Torcasio v. New Canaan Board of Education et al
Filing
98
RULING denying 91 Motion for Reconsideration re 76 Order on Motion to Compel. Signed by Judge Sarah A. L. Merriam on 4/1/2016. (Katz, S.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
------------------------------x
:
ANTONIA TORCASIO
:
:
v.
:
:
NEW CANAAN BOARD OF ED.,
:
et al.
:
:
------------------------------x
Civil No. 3:15CV00053(AWT)
April 1, 2016
RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [Doc. #91]
Pending before the Court is a motion by plaintiff Antonia
Torcasio (―plaintiff‖) seeking reconsideration of the Court‘s
Ruling on Motions to Compel [Doc. #76] with respect to
plaintiff‘s interrogatory requests 19, 20, 21 and request for
production 3. [Doc. #91]. Defendant Bruce Gluck (―Gluck‖)
objects to plaintiff‘s motion. [Doc. #95]. For the reasons
articulated below, the Court DENIES plaintiff‘s Motion for
Reconsideration of Order on Motion to Compel. [Doc. #91].
A.
Background
The Court presumes familiarity with the factual background
of this matter, which is recited in the Court‘s Ruling on
Motions to Compel. See Doc. #76. For purposes of this Ruling,
however, the Court will briefly address the background leading
to the present motion for reconsideration.
On December 2, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion seeking an
order compelling Gluck to respond to numerous discovery
1
requests. [Doc. #55]. As relevant here, plaintiff sought an
order compelling Gluck to respond to three interrogatories
(numbers 19, 20, 21) and one request for production (number 3),
all regarding Gluck‘s prescribed medication and the names of the
physicians with whom he was treating. [Doc. #55-2 at 3-4, 6].
The Court denied plaintiff‘s motion to compel with respect
to these discovery requests for several reasons. First, the
Court sustained Gluck‘s objections that these particular
discovery requests were not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. [Doc. #76 at 11]. The Court
also rejected plaintiff‘s argument that the ―medication issue‖
was ―akin to a defense‖ because Gluck had not raised it as a
defense, and it was unclear how Gluck‘s alleged medical
condition could serve as a defense in light of the time frame of
the alleged misconduct. Id. at 12. In that regard, the Court
found that the deposition testimony submitted in support of the
motion to compel established that Gluck‘s medication issue was
relevant to his conduct for only a one week period in 2010,
which largely predated the alleged timeframe of Gluck‘s alleged
misconduct. Id. at 13. Therefore, the Court found that the
issues surrounding Gluck‘s medication for that period were not
material, and that Gluck‘s privacy concerns outweighed the
potential relevance of the information sought. Id.
2
Plaintiff now seeks reconsideration of that portion of the
Ruling on Motions to Compel pertaining to the medication issue
on the grounds that new evidence, namely Gluck‘s December 17,
2015, deposition transcript, which was not available at the time
of the filing of the motion to compel, undermines the Court‘s
Ruling. See Doc. #91.1 The Court will further address the
parties‘ arguments below.
B.
Legal Standard
―The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration]
is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless
the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that
the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.‖ Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.
1995). Three grounds can justify reconsideration: ―an
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new
1
Plaintiff initially filed an objection to the Ruling on Motions
to Compel on February 8, 2016. [Doc. #79]. This was later
withdrawn, after plaintiff filed a sealed motion for
reconsideration. [Doc. ##80, 82, 83]. Following a telephone
conference with the Court, plaintiff filed an unsealed motion
for reconsideration, along with a redacted memorandum in
support. [Doc. #91]. For purposes of this Ruling, the Court
cites to the motion and memorandum available on the public
docket at entry number 91. Additionally, although the motion for
reconsideration addressed here was filed after the expiration of
fourteen days from the filing on the Ruling on Motions to
Compel, see D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)1., the Court treats the
motion for reconsideration as having been filed as of the date
of the erroneously filed objection.
3
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.‖ Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat‘l
Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting 18 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure
§4478 at 90). ―A motion for reconsideration may not be used to
plug gaps in an original argument or to argue in the alternative
once a decision has been made. ... It is also not appropriate to
use a motion to reconsider solely to re-litigate an issue
already decided.‖ SPGGC, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d 87,
91-92 (D. Conn. 2006) (citing Lopez v. Smiley, 375 F.Supp.2d 19,
21–22 (D. Conn. 2005) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted)), aff‘d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom.
SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2007).
C.
Discussion
Plaintiff asserts two arguments in support of her motion
for reconsideration, to which Gluck has objected. The Court will
address each argument in turn.
Plaintiff first contends that Gluck‘s December 17, 2015,
deposition testimony undermines the Court‘s observation, based
on the evidence presented previously, that Gluck‘s medication
issue apparently lasted for only one week‘s time. [Doc. #91-1 at
2-3]. Specifically, plaintiff points to various excerpts of
Gluck‘s December 17, 2015, deposition for the proposition that
his medication issue lasted from as early as 2009 to December
4
2010, meaning that contrary to the Court‘s observation that the
evidence suggested this issue had a one-week impact, the
medication issue in fact lasted up to two years. [Doc. #91-1 at
3]. Gluck‘s response is twofold. First, Gluck contends that
plaintiff is merely trying to reargue that the information
sought is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible information. [Doc. #95 at 2]. Second,
Gluck contends that the December 17, 2015, deposition transcript
is not in fact ―new evidence‖ in light of plaintiff‘s statement
that Gluck testified similarly at his 2014 deposition. Id. at 3.
Gluck further submits that his counsel received the transcript
of Gluck‘s December 17, 2015, deposition on January 5, 2016,
well before the Court‘s January 25, 2016, Ruling on Motions to
Compel. Id.
