Cecchini v. Schenck et al

Filing 43

ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part 31 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 2/29/2016. (Hillier, D.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
SEAN CECCHINI,
Plaintiff,

No. 3:14-CV-1704 (MPS)

v.
PHILLIP K. SCHENCK, JR., PAUL B. HAMMICK,
STEPHEN HAJDASZ, MATTHEW WILLAUER,
RICHARD BOWEN, TOWN OF BLOOMFIELD,
and ARTHUR FREDERICKS,
Defendants.
RULING AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Sean Cecchini, is a police officer for the Town of Bloomfield, Connecticut.
He brings this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Bloomfield, its Town Manager,
the Chief of Police, and several employees of the Bloomfield police department. In his six-count
Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 28), Cecchini claims that (1) the defendants retaliated
against him in violation of the First Amendment, (2) the defendants intentionally inflicted
emotional distress, (3) the Town of Bloomfield violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, (4) the defendants are liable under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n, which, inter alia,
makes political subdivisions of the state responsible for certain negligent acts by their agents, (5)
the defendants committed the tort of aiding and abetting, and (6) the defendants retaliated against
him in violation of the First Amendment after he filed this lawsuit. The plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages, a declaratory judgment, nominal damages, attorney‘s fees
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, attorney‘s fees under the common law, the costs of this
action, and other equitable relief.
For the reasons discussed below, the defendants‘ motion is granted in part and denied in
part. Count One is dismissed against the individual defendants in their official capacities. Count

Two is dismissed as to all of the defendants except for Richard Bowen. I do not dismiss Count
Three because the defendants moved to dismiss only the equal protection claim in that count,
which the plaintiff subsequently has withdrawn. Counts Four and Five are dismissed in their
entirety. Finally, I grant the motion to dismiss Count Six as to Phillip Schenck and deny the
motion as to the remaining defendants.
The following counts remain: the claim in Count One against the Town of Bloomfield
and the individual defendants in their individual capacities, the claim in Count Two against
Bowen, the claim in Count Three against the Town of Bloomfield under the First Amendment,
and the First Amendment Claim in Count Six against the Town of Bloomfield, Hammick,
Hajdasz, Willauer, Fredericks, and Bowen.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Allegations

As best as can be determined from the erratic chronology in the Second Amended
Complaint, the plaintiff makes the following allegations.
1.

The Parties

Sean Cecchini has been a police officer for the defendant Town of Bloomfield and a
member of the local police union since 1996. (ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 6, 18.) He was a ―union
steward‖ from 2003 to 2004 and union president from 2005 to 2010. (Id. at ¶ 65–66.) Phillip K.
Schenck, Jr. is the Town Manager of Bloomfield. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 16.) Paul B. Hammick is the chief
of police for the Bloomfield police department. (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 17.) Stephen Hajdasz is a captain for
the Bloomfield police. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Matthew Willauer is a lieutenant for the Bloomfield police.
(Id. at ¶ 10.) Richard Bowen was a police officer who later became a sergeant for the Bloomfield
police. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Arthur Fredericks is a lieutenant for the Bloomfield police. (Id. at ¶ 11.)

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2.

Cecchini Reports Misconduct in the Police Department

In 2011, the plaintiff saw Bowen stop a car with three young black teenagers, grab the
genitals of one of them, and threaten the teenagers that a police dog would attack them if they
did not produce marijuana, which Bowen falsely accused them of possessing. (Id. at ¶¶ 21–22.)
The plaintiff told the teenagers that the police dog would not bite them. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Bowen and
two officers then unsuccessfully looked for marijuana in the car. (Id. at ¶ 24.) The plaintiff
described Bowen‘s conduct to the shift supervisor, Sergeant Bolden, who told the plaintiff to
write a report. (Id. at ¶ 25–26.) After the plaintiff reported the incident, Bowen entered false
information into the ―computer dispatch and report system.‖ (Id. at ¶¶ 27–28.) Chief Hammick
and the patrol division commander did not act on the plaintiff‘s report. (Id. at ¶ 29.)
Next, Willauer confronted the plaintiff about whether the plaintiff told the NAACP about
Bowen‘s alleged misconduct. (Id. at ¶ 30.) As a result, the plaintiff was ―harassed and
intimidated from speaking to anyone‖ about what he saw. (Id. at ¶ 31.) The plaintiff complained
to Schenck and Bloomfield‘s human resources director who refused to end the ―retaliation.‖ (Id.
at ¶ 32.)
3.

The Defendants Treat Cecchini Poorly and Deny Him Promotions

In 2012, unlike every other officer, the plaintiff was not issued a new bullet-proof vest.
(Id. at ¶ 39.) Willauer said ―I don‘t care if [the plaintiff] gets shot.‖ (Id.) That same year, the
plaintiff sat for the ―Sergeant examination, which was a corrupt process in which the plaintiff‘s
score and position were inexplicably and maliciously changed, preventing him from obtaining
the promotion.‖ (Id. at ¶ 84.) In 2013, three officers, including the plaintiff, applied for
promotion to detective. (Id. at ¶ 85.) One applicant was promoted to sergeant, ―leaving only two
applicants for detective, which included the plaintiff.‖ (Id. at ¶ 86.) The plaintiff was not

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promoted because Hammick ―falsely claimed the ‗list‘ for detective was no longer valid because
there were not three candidates . . . .‖ (Id. at ¶¶ 85–87.) At some time in 2014, the plaintiff was
one of two applicants seeking to become a sergeant but the plaintiff was not promoted because
Hammick ―falsely stated that the promotion list was invalid.‖ (Id. at ¶ 88.) The actual reason,
according to the plaintiff, was that Hammick wanted to retaliate against the plaintiff for his union
membership and other speech activities. (Id. at ¶ 90.) The plaintiff also alleges that all of the
defendants coordinated to deny the plaintiff a promotion to sergeant and detective, although he
does not say how. (Id. at ¶ 78.)
4.

