Coan et al v. Dunne et al

Filing 447

OMNIBUS RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE. For the reasons stated in the accompanying ruling, defendants' motions to preclude evidence as to Amrakbo (Doc. # 368 ); Newinvest, the Bloem Settlement, and Yesreb (Doc. # 370 ); and 151 Milbank (Doc. # 371 ) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as described in this ruling. Defendants' motion to preclude evidence as to the IGB Lands and Beara properties (Doc. # 375 ) is DENIED. Defendants' motions to preclude evidence as to Lagoon Beach and Belgravia (Doc. # 372 ); and as to subsequent transfers (Doc. # 382 ) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as described in this ruling. John Dunne's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. # 374 ) is DENIED. Defendants' motion to preclude the 151 Milbank deposition testimony of Gayle Killilea (Doc. # 373 ) is DENIED. It is so ordered.Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 5/3/2019. (Rubin, N.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

RICHARD M. COAN,
Plaintiff-Trustee,
No. 3:15-cv-00050 (JAM)
Adv. Proc. No. 15-5019 (JAM) (consol.)

v.
SEAN DUNNE et al.,
Defendants.

OMNIBUS RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE
This is a financial fraud case that is related to bankruptcy proceedings involving real
estate developer Sean Dunne. See Coan v. Dunne, 2019 WL 302674, at *1-*2 (D. Conn. 2019)
(generally describing the history of this case). Defendants have filed numerous motions in limine
with respect to the claims and evidence plaintiffs may introduce at trial. At a pretrial conference
on April 26, 2019, I heard extensive oral argument from the parties on, inter alia, defendants’
motions. As noted in the Court’s memorandum of hearing and order (Doc. #426), I ruled on
many of these motions at the hearing. I took under advisement defendants’ motions in limine to
preclude evidence as to Amrakbo (Doc. #368); Newinvest, the Bloem Settlement, and Yesreb
(Doc. #370); 151 Milbank (Doc. #371); the Lagoon Beach Hotel and Belgravia House (Doc.
#372); defendant Gayle Killilea’s deposition testimony from the 151 Milbank bankruptcy
proceeding (Doc. #373); the IGB Lands and Beara properties (Doc. #375); and evidence of
subsequent financial transfers (Doc. #382). I also took under advisement defendant John Dunne’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. #374). Having further considered the parties’
arguments, I decide these motions now in this ruling.

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Motion to limit evidence to claims in the complaints (Doc. #369)
Although I ruled on this motion at the pretrial conference, I will discuss it briefly to help
clarify my ruling as to the remaining motions in limine. Defendants filed this motion in limine to
limit the evidence the Trustee presents at trial to the claims asserted in the claims in the removed
state court proceeding, see Doc. #1-1, and bankruptcy adversary proceeding, see Doc. #189 to
Coan v. Killilea, No. 15-05019 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2016), that have been consolidated before me,
see Doc. #52. Courts routinely bar parties from raising new claims on the eve of trial, see, e.g.,
Rao v. Rodriguez, 2017 WL 1403214, at *6 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Missigman v. USI Northeast,
Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 495, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), and the Trustee may not use the joint trial
memorandum as a backdoor way of doing so. And for substantially the reasons stated by
defendants, I rejected the Trustee’s suggestion that I allow the Trustee to file a second amended
complaint: allowing new claims after the close of discovery and less than a week before jury
selection would cause defendants substantial prejudice. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.
Supp. 2d 460, 462-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Sullivan, J.).
Accordingly, I granted defendants’ motion in part, insofar as to rule that the Trustee may
not pursue any claims that he has not alleged in the operative complaints in this case. I also
denied defendants’ motion in part, insofar as my ruling on that motion does not necessarily
preclude the Trustee from introducing any of the evidence discussed in that motion—or any
other evidence—solely to prove up the claims that the Trustee has alleged. It is in light of this
determination that I address the bulk of defendants’ remaining motions in limine, which are—in
large part—more specific instances of the same issues.

