
genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the second element of a deliberate indifference to
medical needs claim. This element requires a finding that Mr. Demski’s medical needs were met
with “deliberate indifference.” Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 106.
“The ‘deliberate indifference’ component, as explained by the Supreme Court, includes
both an objective and subjective element.” Frank v. Cty. of Ontario, 884 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17–18
(W.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–299 (1991)). “With respect to the
objective aspect, the court must ask whether there has been a sufficiently serious deprivation of
the prisoner's constitutional rights… With respect to the subjective aspect, the court must
consider whether the deprivation was brought about by defendants in wanton disregard of those
rights.” Id.
19
Mr. Demski seeks to establish deliberate indifference based on Defendants’ delay and
lack of care in responding to the injuries incurred during his arrest.12 However, the record does
not reflect any material factual disputes regarding deliberate indifference on the part of
Defendants. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate with respect to Mr. Demski’s deliberate
indifference to medical needs claims.
Where a plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim is based on an unreasonable delay in
treatment, “the seriousness inquiry focuses on the challenged delay or interruption in treatment
rather than the prisoner's underlying medical condition alone.” Id. at 19; Salahuddin v. Goord,
467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006). Thus, it is “the particular risk of harm faced by a prisoner due
to the challenged deprivation of care, rather than the severity of the prisoner's underlying medical
condition, considered in the abstract, that is relevant” for purposes of establishing deliberate
indifference. Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2003). Negligence alone cannot
constitute deliberate indifference, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 110 (1976); however, in
some circumstances, “a lengthy, unjustifiable delay in providing necessary medical treatment
might evidence deliberate indifference[.]” Gomez v. Cty. of Westchester, 649 F. App'x 93, 95 (2d
Cir. 2016).
It is undisputed that police officers summoned an ambulance at 12:16 A.M. to respond to
Mr. Demski’s altered psychological state, less than twenty minutes after the police officers
initially encountered Mr. Demski. L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶ 11; Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”)
Report, Def. Ex. J, ECF No. 61-12; Police Report, Def. Ex. E, ECF No. 61-7. It is also
undisputed that Defendants brought Mr. Demski into the police cruiser after his arrest because he
12
Mr. Demski also argues that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because they caused
his medical needs through their excessive force; however, Defendants’ involvement in causing Mr. Demski’s
injuries is most appropriately addressed in the context of his remaining excessive force claims, which were not
included in Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Thus, the Court declines to address those arguments here.
20
was acting aggressively, and that the ambulance took around twenty minutes to arrive to the
scene. L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶ 14; Investigative Report, Def. Ex. I, ECF No. 61-11. In light of these
undisputed facts, Defendants’ alleged misconduct—namely, causing Mr. Demski to wait for the
ambulance in a police cruiser and making Mr. Demski “limp around some more before placing
him in a cell” after his release from the hospital—cannot rise to the level of deliberate
indifference, and Mr. Demski’s deliberate indifference claims fail as a result. Indeed, there is no
record evidence for the jury to infer that the waiting time for the ambulance was too much or that
there was an alternative to having Mr. Demski “limp around” that the police officers failed to
make available to him.
In the absence of such evidence, no jury would be able to reasonably conclude that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Demski’s medical needs in connection with their
response to his physical and psychological state on the night of his arrest. Accordingly, Mr.
Demski’s deliberate indifference claims fail as a matter of law, and summary judgment is
granted as to Counts Twelve and Thirteen of Mr. Demski’s Amended Complaint.
C. False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution (Count Fourteen)
Defendants seek dismissal of Mr. Demski’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims,
arguing that these claims fail as a matter of law. Mr. Demski does not respond to Defendants’
motion for summary judgment with respect to these claims.
“Claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution, brought under § 1983 to vindicate the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures, are ‘substantially
the same’ as claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution under state law.” Jocks v.
Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.
1996); Conway v. Vill. of Mount Kisco, 750 F.2d 205, 214 (2d Cir. 1984)). Under Connecticut
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law, in order to prevail on claims of either false arrest or malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must
first establish that the underlying criminal action lacked probable cause. See Russo v. City of
Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2007) (“in Connecticut, a false arrest claim cannot lie
when the challenged arrest was supported by probable cause.”); Shattuck v. Town of Stratford,
233 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306 (D. Conn. 2002) (“Under Connecticut state law, to establish malicious
prosecution, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the ‘initiation or procurement of the initiation of
criminal prosecution with malice for a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice; that the
defendant acted without probable cause, and the criminal proceedings terminated in favor of the
plaintiff.’” (quoting Clark v. Town of Greenwich, No. CV00177986, 2002 WL 237854, at *3
(Conn. Super. Jan. 24, 2002))); see also Jovanovic v. City of N.Y., 486 F. App'x 149, 152 (2d Cir.
2012) (“An element of any malicious prosecution claim is the absence of probable cause”).
It is undisputed that, at the time of his arrest, Mr. Demski was discovered to have
forcefully broken into his neighbor’s house while shirtless and acting incoherently. L.R. 56(a)(1)
¶¶ 1-2; L.R. 56(a)(2) ¶¶ 1-2. Apart from the conclusory statement in Mr. Demski’s Amended
Complaint that the Defendant police officers arrested Mr. Demski “without probable cause to do
so,” see Am. Compl. ¶ 75, Mr. Demski has not articulated any factual basis for the Court to
conclude that the officers lacked probable cause in making the underlying arrest and initiating
the criminal charges against Mr. Demski. Without this essential element, Mr. Demski’s false
arrest and malicious prosecution claims fail as a matter of law.
Furthermore, it is also undisputed that the charge ultimately brought against Mr. Demski,
creating a public disturbance, was not voluntarily dismissed or otherwise resolved in his favor, as
Mr. Demski disposed of this charge by paying a $50 fine. L.R. 56(a)(1) ¶ 19. “A person who
thinks there is not even probable cause to believe he committed the crime with which he is
22
charged must pursue the criminal case to an acquittal or an unqualified dismissal, or else waive
his section 1983 claim.” Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 853 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that “a
dismissal pursuant to the Connecticut accelerated pretrial rehabilitation program is not a
termination in favor of the accused for purposes of a civil rights suit.”). Here, the disposition of
this charge through the payment of a $50 fine was neither an acquittal nor an unqualified
dismissal. Accordingly, his malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of law on this ground
as well.
Mr. Demski has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to
his false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted
with respect to Count Fourteen of Mr. Demski’s Amended Complaint.
III.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Count Five and
Counts Twelve through Fifteen of Mr. Demski’s Amended Complaint are dismissed. Mr.
Demski’s excessive force and failure to intervene claims (Counts One and Ten) are also
dismissed with respect to alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations only. All claims with
respect to Defendants Cwirka, Colantuono, Raigon, and Doe are dismissed, and only the
following Defendants remain in this action: the Town of Enfield, Sergeant Lefebvre, Officer
Dufresne, and Officer Devine.
The following claims will proceed to trial against Defendants Lefebvre, Dufresne and
Devine: excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and the Connecticut Constitution (Counts
One and Two); common law negligence and recklessness (Counts Three and Six); common law
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Counts Seven and Eight); common law
assault and battery (Count Nine); and failure to intervene under the Fourth Amendment and the
23
Connecticut Constitution (Counts Ten and Eleven). The following claims will proceed to trial
against Defendant Town of Enfield: liability under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n (Count Four); and
indemnification under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465 (Count Sixteen). All other claims and
Defendants are dismissed.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 6th day of February, 2017.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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