Cecchini Testifies for the Police Union

Around February 2013, all of the defendants, besides Schenck, subjected police officer
Donald Rajtar to discipline for working unauthorized overtime. (Id. at ¶¶ 67–70.) The plaintiff
―grieved‖ Rajtar‘s discipline because department policies required officers to obtain permission
to work overtime but also required them to complete certain reports even if that meant working
extra hours. (Id. at ¶¶ 67–70.) The plaintiff signed a statement that Rajtar circulated, which
stated:
Currently, in the Patrol Division there are certain cases (i.e. arrests, missing
persons, criminal domestic disputes, other serious cases, etc.) that when assigned
to me, I am aware that I must complete the initial report even if I go beyond the
end of my normal shift. This will be paid overtime and could be without the
request of or by supervision.
(Id. at ¶ 71–72.) Later, the plaintiff testified at Rajtar‘s hearing on behalf of the union. (Id. at ¶
74.)
After the hearing, the defendants would not provide accurate or timely performance
evaluations of the plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 75.) The plaintiff complained but the defendants would not
process his grievance. (Id. at ¶ 75.) This was intimidating and harassing to the plaintiff and was
―facilitated‖ by Hajdasz, Hammick, and Schenck. (Id. at ¶ 76.)
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5.

Cecchini Is Investigated and Reprimanded for Misconduct

Schenck allegedly ―refused to afford plaintiff his rights under the collective bargaining
agreement and conspired with Hammick and Hajdasz to retaliate against the plaintiff.‖ (Id. at ¶
77.) The defendants sought to prevent him from receiving a promotion and would not investigate
the plaintiff‘s claims about corruption within the department, even though they were aware of it.
(Id. at ¶ 78.)
In April 2013, Willauer and Bowen brought disciplinary charges against the plaintiff after
Bowen found a uniform shirt that did not belong to the plaintiff in the plaintiff‘s locker. (Id. at ¶
79–81.) Willauer questioned the plaintiff ―excessively and without notice or union
representation.‖ (Id. at ¶ 82.) The plaintiff met with Haljdasz to complain about the internal
affairs investigation into whether the plaintiff was in possession of another officer‘s uniform. (Id.
at ¶¶ 33). Hajdasz told the plaintiff that the investigation should be stopped because it was
retaliatory. (Id. at ¶ 33.) In May 2013, the plaintiff was suspended for one day ―in abeyance,‖
given a written reprimand, and required to return his ―Field Training Officer Pin.‖ (Id. at ¶ 96.)
6.

Bowen and Willauer Bully Cecchini

A year later around May 2014, Bowen removed the plaintiff‘s gun from his locker and
gave it to another officer ―to give back‖ to the plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 35.) At an unknown time, the
plaintiff filed a grievance about his performance evaluation. (Id. at ¶ 36.) Willauer said that he
would ―shove the fucking evaluation down your throat.‖ (Id.) Bowen and Willauer repeatedly
told the plaintiff that they did not care about his safety on duty. (Id. at ¶ 37.) Bowen waived his
gun in the plaintiff‘s face. (Id. at ¶ 38.) When Willauer removed the plaintiff from ―Street
Survival‖ training, he said that he ―didn‘t care if [the plaintiff] got hurt.‖ (Id. at ¶ 37.)

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Around May 1, 2014, Bowen said to the plaintiff ―would you mind getting the fuck away
from my desk?‖ (Id. at ¶ 58.) At some other time, Bowen saw a note about karma that the
plaintiff‘s wife had attached to the plaintiff‘s coffee cup. (Id. at ¶ 59.) Bowen insinuated in front
of several officers and the plaintiff that the plaintiff‘s wife was having an affair with a captain of
the Avon police department. (Id. at ¶ 59.) Bowen also called him a ―fat shit.‖ (Id. at ¶ 60.)
7.

Cecchini Reports Misconduct and Is Investigated for Providing False
Information in an Investigation; Bowen Is Placed on Administrative Leave

Around May 19, 2014, the plaintiff complained to Willauer, Hajdasz, and Hammick
about Bowen and Willauer‘s comments. (Id. at ¶ 57.) On May 20, 2014, the plaintiff sent a
memorandum to Hajdasz about Bowen‘s alleged misconduct during a motor vehicle stop a
month earlier. (Id. at ¶ 46.) The plaintiff complained that Bowen discarded evidence and falsified
a report after the plaintiff found a knife and a straw with white powder on a suspect. (Id. at ¶ 47.)
He gave the evidence to Bowen, but Bowen did not mention the evidence in his report. (Id.)
Hajdasz ordered Willauer to investigate the plaintiff‘s complaint. (Id. at ¶ 48.) Based on
Willauer‘s findings, Hajdasz told Hammick that the plaintiff provided false information during
the investigation. (Id. at ¶ 49.)
On June 5, 2014, Hammick ordered Hajdasz and Willauer to begin an internal affairs
investigation of the plaintiff, noting that the plaintiff gave inconsistent statements about whether
Bowen called the plaintiff a ―fat shit‖ or a ―‗piece of shit‘ needing suspenders.‖ (Id. at ¶¶ 51, 53,
61.) Even though there was allegedly no reason to investigate the plaintiff, Hajdasz and Willauer
continued to seek to discipline the plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 55–56.) While that investigation was
pending, Hammick placed Bowen on paid administrative leave after determining that Bowen had
committed misconduct. (Id. at ¶¶ 54, 62.)