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Motion to preclude evidence as to Amrakbo (Doc. #368)
Defendants’ first motion in limine asks me to preclude as irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence regarding the Irish corporate entity Amrakbo. Doc. #368 at 1. Amrakbo is not a party to
this case, nor does the Trustee allege that Amrakbo was, itself, fraudulently transferred. See Doc.
#1-1 at 1; Doc. #189 at 1 to Coan v. Killilea, No. 15-05019 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2016). Because I
have limited the Trustee’s claims to those alleged in the complaints, he may not add new claims
against Amrakbo now. Still, Amrakbo is the subject of several factual allegations in the
adversary complaint, such as the alleged funneling through Amrakbo of one of Sean Dunne’s
properties to Killilea. See Doc. #189 at 34 (¶ 63) to Coan v. Killilea, No. 15-05019 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2016). Because evidence should only be excluded on a motion in limine if it is
inadmissible on all potential grounds, see Hart v. RCI Hospitality Holdings, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d
250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), I will grant defendants’ motion only in part—as to evidence that is
solely relevant to support claims against Amrakbo not alleged in the complaints—but will deny
defendants’ motion as to any evidence that involves Amrakbo that is used to prove claims as to
different properties and entities that the Trustee has alleged.
Motion to preclude as to Newinvest, the Bloem Settlement, and Yesreb (Doc. #370)
Defendants’ third motion in limine asks me to preclude as irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence about three more companies: Newinvest, the Bloem Settlement, and Yesreb. Doc. #370
at 1. As with Amrakbo, none of these entities is a party to this case. But also as with Amrakbo,
the Trustee has shown that evidence about each of them will be relevant to the claims the Trustee
alleges. The Trustee alleges that defendants fraudulently transferred the property at 22 Stillman
Lane in Greenwich, Connecticut, see Doc. #1-1 at 17-18 (¶¶ 68-74), and in factual allegations
about that transfer, states that Newinvest was used to encumber the property as a mortgagee, see

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Doc. #189 at 29 (¶ 124) to Coan v. Killilea, No. 15-05019 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2016). Although
neither complaint mentions the Bloem Settlement by name, the Trustee argues that defendants
used the Bloem Settlement as a vehicle to fund the purchase of properties in Connecticut that are
discussed in the complaints, see Doc. #1-1 at 8-11 (¶¶ 28-36), and that evidence of defendants’
use and control of the Bloem Settlement is relevant to the Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claims.
Doc. #408 at 8. Similarly, while neither complaint uses the name “Yesreb,” the adversary
complaint alleges that Sean Dunne fraudulently transferred the Walford property in Ireland “to
an offshore entity,” Doc. #189 at 32-33 (¶¶ 147, 153) to Coan v. Killilea, No. 15-05019 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 2016), and seeks to recover from John Dunne as transferee, id. at 50 (¶¶ 308-10). The
Trustee contends that discovery has revealed that Yesreb is a Cypriot entity to which Walford
was transferred, and that John Dunne is the beneficiary of Yesreb. Doc. #408 at 9-10.
Accordingly, I am persuaded that evidence involving each of Newinvest, the Bloem Settlement,
and Yesreb may be relevant to proving the Trustee’s existing claims. As with Amrakbo, I will
therefore grant defendants’ motion in part and deny it in part. The Trustee may present evidence
about each of these entities that goes to prove the elements of the claims he alleges in the
operative complaints. But he may not present any evidence that exceeds these bounds and goes
to prove unalleged claims against or involving these entities.
Motion to preclude as to 151 Milbank (Doc. #371)
Defendants’ fourth motion in limine asks me to preclude evidence related to 151
Milbank, LLC on the ground that 151 Milbank is currently in bankruptcy and subject to an
automatic bankruptcy stay. Doc. #371 at 1; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); In re 151 Milbank, LLC, No.
15-51485 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2015). But automatic stays generally apply only to claims involving
the debtor, see Queenie, Ltd. v. Nygard Int’l, 321 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003), and the Trustee