The Court is hard-pressed to find that testimony offered at
a December 17, 2015, deposition, at which plaintiff‘s counsel
was in attendance, and which was (according to plaintiff)
consistent with testimony offered in 2014, constitutes ―new
evidence‖ in regard to a ruling issued on January 25, 2016. If
plaintiff‘s counsel felt that the December 17, 2015, deposition
testimony was relevant to the arguments raised in the motion to
compel, counsel should have alerted the Court to that fact while
the motion was pending. Even assuming, however, that the
December 17, 2015, deposition testimony is properly considered
5
―newly discovered evidence,‖ plaintiff‘s argument still misses
the mark.
As set forth in the Ruling on Motions to Compel, the time
frame at issue in plaintiff‘s Complaint ranges from, at a
minimum, January 2010, through the date of the complaint,
January 12, 2015. See Doc. #76 at 12 (citing Doc. #1, Compl., at
¶¶13, 28). Accordingly, out of at least five years at issue in
this case, per plaintiff‘s arguments, Gluck‘s medication issue
endured for no more than one year (January 2010 to December
2010). As noted in the Court‘s prior ruling, plaintiff does not
contend that Gluck‘s behavior improved after 2010. Even if Gluck
was on some kind of medication throughout 2010, and that
medication was changed, if his behavior did not change after
that, and instead continued unabated through at least 2015, the
plaintiff‘s interest in exploring the details of that medication
is still not sufficiently compelling to overcome Gluck‘s
interest in maintaining the privacy of his medical records.2 See
2
Plaintiff‘s motion suggests that the relevant time period is
the twelve years during which plaintiff worked for the Board of
Education: ―The Court‘s rationale is hardly disputable; in light
of Plaintiff‘s twelve years of employment with BOE, the
potential relevance of information relating to one week is
minimal and consequently outweighed by Gluck‘s privacy
concerns.‖ [Doc. #91-1 at 2-3]. The Court similarly finds that
the potential relevance of information relating one or two
years, out of a potential twelve, in light of the evidence
establishing that Gluck‘s behavior did not in fact change
dramatically after 2010, is outweighed by Gluck‘s interest in
maintaining the privacy of his medical records.
6
E.E.O.C. v. Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 114, 122
(W.D.N.Y. 2009) (―Rule 26(c) authorizes the court to fashion a
set of limitations that allows as much relevant information to
be discovered as possible, while preventing unnecessary
intrusions into the legitimate interests — including privacy and
other confidentiality interests — that might be harmed by the
release of the material sought.‖ (quoting Pearson v. Miller, 211
F.3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
In other words, plaintiff has failed to point to matters that
might reasonably be expected to alter the Court‘s prior
conclusion. Therefore, reconsideration is not warranted on this
point. See Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
Next, plaintiff speculatively argues that introduction of
evidence at trial relating to Gluck‘s medication issue will
―serve as a quasi-defense.‖ [Doc. #91-1 at 4]. Plaintiff further
elaborates that without the information requested in the
discovery requests at issue, ―Gluck could tell a jury as he
wishes even though none of his assertions may be true, while the
Plaintiff is simply left helpless to simply watch.‖ [Doc. #91-1
at 4]. Gluck responds that plaintiff is ―grasping at straws‖ and
that at no point has he ―relied on any aspect of his medical
history to disavow responsibility for any of his conduct.‖ [Doc.
#95 at 3].
7
Plaintiff‘s argument simply reiterates the contentions in
her original briefing. In her supplement to the motion to
compel, plaintiff argued: ―Ostensibly, a jury could be persuaded
that Gluck was a quasi-victim in all of this ... The need to
discover the accuracy of the ‗medication issue,‘ which is akin
to a defense, is obviously material to the Plaintiff‘s case.
Without requiring the production of such information, the
Plaintiff is straightjacketed; Mr. Gluck can argue anything.‖
[Doc. #70 at 3-4]. The motion for reconsideration simply parrots
this argument and does not proffer a sufficient basis upon which
to grant reconsideration. ―A motion for reconsideration is ‗not
simply a second bite at the apple for a party dissatisfied with
a court‘s ruling.‘‖ Morien v. Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., 270
F.R.D. 65, 69 (D. Conn. 2010) (citing Weinstock v. Wilk, No.
3:02CV1326(PCD), 2004 WL 367618, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 25,
2004)). Here, with respect to the ―quasi-defense‖ argument,
plaintiff simply attempts a second bite at the proverbial apple;
namely, relitigation of an issue which has already been decided.
This does not justify the Court‘s granting reconsideration.
Further, to the extent plaintiff contends that Gluck may
try to use his medication issue as a form of a ―quasi-defense‖
at trial, such concerns or potential for prejudice can be cured
through a motion in limine or an appropriately crafted jury
instruction. Counsel will of course have the opportunity to
8
cross-examine Gluck as well. The representations of defense
counsel as to this issue have clearly placed off-limits any
claim at trial that Gluck‘s medication somehow excused his
behavior. Accordingly, because plaintiff has not raised an issue
justifying reconsideration of the Court‘s Ruling on Motions to
Compel, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
D.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court DENIES
plaintiff‘s Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Motion to
Compel. [Doc. #91]. This is not a Recommended Ruling. This is an
order regarding discovery and case management which is
reviewable pursuant to the ―clearly erroneous‖ statutory
standard of review. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(a); and D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 72.2. As such, it is an order of
the Court unless reversed or modified by the District Judge upon
motion timely made.
SO ORDERED at New Haven, Connecticut this 1st day of April,
2016.
/s/
HON. SARAH A. L. MERRIAM
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?