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8.

Cecchini’s Wife Complains to the Town Manager;
Bowen Is Suspended; Cecchini Is Not Disciplined

On June 12, 2014, the plaintiff‘s wife, Jackie Cecchini, met with Schenck to complain
about the way her husband was being treated and to express her concerns about his safety. (Id. at
¶ 40.) She described what Willauer and Bowen had said and done, that her husband was subject
to a hostile environment and potential workplace violence, and that the defendants were putting
her husband in unnecessary danger. (Id. at ¶ 41.) Schenck took no action but told the plaintiff‘s
wife that Bowen was ―being monitored,‖ which the plaintiff claims was not true. (Id. at ¶¶ 42–
43.) Jackie Cecchini contacted Schenck again on July 1, 2014 to repeat her concerns and
complain about ―corrupt promotional exams.‖ (Id. at ¶ 44.) Schenck told her that human
resources, not Chief Hammick, decides who receives a promotion and that Bowen was
continuing to be monitored. (Id. at ¶¶ 44–45.)
On September 6, 2014, Hammick suspended Bowen for two weeks as shown in a
―Memorandum of Agreement,‖ but the memorandum stated that the suspension began on August
24, 2014. (Id. at ¶¶ 63–64.) Hammick ultimately did not sustain discipline against the plaintiff on
September 9, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 56.)1
9.

Cecchini’s Lawsuit Affects His Candidacy for Union President

Balloting for the police union‘s presidential election started around November 14, 2014.
(ECF No. 28 at ¶ 137.) Shortly afterwards, the defendants learned that the plaintiff sued them in
this lawsuit. (Id. at ¶ 132; ECF No. 1.) Fredericks—who was not yet a defendant—used his
position as a supervisor while he was on duty to force officers to sign a petition to suspend the
election, even though officers are not allowed to conduct union business on the job. (Id. at ¶¶
1

The plaintiff wrote ―Without any legitimate basis, Hajdasz and Willauer sought discipline
against plaintiff pursuant to IA 14-15689, which was after three months and unwarranted delays
―Not Sustained‖ by Hammick on September 9, 2014.‖ (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 56.)
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138–39.) On November 19, 2014, the union‘s attorney told the plaintiff that union members were
concerned that the plaintiff might have a conflict of interest as union president because of his
lawsuit. (Id. at ¶ 141.) That same day, Hammick sent an email about the lawsuit to each
Bloomfield police officer, saying that ―the defendants intend to vigorously defend the
accusations in this matter,‖ encouraging the officers to focus on serving the community, and
reminding the officers to report any misconduct to a supervisor. (Id. at 148.)
The plaintiff lost his bid to become union president in January 2015 after the election was
postponed. (Id. at ¶¶ 143–44.) On ―numerous‖ unspecified occasions since the plaintiff brought
this suit, the defendants have given him false reprimands and poor performance evaluations. (Id.
at 147.) All of the defendants‘ actions were done to ostracize the plaintiff, to imply that he was a
liar, and to interfere with the union election in retaliation for the plaintiff‘s lawsuit. (Id. at 149–
50.) The plaintiff has suffered humiliation, pain, embarrassment, anxiety, stress, and loss of
sleep. (Id. at ¶ 100.)
II.

Discussion
A.

Legal Standard

In considering a motion to dismiss, I take Cecchini‘s ―factual allegations to be true and
[draw] all reasonable inferences in‖ his favor. Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009).
―To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‖ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ―A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.‖ Id. The plausibility standard ―does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence‖ supporting the claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A court need not accept legal conclusions as true and
―[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.‖ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
B.

Count One: Free Speech Retaliation Claim

Although the plaintiff‘s allegations are unclear, Count One appears to be brought against
the Town of Bloomfield and the other defendants in their individual and official capacities. The
defendants move to dismiss Count One as to the all individual defendants in their official
capacities and as to Schenck in his individual capacity.
1.

Official Capacity Claims Against the Individual Defendants

The defendants argue that Count One should be dismissed against the defendants in their
official capacities because they are duplicative of the plaintiff‘s claims against the Town of
Bloomfield. (ECF No. 31-1 at 15.) ―As long as the government entity receives notice and an
opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated
as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in
interest is the entity.‖ Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (internal citations omitted);
see also Reynolds v. Guiliani, 506 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir. 2007) (―An official capacity suit
against a public servant is treated as one against the governmental entity itself.‖). Cecchini
asserts municipal liability claims against Bloomfield for the named individuals‘ activities in their
official capacities; therefore, the official capacity claims against the individual officers are
redundant and will be dismissed. Olschafskie v. Town of Enfield, No. 3:15-CV-00067 (MPS),
2015 WL 9239742, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 17, 2015) (dismissing official capacity claims as
duplicative of claims against a municipality); Demski v. Town of Enfield, No. 3:14-CV-01568VAB, 2015 WL 4478401, at *3 (D. Conn. July 22, 2015) (―[D]istrict courts within the Second

9

Circuit consistently dismiss as duplicative claims asserted against officials in their official
capacities where the plaintiff has named the municipal entity as a defendant.‖).
2.