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maintains that the claims he intends to pursue at trial are not subject to the stay because they are
only against other parties, and not 151 Milbank itself. Doc. #400 at 2-4. This action is, of course,
stayed insofar as any claim might be asserted against 151 Milbank. But inasmuch as the
adversary complaint includes, inter alia, factual discussions of 151 Milbank, see Doc. #189 at 32
(¶¶ 141-144) to Coan v. Killilea, No. 15-05019 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2016), I am persuaded that
there may be evidence concerning 151 Milbank that is relevant to claims the Trustee is pursuing
that are against other entities. Accordingly, I will grant defendants’ motion to the extent that the
Trustee may not introduce evidence that is only relevant to stayed claims against 151 Milbank
(or any other claims not alleged in the complaint), but deny the motion insofar as the Trustee
may introduce relevant evidence regarding 151 Milbank that goes to prove any non-stayed
claims that the Trustee asserts in the two operative complaints.
Motion to preclude evidence as to IGB Lands and Beara properties (Doc. #375)
Defendants’ eighth motion in limine asks me to preclude the Trustee from introducing
evidence about the IGB Lands and Beara properties on the ground that any claim as to these two
properties is moot. Doc. #375 at 1. The Trustee has contested defendants’ assertions of mootness,
claiming in part that Killilea maintains an interest. Doc. #408 at 14-15. The Trustee’s adversary
complaint unambiguously asserts claims to both sets of properties. Doc. #189 at 47-49 (¶¶ 27697) to Coan v. Killilea, No. 15-05019 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2016). Accordingly, should the validity
of these claims be an issue at trial, evidence about the properties will be relevant. See Fed. R.
Evid. 401. By asking me to rule that evidence of these alleged transfers is irrelevant because the
Trustee’s claims are moot, defendants have attempted to package a motion for summary
judgment in the form of a motion in limine. But “an in limine motion is generally not the
appropriate vehicle for effecting the dismissal of entire claims,” MF Global Holdings Ltd. v.

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PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 232 F. Supp. 3d 558, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), and dismissal of a
claim on an in limine motion lacks the procedural safeguards of Rule 56. See C & E Servs., Inc.
v. Ashland Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 316, 323 (D.D.C. 2008). I will therefore deny defendants’
motion, and allow the Trustee to present evidence as to the IGB Lands and Beara properties
relevant to the claims for the fraudulent transfer of those properties he alleges.
Motion to preclude evidence as to Lagoon Beach and Belgravia (Doc. # 372)
Defendants’ fifth motion in limine asks me to preclude evidence relating to the Lagoon
Beach Hotel and Belgravia House properties. Doc. #372 at 1. Defendants first point out that the
only references to the Lagoon Beach Hotel are discussions in the factual sections of the
pleadings. See Doc. #189 at 15, 19 (¶¶ 48, 68) to Coan v. Killilea, No. 15-05019 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2016). Belgravia is not mentioned at all in any of the complaints. In line with my rulings
on defendants’ motions in limine as to other properties, the Trustee may not assert a claim for the
fraudulent transfer of the Lagoon Beach Hotel or Belgravia, nor may he introduce evidence that
would only be relevant to proving such unalleged claims.
The Trustee does, however, assert claims for unjust enrichment, see id. at 50-51 (¶¶ 31113); Doc. #1-1 at 20 (¶¶ 82-85), and so argues that transfers involving Lagoon Beach and
Belgravia are relevant to those claims. Doc. #408 at 8-9. Notwithstanding that “[a] fraudulent
transfer claim shares many features of a claim for unjust enrichment, . . . courts have refused to
dismiss unjust enrichment claims on the basis that they were duplicative of fraudulent transfer
claims, noting that it is conceivable that the plaintiff could recover under one theory but not the
other.” In re Hellas Telecomms. (Lux.) II SCA, 535 B.R. 543, 585 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the fact that the complaints do not have fraudulent

