Minnifield v. Dolan et al

Filing 17

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER: See attached memorandum. Discovery due by 5/5/2016 Dispositive Motions due by 6/4/2016. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 10/5/2015.(Nadler, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
WENDELL MINNIFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIN DOLAN, ET AL.
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:14-cv-1580 (VLB)
October 5, 2015

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
The plaintiff, Wendell Minnifield, currently incarcerated at MacDougall
Correctional Institution, filed this civil rights complaint pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The defendants named in the Complaint are Nursing Supervisor Erin Dolan,
Nursing Supervisor Heidi Green, and Dr. O’Halloran.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must review prisoner civil
complaints against governmental actors and “dismiss ... any portion of [a]
complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” Id. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a
complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Although detailed allegations are not required, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

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the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). A complaint that includes only “‘labels and
conclusions,’ ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ or ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’ ” does not meet the facial
plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557
(2007)). Although courts still have an obligation to liberally construe a pro se
complaint, see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), the complaint must
include sufficient factual allegations to meet the standard of facial plausibility.
The plaintiff alleges that on June 5, 2014, prison officials at Cheshire
Correctional Institution transferred him to MacDougall Correctional Institution. The
plaintiff had been treated for a scalp condition for years during his confinement at
Cheshire. The plaintiff claims that upon his arrival at MacDougall, Nursing
Supervisor Dolan ordered his medical treatment to be discontinued. The plaintiff’s
treatment included cleaning his wounds and changing the bandages covering the
wounds. Since his treatment was discontinued, his condition has gotten worse and
he suffers from severe pain, headaches, dizziness and trouble sleeping. Plaintiff
further claims that on June 13, 2014, prior to the discontinuation of his treatment,
Defendants O’Hallaran and Dolan threatened to transfer him back to Cheshire if he
did not agree to stop seeking his treatment. Plaintiff also contends that on July 17
and 18, 2014, he was denied treatment upon the order of Defendant Dolan. In
addition, on the 18th, Defendant Greene informed the plaintiff that she’d directed the
nursing staff to refuse him treatment on Dolan’s instruction, and if he sought

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treatment, he needed to complete a sick-call request. Finally, the plaintiff contends
that on February 19, 2015, he learned that Defendant Greene would no longer
perform a portion of his treatment.
The plaintiff has filed grievances regarding his medical treatment. He seeks
monetary damages and injunctive relief.
Deliberate indifference by prison officials to a prisoner’s serious medical or
mental health needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Jareck v.
Hensley, 552 F. Supp. 2d 261, 264 (D. Conn 2008). To prevail on such a claim, a
plaintiff must provide evidence of sufficiently harmful acts or omissions and intent
to either deny or unreasonably delay access to needed medical care or the wanton
infliction of unnecessary pain by prison personnel. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-06.
Mere negligence will not support a section 1983 claim. See Smith v. Carpenter, 316
F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Eighth Amendment is not a vehicle for bringing
medical malpractice claims, nor a substitute for state tort law”). Furthermore, mere
disagreement with prison officials about what constitutes appropriate care does not
state a claim cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. “So long as the treatment
given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does
not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d
698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998).
To the extent that the plaintiff seeks monetary damages from the defendants
in their official capacities, those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, are

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therefore DISMISSED. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (Eleventh
Amendment, which protects the state from suits for monetary relief, also protects
state officials sued for damages in their official capacity); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 342 (1979) (Section 1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
The court concludes that the plaintiff has stated plausible claims of deliberate
indifference to his medical needs against the three named Defendants in their
individual capacities. However, his claim is limited to the denial of the medical
treatment for his scalp condition. Any claims based on the denial of treatment
through requiring a co-pay are DISMISSED.
ORDERS
The court enters the following orders:
(1)

Within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, the Clerk shall ascertain

from the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs the current work
addresses for Defendants Erin Dolan, Heidi Greene, and Dr. O’Halloran, and mail a
waiver of service of process request packet to each in their individual capacities at
their current work addresses. On the thirty-fifth (35th) day after mailing, the Clerk
shall report to the court on the status of all waiver requests. If any defendant fails to
return the waiver request, the Clerk shall make arrangements for in-person service
by the U.S. Marshals Service and the defendant shall be required to pay the costs of
such service in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d).
(2)

The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of the Complaint and this Order to

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the Connecticut Assistant Attorney General Terrence M. O’Neill and the
Department of Correction Legal Affairs Unit.
(2)

Defendants shall file their responses to the Complaint, either an

answer or motion to dismiss, within seventy (70) days from the date of this order.
If a defendant chooses to file an answer, they shall admit or deny the allegations
and respond to the cognizable claims recited above. They may also include any
and all additional defenses permitted by the Federal Rules.
(3)

Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through

37, shall be completed within seven months (210 days) from the date of this
order. Discovery requests need not be filed with the court.
(4)

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(a), a nonmoving party must respond to

a dispositive motion within twenty-one (21) days of the date the motion was filed.
If no response is filed, or the response is not timely, the dispositive motion can
be granted absent objection.
(5)

All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within eight months

(240 days) from the date of this order.
(6)

If the plaintiff changes his address at any time during the litigation of

this case, Local Court Rule 83.1(c)(2) provides that the plaintiff MUST notify the
court. Failure to do so can result in the dismissal of the case. The plaintiff must
give notice of a new address even if he is incarcerated. The plaintiff should write
PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS on the notice. It is not enough to just put the
new address on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. If the plaintiff
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has more than one pending case, he should indicate all of the case numbers in
the notification of change of address. The plaintiff should also notify the
defendant or the attorney for the defendant of his new address.

SO ORDERED at Harford, Connecticut this 5th day of October, 2015.

/s/
________
Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge

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