The Individual Capacity Claim
Against Schenck in His Individual Capacity

Schenck moves to dismiss the First Amendment retaliation claim in Count One against
him in his individual capacity. To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, Cecchini must
allege that ―(1) his speech or conduct was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant
took an adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal connection between this adverse
action and the protected speech.‖ Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir.
2015) (quoting Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2011)). To
determine whether his speech is protected a court must consider whether he was speaking ―as a
citizen on a matter of public concern,‖ Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006), and if so,
whether the government—under the so-called Pickering analysis—―had ‗an adequate
justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the public‘ based on
the government‘s needs as an employer.‖ Matthews, 779 F.3d at 172 (quoting Lane v. Franks,
132 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014)). The parties have not raised the issue of whether the plaintiff‘s
reports of police misconduct were made ―as a citizen,‖ Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417, and I express
no opinion on that issue.
Schenck‘s argument centers on whether there are sufficient allegations to make it
plausible that Schenck took an adverse action against Cecchini, and whether there was a causal
connection between the adverse action and any protected speech. (ECF No. 31-1 at 17–18.)
A supervisor may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983; instead, ―a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official‘s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.‖ Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 116 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal,
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556 U.S. at 676). Supervisory personnel may be considered personally involved if they: (1)
directly participated in the violation; (2) failed to remedy that violation after learning of it
through a report or appeal; (3) created, or allowed to continue, a policy or custom under which
the violation occurred; (4) were grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the
violation; or (5) exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of the plaintiff by failing to act on
information indicating that a constitutional violation was occurring. Raspardo, 770 F.3d at 116
(citing Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir.1995)).
District Courts in the Second Circuit have struggled with whether the categories for
establishing personal liability of supervisory personnel set forth in Colon v. Coughlin are still
good law:
In [Iqbal], the Supreme Court ruled that where the underlying
constitutional claim is a claim of intentional discrimination, a supervisory
official‘s liability must be judged by the official‘s purpose rather than the
official‘s knowledge of subordinates‘ actions or policies. The Second Circuit has
not yet issued a decision discussing Iqbal’s effect on the Colon categories.
Several district courts in the Second Circuit have determined that Iqbal nullified
some of the Colon categories. See Sash v. United States, 674 F.Supp.2d 531, 543–
44 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (collecting cases). The Second Circuit itself has noted that
―Iqbal has . . . engendered conflict within our Circuit about the continuing vitality
of the supervisory liability test set forth in Colon.‖ Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d
193, 205 n. 14 (2012).
Johnson v. Fischer, No. 9:12-CV-0210 DNH/TWD, 2015 WL 670429, at *7 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.
17, 2015) appeal filed No. 15-767 (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 2015).
After the Supreme Court‘s decision in Iqbal, the Second Circuit has continued to apply
the Colon categories to cases brought by police officers against police department supervisors.
Raspardo, 770 F.3d at 101, 116. Cases that have followed Raspardo have not cast doubt on its
validity. E.g., Turkman v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 250 (2d Cir. 2015); Haynes v. Johnson, No. 143999, 2015 WL 6457738, at *1 n.2 (2d Cir. Oct. 27, 2015). I, therefore, proceed on the

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assumption that the Colon categories continue to provide a viable framework to plead
supervisory liability after Iqbal.
Here, the plaintiff‘s allegations specifically involving Schenck include the following
facts. At some unspecified point, the plaintiff complained to Schenck about a 2011 incident in
which Bowen allegedly conducted an illegal stop and Willauer‘s subsequent ―confront[ation]‖
about whether plaintiff told the NAACP about Bowen‘s conduct. (ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 30–31.)
Schenck did nothing in response. (Id. at ¶ 34.) After the plaintiff testified in a hearing in
February 2013, Schenck along with Hajdasz and Hammick ―facilitated‖ a ―conspiracy to harass
intimidates and refuses to provide performance evaluation and subsequent refusal to hear
grievances. [sic.]‖ (Id. at ¶¶ 76–78.) Schenck ignored the plaintiff‘s grievances and complaints.
(Id. at ¶ 92.)
The plaintiff alleges that his wife complained to Schenck, who falsely told her that
Bowen was being ―monitored.‖ (Id. at ¶¶ 42–43.) The plaintiff alleges that Schenck lied when he
said that Bowen was being monitored in June and July 2014 but also alleges that Bowen was
under investigation from May 2014 until September 2014. (Id. at ¶¶ 42–43, 46–49, 63–64.)
Drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor, Harris, 572 F.3d at 71, I
conclude that the plaintiff has plausibly alleged Schenck‘s personal involvement under the Colon
categories. Cecchini alleges that Schenck ignored his grievances and complaints about retaliatory
conduct and police misconduct. (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 92.) Specifically, the plaintiff has alleged that
Schenck did nothing after Cecchini reported retaliation for his report of misconduct. (Id. at ¶¶
30–31, 34.) At this early pleading stage, it is reasonable to infer that Schenck as town manager
(id. at ¶ 7), had the authority to prevent retaliation from occurring but did not do so. Therefore,
the plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Schenck failed to remedy a violation after learning of it

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through a report, which is sufficient to state a claim against him as a supervisor. See Raspardo,
770 F.3d at 116 (―The personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by
evidence that . . . the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal
failed to remedy the wrong.‖ (quoting Colon, 58 F.3d at 873)).
Therefore, the motion to dismiss as to the claim in Count One against Schenck in his
individual capacity is denied. The case will thus proceed on Count One against the Town of
Bloomfield and the individual capacity claims against Schenck, Hammick, Hajdasz, Willauer,
Bowen, and Fredericks.2
C.