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transfer claims specifying Lagoon Beach and Belgravia does not mean that evidence concerning
Lagoon Beach and Belgravia cannot be admissible to support an unjust enrichment claim.
Still, there is an additional timing concern here. Even if transfers involving Lagoon
Beach and Belgravia may be relevant to a claim for unjust enrichment, the claim for unjust
enrichment is subject to the inherent temporal limits of the complaints themselves. That is, when
a civil complaint for money damages or recovery is filed, the presumptive basis for imposing
liability must be conduct that has occurred at some point before the filing of the complaint. A
principal function of a complaint is to serve fair notice on a defendant of the alleged wrongful
acts for which a plaintiff seeks relief, and fair notice does not allow for a defendant to be subject
to liability on the basis of transactions have not been alleged in the complaint and that have
occurred only after the filing of the complaint.
Of course, this is not to say that after-occurring acts are never relevant or admissible at
trial. They may well be relevant to damages. Or they may well be relevant if they retrospectively
shed light on the significance and nature of acts that are within the temporal scope of the
complaint. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (allowing “other act” evidence for purposes including
“proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake,
or lack of accident”). In light of this framework and to the extent that evidence concerning
Lagoon Beach and Belgravia involves acts or transactions occurring after the filing of the
operative complaints, I conclude that evidence concerning Lagoon Beach and Belgravia may be
admitted only to the extent that such evidence is shown to be linked to and therefore to help
explain the nature or significance of acts that occurred and were charged in the operative
complaints.

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Post-complaint transactions may be relevant to the Trustee’s claim for constructive trust.
But “[a] constructive trust is a remedy, not an independent substantive cause of action.” Carney
v. Lopez, 933 F. Supp. 2d 365, 384 (D. Conn. 2013) (dismissing claim for constructive trust and
converting it to a request for a remedy). Constructive trusts are designed to prevent unjust
enrichment, and “[a] claimant entitled to restitution from property may obtain restitution from
any traceable product of that property, without regard to subsequent changes of form.” Town of
New Hartford v. Conn. Res. Recovery Auth., 291 Conn. 433, 466 (2009). Because of the factintensive nature of this tracing, the Trustee should be prepared to establish that there is a genuine
basis to conclude that any post-complaint evidence concerning Lagoon Beach or Belgravia
would be sufficient to allow for the imposition of a constructive trust.
In short, I will grant in part and deny in part defendants’ motion to preclude evidence
relating to the Lagoon Beach Hotel and Belgravia House properties. The motion is granted to the
extent that the Trustee offers such evidence to prove an unalleged claim. The motion is denied to
the extent that the Trustee establishes the relevance of such evidence to those claims actually
alleged in the operative complaints and subject to the limitations described above.
Motion to preclude evidence as to subsequent transfers (Doc. #382)
Defendants’ fourteenth motion in limine asks me to preclude evidence of “subsequent
transfers of property and assets.” Doc. #382 at 2. Defendants’ motion is quite general, but as best
I can tell, defendants mean that I should preclude as irrelevant evidence of any transfers of assets
not explicitly set out as counts of fraudulent transfers or described through factual allegations in
the complaints. The Trustee, on the other hand, argues that his claim under 11 U.S.C. § 550
allows him to recover for certain subsequent transfers from defendants, and that evidence of
subsequent transfers is also probative of his other claims. Doc. #408 at 13.