Count Two: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
1.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress as to the Town of Bloomfield

The plaintiff claims that the defendants have intentionally inflicted emotional distress.
The Town of Bloomfield argues that the claim against it should be dismissed because a
municipality is immune from liability for its employees‘ intentional torts under Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 52-557n. The plaintiff states that he has not brought a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress against the Town of Bloomfield (ECF No. 32 at 17.) However, the Complaint
states that Count Two is brought against all of the defendants. (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 106.) Therefore,
I construe the plaintiff‘s statement to be a motion to withdraw his claim in Count Two against
the Town of Bloomfield and grant the motion. See Aviles v. Wayside Auto Body, Inc., 49 F. Supp.
3d 216, 234 (D. Conn. 2014) (treating a plaintiff who ―dropped‖ a claim in his objection to a
motion for summary judgment as making a motion to withdraw a claim).

2

Although Fredericks does not appear to be mentioned before Count Six, the defendants have
not moved to dismiss this count against him.
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2.

The Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress Against Bowen

The plaintiff brings a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against all of the
individual defendants. (ECF No. 32 at 18.) The plaintiff must allege ―(1) that the actor intended
to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the
likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the
defendant‘s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff‘s distress; and (4) that the emotional distress
sustained by the plaintiff was severe.‖ Appleton v. Bd. of Educ., 254 Conn. 205, 210 (2000). The
defendant‘s conduct must be ―beyond all possible bounds of decency, . . . atrocious, and utterly
intolerable . . . .‖ Id. at 210–11. Merely insulting or rude actions are insufficient to plead a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 211.
Here, the plaintiff alleges that the ―individual defendants intended to subject plaintiff to
public ridicule, falsely stating he was an inferior officer, a thief and filing [an] untrue lawsuit,
made statements that they did not care if he was shot on duty or otherwise severely harmed and
subjected to public scorn by the defendants.‖ (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 108.) The plaintiff‘s complaints
against the defendants about untimely and inaccurate performance evaluations, denial of
promotions, and unprocessed grievances are not examples of extreme and outrageous conduct.
Bombalacki v. Pastore, 71 Conn. App. 835, 840–41 (2002) (Police chief‘s conduct was not
extreme and outrageous when he spoke ill of a police officer, opposed an officer‘s promotion,
and did not recommend the officer for promotion).
Likewise, the claim against Hajdasz does not state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The plaintiff alleges that Hajdasz ―improperly ordered Willauer to conduct an
investigation into the plaintiff‘s complaint against Bowen . . . .‖ (ECF No. ¶ 48.) Consequently,
Hajdasz sought to discipline the plaintiff and ―without any support adopted and supported the
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false determinations of Willauer‖ that the plaintiff had provided false information in an internal
investigation. (Id. at ¶¶ 49–51.) The actions of a supervisor who falsely states than an employee
has lied, without more, are not extreme and outrageous. Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 254
(1986) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford
Hosp., 272 Conn. 776, 786–88 (2005). It is not ―beyond all possible bounds of decency‖ for a
police captain to investigate an officer‘s role in a complaint of police misconduct, to adopt the
report of the investigating officer, and to seek to discipline an officer who is suspected of lying.
Appleton, 254 Conn. at 210–11. Thus, the only two defendants against whom the plaintiff might
have a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are Bowen and Willauer.
There are allegations that Bowen told the plaintiff that his wife was sleeping with a police
captain, that Bowen waived a gun in the plaintiff‘s face, and that Bowen told the plaintiff that he
did not care about his safety on duty. (Id. at ¶¶ 37–39, 59.) Bearing in mind that I must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Harris, 572 F.3d at 71, Bowen‘s alleged actions of
angrily waiving a gun in the plaintiff‘s face, stating that he did not care if the plaintiff was safe
on duty, and telling the plaintiff at ―roll call attended by numerous employees‖ that his wife was
having an affair with a police captain could amount to extreme or outrageous conduct; his
actions are not merely insulting or impolite but are, at least as construed at the pleadings stage,
beyond all possible bounds of decency in this context. Appleton, 254 Conn. at 210–11; cf. Russo
v. City of Hartford, 341 F. Supp. 2d 85, 120 (D. Conn. 2004) (―mere verbal threat‖ outside the
presence of the plaintiff that ―was not repeated or acted upon‖ is not as a matter of law extreme
and outrageous.‖)
The allegations against Willauer do not state a claim because they are merely rude and
insulting and do not extend ―beyond all possible bounds of decency.‖ Appleton, 254 Conn. at

15

210–11. Willauer expressed ―concern that the plaintiff had notified the NAACP‖ about police
misconduct. (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 30.) Willauer cursed at the plaintiff and told him to shove an
evaluation down his throat. (Id. at ¶ 36.) He told the plaintiff that he didn‘t care about his
safety—but unlike Bowen did not angrily waive a gun in the plaintiff‘s face. (Id. at ¶ 37.)
Willauer also questioned the plaintiff ―excessively and without notice or union representation‖
and sought to discipline the plaintiff after being ordered to begin an internal affairs investigation
into the plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 48, 55–56, 61, 82.) He made the ―false finding‖ that the plaintiff lied
in an investigation. (Id. at ¶ 49.) Given that Willauer did not physically threaten the plaintiff with
a gun while also expressing disregard for the plaintiff‘s safety or publically insinuate that the
plaintiff‘s wife was having an affair—unlike Bowen—Willauer‘s conduct does not rise above
merely insulting or impolite behavior; the case against Willauer is not ―one in which the
recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‗Outrageous!‘‖ Appleton, 254 Conn. at 211 (citations
omitted). Therefore, Count Two is dismissed except for the plaintiff‘s claim against Bowen.
D.

Count Three: Section 1983 Claim Against the Town of Bloomfield

In Count Three, the plaintiff alleges that the Town of Bloomfield violated his rights to
free speech and association under the First Amendment and his right to equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 112–23.) The defendants move to dismiss the
equal protection claim in Count Three. (ECF No. 31-1 at 25.) However, the plaintiff states in his
opposition that he is not bringing an equal protection claim against the Town in Count Three.
(ECF No. 32 at 18 (―The plaintiff‘s equal protection claim is not against the defendant Town.‖)
Construing the plaintiff‘s statement as a motion to withdraw his Fourteenth Amendment claim in
Count Three against the Town of Bloomfield, I grant the motion. See Aviles, 49 F. Supp. 3d at

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234 (D. Conn. 2014) (treating a plaintiff who ―dropped‖ a claim in his objection to a motion for
summary judgment as making a motion to withdraw a claim).
Even if the plaintiff did not intend to withdraw his equal protection claim in Count Three,
the claim does not statue a plausible violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. That amendment
provides that no state may ―deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.‖ U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. A government employer does ―not escape the strictures of
the Equal Protection Clause in their roles as employers,‖ but not ―every employment decision
[is] a constitutional matter.‖ Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 597 (2008)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). So-called ―class-of-one‖ claims, where a person
claims to have been singled out for unequal treatment, are not permitted in the public employee
context. Id. at 605.
Rather, ―the Equal Protection Clause is implicated when the government makes classbased decisions in the [public] employment context, treating distinct groups of individuals
categorically differently.‖ Id. The plaintiff emphasizes that he is not bringing a class-of-one
claim. (ECF No. 32 at 22.) Thus, as a public employee, Cecchini must allege that he was part of
a distinct group of individuals, which the Town of Bloomfield treated categorically differently.
Engquist, 553 U.S. at 605.
The plaintiff alleges that Bloomfield‘s policies were used ―to retaliate against Plaintiff,
and other similarly situated officers, who speak on a matter of public concern, or associate or and
[sic.] advocate for their union.‖ (Id. at 118–19.) One could argue—although the plaintiff does not
appear to do so—that the plaintiff alleges here that he is part of the class of unionized officers
who exercise their free speech rights. (ECF No. 32 at 22–23.) Even if the plaintiff does make that
argument, he does not allege facts to support the conclusory allegation that this class exists and

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that it was treated differently. The plaintiff does allege facts about a disciplinary hearing of
Donald Rajtar, a fellow union member, but Rajtar was disciplined for working unauthorized
overtime, not for exercising his free speech rights. (ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 67–71.) The plaintiff
merely states that he is a member of a class but does not allege that other class members exist or
that the Town of Bloomfield ―treat[ed this] distinct group[] of individuals categorically
differently.‖ Engquist, 553 U.S. at 606.
The plaintiff attempts to bring an equal protection claim based on the theory of selective
enforcement. The Second ―Circuit has not yet decided whether selective enforcement claims are
still viable in the public employment context after‖ the Supreme Court eliminated public
employee class-of-one claims in Enquist. Emmerling v. Town of Richmond, 434 F. App‘x 10, 12
(2d Cir. 2011); Kamholtz v. Yates Cnty., 350 F. App‘x 589, 591 (2d Cir. 2009). ―[E]ven
assuming that [the plaintiff], a public employee, is not [barred] from pursuing a selective
enforcement claim, he nevertheless has failed to sufficiently state his claim.‖ Kamholtz, 350 F.
App‘x at 591 (internal citation omitted).
―To prevail on a claim of selective enforcement, plaintiffs in this Circuit traditionally
have been required to show both (1) that they were treated differently from other similarly
situated individuals, and (2) that such differential treatment was based on ‗impermissible
considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional
rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.‘‖ Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of
Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting LaTrieste Rest. & Cabaret v. Vill. of Port
Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994)). The defendants argue that the plaintiff has not
identified similarly situated individuals in his allegations. (ECF No. 31-1 at 26.) In response, the
plaintiff does not point to any allegations in the Second Amended Complaint to address this

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concern. Rather, he contends that he does not have to identify a similarly situated individual until
summary judgment. (ECF No. 32 at 18–19.) A plaintiff must, at the very least, allege that he was
treated differently than a similarly situated individual. Kamholtz, 350 F. App‘x at 591 (―For a
claim of selective enforcement, plaintiff must allege: 1. That compared with others similarly
situated, he was selectively treated . . . .‖).
Although not pointed out by the plaintiff, the closest he comes to stating that he was
treated differently than similarly situated individuals is this statement: ―Defendants have
orchestrated a joint effort to force plaintiff from his government employment, similarly situated
persons were not denied promotion; thereby his Equal Protection and Property Rights in
government employment were violated.‖ (ECF No. 28 at ¶ 120.) But this is conclusory and the
factual allegations do not bear out that conclusion. In 2012, the plaintiff took a test to become a
sergeant but he was not promoted because his score was changed; he does not allege that
anybody else was promoted at that time. (Id. at ¶ 84.) In 2013, he was one of two applicants for a
detective position; he was not promoted but he does not suggest that the other applicant received
a promotion. (Id. at ¶¶ 86–87.) Finally, in 2014, the plaintiff and one other officer applied to
become a sergeant; the plaintiff was unsuccessful but there is no allegation that the other officer
advanced to sergeancy. (Id. at ¶¶ 88–89.) Therefore, the plaintiff‘s equal protection claim fails
because he has not alleged that he was treated differently than a similarly situated individual.
In the defendants‘ motion to dismiss and their memorandum in support of their motion,
they explicitly limit their motion to arguing that the plaintiff had not stated an equal protection
claim. (ECF No. 31-1 at 25 (―At this time, Defendants address only Plaintiff‘s Equal Protection
claim, which should be dismissed as a matter of law, as Plaintiff has failed to set forth a cause of
action.‖); ECF No. 31 at 2 (―Count Three should be dismissed as to the Town because Plaintiff

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has failed to assert a claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.‖).) The defendants‘
reply brief raises novel attacks that relate to the First Amendment and municipal liability. (ECF
No. 33 at 1.) I decline to address these arguments because the defendants raised them for the first
time in their reply brief. Ringenback v. Crabtree Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 199,
204 (D. Conn. 2000).
For the reasons discussed above, the only remaining claim in Count Three is against the
Town of Bloomfield for violations of the First Amendment. 3
E.