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The subsequent transfers the parties put at issue fall into two groups. The first are those
transfers that took place after the adversary complaint was filed—April 12, 2016. See Doc. #189
at 56 to Coan v. Killilea, No. 15-05019 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2016). The adversary complaint does
not allege any particular events—let alone transfers—that took place after 2014, nor does it
allege defendants to be engaged in a process of making transfers going forward from the date of
the complaint.
While limited authority suggests that the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act may allow a
plaintiff to seek recovery for transfers made after the filing of the complaint, see Titus v. Shearer,
498 B.R. 508, 514 (W.D. Pa. 2013), that case took place in the context of a continuing series of
wage payments from a single checking account, see id. at 512, with a clear allegation that the
defendant “transacted and continues to transact these transfers,” In re Titus, 566 B.R. 755, 763
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2017). Here, the Trustee can at best point to his state court complaint, which
requests an injunction and includes the argument that injunctive relief is necessary to “enforce
and collect on any judgment” given the Dunnes’ “ability to freely purchase, transfer and
dissipate assets,” Doc. #1-1 at 15-16 (¶ 54), but which does not itself allege any ongoing
transfers, and certainly does not notice ongoing liability for the many transfers included in the
adversary complaint.
I therefore conclude that because transfers taking place after April 12, 2016, are not
included within the scope of the complaints, they cannot be, themselves, the basis for liability—
and so evidence of transfers after the date of the complaints that would only go to prove such
claims is irrelevant. That is of course not to say that any evidence of those transfers is irrelevant.
Rather, as I have already explained above with respect to defendants’ motion re Lagoon Beach

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and Belgravia, evidence about post-adversary complaint transfers is only relevant if it goes to
prove up some element of or the remedy for one of the claims the Trustee has alleged.
The second group of transfers includes those transfers that may not be explicitly laid out
in the adversary complaint as a basis for liability, but which took place before April 12, 2016. As
with transfers postdating the adversary complaint, evidence about these transfers may be relevant
if it bears on the claims for fraudulent transfers or on other counts that the Trustee explicitly
alleges.
But there is a key additional way in which these transfers may serve as a basis for
liability. Count XXVIII of the adversary complaint asserts a claim for recovery of avoided
transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 550(a), which allows a trustee to recover on avoided transfers not
just from the initial transferee, but also from “any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial
transferee.” Id. at § 550(a)(2); Doc. #189 at 50 (¶ 310) to Coan v. Killilea, No. 15-05019 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 2016). The Trustee cannot, of course, recover from any subsequent transferee that is
not a party to this action. But this provision does put defendants on notice of the Trustee’s intent
to seek recovery for subsequent transfers between them, such that evidence about those transfers
is relevant, and the Trustee may also introduce that sort of evidence at trial.
In short, I will grant in part and deny in part defendants’ motion to preclude evidence of
subsequent transfers. The motion is granted to the extent that the Trustee would offer evidence of
post-complaint transfers that are not relevant to transfers that are within the temporal scope of
the complaint. The motion is denied to the extent that the Trustee may offer evidence of transfers
(and subsequent transfers) within the scope of the complaint.

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John Dunne’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. #374)
Having considered defendants’ motions in limine as to the scope of the claims in this
case, I turn now to two remaining issues. I first address John Dunne’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings. The principles that govern a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) are well established. The Court must accept as true all
factual matters alleged in a complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, although a complaint may not survive are enough to state plausible grounds for
relief. See, e.g., Jaffer v. Hirji, 887 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2018). John Dunne argues that he
should be dismissed from this action principally because, he contends, the Trustee does not level
any claims against him with respect to any fraudulent transfers. Doc. #374 at 6. I do not agree.
The adversary complaint alleges that Sean Dunne transferred Walford to “an offshore entity,” see
Doc. #189 to Coan v. Killilea, No. 15-05019, at 32-33 (¶¶ 147, 153), and also alleges that John
Dunne was a transferee of various pleaded transfer properties, see id. at 50 (¶¶ 307-10). The
Trustee argues that discovery has revealed that Walford was transferred to the Cypriot offshore
entity Yesreb, and that John Dunne is the purported beneficiary of Yesreb. Doc. #408 at 9-10,
16. Because on a motion for judgment on the pleadings I must construe all inferences of fact in
favor of the Trustee, I conclude here that John Dunne fails to show that the trustee has no
plausible grounds for relief, and so will deny his motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Accordingly, I also do not find evidence of claims the Trustee alleges against John Dunne to be
irrelevant. Therefore, I will deny the motion to dismiss claims against John Dunne and/or to
exclude evidence against John Dunne.