Count Four: Liability Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n Against the Town of
Bloomfield

Unless otherwise provided by law, a municipality is liable for the negligent acts of its
employees. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a)(1)(A). The issue is whether Bloomfield can be held
liable under a statute that makes municipalities liable for the negligence of its employees when
the plaintiff does allege that a municipal employee was negligent. It cannot. I grant the motion to
dismiss as to Count Four because the plaintiff invokes Bloomfield‘s liability under Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 52-557n on a negligence theory but has eliminated his claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, which was his only claim sounding in negligence. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52557n(a)(1)(A); (ECF No. 32 at 2; ECF No. 28 at ¶ 126; ECF No. 18 at ¶¶ 71–74).
F.

Count Five: Aiding and Abetting Against All Defendants

The defendants move to dismiss Count Five, which the plaintiff brings against all of the
defendants for the common law tort of aiding and abetting. The elements for aiding and abetting
are:
(1) [T]he party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes
an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an

3

It is unclear whether this claim is intended to be distinct from the First Amendment claim
against the Town in Count One. The defendants, however, have not raised this point.
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overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; (3)
the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.
Williams v. Cmty. Sols., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333 (D. Conn. 2013) (quoting Efthimiou v.
Smith, 268 Conn. 499, 505 (2004)). The defendants argue that the plaintiff has merely recited the
elements of aiding and abetting. (ECF No. 31-1 at 27–28.) The plaintiff responds by reciting the
elements of aiding and abetting. (ECF No. 32 at 26.) ―Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements‖ are insufficient to state a claim for
relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, the plaintiff recites the elements of aiding and abetting but
alleges no facts to support his conclusory allegations, other than a passing reference to the entire
Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 127–30.) Count Five is, therefore, dismissed.
G.

Count Six: First Amendment Retaliation

Count Six is brought against all of the defendants and concerns a First Amendment
retaliation claim arising out of events that occurred after the plaintiff filed this lawsuit. (ECF No.
28 at ¶ 133.) When filing a lawsuit is the basis for a First Amendment claim, it is properly
analyzed under the Petition Clause, not the Speech Clause. U.S. Const. amend. I; see also
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011). However, ―[t]he framework used
to govern Speech Clause claims by public employees, when applied to the Petition Clause, will
protect both the interests of the government and the First Amendment right.‖ Guarnieri, 131 S.
Ct. at 2500. Courts use the same test for claims under the Petition Clause as they use for claims
under the Speech Clause in the context of public employee suits. Singer v. Ferro, 711 F.3d 334,
342 (2d Cir. 2013).
To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, Cecchini must allege that ―(1) his
speech or conduct was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took an adverse
action against him; and (3) there was a causal connection between this adverse action and the
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protected speech.‖ Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Cox
v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2011)). To determine whether his
speech is protected, I must consider whether he was speaking ―as a citizen on a matter of public
concern,‖ Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006), and if so, whether the government—
under the so-called Pickering analysis—―had ‗an adequate justification for treating the employee
differently from any other member of the public‘ based on the government‘s needs as an
employer,‖ Matthews, 779 F.3d at 172 (quoting Lane v. Franks, 132 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014)).
1.

Whether Cecchini’s Lawsuit Addresses a Matter of Public Concern

The defendants argue that the plaintiff‘s lawsuit is not protected by the First Amendment
because his lawsuit is not on a matter of public concern. The issue is whether a complaint, which
alleges among other things that a police officer reported police misconduct that he witnessed
while on duty, testified in a disciplinary hearing about internal police department policies, was
subsequently denied promotions and timely evaluations, was subjected to internal investigations,
and was otherwise treated poorly by his coworkers ―addresses a matter of public concern or is
merely ‗related to personal grievances.‘‖ Golodner v. Berliner, 770 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Reuland v. Hynes, 460 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2006)) A lawsuit is not a matter of public
concern merely because it raises a First Amendment claim. Singer, 711 F.3d at 342–43.
Generally, a matter of public concern ―relates to any matter of political, social, or other concern
to the community‖ as ―determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record,‖ including the speaker‘s motive, though motive is not dispositive.
Golodner, 770 F.3d at 203, 202.
A public-employee‘s lawsuit must do more than present a ―generalized public interest in
the fair or proper treatment of public employees.‖ Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184,

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190 (2d Cir. 2008). The ―First Amendment does not protect all private ventings of disgruntled
public employees,‖ and accusations of public corruption receive First Amendment protection
only when the corruption ―constitutes ‗a subject of general interest . . . to the public.‘‖ Singer,
711 F.3d at 340 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004)).
In Golodner v. Berliner, a government contractor, who was considered a public
employee, sued his employer for constitutional violations arising out of his arrest that was
allegedly motivated by a ―constitutionally impermissible policy promulgated by the City and
malice directed at him personally,‖ and by ―malicious intent to retaliate against [him] for having
complained against a brother officer.‖ Golodner, 770 F.3d at 199, 204–05. The court held that
the contractor‘s lawsuit rose to the level of public concern because it was an ―attempt to
vindicate [the public employee‘s] constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments in the face of alleged police misconduct directed against him as a private citizen.‖
Id. at 204. The court said that the public employee‘s theory that the defendants maliciously
intended to retaliate against him in his ―complaint incontrovertibly implicate[s] police
misconduct that raises serious constitutional concerns, and [is], therefore, clearly [a] matter[] of
public concern.‖ Id. at 205.
The plaintiff‘s lawsuit is on a matter of public concern. ―Exposure of official misconduct,
especially within the police department, is generally of great consequence to the public.‖ Jackler
v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 236 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Branton v. City of Dallas, 272 F.3d 730, 740
(5th Cir. 2011)). Here, the plaintiff alleges that the Town of Bloomfield and its employees
retaliated against him after he reported racial profiling. (See, e.g., ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 20–32.) The
plaintiff‘s lawsuit is about the harm that the defendants inflicted on the plaintiff after he reported

23

official misconduct within a police department. His lawsuit, therefore, addresses a matter of
public concern. Golodner, 770 F.3d at 204–05.
2.

Cecchini’s Retaliation Claim in Count Six Against Fredericks

The defendants ask me to dismiss the claim in Count Six against Fredericks because they
argue that he was not acting under color of law. (ECF No. 31-1 at 32.) ―The traditional definition
of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised
power ‗possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law.‘‖ West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). ―[G]enerally, a public employee acts under color of state law
while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.‖
Id. at 49–50 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In analyzing whether a police officer is acting under color of law, ―[m]ore is required
than a simple determination as to whether an officer was on or off duty when the challenged
incident occurred. For example, liability may be found where a police officer, albeit off-duty,
nonetheless invokes the real or apparent power of the police department. Liability also may exist
where off-duty police officers perform duties prescribed generally for police officers. In short,
courts look to the nature of the officer‘s act, not simply his duty status.‖ Pitchell v. Callan, 13
F.3d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). ―Although no ‗bright line‘ separates
actions taken under color of law from personal pursuits, the ‗relevant question‘ in determining
whether an action was taken under color of law is not whether the action was part of the
defendant‘s official duties but, rather, whether the action was made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of [state] law.‖ United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130,
138 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

24

Here, the plaintiff alleged that Fredericks, an on-duty police lieutenant, used his authority
as a supervisor and a lieutenant to force on-duty police officers to sign a petition against the
plaintiff. (ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 138–140.) Even though his petition related to union activity,
Fredericks allegedly exercised power possessed solely by virtue of state law by using his rank as
lieutenant to force on-duty officers to sign a petition. West, 487 U.S. at 49. This is further
supported by the allegation that officers were not permitted to conduct union business while
working, but Fredericks compelled officers to violate this policy. (ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 139–40.) It
is reasonable to infer that his role as a lieutenant helped him to coerce his junior officers into
breaking the policy against on-duty union activity by signing the petition against Cecchini.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor Harris, 572 F.3d at 71, I conclude that
the plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Fredericks was able to require the on-duty officers to sign
a petition ―only because [Fredericks was] clothed with the authority of [state] law,‖ Temple, 447
F.3d at 138. The plaintiff adequately alleges that Fredericks was acting under color of law.
3.

Cecchini’s Retaliation Claim in Count Six Against Schenck

The defendants have moved to dismiss the claim against Schenck in Count Six because
the plaintiff has not alleged that Schenck was involved in retaliatory misconduct following the
filing of this lawsuit. (ECF No. 31-1 at 35.) Count Six mentions Hammick, Hajdasz, Willauer,
Bowen, and Fredericks, but not Schenck. (ECF No. 28 at ¶¶ 131–150.) At times the plaintiff
states generically that ―the defendants‖ took actions against him, but unlike the other defendants,
does not otherwise refer to Schenck. Therefore, I grant the motion to dismiss Count Six as to
Schenck and, for the reasons discussed above, deny the motion as to the remaining defendants.
H.

Common Law Attorney’s Fees

The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff‘s request for common law attorney‘s fees on
the ground that Connecticut follows the so-called American rule that parties generally pay their
25

own attorney‘s fees and costs. There is an exception to this rule where a party or his attorney acts
in bad faith during the course of litigation. Maris v. McGrath, 269 Conn. 834, 835, 844 (2004).
Therefore, dismissing the plaintiff‘s claim for common law attorney‘s fees is premature at this
early stage of litigation, although I have no reason to expect that the parties or attorneys will act
in bad faith.
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31) is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. Count One is dismissed against the individual defendants in their
official capacities. Count Two is dismissed as to all of the defendants except for Richard Bowen.
I do not dismiss Count Three because the defendants moved to dismiss only the equal protection
claim in that count, which the plaintiff subsequently has withdrawn. Counts Four and Five are
dismissed in their entirety. Finally, I grant the motion to dismiss Count Six as to Phillip Schenck
and deny the motion as to the remaining defendants.
The following counts remain: the claim in Count One against the Town of Bloomfield
and the individual defendants in their individual capacities, the claim in Count Two against
Bowen, the claim in Count Three against the Town of Bloomfield under the First Amendment,
and the First Amendment Claim in Count Six against the Town of Bloomfield, Hammick,
Hajdasz, Willauer, Fredericks, and Bowen.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

Hartford, Connecticut
February 29, 2016
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