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Motion to preclude as to Killilea’s 151 Milbank deposition testimony (Doc. #373)
Defendants also move in limine to preclude Gayle Killilea’s deposition testimony from
the 151 Milbank bankruptcy proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a). Doc. #373
at 1. Under Rule 32(a)(1), a party opponent’s deposition testimony may be used against that
party when the party is: (a) represented at the deposition or had reasonable notice of it; (b) the
deposition testimony is consistent with the admissibility requirements of the Federal Rules of
Evidence; and (c) the use is allowed by Rule 32(a)(2)-(8). Rule 32(a)(8) requires that depositions
in an earlier action “may be used in a later action involving the same subject matter between the
same parties, or their representative or successors in interest, to the same extent as if taken in the
later action.”
The requirements of Rule 32(a) are satisfied here. Although Killilea contends she had
inadequate notice of the deposition and was not personally represented, the Trustee’s
submissions make clear that her counsel was notified the day beforehand, see Doc. #398-1, and
she and her counsel had the opportunity to have counsel accompany Killilea if they wished. The
use of the deposition is certainly compatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence: Killilea is a
party to this case, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), party opponent statements
are not subject to the general rule against hearsay.
As for Rule 32(a)(8), “[t]he same subject matter and same parties requirements have been
construed liberally in light of the twin goals of fairness and efficiency.” Dist. Attorney v.
Republic of the Philippines, 307 F. Supp. 3d 171, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). “The accepted inquiry
focuses on whether the prior cross-examination would satisfy a reasonable party who opposes
admission in the present lawsuit. Consequently, courts have required only a substantial identity
of issues, and the presence of an adversary with the same motive to cross-examine the

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deponent.” Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 2014 WL 798385, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Hub v. Sun Valley Co., 682 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1982)).
I am satisfied that there is a substantial overlap of issues between this case and the 151
Milbank bankruptcy. In Republic of the Philippines, the court concluded that the alleged theft of
and subsequent dispute over the rights to the same contested property across different cases were
sufficiently similar issues for purposes of Rule 32(a)(8). See 307 F. Supp. 3d at 209. In the 151
Milbank case, the Bankruptcy Court stayed the action after noting that “[a]t almost every
hearing . . ., the Trustee has argued that the Debtor and its assets are truly the assets of Mr.
Dunne,” and then went on to conclude that the result of this case would govern how all of 151
Milbank’s assets would be distributed. See Doc. #521 at 1, 4-5 to In re 151 Milbank, LLC, No.
15-51485 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2018). Particularly in light of counsel’s representations about the
subject matter of questioning to be introduced in this case—Killilea’s familiarity with Yesreb—I
am persuaded that the nexus between this case and the 151 Milbank bankruptcy is tight enough
that the issues substantially overlap. And there is little doubt that an adversary was present with
appropriate motive to cross-examine Killilea: Coan is also the Trustee in the 151 Milbank
bankruptcy. See Doc. #398-1 at 2. As such, because of the liberal construction undergirding Rule
32(a)(8) and the significant overlap of issues, parties, and counsel with this case, I am persuaded
that under Rule 32(a)(8), Killilea’s deposition testimony as described by counsel at the pretrial
hearing may be used to the same extent as if it were taken in this case. I will therefore deny
defendants’ motion to preclude the Gayle Killilea deposition transcript from the 151 Milbank
bankruptcy (insofar as those portions of the transcript that the Trustee offers are relevant to
claims at issue in this action).

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motions to preclude evidence as to Amrakbo
(Doc. #368); Newinvest, the Bloem Settlement, and Yesreb (Doc. #370); and 151 Milbank (Doc.
#371) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as described in this ruling. Defendants’
motion to preclude evidence as to the IGB Lands and Beara properties (Doc. #375) is DENIED.
Defendants’ motions to preclude evidence as to Lagoon Beach and Belgravia (Doc. #372); and
as to subsequent transfers (Doc. #382) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as
described in this ruling. John Dunne’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. #374) is
DENIED. Defendants’ motion to preclude the 151 Milbank deposition testimony of Gayle
Killilea (Doc. #373) is DENIED.
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven this 3d day of May 2019.
/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

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